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ABSTRACT 
Despite widespread recognition of the importance of institutions in environmental 
management and suggestion that networks and institutions mutually shape each other, the 
theory of how activities of actors in networks generate institutions is underdeveloped. 
There is no framework for explaining institutional change processes in situations where 
formal and informal institutions of multiple actors are intertwined. To help fill this gap, a 
new Network Communication Framework (NCF) was developed to understand how things 
work in real life and analyse institutional change process in environmental management 
involving multiple actors.  
 
The NCF was used to predict four institutional outcomes where two networks that vary in 
direction, autonomy, adaptation and scalar reach communicate. The first is unidirectional 
non-autonomous non-adaptive communication where a modern state network perfectly 
imposes communication content on a non-state network. The second is unidirectional 
autonomous non-adaptive communication, where a traditional network resists such 
impositions from modern state network. The third is multidirectional adaptive endogenous 
communication, in which a modern state network has poor scalar reach and a traditional 
network is able to assert its autonomy and adapt to the virtual absence of the state at local 
scale by devising its own institutions for sustainable management. The fourth is 
multidirectional adaptive exogenous communication in which a modern state network has 
moderate scalar reach and state and non-state networks can vary state institutions for 
mutual benefit.  
 
In order to test the robustness of the new model, it is applied to wetland management in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The results showed that the fourth category of institution 
predicted by the NCF is widespread, with good awareness of, and support for it across all 
actors. The informality and multidirectional nature of this outcome ensures flexibility, so it 
can be modified in response to changes in the preferences of the actors adopting it. The 
results also showed that the everyday narratives of actors are heterogeneous, which 
provides further evidence for communication between networks.  
 
Based on these findings it is suggested that future policies for sustainable environmental 
management in the Niger Delta should be based on how things work rather than on 
idealistic representations. 
vi 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................. ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................... xv 
LIST OF APPENDIXES ............................................................................................. xvi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS ............................................................ xvii 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction to the Study ....................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Environments of Conflict: The Niger Delta Wetlands .......................................... 3 
1.3 Aims of the Study ................................................................................................. 6 
1.4 Definitions of Key Terms...................................................................................... 6 
1.4.1 Wetland ............................................................................................................... 6 
1.4.2 Environmental Management ............................................................................... 6 
1.4.3 Discourse ............................................................................................................ 7 
1.4.4 Practices .............................................................................................................. 7 
1.4.5 Institutions .......................................................................................................... 7 
1.4.6 Institutionalization .............................................................................................. 7 
1.4.7 Networks ............................................................................................................. 7 
1.4.8 Actors .................................................................................................................. 7 
1.4.9 Ecosystem Services ............................................................................................. 8 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis .......................................................................................... 8 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................... 10 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 10 
2.2 Three Schools of New Institutionalism ............................................................... 10 
2.2.1 Historical Institutionalism ................................................................................. 11 
2.2.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism....................................................................... 14 
2.2.3 Sociological Institutionalism ............................................................................ 18 
2.3 Theories of Institutional Change ......................................................................... 21 
2.3.1 Collective Choice Theories ............................................................................... 21 
2.3.2 Evolutionary Theories ....................................................................................... 22 
2.3.3 Blending Evolution and Design ........................................................................ 23 
vii 
 
 
2.4 Theories of Networks .......................................................................................... 24 
2.4.1 Policy Network ................................................................................................. 24 
2.4.2 Actor Network Theory ...................................................................................... 25 
2.4.3 Social Network Analysis .................................................................................. 26 
2.5 Models of Interaction .......................................................................................... 29 
2.5.1 Unilateral Action ............................................................................................... 29 
2.5.2 Negotiated Agreement ...................................................................................... 30 
2.5.3 Majority Voting ................................................................................................ 31 
2.5.4 Hierarchical Direction ....................................................................................... 31 
2.6 Theories of the Politics of the Environment ....................................................... 32 
2.6.1 Political Ecology ............................................................................................... 32 
2.6.2 Advocacy Coalition Framework ....................................................................... 33 
2.6.3 Discourse Coalition Framework ....................................................................... 34 
2.7 The Concept of Power ......................................................................................... 35 
2.7.1 Dimensions of Power ........................................................................................ 36 
2.7.2 The Place of Power in Network Interaction ...................................................... 37 
2.8 Concepts of the State ........................................................................................... 38 
2.8.1 Definition .......................................................................................................... 39 
2.8.2 Types of State ................................................................................................... 39 
2.8.3 Differing Perspectives of the State ................................................................... 41 
2.9 Models of Governing .......................................................................................... 42 
2.9.1 Governing by Hierarchies ................................................................................. 42 
2.9.2 Governing by Market ........................................................................................ 43 
2.9.3 Governing by Communities .............................................................................. 44 
2.9.4 Governing by Network ..................................................................................... 45 
2.10 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 46 
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................ 48 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 48 
3.2 A Network Communication Framework ............................................................. 48 
3.2.1 Rationale ........................................................................................................... 48 
3.2.2 Actors in Networks ........................................................................................... 50 
3.2.3 Communication Between and Within Networks .............................................. 51 
3.2.4 Principal Categories of Communication Content ............................................. 53 
3.2.4.1 Information ..................................................................................................... 53 
3.2.4.2 Institutions ...................................................................................................... 54 
3.2.4.3 Material Resources ......................................................................................... 55 
3.2.4.4 Power.............................................................................................................. 55 
3.2.5 Dimensions of Communication Between Networks ......................................... 56 
viii 
 
 
3.2.5.1 Direction ......................................................................................................... 56 
3.2.5.2 Adaptation ...................................................................................................... 57 
3.2.5.3 Autonomy ....................................................................................................... 57 
3.2.5.4 Reach .............................................................................................................. 58 
3.2.6 Combinations of Dimensions of Communication ............................................. 59 
3.2.6.1 Two Networks ................................................................................................ 59 
3.2.6.2 Three Networks .............................................................................................. 62 
3.2.6.3 Mutual Learning and Mediation ..................................................................... 62 
3.2.7 Overlaps Between Network Flows in Adaptive Communication Outcomes .... 62 
3.2.7.1 Single Flows ................................................................................................... 63 
3.2.7.2 Multiple Flows ............................................................................................... 63 
3.2.8 Advances Made by This Methodology ............................................................. 64 
3.2.9 Testing the Network Communication Framework............................................ 64 
CHAPTER 4 THE ENVIRONMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE NIGER DELTA . 66 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 66 
4.2 Overview of Nigeria ............................................................................................ 66 
4.2.1 Location and Land Area.................................................................................... 66 
4.2.2 Geology and Relief ........................................................................................... 67 
4.2.3 Climate and Vegetation .................................................................................... 67 
4.2.4 Land and People of Nigeria .............................................................................. 69 
4.2.5 Political and Economic Structure ...................................................................... 70 
4.3 Wetlands in Nigeria............................................................................................. 71 
4.3.1 Overview ........................................................................................................... 71 
4.3.2 Status of Nigerian Wetlands ............................................................................. 72 
4.4 The Niger Delta Region ...................................................................................... 76 
4.4.1 The Niger Delta Environment ........................................................................... 76 
4.4.2 People, History and Culture of Niger Delta ...................................................... 78 
4.4.2.1 Definition ....................................................................................................... 78 
4.4.2.2 Pre-Colonial Period ........................................................................................ 80 
4.4.2.3 Trade with Europe .......................................................................................... 80 
4.4.2.4 Independence .................................................................................................. 82 
4.4.2.5 Conflicts in the Niger Delta ............................................................................ 83 
4.4.3 Human Impacts on the Niger Delta Wetlands .................................................. 85 
4.4.3.1 Oil and Gas Exploration and Development .................................................... 85 
4.4.3.2 Wetland Reclamation ..................................................................................... 87 
4.4.3.3 Dredging ......................................................................................................... 87 
4.4.3.4 Invasive Species ............................................................................................. 88 
4.4.3.5 Discussion ...................................................................................................... 89 
4.5 Wetland Institutions in Nigeria ........................................................................... 89 
ix 
 
 
4.5.1 Pre-Colonial Period (Before 1830) ................................................................... 90 
4.5.2 Colonial Period (1830 to 1960)......................................................................... 90 
4.5.3 From Independence in 1960 to the Present Day ............................................... 91 
4.5.3.1 1960 to 1979 ................................................................................................... 91 
4.5.3.2 From 1981 to the Present................................................................................ 92 
4.5.4 Other Institutions Governing Wetlands in Nigeria ........................................... 95 
4.5.4.1 International Conventions .............................................................................. 95 
4.5.4.2 State and Local Government Laws................................................................. 97 
4.5.4.3 Private (Voluntary) Initiatives ........................................................................ 97 
4.5.4.4 Discussion ...................................................................................................... 98 
4.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 98 
CHAPTER 5 METHODS ............................................................................................. 99 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 99 
5.2 Location of Study ................................................................................................ 99 
5.2.1 Bayelsa State ..................................................................................................... 99 
5.2.2 Choice of Communities .................................................................................. 100 
5.3 Types of Approaches......................................................................................... 102 
5.3.1 Interviews........................................................................................................ 104 
5.3.1.1 Structured Interviews ................................................................................... 105 
5.3.1.2 Unstructured Interviews ............................................................................... 106 
5.3.1.3 Focus Group Interviews ............................................................................... 108 
5.3.2 Direct Field Observations ............................................................................... 109 
5.3.3 Secondary Data Sources ................................................................................. 109 
5.3.4 Data Analysis and Presentation ...................................................................... 110 
5.4 Researcher's Diary ............................................................................................. 111 
5.5 Ethical Issues ..................................................................................................... 113 
5.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 114 
CHAPTER 6 DISTRIBUTION OF WETLAND BENEFITS AND COSTS 
ACROSS NETWORKS .............................................................................................. 115 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 115 
6.2 Data Sources and Description ........................................................................... 116 
6.3 Direct Economic Benefits of the Wetlands to Local Communities .................. 117 
6.3.1 Biographical Data ........................................................................................... 117 
6.3.2 The Monetary Value of Material Collection ................................................... 118 
6.3.3 The Monetary Value of Fishing ...................................................................... 121 
6.3.4 The Monetary Value of Crop Production ....................................................... 124 
6.3.5 The Monetary Value of Hunting ..................................................................... 126 
6.3.6 The Monetary Value of Logging .................................................................... 127 
x 
 
 
6.3.7 Aggregate Value of Provisioning Services ..................................................... 129 
6.3.8 Non-Use Values .............................................................................................. 130 
6.4 Direct Economic Benefit of the Wetlands to Governmental Networks ............ 133 
6.5 Direct Economic Benefit of the Wetlands to Corporate Networks ................... 134 
6.6 Distribution of Benefits ..................................................................................... 135 
6.6.1 Distribution of Benefits Accruing To Local Community Networks ............... 135 
6.6.2 Distribution of Benefits Accruing to Government Networks ......................... 135 
6.6.3 Distribution of Benefits Accruing to Corporate Networks ............................. 136 
6.7 Costs Associated With the Activity of the Principal Networks ........................ 137 
6.7.1 Costs Associated With Local Network Activities........................................... 138 
6.7.2 Costs Associated With Governmental Network Activities ............................. 139 
6.7.3 Costs Associated With Corporate Network Activities .................................... 139 
6.8 Aggregating Cost and Benefits of Niger Delta Activities ................................. 140 
6.9 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 140 
CHAPTER 7 NARRATIVES, DISCOURSES AND NETWORKS IN THE NIGER 
DELTA ......................................................................................................................... 141 
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 141 
7.2 Niger Delta Narratives ...................................................................................... 143 
7.2.1 Government Narrative .................................................................................... 143 
7.2.2 Local Narrative ............................................................................................... 146 
7.2.3 Corporate Narrative ........................................................................................ 153 
7.2.4 Non-Governmental Organization Narrative.................................................... 157 
7.2.5 Multilateral Organization Narrative ................................................................ 161 
7.2.6 Academic Narrative ........................................................................................ 163 
7.2.7 Media Narrative .............................................................................................. 166 
7.2.8 Discussion ....................................................................................................... 166 
7.3 Analysis of Actors’ Narratives .......................................................................... 168 
7.3.1 Information on Interviewees ........................................................................... 168 
7.3.2 Government Actors ......................................................................................... 170 
7.3.3 Corporate Actors ............................................................................................. 173 
7.3.4 Local Actors .................................................................................................... 175 
7.3.5 Non-Governmental Organization Actors ........................................................ 178 
7.3.6 Academic Actors ............................................................................................. 181 
7.3.7 Multilateral Organization Actor ...................................................................... 183 
7.3.8 Media Actor .................................................................................................... 184 
7.4 Making Inferences about Discourses ................................................................ 185 
7.5 Informant Discourses and Network Relations .................................................. 186 
7.5.1 Network Composition ..................................................................................... 186 
xi 
 
 
7.5.2 Linking Narratives with Network Structures .................................................. 189 
7.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 191 
CHAPTER 8 INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS IN THE NIGER DELTA ... 193 
8.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 193 
8.2 Institutions Affecting the Management of Niger Delta Wetlands .................... 194 
8.2.1 Fourfold Framework ....................................................................................... 194 
8.2.2 Unidirectional Non-Adaptive State Institutions .............................................. 196 
8.2.3 Unidirectional Non-Adaptive Traditional Institutions .................................... 199 
8.2.4 Multidirectional Adaptive Endogenous Institutions Where the State has Poor 
Scalar Reach ................................................................................................................ 201 
8.2.4.1 Origins .......................................................................................................... 201 
8.2.4.2 Mechanisms .................................................................................................. 202 
8.2.4.3 Exchanges of Materials ................................................................................ 203 
8.2.4.4 Enforcement ................................................................................................. 206 
8.2.4.5 Institutionalization ........................................................................................ 207 
8.2.4.6 Benefits ........................................................................................................ 208 
8.2.4.7 Evolution of Institutions of Resistance ......................................................... 209 
8.2.5 Multidirectional Adaptive Exogenous Institutions When the State has Moderate 
Scalar Reach ................................................................................................................ 211 
8.2.5.1 Origins .......................................................................................................... 211 
8.2.5.2 Mechanisms .................................................................................................. 211 
8.2.5.3 Exchange of Materials .................................................................................. 213 
8.2.5.4 Enforcement ................................................................................................. 215 
8.2.5.5 Institutionalization ........................................................................................ 216 
8.2.5.6 Benefits ........................................................................................................ 217 
8.2.6 Institutions of Memoranda of Understanding ................................................. 217 
8.3 Awareness of and Support for Institutions ........................................................ 218 
8.4 Explaining the Choice of Institutions ................................................................ 223 
8.5 Important Factors in the Institutionalization Process ........................................ 225 
8.5.1 Opportunities for Formal and Informal Interactions ....................................... 225 
8.5.2 Exchange of Materials .................................................................................... 227 
8.5.3 Trust Building and Learning ........................................................................... 229 
8.5.4 Transaction Costs of Interactions .................................................................... 230 
8.5.5 The Role of Key Persons in Networks ............................................................ 232 
8.6 Linking Institutional Support with Network Structures and Narratives ........... 234 
8.7 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 236 
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................. 238 
9.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 238 
9.2 Summary of Findings ........................................................................................ 238 
xii 
 
 
9.3 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 241 
9.4 Relationship with Previous Research ................................................................ 245 
9.5 Personal Reflections on the Research Process .................................................. 249 
9.6 The NCF in Practice: Lessons Learned and a Way Forward ............................ 255 
9.7 Limitations of this Research ............................................................................. 256 
9.8 Recommendations ............................................................................................. 257 
9.8.1 Management Recommendations ..................................................................... 257 
9.8.1.1 Recommendations to the Nigerian Government........................................... 257 
9.8.1.2 Recommendations to Non-Governmental and Multilateral Organizations... 258 
9.8.2 Recommendations for Future Research .......................................................... 259 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 261 
APPENDIXES ............................................................................................................. 289 
 
xiii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
 
Table 4.1. Niger Delta States – Population, Area and Revenue. .................................... 79 
Table 4.2. Post Independence Laws That Affect Wetland Management in Nigeria. ...... 93 
Table 4.3. International Conventions Relating to Wetland Management. ...................... 96 
Table 5.1. Details of Sample Settlements. .................................................................... 101 
Table 6.1. Aggregate Value of the Niger Delta Wetlands Provisioning Services. ....... 129 
Table 7.1. Texts Representing the Government Narrative. ........................................... 144 
Table 7.2. Texts Representing Colonial and Economic Aspects of the Local Narrative.
 ....................................................................................................................................... 148 
Table 7.3. Texts Representing International and Citizenship Aspects of the Local 
Narrative. ....................................................................................................................... 149 
Table 7.4. Other Texts Representing the Local Narrative. ........................................... 150 
Table 7.5. Texts Representing Internal Aspects of the Corporate Narrative. ............... 154 
Table 7.6. Texts Representing External Aspects of the Corporate Narrative. .............. 155 
Table 7.7. Texts Representing Human Rights and Government Aspects of the Non-
Governmental Organization Narrative. ......................................................................... 159 
Table 7.8. Texts Representing Oil Company, Internal and Sustainable Development 
Aspects of the Non-Governmental Organization Narrative. ......................................... 160 
Table 7.9. Texts Representing the Multilateral Organization Narrative. ...................... 162 
Table 7.10. Texts Representing the Academic Narrative. ............................................ 165 
Table 7.11. Summary of Niger Delta Wetland Narratives. ........................................... 167 
Table 7.12. Information on Interviewees. ..................................................................... 169 
Table 7.13. Actors and their Narratives  ....................................................................... 172 
Table 7.14. Actors and their Narratives  ....................................................................... 185 
Table 7.15. Alters in Actor Informants Ego Networks. ................................................ 187 
Table 7.16. Percentages of Informants by Network Category Having Alters in Eight 
Networks . ..................................................................................................................... 188 
Table 7.17. Nature of Interactions between Actors....................................................... 188 
Table 7.18. Variables in the Ego Networks of Informants. .......................................... 189 
Table 7.19. Correlation Analysis between Network Variables of Actors Informants and 
Their Discourses............................................................................................................ 189 
xiv 
 
 
Table 7.20. Association between Narrative Acquisition and Percent of Alters in the 
Networks of Five Actors. .............................................................................................. 191 
Table 7.21. Association between Narrative Acquisition and Percent of Alters in the 
Networks of Four Actors. .............................................................................................. 191 
Table 8.1. Nigerian Legislation Containing State Institutions Relevant to Wetlands 
Management. ................................................................................................................. 198 
Table 8.2. Interview With Community Leader in Oporoma on Boupere Lake. ........... 204 
Table 8.3. Interview With a Local Youth in Oporoma about Boupere Lake. ............... 205 
Table 8.4. Institutional Awareness, Support and Satisfaction for Four Actor Groups. 220 
Table 8.5. Average Ranking of Factors Influencing Local Actors’ Adoption of an 
Institution. ..................................................................................................................... 224 
Table 8.6. Correlation Analysis between Network Variables of Informants and Their 
Support for Multidirectional Institutions and their Narratives. ..................................... 235 
 
xv 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 3.1. A Diagram Depicting Possible Directions of Communication..................... 56 
Figure 3.2. An Example of Adaptation in Communication. ........................................... 58 
Figure 3.3. High And Low Scalar Reach in Network Communication. ......................... 59 
Figure 3.4. Diagram Depicting Communication between Two Networks Based on the 
Network Communication Framework............................................................................. 60 
Figure 3.5. Communication between Two Networks Based on the Network 
Communication Framework............................................................................................ 61 
Figure 4.1. Nigeria, Showing the Niger Delta Region. ................................................... 68 
Figure 4.2. Nigeria Showing the Ramsar Sites  .............................................................. 73 
Figure 4.3. An Example of Threats to Wetlands in Nigeria............................................ 75 
Figure 5.1. The Author Conducting an Interview. ........................................................ 105 
Figure 6.1. Selected Materials Collected from the Niger Delta Wetlands. ................... 119 
Figure 6.2. Shells Used for Concrete Reinforcement. .................................................. 121 
Figure 6.3. Some Fish Species Common In The Niger Delta Wetlands. ...................... 123 
Figure 6.4. Some Crops Common In The Niger Delta Wetlands. ................................ 124 
Figure 6.5. Nigeria Crude Oil Exports by Destination ................................................. 138 
Figure 8.1. Mechanisms of Institutional Formation based on the Network 
Communication Framework.......................................................................................... 195 
xvi 
 
 
LIST OF APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix 4.1. The Major Oil Companies Operating In the Niger Delta…………... ...289 
Appendix 4.2. Summary of Revenue Allocation by State 1999 – 2010…………… ...290 
Appendix 4.3. A Highlight of Major Conflict and Incidences in the Niger Delta…. ...292 
Appendix 4.4. Threats to the Niger Delta Wetlands……………………………….. ...293 
Appendix 5.1. Household Questionnaire…………………………………………......294 
Appendix 5.2. Questionnaire for Representatives of Various Organizations……….. 298 
Appendix 5.3. Guide for Focus Group Discussion…………………………………...302 
Appendix 6.1. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents and their Households.
 ……………………………………………………………………………303 
Appendix 6.2. Monetary Value of Material Collection in the Niger Delta Wetlands.
 ………………………………………………………………………………...304 
Appendix 6.3. Medicinal Plants and Materials Derived From the Niger Delta Wetlands.
 ………………………………………………………………………………...307 
Appendix 6.4. Monetary Value of Fishing in the Niger Delta Wetlands………….. ...308 
Appendix 6.5. Monetary Value of Cropping in the Niger Delta Wetlands………... ...310 
Appendix 6.6. Monetary Value of Hunting in the Niger Delta Wetlands……………313 
Appendix 6.7. Monetary Value of Logging in ihe Niger Delta Wetlands…………....315 
Appendix 6.8. WTA and WTA Bids………………………………………………....317 
Appendix 7.1. Narratives of Actors…………………………………………………..318 
Appendix 7.2. Ego Network of GOV 8………………………………………………320 
xvii 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS 
ACA Academic Network 
BP British Petroleum 
Bpd Barrel Per Day 
BUS Business Network 
CDC Community Development Committee 
CNL Chevron Nigeria Limited 
DCF Discourse Coalition Theory 
DCF Discourse Coalition Framework 
FEPA Federal Environmental Protection Agency 
GOV Governmental Network 
IFC International Finance Corporation  
IMF International Monetary Fund  
ITCZ Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone 
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature 
LGA Local Government Area 
LGA Local Government Area 
LOC Local Community Network 
MED Media Network 
MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
MOSOP Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding  
MUL Multilateral Organization Network 
NCF Network Communication Framework 
NDVF Niger Delta Volunteer Force 
NESREA  National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency 
NGO Non Governmental Organization 
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
RBDA River Basin Development Authorities  
SERAP Socio-Economic Right Accountability Project 
SNA Social Network Analysis 
SNEPC Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company 
xviii 
 
 
         
 
SPDC Shell Petroleum Development Company  
VAT Value Added Tax 
WTA Willingness to Accept 
WTP  Willingness to Pay 
$ United States of America Dollar 
N Nigerian Naira: $1 =   N 150 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1  Introduction to the Study 
 
Wetlands are experiencing unprecedented rates of loss (Day et al., 2000; Finlayson and 
Rea, 1999; Reid et al., 2004). Estimates put the global wetland loss during the twentieth 
century at about 50% of the total area of 1,280 million hectares (Barbier, 1994; 
International Council for Science et al., 2008). In Africa, there is an increasing trend in 
the severity and extent of wetland degradation (Thiombiano and Tourino-Soto, 2007; 
Schuyt, 2005). These same ecosystems are increasingly recognized for being hot spots of 
biodiversity (Renema et al., 2008; Keddy et al., 2009); providing food, water and 
livelihood security to the mainly poor people living around them (Adams, 1993; Rebelo 
et al., 2010; Schuyt, 2005; Silvius et al., 2000); and, most recently, for their ability to 
sequester atmospheric carbon (Ringius, 2002; Loiselle et al., 2006).  
 
The rapid loss of wetlands has led to changes in international and national environmental 
laws (Shine and De Klemm, 1999), with a general acknowledgement that more effective 
institutions are a prerequisite for successful wetland management (Dugan, 1992; Hodge 
and McNally, 2000; Finlayson, 2007; Acheson, 2006; Maconachie et al., 2009). This 
line of argument, which is reiterated in most major international wetland policy 
documents (e.g. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) and Ramsar Convention 
Secretariat  (2010)), has prompted many countries in Africa to adopt international 
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agreements and develop national wetland laws and policies (see Adekola et al., 2012; 
Mafabi, 2000; Ntambirweki, 1998). However, formal state institutions and traditional 
indigenous institutions have also been brought to the fore in efforts to achieve  wise use 
of wetlands (Dixon and Wood, 2007; Maconachie et al., 2009). The Ramsar Convention 
Secretariat (2010) argues that laws that recognize traditional institutions will ensure 
effective wetland management.   
 
It has also been suggested that institutional processes governing resource management 
should bring together multiple institutions, actors, and processes in a manner that cuts 
across public and private authority, national borders, and policy sectors (Seo and Creed, 
2002; World Resources Institute, 2012). Recognizing the multiplicity of actors is 
especially important when dealing with multi-functional ecosystems, such as wetlands, 
which provide multiple common pool resources for multiple actors with varying 
agendas, discourses, preferences, working routines, norms, values, interests and power 
(Rydin and Falleth, 2006).  
 
Despite these suggestions, little is known of how formal modern state institutions 
interact with indigenous informal institutions, especially in Africa where the informal 
dimension of institutions is very important (Teye, 2008). Furthermore, while it has been 
acknowledged that the discourses of multiple actors are important in the 
institutionalization process (Scott, 2000b; Yates and Orlikowski, 1992; Schmidt and 
Radaelli, 2004), their role in shaping institutions has not fully understood  (Phillips et al., 
2004). This is because few studies have focused on discourses in a detailed and context-
sensitive manner. Although the discourses of actors usually differ, as do their institutions 
(Rydin and Falleth, 2006), few studies on environmental management have focused on 
differences between the discourses and narratives of individual actors. Adequate effort 
has not been made to explore how discursive interactions between multiple actors affect 
environmental management institutions. This has led to inadequate explanations that 
lack insight into situations where ecosystems are governed by the intertwining formal 
and informal institutions of multiple actors.  
 
The lack of such explanations explains why formal state institutions are still often 
regarded in some quarters as supreme, simply because the state ‘holds power in trust for 
the people’ and this has prompted calls for “strong” national legislation to manage 
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environments. On the other hand, by virtue of being “authentic and socially embedded” 
(Crook, 2009), traditional indigenous institutions are also recommended by other authors 
as alternative forms of social and political authority and  private institutions are 
prescribed by a third group as the answer to conflicting interests (Patterberg, 2005).  
 
One reason for the  failure of existing theories may be that research on institutions, and  
research on the networks that connect multiple actors, have proceeded on largely 
separate trajectories, so that the mutuality of institutions is not properly recognized 
(Owen-Smith and Powell, 2007). Any rigorous analysis of institutional change must start 
from the fact that institutions are neither self-generating nor self-sustaining, and that 
they are shaped, implemented, undermined or reformed by individuals and their 
networks (Leftwich and Sen, 2010). A new framework to analyse interactions between 
institutions and networks is needed to facilitate this, and contribute to our understanding 
of processes of institutional change where evolution and design are integrated (Kingston 
and Caballero, 2009).  
 
This thesis aims to make a significant contribution to the literature on institutional 
analysis, and to advance institutional change theories, many of which fail to 
acknowledge the place of actors’ discourses in institutional change. This failure is odd, 
given that linguistic exchanges are not just means of coordinating activities (Clark, 
1996), but are also the means by which concepts arise (Baker, 2002). Hajer (2010) has 
indicated that linguistic utterances cannot be understood outside the practices in which 
they are uttered. Similarly, discourse should always be conceived of in relation to the 
practices in which it is produced, reproduced and transformed (Hajer, 2010). Given that 
the Niger Delta Wetlands provide multiple ecosystem services to multiple actors 
(Adekola and Mitchell, 2011), an analysis of wetland management  in Nigeria provides a 
good opportunity to fill some of these intellectual gaps.  
 
1.2  Environments of Conflict: The Niger Delta Wetlands 
 
Wetlands are complex multifunctional ecosystems providing diverse interdependent 
ecosystem services to multiple actors. The shared use of wetland ecosystem services by 
multiple actors with diverse interests, discourses and institutions, presents a unique 
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opportunity to investigate how interactions between actors influences the 
institutionalization process.  
 
There are a number of reasons why the choice of the Niger Delta Wetlands is significant. 
First, the state of the wetland is so poor that it was declared one of the most endangered 
ecosystems in the world (Nigerian Conservation Foundation, 2006). It is therefore 
important to critically analyze the contribution of institutional processes to this. The 
Niger Delta region have been facing a host of issues including livelihoods challenges, 
conflict management, governance problems, all having their root causes in the 
management of wetland resources (Ikelegbe, 2006).  
 
Oil and gas exploration activities which began in the Niger Delta in 1956 have caused 
severe environmental damage, leading to massive destruction of farmlands, wild area 
and aquatic systems upon which traditional livelihoods depend. The destruction of the 
means of livelihood without commensurate development has forced Niger Delta people 
into an environment-related poverty, deteriorating living conditions, and massive 
underdevelopment (Odoemene, 2011). The people of the region have felt short-changed 
and denied benefits accrued from the natural resources found in their environment. This 
has led to several agitations for self-determination, resource ownership and control and 
calls to the Federal Government of Nigeria to develop the Niger Delta. The people have 
generally blamed the Nigerian government for the state of underdevelopment and the oil 
companies for not meeting their social obligations. This feeling among the people is best 
captured in the words of Ken Saro Wiwa (an outspoken environmental activist) in his 
closing statement to the Nigerian Military Tribunal that sentenced him to death: 
 
“We all stand before history ….. Appalled by the denigrating poverty of my 
people who live on a richly endowed land, distressed by their political 
marginalization and economic strangulation, angered by the devastation of 
their land, their ultimate heritage, anxious to preserve their right to life and 
to a decent living, and determined to usher to this country as a whole a fair 
and just …. System which protects everyone and every ethnic group and 
gives us all a valid claim …” (Wiwa, 1995). 
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Since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, after almost three decades of military rule, 
there has been a change of approach among the people, especially the youths who have 
expressed their frustration and struggle for survival through militancy and gangsterism 
(kidnapping and hostage taking). The volatility of the Niger Delta peaked around 2006. 
According to Watts (2007), within the first three months of 2006, $1 billion in oil 
revenues was lost and over 29 Nigerian soldiers were killed in the uprising.  
 
In response, the Nigerian government have resorted to repression through the 
deployment of troops and mobile police units with mortal instructions.Yet, this has only 
made the region more difficult to govern. Furthermore, the scarcity of revenue has 
exposed deep rooted inter and/or intra ethnic divisions between oil-bearing communities 
that struggle for the ownership of resources, usually land. This is responsible for the 
many violent communal clashes that pervade the Niger Delta. Yet, global demand for 
crude oil from the Niger Delta is high, with the United States of America the largest 
importer of Nigerian crude. The interests of local people, the Nigerian people, the 
Nigerian government, oil multinationals and international community in the resources of 
the Niger Delta Wetlands have left it one of the most contested environments in the 
world (Watts, 2003).   
 
Another response has been to establish more formal institutions without any 
investigation and analysis of why previous formal institutions did not achieve their aims. 
In such a contested environment, adequate attention need to be paid to how things work 
on the ground in order to understand institutional processes and how to promote 
sustainable environments. Failure to do this can only result in the haphazard and 
reactionary introduction of legislation which may lead to further violence. This study 
presents a critical analysis of wetland institutions in the Niger Delta, and shows how 
multidirectional institutions are entrenched in the management of the wetlands. It will 
therefore be an important addition to literature on wetlands management in Nigeria for 
which there is a general dearth of critical conceptual and empirical study.  
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1.3  Aims of the Study 
 
The main aims of this study are to: 
 
1. Design a framework for analyzing institutional change processes in environmental 
management involving multiple actors. 
 
2. Use this framework to analyse:  
 
i. How environmental management in a developing country, Nigeria, depends on 
communication between national social networks.  
  
ii. How this is influenced by communication within national social networks. 
 
1.4  Definitions of Key Terms 
 
1.4.1  Wetland  
 
Wetland is a contested term among scholars, partly because of its highly dynamic 
character, and because of difficulties in defining its boundaries with any precision 
(Mitsch and Gosselink, 2007; Turner, 2008). Dugan (1990) points out that there are 
about 50 definitions of wetlands in use. The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands provide 
the most widely used, defining wetlands as “areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, 
whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, 
fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide 
does not exceed six metres”. In addition, they “may incorporate riparian and coastal 
zones adjacent to the wetlands, and islands or bodies of marine water deeper than six 
metres at low tide lying within the wetlands” (Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 2007). 
 
1.4.2  Environmental Management  
 
Mitchell (2004) defines environmental management as the “actual decisions and actions 
concerning policy and practice regarding how resources and the environment are 
appraised, protected, allocated, developed, used, rehabilitated, remediated and restored”. 
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1.4.3  Discourse 
 
A discourse is "a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities" (Hajer, 1995a).  
 
1.4.4  Practices 
 
Practices are “embedded routines and mutually understood rules and norms that provide 
coherence to social life” (Hajer, 2010). 
 
1.4.5  Institutions 
 
Institutions are “enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, 
norms and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world” (Crawford and Ostrom, 
2005). 
 
1.4.6  Institutionalization 
 
Institutionalization is the process by which institutions are produced and reproduced 
(Phillips et al., 2004). This could either be exogenous, e.g. where a government 
introduces legislation and imposes new institutions on society, or endogenous e.g. 
where changes are based on internal stimuli such as when a community changes activity 
in response to a prevailing condition.  
 
1.4.7  Networks  
 
A network is “a set of actors connected by a set of ties” (Borgatti and Foster, 2003) 
 
1.4.8  Actors 
 
Actors are individuals and groups who are actively involved in an activity or whose 
interests may be positively or negatively affected as a result of the activity (Cleland, 
1998).  
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1.4.9  Ecosystem Services  
 
Ecosystem services are the “benefits that people obtain from ecosystems” (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2003). They include provisioning services, such as food and 
water; regulating services such as flood control; cultural services, such as recreation and 
supporting services, such as nutrient cycling. The concept of “ecosystem goods and 
services” (De Groot et al., 2002) is synonymous with the outputs of provisioning 
services.  
 
1.5  Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is structured in nine chapters. 
  
Chapter 1 (this chapter) set the stage by situating this study in current academic 
thinking. It outlined the background and significance of the study, presented the 
rationale for this research, drawing on the current state of research in this field, and 
listed the principal aims.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the current literature and presents the emerging themes within this 
field of research. Its aim is to identify gaps in knowledge and to choose an appropriate 
methodology for the study, focusing on environmental management institutions. Some 
of the literatures reviewed in this chapter include new institutionalism, network theories 
and models of governing.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology - a new approach to analyzing institutional change - 
which was adopted in this study. After introducing the main philosophical position that 
will shape the analytical framework, it presents a new Network Communication 
Framework and discusses the methodological implications of this appraoch.  
 
Chapter 4 presents a justification why the Niger Delta is a good place and context to test 
the NCF. The unique nature of the Niger Delta environment, and an overview of the 
many pressures exerted on the wetlands, are described. The chapter examines the 
overarching challenge of sustainable development of the wetlands with reference to the 
institutional and livelihood burdens faced by society. It goes on to review aspects 
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related to wetland institutions in Nigeria, with a special emphasis on the Niger Delta 
Wetlands.  
 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the research methods used in this thesis. This 
includes a description of the data collection tools used, and of the ethical challenges and 
how they were addressed. The chapter also discusses the techniques used in the analysis 
of the data.   
 
Chapter 6 complements Chapter 4 by evaluating the benefits and costs associated with 
using the Niger Delta wetlands. It discusses how benefits and costs from use of the 
wetlands is shared among various networks (local community, government and 
corporate networks), with particular emphasis on how the local communities have been 
factored into benefit/cost sharing equation.  
 
Chapter 7 identifies the diverse public narratives of major stakeholder groups 
concerning the causes of, and possible solutions to, the economic, social, political and 
environmental problems facing the Niger Delta region. The chapter then analyses 
respondents’ narratives and how this relates to their network structure. The findings in 
this chapter shed valuable light on the influences of multiple actors on environmental 
management in the Niger Delta.  
 
Chapter 8 examines institutions in the Niger Delta in the light of the proposed Network 
Communication Framework. Emphasis is placed on multi-directional institutions that 
are formed by interactions between different types of institutions. This chapter explores 
how institutional interactions of this kind are apparent in the management of the Niger 
Delta Wetlands. The important factors in the institutionalization process are identified, 
and links between institutional support, network structure and narratives are analyzed. 
 
Chapter 9 summarizes the main research findings, presents the conclusions drawn from 
these findings, and includes the author’s reflections on the study. It also outlines 
recommendations for future research, and presents policy recommendations for a more 
sustainable use of wetlands in Nigeria.  
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CHAPTER 2   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In reviewing the relevant literature, this chapter situates the present study within 
contemporary scholarly research on networks, institutions and institutional change that 
relates to relevant research on power and models of governing is also discussed. The 
chapter identifies current gaps in our understanding of these fields and identifies 
particular methodologies which can be utilized in this study. 
 
2.2  Three Schools of New Institutionalism  
 
It has been suggested that institutions play an important role both in causing and in 
confronting various types of environmental change (Young, 2008). This approach was 
previously dominated by what is now referred to as ‘old institutionalism’, which 
focused on the description and mapping of the formal institutions of government and the 
modern state (Selznick, 1996). This form of institutionalism has been criticized for its 
lack of explanatory power and a narrow focus on analyzing the individual rather than 
the formal and informal institutions that constrain individuals (Peters, 2005). A second 
concern about old institutionalism is its lack of a theoretical and methodological 
approach to explicitly constructing empirical theories, which made it generally 
“atheoretical and descriptive” (Peters, 2005; March and Olsen, 1984).  
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More recently, ‘new institutionalism’ has gathered force in explaining the actual role 
that institutions play as determinants of the outcomes of interactive human behaviour 
(Young, 2002). This approach also focuses on the rules in use and the rules in form 
(formal constitutional provisions) (Ostrom, 1990), contrary to the old institutionalism, 
which merely concentrates on describing and mapping the formal institutions of 
government and the modern state. New institutionalism considers the processes by 
which schemes, rules, norms, and routines become established as authoritative 
guidelines for social behaviour (Scott, 2000a; Scott, 1994). Different schools of new 
institutionalism have attempted to explain how these elements are created, diffused, and 
adapted over space and time, and how they decline and fall into disuse. Hall and Taylor 
(1996) have identified three main schools of  new institutionalism which have evolved 
in parallel: historical, rational choice, and sociological institutionalism.  
 
2.2.1  Historical Institutionalism  
 
Historical institutionalism emerged in response to the failure of group theories of 
politics and structural-functionalism prominent in political science prior to the 1970s 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996; Steinmo, 2008). The approach sought to use real world 
outcomes and history as an analytic tool to explain the “ways in which institutions 
structure and shape political behaviour and outcomes” (Steinmo, 2008). Therefore, 
historical institutionalism emphasizes how institutions emerge from and are embedded 
in concrete temporal processes. The basic idea behind historical institutionalism is that 
initial decisions and choices, made when an institution is formed, will have a 
continuing, and largely determinate influence over the institution far into the future 
(Skocpol and Pierson, 2002; Pierson, 2000a; Thelen, 1999; Steinmo, 2008).  
 
The concept of ‘punctuated equilibria’ has been used by historical institutionalism to 
explain institutional change. This relates that, for the most part, an institution will exist 
in an equilibrium state, functioning in accordance with the decisions made ab initio, or 
perhaps those made at the previous point of equilibrium. Institutions can change through 
learning and can move between equilibria by responding to new information. The 
information may come from experience as they move along their own path, or from 
experience accrued from other institutions. As power is a central concept in historical 
institutionalism, institutional change translates as the question of how to change ideas, 
12 
 
 
i.e. where do institutions conflict over ideas? There are four distinctive features of 
historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996) 
 
The first relates to how historical institutionalism tends to conceptualize the relationship 
between institutions and individual behaviour. Historical institutionalism approaches 
this from two broad perspectives, which Hall and Taylor (1996) refer to as the ‘calculus 
approach’ and the ‘cultural approach’. The calculus approach views humans as self-
interested rational actors, who make decisions based on strategic calculations, while the 
cultural approach views humans as both norm-abiding and rule-following. Their 
behaviour is not fully strategic but bounded by the individual’s worldview (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). This is what gives historical institutionalism the semblance of a “stand-
between” (Steinmo, 2008) the two other schools of new institutionalism. 
 
The second feature places emphasis on the asymmetries of power. The asymmetries of 
power refer to the imbalance in societal power relations. Historical institutionalism 
accepts that conflict over resources is an important phenomenon in institutional 
relationships, pointing to the privileging of some actors to the detriment of others (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996). To its credit this approach recognizes that a polity is an overall 
system of interaction that structures collective behaviour and generates distinctive 
outcomes, while the state is not viewed as a neutral broker between competing interests. 
The state, however, whose institutions are capable of structuring the character and 
outcome of group conflicts, is given a position of primacy (Steinmo, 2008; Pierson, 
1996b). This view of power suggests that institutional change comes through the 
imposition of the ideas of certain powerful actors. Such a conception is, however, blind 
to the fact that power can be much more diffused (Gaventa, 2003; Foucault, 1995). In 
this view, power cannot be communicated between different actors. This, however, is 
far from being a realistic stance, as power can be communicated between groups.  
 
Another feature of historical institutionalism is the view that closely associates 
institutional development with path dependence and unintended consequences. Path 
dependency explains how the set of decisions an institution faces for any given 
circumstance is limited by the decisions it has made in the past. If an institution is 
formed by the acceptance of some norms or value, then a relevant structure must have 
pre-existed. The historical institutionalism proposition, however, does not provide a 
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straightforward explanation that would determine when such a structure was formed.  
Thus, it has been suggested that simply tracing institutional outcomes back to 
temporally remote causes undermines objective analysis, as there are no criteria for 
determining the ‘initial’ or ‘starting’ conditions of a sequence (Mahoney, 2000). 
Historical institutionalism has resorted to choosing relevant dates from which to count 
present and future development. This still leaves open and, thus, subjectifies, the 
determination of the defining event that is fundamental to historical institutionalism. 
The idea of unintended outcomes suggested by historical institutionalism rightly 
emphasizes the evolutionary aspect of institutional change. This approach, however, 
does not explain how even immediately successful reforms may bring unintended 
consequences or what may be done to prevent these (Cortell and Peterson, 2001). 
 
Historical institutionalism is also concerned with integrating institutional analysis 
factors, such as ideas, and their relationship to political outcomes. According to Steinmo 
(2008), in order “to explain institutional change … one needs to bring ‘ideas’ into 
institutional analysis.” An idea in this context is defined as the “creative solutions to 
collective action problems”. It is often assumed, however, that these ideas originate 
from one network, which is defined as the most powerful network. In reality, actual 
institutions are made up of the ideas of diverse networks of actors. This key concept of 
ideas, and how they influence institutions comes over very strongly in the historical 
institutionalism approach. Although historical institutionalists have paid attention to the 
relationship between institutions and ideas (i.e. information and discourse), they have 
not explained how these could interact to mediate the institutional process. 
 
Historical institutionalism is surprisingly vague and less explicit when it comes to the 
definition of what constitutes an institution (Peters, 2005). A definition by Hall (1986), 
which suggested that institutions are “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and 
standard operating procedures that structure the relationship between people in various 
units of the polity and economy” comes closest to a definition of institution in this 
tradition. However, as will be seen from this definition, the emphasis is placed on 
formal rules. Although mention is made of ‘procedures’, there is no clarity as to 
whether this refers also to the informal dimensions of an institution. Generally, 
historical institutionalism defines institutions as “the formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity 
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or political economy” (Hall and Taylor, 1996). According to this definition, institutions 
can range from formal governmental structures (legislatures) through to legal 
institutions (electoral laws), and social institutions (social class), (Thelen, 1999; Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992). Overall, historical institutionalism associates institutions with 
organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organizations. It is 
often common to focus on either of the two. For instance, Streeck and Thelen (2005)  
focused on formal rules and organizations, while informal rules and norms were 
addressed by Marcussen (2000). Yet, studies recognizing and focusing on the co-
existence of the formal and informal aspects of institutions are scarce in this tradition. 
 
In understanding issues such as why institutions succeed or fail to address 
environmental crises, historical institutionalism puts forward a useful method of 
historical analysis with which to examine the ways in which a number of factors have 
intersected and affected one another over time (Hall and Taylor, 1996). For example, 
historical institutionalism can yield useful insights for the understanding of the role of 
institutions (formal and informal, and at different spatial scales) in the historical 
annexation of environmental resources in developing countries in both the pre- and 
post-colonial times. How this led to the creation of various (centralized) institutions, 
and shaped the access of different groups to resources is well addressed by historical 
institutionalism. Historical institutionalism, however, still does not offer adequate 
insights into how institutions change. Rather, it focuses on their path following their 
creation (Peters, 2005; Hall and Taylor, 1996).   
 
2.2.2  Rational Choice Institutionalism  
 
Rational choice institutionalism grew out of the observation of American congressional 
behaviour. It contends that if traditional rational choice postulates are correct, it should 
be difficult to secure stable majorities for legislation in the U.S. Congress. It was thus 
suggested that the answer lies in the rules of Congress that structure the choices and 
information available to its members. Early work explored how institutions influence 
the range and sequence of the options relating to legislature (Shepsle and Weingast, 
1981).  
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At first glance, rational choice institutionalism might appear as a contradiction, or even 
an oxymoron, and a departure from the mainstream rational choice approach, which 
emphasizes utility-maximizing individual behaviour. A closer look, however, reveals 
that rational choice institutionalism still assumes egoistic behavioural characteristics. It 
argues that utility maximization is the primary motivation of individuals, but those 
individuals may realize that their goals can be achieved most effectively through 
institutional action and consequently find that their behaviour is shaped by those 
institutions. Even though individuals are interested in maximizing personal utility, they 
quickly learn that in order to make the most out of institutions they must abide by their 
rules, norms and values (Shepsle, 2006; Peters, 2005). Rational choice institutionalism 
suggests that institutions are only vested with powers by individuals. Hence, in order to 
understand institutions we need first and foremost to understand individual interactions. 
 
This approach by no means forms a coherent school, as internal debates in rational 
choice institutionalism are commonplace (Peters, 2005; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Hall 
and Taylor (1996) emphasize four notable features of rational choice institutionalism. 
The first is the suggestion that actors have a fixed set of preferences and are utility 
maximizers. The second emphasizes collective action dilemmas and the lack of 
institutional arrangements that prevents actors from taking collectively superior courses 
of action. Thirdly, the authors emphasize the role of strategic interaction in the 
determination of political outcomes. The final feature focuses on the explanation of 
institutional change.  
 
The idea that actors have a fixed set of preferences and modify their behaviour entirely 
in order to maximize the attainment of these preferences suggests that humans are 
passive and that preferences are established exogenously. This is far from what is 
observable in societies where actors experience societal limitations that might 
cognitively affect their rationality. Emphasis on rationality does not explain why some 
individuals are willing to violate their own self-interest in favour of that of their society. 
It has been frequently suggested that actors are not entirely rational, but rather function 
under a bounded rationality (Simon, 1991). At the same time the tenet of rational 
institutionalism that assumes that human preferences and their motives exist a priori 
neglects the fact that actors have the capacity to observe and learn. Such a view of 
rational actors is also critiqued for being relatively static and ahistorical (Bell, 2002).  
16 
 
 
The second feature of rational choice institutionalism is the emphasis on ‘collective 
action dilemmas’, suggesting instances where utility maximizing actors are likely to 
produce sub-optimal outcomes. Thus, it is suggested that there is a need for institutional 
arrangements that could create optimal solutions that might resolve scenarios similar to 
Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’. Actors are also described as strategic and 
calculating based on their expectations of others’ behaviour. It is suggested that 
institutions structure interactions and lead actors to particular calculations that promise 
potentially better social outcomes. This does not, however, explain why in some cases 
actors comply with rules and institutions that are successful, while in others they do not 
and institutions are, by extent, less successful (North, 1998). Unlike historical 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism views individual and institutional 
interaction as bi-directional. 
 
In explaining institutional change rational choice institutionalism suggests that the 
creation of institutions is a result of the voluntary agreement by actors who are driven 
by the benefits they stand to gain. This suggests that institutions are a given and can be 
easily created. It is argued that if there is a logical need for the existence of a particular 
institution then this will be created, given that actors are rational. Institutions arise from 
the desire of individuals, who have the capability to manipulate political structures, to 
impose their will on others (Sened, 1991). This pattern might comfortably apply to 
formal institutions, but the creation process of informal institutions is more complex 
(Chavance, 2008). According to rational choice institutionalism, institutional 
equilibrium is the norm. A normal state is one in which the rules of the game are stable 
and actors maximize their utilities (usually self-interest) according to these rules. As 
actors learn the rules, their strategies adjust and an institutional equilibrium sets in. 
Though not everyone is necessarily happy with the institutional structure, a significant 
coalition is built. Otherwise, the structure would not, by definition, be stable. Once 
stabilized, it becomes very difficult to change the rules because no one can be certain of 
what the outcomes of new structures would be. This is because institutions shape 
strategies. New institutional rules prompt new strategies throughout the system. In 
short, the amount of uncertainty accompanying new institutional structures makes actors 
unwilling to change the extant structure (Shepsle, 1986). It survives primarily because it 
provides more benefits to the relevant actors than alternate institutional forms.  
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One area that rational choice has contributed more than historical institutionalism is in 
defining what an institution is. The most widely quoted definitions of an institution are 
those suggested by rational choice institutionalists. According to them, institutions are 
viewed in terms of rules. It is rules that separate the institutional from the non-
institutional (Peters, 2005). One of the earliest definitions of institution states that 
“institutions are collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual 
action” (Commons, 1931). Collective action here can be taken to mean that individuals 
always act within some framework of 'collectively enforced' social rules (Vanberg, 
1989). Obviously, this definition overlooks institutions resulting from the exercise of 
power, such as coercion and even those emerging out of the unexpected consequences 
of human actions. More recently, Douglass North proposed his influential definition that 
“institutions are the rules of the game in society” (North, 1990). North further suggests 
a restriction of the term ‘rules’ to describe the ‘formal’, while he describes the 
‘informal’ with the terms ‘norms’ or ‘constraints’ (North, 1993; Hodgson, 2006). To 
North, “formal rules are enforced by courts while informal constraints or norms are 
usually enforced by peers or others who will impose costs.” Although North 
emphasized “informal constraints” and the “cultural transmission of values” he 
unnecessarily confines his definition of institutions to rules codified in law (Hodgson, 
2006), thereby neglecting the place of “informal constraints” as institutions. Such a 
conceptualization of institutions does not fit well with many developing societies, 
especially those in Africa, where the informal dimension of political relationships and 
institutions is very important (Teye, 2008) .  
 
While the aforementioned are all significant contributions to the understanding of 
institutional outcomes, the rational choice tradition has emphasized the impact of 
human behaviour and policy and has generally treated institutional change as not 
particularly important. This has led, by extent, to an inchoately developed explanation 
of institutional change (Peters, 2005). Rational choice institutionalism overemphasizes 
reality and often suggests a static image of political development. Its explanation of 
institutional processes can be argued to be incomplete, as it neglects beliefs (Weyland, 
2002), an aspect important in African societies and one emphasized by sociological 
institutionalism. 
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2.2.3  Sociological Institutionalism  
 
Sociological institutionalism appeared in the late 1970s as an offshoot of organization 
theory. The movement challenges the prevailing emphasis on formal institutions to the 
neglect of ‘culture’ and argues that institutions should be seen in the light of culturally 
specific practices. As such, sociological institutionalists see human beings as 
fundamentally social beings who are not overtly rational or atomistic, acting to 
maximize their personal utility but, instead, are ‘satisficers’ who follow a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1984) by reflecting more closely on the values of 
the institutions with which they are associated (Peters, 2005). 
 
Sociological institutionalism holds that a “logic of appropriateness” guides the 
behaviour of actors within an institution. According to this ‘logic’, human actions are 
seen as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into 
institutions. It suggests that institutions derive their norms and rules from the society in 
which they are formed.  
 
Hall and Taylor (1996) have emphasized three features of sociological institutionalism, 
which render it relatively distinct from historical and rational choice institutionalism.  
 
The first is that sociological institutionalism defines institutions much more broadly, as 
it includes not just formal rules but also informal institutions. According to March and 
Olsen (1989), institutions are not necessarily a formal structure. They are a collection of 
norms, rules, understandings and, perhaps most importantly, routines and “symbolic and 
behavioural systems (Scott, 1994) that give meaning and identities to participating 
actors.  
 
The second feature involves the explanation of the relationship between institutions and 
individual action. Sociological institutionalism puts an emphasis on norms and values in 
explaining human behaviour (March and Olsen, 1984). Institutions are conceived as 
influencing behaviour by providing the cognitive scripts, categories and models that 
specify what one should do and what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context. 
This does not, however, suggest that individuals are not purposive, goal-oriented or 
rational. Rather, it is a suggestion that institutions are equally socially constructed. It 
assumes bounded rationality, whereby individuals cannot really meet the conditions for 
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full rationality and, therefore, use a variety of mechanisms to facilitate their decision-
making. The relationship between the individual and the institution then, is built on a 
kind of ‘practical reasoning’, whereby the individual works with and reworks the 
available institutional templates to devise a course of action. Sociological 
institutionalists frequently posit a world of individuals seeking to define and express 
their identity in socially appropriate ways. Many sociological institutionalists emphasize 
this interactive and mutually-constitutive character of the relationship between 
institutions and individual action and suggest the idea of a reciprocal relationship at 
work.  
 
Finally, as regards how institutions change, sociological institutionalism argues that 
actors have a ‘garbage can’ (a set of re-utilized responses) from which to seek solutions 
to problems before searching for alternatives that are farther away from their core 
values. Actors identify and then adapt to changing circumstances in their environment. 
Sociological institutionalism suggests that new institutions are adopted because they 
enhance social legitimacy. This suggests that they are widely valued in society. Such an 
explanation may hold true for many communities in Africa, where formal institutions 
are not socially popular and, hence not followed, while other informal institutions, 
which are more popular within society, are much more widely followed even though 
they may be dysfunctional with regard to achieving formal goals. This is what Campbell 
(1989) described as a ‘logic of social appropriateness’ in contrast to a ‘logic of 
instrumentality’. In these circumstances, the legitimacy of the new institution comes 
from the fact that it is culturally more acceptable.  
 
One key contribution of sociological institutionalism is the idea that institutions are 
socially constructed and “embody shared cultural understandings” (Thelen, 1999), 
which give meaning to, and legitimize, certain behaviours. This might explain how 
individuals from diverse networks can subvert formal institutions. Sociological 
institutionalism also points to the role of belief systems, ideas, and discourses in shaping 
institutions, forming policy, and binding actors together (Rosamond, 2000).  
 
Sociological institutionalism is critiqued for not giving adequate consideration to those 
cases where institutions may behave in ways that may violate their own self-interest. In 
response to that, it has been suggested that rules are followed because they are seen as 
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natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate (Peters, 2005). The challenge also arises to 
rationalize why institutions sometimes appear to have different norms and rules to those 
of society. Another fundamental criticism of sociological institutionalism is that the 
criteria for the ‘logic of appropriateness’ within an institution are sufficiently vague that 
it would be difficult to ascertain whether they exist and whether they do influence the 
behaviour of the members of the organization. The approach is also criticized for 
distancing human agency away from political decision-making, as well as the 
assumption that behaviour is normative, rather than coercive (and as such, blind to 
power relations) (Peters, 2005). Sociological institutionalism is also critiqued for its 
inability to provide a clear distinction between institutions as entities and the process of 
institutional change (Peters, 2005).  
 
 The three schools of new institutionalism have enhanced our understanding of the 
institutional change process. All three schools emphasize the interaction between actors, 
as well as between actors and institutions. Historical institutionalism also emphasizes 
the fact that the state is not neutral, while rational choice institutionalism emphasizes 
that humans are strategic in their decision-making. Of the three strands of new 
institutionalism, however, it is sociological institutionalism that fits better with how 
things actually work in an African context. Institutions should be viewed as both formal 
and informal. The definition of institutions which captures the strengths of all three 
schools is that of Crawford and Ostrom (1995): “institutions are enduring regularities of 
human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as 
by the physical world”. For the purposes of this research, the author finds this 
description of an institution most helpful. This definition is broader in that it 
accommodates the informal basis of institutions rather than just their rules (formal 
institutions). Such a broad definition captures how things actually work in an African 
context, where both formal and informal dimensions are constantly intertwined. 
Furthermore, it emphasizes that institutions are repetitive.  
 
Despite the strengths of the three new institutionalism types, however, all fail to 
advance an understanding of how actors’ interactions can change institutions, and are 
often weak in explaining the fluidity of power.  
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2.3  Theories of Institutional Change 
 
The three schools of new institutionalism are good at explaining why institutions don't 
change, but less good at explaining how and why they do change (Hall and Taylor, 
1996). The reality in many developing societies does not involve primarily institutional 
inertia/lock (Pierson, 2000b), but changes that have been implicated in political 
outcomes. Different theories of institutional change have been suggested by different 
scholars, but Kingston and Caballero (2009) put all these approaches into three broad 
categories according to their explanation of causes, processes, and outcomes. These are: 
collective choice theories, which emphasize the deliberate creation of institutions; 
evolutionary theories, which emphasize the spontaneous emergence of institutions 
through evolutionary processes; and theories that combine elements of collective choice 
and evolution.  
 
2.3.1  Collective Choice Theories 
 
Although there are several variants, collective-choice theories generally posit that 
institutional change is purposefully designed in a centralized way either by a single 
individual (such as the King) or a collective political entity (such as the community or 
the state) (Kingston and Caballero, 2009). In collective choice, institutional change 
emerges through individuals and organizations who are engaged in collective action, 
conflict, and bargaining in an attempt to change the rules for their own benefit. This 
group generally involves strategic individuals who calculate the costs and benefits of an 
institutional change before it can occur. Such a view is reminiscent of the rational 
choice institutionalism discussed above.  
 
Theories in this group emphasize “hierarchies of rules”, treat institutional change not as 
a decentralized and spontaneous process, but as a centralized, political process in which 
the state specifies formal rules and individuals and organizations engage in conflict and 
bargaining in order to shape the rules according to their benefit. The state and/or 
elements thereof is given the role of actor with its own objectives, rather than viewing it 
primarily as a battleground in which groups compete to mould formal rules to their own 
advantage.  
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Although they provide numerous insights, theories which view institutional change as 
the outcome of a deliberate, collective-choice process of rule-creation, also leave 
several important questions unanswered. In particular, they have difficulty in explaining 
why, in many cases, formal rules are ignored, or fail to produce their intended 
outcomes. While exponents of collective-choice acknowledge the importance of 
informal rules, the approach is ill-equipped to deal with ‘informal rules’ (i.e. rules that 
are not deliberately designed), but are nevertheless followed because deviating from the 
rules (social norms and conventions) is not individually rational if others follow them. 
These are institutions that do sometimes change over time but generally evolve in a 
decentralized and spontaneous manner. As such they do not fit into the collective-choice 
model. In addition, the existence of some ‘powerful groups’ blocking or imposing 
institutions only tells one side of the story.  
 
2.3.2  Evolutionary Theories 
 
Evolutionary theories perceive institutional change as a random process in which 
institutions undergo some kind of decentralized selection process, as a consequence of 
which institutions that survive random selection spread through the population, while 
unsuccessful institutions die out. Thus, new rules and  associated patterns of behaviour 
emerge from the uncoordinated choices of many individuals rather than a single, 
collective-choice or political process. Implicitly, if existing institutions are not efficient 
following such a change, then new, more efficient, institutions will in time emerge. The 
process of institutional change envisaged is one in which more efficient institutions will 
drive out less efficient ones through the evolutionary-competitive process. This 
competitive pressure ensures that bounded rationality will not impede the selection of 
efficient institutions (Kingston and Caballero, 2009). 
 
Selection is thought to be driven by exogenous parameters that aim to reduce the 
transaction costs resulting from the bounded rationality and the opportunism of the 
transacting parties. In evolutionary theories there is no mechanism, such as legislation, 
that would cause a coordinated shift in the rules perceived by all the players, or in their 
behaviour or beliefs.  
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A common conclusion from such an approach is the suggestion that formal rules change 
or drive out informal rules (McAdams, 1997). These theorists have neglected the role of 
collective action and political processes and have turned a “blind eye” to bounded 
rationality (the core of transaction cost theory on which its thesis is based). The 
possibility of institutions being rendered neutral by actors is ignored. Neither has the 
possibility of formal and informal rules cooperating and coexisting in harmony been 
considered.  
 
2.3.3  Blending Evolution and Design  
 
Both evolutionary theories and centralized collective-choice processes have their 
limitations and are only useful in particular settings. In many real-world processes of 
institutional change, however, both unintentional, evolutionary processes and 
intentional processes of design are at work, and it is often difficult to clearly separate 
the two (Kingston and Caballero, 2009). For example, the impetus for attempts at 
deliberate institutional design may reflect gradual underlying changes in parameters, 
beliefs, or knowledge, which result from the spontaneous evolution of existing 
institutions over time. Even when deliberate attempts are made to design and implement 
new institutions, competition or other evolutionary processes may subsequently play a 
role in determining which kinds of institutions survive and spread.  
 
Such institutions recognize the fact that while in many societies there are purposefully 
designed institutions, evolutionary processes outside the hierarchical centralized 
environment exist, which may interact and give rise to new institutions. While Kingston 
and Caballero have identified these institutions, they have not developed a framework 
with which to explain institutional change in such complex environments. Such a 
framework would not only explain how institutions change, but could provide further 
insights into the multiplicity of institutions that are widespread, since it is possible for 
multiple institutions (both designed and evolved) to be at work at the same time.  
 
Although some insights are provided by the above, however, these do not allow a 
rigorous analysis of institutions found in an African context, where institutions made up 
of numerous actors belonging to multiple interacting networks influence one another. 
This is despite the fact that networks have been named as an important governance 
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mechanism, and the suggestion that institutions are generated through repeated practices 
within and between networks (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2007; Rodriguez-Pose, 2009; 
Rydin and Falleth, 2006).  
 
2.4  Theories of Networks  
 
Network models are widely used to represent relational information among interacting 
units. The term ‘network’ is frequently used to describe a set of actors connected by a 
set of ties (Borgatti and Foster, 2003) in order to share and exchange resources and 
allow communication. What follows is a review of relevant network theories.  
 
2.4.1  Policy Network 
 
The concept of a policy network (i.e. interactions between groups involved in policy-
making and their influence on the policy process), has a variety of uses among scholars 
(Rhodes, 1990a; Rhodes, 1990b). A number of concepts are used which sometimes 
describe very similar or even overlapping phenomena. Such concepts are, for example, 
‘policy communities’ (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974) and ‘issue networks’ (Heclo, 2010; 
Kenis and Schneider, 1991). The central theme of this approach is that a policy network 
is a “set of relatively stable relationships which are of a non-hierarchical and 
interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with 
regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests 
acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals” (Börzel, 
1997).  
 
Theoretical debates persist within this approach between the British school, which 
believes that state actors are equal partners, and the Dutch school, which believes that 
the state holds a special position in the network (Sibeon, 2000), but the policy network 
approach captures the complexity of the policy process by pointing attention to the 
diverse interests, or ‘stakes’, of clusters of actors within the network (Peterson, 2003).  
 
Despite the strengths and contributions of the policy network approach it has been 
criticized for focusing on characteristics of network components rather than the 
characteristics of the network itself (Dowding, 1995). Another weakness of this 
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approach is that it is too descriptive and lacks adequate explanation of how networks 
change (Dowding, 1995). Furthermore, it neglects the roles of those not in the policy 
arena and their institutions, and emphasizes cooperation to the detriment of situations 
where there are power differences and conflicts. 
 
2.4.2  Actor Network Theory 
 
Actor network theory (ANT) emerged during the mid-1980s and is associated with the 
works of Michel Callon, John Law and Bruno Latour (Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005; Law, 
1992; Law and Callon, 1988). The theory focuses on networks that are made up of 
humans, as well as taking seriously into consideration the agency of non-humans 
(machines, animals, texts, and hybrids, among others). As such, ANT focuses on 
textual, conceptual, social, and technical actors. It assumes that in order to understand 
social processes, one has to take into account all human and non-human entities within 
the network arguing that ‘social relations’ are not independent of the material and 
natural world (Latour, 2005). The theory which stems from a science and technology 
point of view, has in recent years come to attract wider application within the social 
sciences (Nimmo, 2011). This has resulted in a body of studies that uses ANT to 
understand phenomena as diverse as environmental management (Steins, 2001; van der 
Duim, 2007; Burgess et al., 2000).  
 
The possibility of combining human and non-human actants in societies makes actor 
network theory promising for the understanding of environmental institutions, where 
one needs to take into consideration interactions and exchanges that take place between 
humans (in terms of language, money etc.). The bringing of the ‘missing masses’ 
(Latour, 1992) of non-human actors into the frame of analysis is important and timely 
given the influence of the linguistic turn in organization theory (Whittle and Spicer, 
2008). Furthermore, it further brings the focus of attention on the diversity of actors and 
the interactions between them. Through these interactions it is possible for an actor’s 
interest to be translated - a situation whereby actors construct common definitions and 
co-opt in the pursuit of individual and collective goals.  
 
Whilst a novel approach, ANT has certain shortcomings. The first problematic area is 
the ethical implication of equating humans with inanimate objects and according 
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inanimate objects, such as machines, the same degree of agency as a person (Whittle 
and Spicer, 2008). While this attempt to invite non-humans into the policy arena is a 
worthy gesture, it runs the risk of displacing the defining human characteristics of the 
policy arena as a space of meaningful, purposeful, self-aware and non-repetitive action 
(Mutch, 2002). 
 
Also, ANT focuses on stable relationships organized and stabilized to create a durable 
and robust network (Callon, 1991). For instance, a formal institution functions properly 
as long as the enforcers employ their technical knowhow and the local communities 
continue to obey. However, the actor network is only stable as long as all human and 
non-human actors remain faithful to the network (Whittle and Spicer, 2008). The 
approach has also been critiqued for not adequately examining power differentials and 
for presenting an overly rationalistic and cynical understanding of the human actor 
(Laurier and Philo, 1999). Even more fundamentally, ANT does not provide a 
framework for forensic evaluation of the merits and demerits of different network as it 
focuses too much on negotiation where actors pursue collective goals. 
 
This does not completely dismiss ANT as a useful approach for the study of 
institutional change. It does, however, question the contribution of ANT to the 
development of a critical theory of institutional change in an African context where the 
exercise of power is important.  
 
2.4.3  Social Network Analysis 
 
Social network analysis is applied across a wide range of discipline including the social 
and natural sciences, e.g. sociology, psychology, anthropology, biology and medicine 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The origin of the main developments of social network 
theory is traced to the work of several groups in different traditional fields working 
independently in the 1930s (Scott, 1991). Overall, this approach focuses on the 
interactions between individuals within a group in order to understand the collective 
behaviour of that group (Martínez-López et al., 2009).  
 
The social network perspective is based on the importance of the relationships among 
interacting units. The peculiarity of this perspective is that it focuses not on individuals 
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or other social units, but on relationships between them, recognizing that individuals’ 
behaviour is influenced by those around them (Burkhardt, 1994). Social network 
analysis seeks to describe networks of relations as fully as possible, tease out the 
prominent patterns in such networks, trace the flow of information (and other resources) 
through them, and discover what effects these relations and networks have on people 
and organizations (Garton et al., 1997). According to Wasserman and Faust (1994), in 
addition to a focus on relationships, there are four fundamental concepts important to a 
social network analysis: the actors (the people, organizations or other social entities) in 
social networks; the sets of social relationships, such as friendship, co-working or 
information exchange through which they are connected and which serve as channels 
for the transfer of resources (material or non-material); the structure of the network, 
which provides opportunities and constraints for individual action; and the lasting 
patterns of these social structures.  
 
The actors are referred to as the ‘egos’ or ‘nodes’ while those they are connected to are 
referred to as their ‘alters’. For instance, if A is connected to B, this will be termed as a 
network in which A is the ego and B is A’s alter. A may not only be connected to B, but 
also C, D, E etc. At the same time the alters of A (B, C, D, E…) may also be connected 
to other actors to whom A is not connected, but are also members of A’s network. Such 
indirect links to actors whose alters are connected is also important in social network 
analysis (Garton et al., 1997). Some network analysts have relied on such single 
individuals or nodes for explaining the network of A in an ego-centred approach. 
However, if we consider the fact that in reality A has more than one alters, while the 
same is true for B and that ties not only give one ego access to their alter, but also 
indirect access to all those network members to whom their alters are connected. A has 
its ego network, while B also has its ego network. In principle, every network is linked 
to the total network covering the whole of society. This is much more the case because 
in reality relations are widespread and it can no longer be considered appropriate to 
focus on the individual. Instead, one should concentrate on the larger or total network. 
These two, the ego-centric and total networks, represent the two approaches to social 
network analysis (Garton et al., 1997). 
  
The defining feature of a social network is the relational link between actors. These 
links are referred to as ties (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), which can be quite extensive. 
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Wasserman and Faust (1994) suggest some common examples of ties, but Borgatti et al 
(2009) were more helpful when they divided the ties that link nodes in a network 
according to similarities (location, membership and attributes), social relations 
(affective and cognitive kinship, and other roles), interactions (talking, helping, harming 
etc.), and flows (information, institutions, personnel, resources and power). Such a 
division helps in focusing on the type of ties that can be found in any institutional 
process, and especially in interactions and flows. One other advantage of the social 
network approach is that it emphasizes informal links, such as friendship, financial 
exchange, dislike, or relationships based on beliefs, knowledge or prestige among 
individuals or groups, which are often neglected by the policy network approach.  
 
Another important feature of the social network approach, which makes it attractive, is 
that it does not only place emphasis on the structure but allows it to be mapped and 
measured (Smith, 2001) in such a way that the structure of relations between various 
actors can be understood. The connections (ties) between actors (points) are mapped 
using a line. The resulting system of points and lines indicates the nature of a structure 
within the network.  In its most simple form, a social network is a map of all the 
relevant ties between the nodes being studied. These concepts are displayed in a social 
network diagram, where nodes are the points and ties are the lines. The resulting 
structure of the network of actors can be measured and is important in understanding 
societal outcomes. The measurement of a network’s structural properties has generated 
a considerable body of literature (Okuyama and Holland, 2007; Lauber et al., 2008; 
Janssen et al., 2006).  
 
Social network theory has been criticized for leaving less room for individual agency 
and the ability of individuals to influence their own success. So much of it rests within 
the structure of their network. Another critique is that social network analysis focuses 
attention on the structure and neglects the interaction between structure and content 
(Stokman, 2004). As such, it explains interactions within the network but places little 
emphasis on interactions between networks. It may be possible to conceive that any one 
interaction within the network can mirror interaction between networks. Surely this is a 
challenge to traditional social network thinking as we know it. Therefore, any model 
must take this into consideration and employ a more content-driven methodology.   
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Despite its critics, the power of social network theory stems from its emphasis on 
linkages among individuals, rather than the attributes of individual actors themselves. 
This approach has turned out to be useful in explaining many real-world phenomena 
and there is a call for incorporating social network perspective in environmental 
governance (Ernstson et al., 2008). A major advantage compared with other analytical 
approaches is an inherent ability to handle relations that are bi-directional (Martínez-
López et al., 2009) and communication contents that are exchanged simultaneously. 
Social network theory also encompasses indirect links, which are mostly informal and 
not necessarily visible during the policy processes, as suggested by the policy network 
approach.  Futhermore, the approach can provide a conceptual framework within which 
to study interaction patterns between actors that are frequently or intensely connected 
within the network and that result in institutional change.  
 
2.5  Models of Interaction 
 
Given that the network approach involves interaction among actors who differ, it is 
good to understand the nature of interactions possible in a network. Scharpf (1997) 
developed a typology of institutional settings based on four models of interaction: 
unilateral action, negotiated agreement, majority vote and hierarchical direction. These 
modes of interaction can explain how networks are converted to policy outcomes. 
Although based on rational choice assumptions (Peters, 2005), these models offer 
insights into how actors may pattern their interactions within and between networks.  
 
2.5.1  Unilateral Action  
 
This model is applicable to the “anarchic field” (Hermann, 1998) in which actors in the 
network respond to each other either by mutual adjustment or through non-cooperative 
strategy where dialogue is almost non-existent. This is possible because actors do not 
have pre-existing relationships or specific obligations to themselves. Hence, even where 
they do reach agreements they may still renege. In such a scenario actors can engage in 
non-cooperative games in which case all they think about is maximizing their own best 
interest. Although aware of other actors and their interdependence to them, as well as 
their strategies, the goal is to secure a clear strategic interaction. The other option 
(mutual adjustment) involves the actor’s knowledge of his own strategy and its 
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outcome, as well as the ability to predict the strategies of other actors. This enables 
decision-making geared towards the maximization of their benefits. In reality, however, 
it is difficult to know the other actors’ true intentions. In other words, one cannot know 
exactly how people will interact and what the ﬁnal outcome will be (Stacey and Stacey 
Ralph, 1996).  In both instances (non-cooperative and mutual adjustment) there is a lack 
of any mechanism that could prevent actors from inflicting damage on one another, 
which may result in significant welfare loss. 
 
Although unilateral strategies may in some cases stimulate a process of interaction 
(Bruijn, 2005), interaction itself is often not based on them. This renders this model less 
helpful in studying networked interaction. Further, the model does not foresee a 
situation where actors cooperate in networks in which decision-making is based on 
multilateral interaction (Bruijn, 2005). The model also assumes a ‘lawless’ society 
where institutions capable of preventing unilateral violations do not exist. While this 
model is generally not applicable to modern states, where legal institutions to prevent 
unilateral violations exist, in scenarios where a weak state has little or no autonomy 
unilateral actions could be observed. Even in this case, however, there are informal 
institutions in place that may act preventively.  
 
2.5.2  Negotiated Agreement 
 
The unilateral action model can lead to welfare loss, which can be avoided in an 
environment of negotiation (Scharpf, 1997). This model posits that actors can 
voluntarily negotiate outcomes that can lead to agreement that will realize benefit for all 
participants, provided that transaction costs are negligible (Dixit and Olson, 2000; 
Scharpf, 1997). This approach recognizes the fact that actors may engage in 
negotiations despite them not being fully aware of the other actors’ true intentions, 
because they are able to trust each other (Scharpf, 1997). This world-view relates to 
social network analysis in which network relations are seen as a form of social capital 
(Putnam, 1993). The model also recognizes that importance of negotiation in self-
organizing networks where decision-making is a joint process. Therefore, apart from 
bearing similarities to the social network perspective, this model also recognizes the 
fluidity of power in networks. Even though power may be unequal among negotiating 
partners, outcomes are voluntarily agreed in non-coercive negotiations (Pfetsch, 1998) 
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This mode of interaction may result in ‘fair’ outcomes for all participants in terms of 
other alternatives that may be available to them if they had chosen not to enter 
negotiations. This mode, however, often does not correct existing inequalities in society. 
Nevertheless, it does offer an attractive promise, closest to what is actually available.  
 
2.5.3  Majority Voting 
 
Majority voting suggests that neither the welfare damaging unilateral interaction nor 
negotiations, which may run into prohibitive transaction costs is helpful in explaining 
interaction between actors. A situation whereby decision-making is based on majority 
rule suggests a model based on a system of ‘democratic majority consensus’, where 
objections by a dissenting minority can be overruled by the majority.  
 
In practice, decision-making is not a democratic process. There are many instances 
where the minority dominates the majority (Nafziger, 1988). This is particularly 
common in many African societies. The other weakness of this model in an African 
context is the assumption that the ‘majority’ vote always counts. As such, interaction by 
a majority decision rule is far from realistic. It is also too idealistic and too much of a 
western conception to correspond to what is practiced in Africa (Adejumobi, 2000). 
 
2.5.4  Hierarchical Direction 
 
Hierarchical direction is another mode of network interaction. According to Scharpf 
(1997), hierarchical direction is a mode of interaction in which egos are able to specify 
alter choices, or more precisely some alters decisions, which arise out of the egos 
superior power. As such, this model assumes that decisions can be imposed without the 
consent of other actors within the network. Based on the fact that power is diffused in 
networks, hierarchical interaction is not possible in them (Blatter, 2003). 
 
It has been suggested that actors may be forced to act against their own preferences 
because of the consequences their inaction may bring from the hierarchical head. 
Scholars do recognize the fact that the reach of such hierarchical authority can be 
constrained by factors within the environment (Scharpf, 1997). In reality, many 
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governments have realized the need to collaborate with other actors as an effective 
means of problem-solving.  
 
2.6  Theories of the Politics of the Environment 
 
2.6.1  Political Ecology 
 
Political ecology emerged in response to the deconstruction of dominant apolitical 
myths that were widespread in the debates on environmental change (Blaikie and 
Brookfield, 1987). In its broadest sense, political ecology is an outgrowth of ecological 
and social science research that combines social and political investigation with 
environmental processes (Bryant, 1992). Political ecology posits that ecological 
arguments are never socially neutral but are influenced by structural forces that 
condition the choices available (Watts and Peet, 2004). To its credit, political ecology 
engages a wider set of influential political and economic structures by emphasizing the 
role of political and economic obstacles as a force in environmental degradation 
(Walker, 2005). This implies a shifting of emphasis from biophysical characteristics of 
human life, analyzed through theories of evolution and adaptation, towards the study of 
the social and cultural dimensions of human life embedded in political economic 
contexts (Paulson et al., 2003).  
 
Despite its strengths, political ecology is critiqued for its lack of coherence (Peluso, 
1992; Watts, 2000).  Political ecology is also critiqued for basing explanations on a 
priori judgments, theories, or biases centring on what tools should be used in order to 
explain, rather than on what is to be explained (Vayda and Walters, 1999). As a result, it 
is often accused of dealing with politics and not with ecology (Vayda and Walters, 
1999) and is frequently called ‘politics without ecology’. Another shortcoming of 
political ecology is its emphasis on the idea that some individuals and groups drive 
changes in society by their exercise of power over how others in society benefit from 
the environment (Boyce, 2002; Robbins, 2004). This generally ignores the fact that 
power can be fluid in society and results in local people being portrayed as victims 
instead of agents (Hummel et al., 2012).  
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Despite these criticisms, political ecology has become a widely accepted approach, and 
today there is a considerable diversity of political ecologies, including feminist political 
ecology, liberation ecology, third world political ecology, first world political ecology, 
local and regional political ecology, and more recently, critical political ecology 
(Robbins, 2004; Bryant and Bailey, 1997). 
 
2.6.2  Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACT) was developed to analyse policy processes 
(Sabatiwer and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier, 1998). An advocacy 
coalition, according to Sabatier and Jenkins‐Smith, refers to coalitions of “actors from a 
variety of … institutions at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs … 
who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets, and personnel of governmental institutions in 
order to achieve these goals over time” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
 
Basic to this approach is the importance of sub‐systems in policy formulation and 
implementation.  It argues that policy-making entails policy sub-systems that come 
together to form coalitions. Each sub-system is characterized by coalitions, which differ 
in belief systems and policy preferences. It is these belief systems that make coalitions 
hold together and build the basis for their coordination and internal organization. 
Coalitions can be composed not only of policy actors, parties, lobbies, administrative 
agencies, but also of journalists and scientific representatives (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993). Hence, the Advocacy Coalition Framework emphasizes the importance of 
even small groups and other actors that may play a direct or indirect role in the policy-
making process. The idea is that any advocacy group is potentially important in 
effecting change on the basis of shared beliefs, irrespective of their formal location or 
size.  
 
The framework distinguishes between three levels of beliefs in the belief system of a 
coalition: the deep core, the policy core and secondary aspects. The central ideas of a 
policy sub-system, namely whether a coalition sticks together or not, depend on the 
policy core level (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Learning processes (the so-called 
policy-oriented learning) and policy change are most likely to concern only secondary 
aspects of a belief system, leaving the policy core of a coalition intact, and thus able to 
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bring about only minor policy changes (Sabatier, 1998). Minor policy changes are the 
result of two processes: learning within and learning across coalitions. The second is 
more interesting in this case, as it is where policy brokers may intervene. Learning 
across two coalitions happens when their respective belief systems, as well as their 
opinions about the specific policy domain, differ. The two coalitions are in conflict and 
it is difficult to obtain a dialogue between them. Conflicting belief systems of coalitions 
are mediated by policy brokers whose principal concern is to find some reasonable 
compromise, which will reduce conflict intensity (Sabatier, 1988). In that sense, policy 
brokers have to combine two tasks: first, they have to relativize the beliefs and 
preferences of the competing coalitions in order to facilitate feasible policy solutions, 
and second, they must be linked to actors from different coalitions and, ideally, directly 
to the decision makers as well.  
 
While the Advocacy Coalition Framework is novel in pointing to the important role of 
brokers in the policy process, and is a prominent approach used to analyse broker 
positions in a political sub-system, the suggestion that brokers do not have strong 
beliefs, or they abandon their preferences in order to make feasible political solutions 
possible (Ingold, 2011), does not give room for real life situations where brokers still 
hold strongly to their own beliefs, instead of readily adopting the beliefs of other 
coalitions. The approach has, thus, been criticized for downplaying the interests of 
policy brokers (Kübler 2001; Schlager 1995) and for being weak in integrating power in 
the policy process (Doolin and Lowe, 2002). Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance 
of policy sub-systems, which are quiescent in nature, meaning they only get together 
when there is a need. Once the need is resolved, the sub-systems adjourn (Ike, 2009). 
The institutional process, however, is continuous and repetitive and there may not be an 
opportunity to stop or adjourn.  
 
2.6.3  Discourse Coalition Framework 
 
The Discourse Coalition Framework has its roots in the work of Maarten Hajer, who 
criticized the Advocacy Coalition Framework for being analytically too thin to account 
adequately for the interactive dynamics of policy changes, and hence why and how 
changes come about (Hajer, 1995b). Therefore, whereas the advocacy Coalition 
Framework emphasizes policy beliefs, Hajer points to narratives and story lines (Hajer, 
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1993). It is also a departure from traditional approaches, which hold that interests and 
institutional constraints are the key determinants of policy formulation and 
implementation. Hajer contends that language is not neutral and should be recognized as 
a medium through which actors not simply describe but also create the world (Hajer, 
1993). As such, the focus should extend beyond differences of opinion expressed in 
language and include extra-discursive practices, such as context and structure of 
language from which social constructs emerge.  
 
The Discourse Coalition Framework suggests that actors from various networks can 
form coalitions around specific story lines. Story lines are the medium through which 
actors try to impose their view of reality on others, suggest certain social positions and 
practices and criticize alternative social arrangements. A storyline simplifies the 
discursive space and helps to bring about a discursive closure. 
 
The crux of the argument is that hegemonic discourses often hinge on the construction 
of a particular storyline that provides a short, condensed and often metaphorical 
expression of how policy discourse defines problems and solutions. Adoption of a 
particular storyline tends to facilitate mutual learning and compromises formation while 
serving to exclude competing problem definitions and alternative policy solutions. 
According to Hajer (1993), a discourse coalition can be said to dominate a given 
political realm only if it fulfils two conditions: (i)  it dominates the discursive space 
(discourse structuration), that is, “central actors are persuaded by, or forced to accept, 
the rhetorical power of a new discourse”, and (ii)  this is reflected in institutional 
practices (discourse institutionalization), that is, the actual policy process is conducted 
according to the ideas of a given discourse. 
 
2.7  The Concept of Power 
 
Power is a key concept when studying interactions between multiple actors who 
mobilize different institutions. It plays an important role in shaping network 
interactions, the nature of institutions that are formed, and the direction of institutional 
change. Despite this, contemporary discussion about networks and institutions ignores 
the question of power (Pratt, 2003).   
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In spite of the acknowledged importance of power, there is no clear-cut consensus on 
how power should be conceptualized (Sharp et al., 2000). An early conceptualization 
suggests that “power is the production of intended effects” (Russell, 2004) which means 
that one person can have power over another if they are able to dominate or produce 
certain effects over them. However, recent conceptualizations have emphasized that 
power is rather more diffused than suggested above. Hence, it is wrong to portray those 
with power of domination as the only people with power and consider also weaker 
forces of resistance as forms of power. This is a departure from early models that 
generally maintain that power is in the hands of a rich few (Anderson, 1975).  
 
2.7.1  Dimensions of Power 
 
Power is divided into various dimensions in the literature. In the first dimension power 
is viewed in terms of behaviour in concrete situations. According to Dahl (1957), “A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B wouldn’t 
otherwise do”. This concept can easily be determined by observing who participates in a 
process. It focuses on a decision-making process in a formal setting, to the neglect of 
many informal unobservable situations in which power is exercised. Dahl’s approach 
was challenged by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) for neglecting “what does not happen” 
in decision-making settings, namely, those issues that are unwittingly neglected or 
consciously excluded from the agenda. In their view, the second dimension of power 
includes situations where individuals or groups work to limit the scope of public debate 
and decision-making to those issues that are relatively harmless to themselves, i.e. that 
do not damage their own interests.  
 
Lukes (1974) proposed that power has three dimensions. He called the two already 
mentioned above "overt" and "covert", respectively, but argued that they were limited to 
those forms of power that could be seen. He introduced a third "hidden" dimension, in 
which power makes existing social, economic and political relations seem natural and 
therefore shapes the ways that the powerless perceive their wants: “A exercises power 
over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interest.”. In this view, power is 
not always associated with conflict, as people without power may not even know they 
are under the influence of power. So it is possible for values, interests, and rules 
adopted by networks to be a product of power influences. 
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Barnett and Duval (2005) recently extended Lukes' taxonomy to give "four faces of 
power". In compulsory power, one actor directly controls another, as in Lukes' overt 
dimension.  In institutional power, actors indirectly control others by setting rules, as in 
Lukes' covert dimension. In productive power, domination is achieved by capturing 
people's thought processes through language. This interprets Lukes' hidden dimension 
in a poststructuralist way, drawing on the work of Foucault (1978), who claimed that 
power "is productive in that it shapes reality". The new fourth face is "structural power", 
in which actors control others by virtue of their membership of social groups. 
 
2.7.2  The Place of Power in Network Interaction 
 
Power is a major factor to be implicated in the process of institutionalization. Although 
some contemporary discussions about networks and institutions often ignore the 
question of power, the author believes that the power of actors within the network is an 
important element. The power effect within networks can explain aspects of 
institutional outcomes. As actors in the action arena are constantly involved in processes 
to define and redefine each other’s interests, they variously bring power to bear in order 
to enrol other actors in the pursuit of their own interests.  
 
In the first place, power can play a role in bringing actors into the network. Since 
networks are not pre-existent, it is possible for some actors to be enrolled in a network 
without their active knowledge. Privileged actors can create a network by co-opting and 
coordinating the interests of other actors (Rydin, 2007). Central to this process is the 
concept of entanglements. Entanglement is based on the idea that interactions may not 
necessarily arise from direct or physical contact, but that “two (or more) entities, 
spatially separated and canonically considered causally disconnected, are entangled if 
an interaction with one of them can influence the other one, without in any way directly 
interacting with it'' (Garton et al., 1997). This can be done by making the actors believe 
that their interests will be met within the network. Enrolled actors will remain as long as 
they believe that their interests are being satisfied. If the contrary should happen, 
however, they might disrupt the status-quo by trying to introduce new institutions, 
which might be met with resistance. This underscores the importance of an actor’s 
interest in the action arena and institutionalization. According to Ostrom (2008), as 
actors learn more about the outcome of their own and others’ actions within a particular 
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situation, they may change norms and strategies leading to better or worse outcomes for 
themselves and the relevant environment. 
 
Efforts to enrol other actors’ interests may be aided by the use of power (control and 
resistance), which can be confrontational. According to Fligstein (2001) institution-
building moments follow from crises of existing groups, either in their attempts to 
produce stable interactions or when their current rules no longer serve their purposes. 
When things are going smoothly and there is cooperation between different actors, 
institutions appears to be stable, but when the interest of any actor is not met, then there 
is the possibility for institutional change. Also, power can be used as an instrument of 
coercion or inducement to embed others into one’s interests. While privileged actors 
may use power in such a way, less privileged actors may continue to adopt resistance or 
rebellion in order to push their own interests.  
 
Within networks, it is important to view power as relational and not fixed or deposited 
in one actor. Rather, it depends on the stability of a dominant relation, i.e. A has power 
because he is related to B. The reason it often seems as though power is located in some 
central figure or institution (like the government), is because that resource has been 
stabilized in that relationship over time (Allen, 2003). This can change through ongoing 
processes of translation. It can be linked to the idea of a “hybrid collective of people and 
things” (Callon and Law, 1995), which refers to the relations and their heterogeneity as 
being really important, and not the things in themselves. This shows that in some cases 
emphasis should be laid on the relations rather than the individuals. In most parts of 
Africa, power is gradually moving from hierarchies into networks, so that when the top 
fails, the other members of the network are able to use power to enforce the institutions. 
Such an arrangement calls into question the process of governing, which is the 
relationship between the state and the society. In order to understand fully the process 
we need to examine the concept of the state as it is important in environmental 
governance.  
 
2.8  Concepts of the State 
 
Agreement among analysts regarding the importance for the state as the focus for the 
institutionalization process cannot be properly explained without an understanding of 
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the concept of the state (Pierson, 1996a; Ham et al., 1984). The centrality of the state 
derives from the assumption that all political societies ought to be united under a 
determinate rule of law. Since laws emanating from several authorities are likely to 
come into conflict, it follows that there can be no determinate law of the land unless 
there is, within that land, a supreme law-making authority whose institutions are final 
(Alapiki, 2004).  
 
2.8.1  Definition  
 
Although it is difficult to provide a meaning of “the state” (Pierson, 1996a), the concept 
has been used to capture the legitimate sovereign political entity that governs a society. 
At one end of the definitional spectrum, the state is identified with one or more features, 
such as organised coercive powers, defined spatial boundaries, and a formal judiciary. 
At the other end, there are definitions that regard the state as the institutional aspect of 
political interaction with no concrete structures because the state is assumed to be 
coterminous with society. Such a view suggests that the state is only one of many 
networks in the society in which it seeks to rule (Migdal, 1988).  
 
2.8.2  Types of State 
 
One can broadly identify two periods of state formation. The first occurred in the 
Middle Ages (Gorski, 2000) and is referred to here as the traditional state, while the 
second is what is now widely referred to as the modern state (Duverger, 1966; Pierson, 
1996a). The political condition against which the concept of the state emerged was an 
outgrowth of the Middle Ages. During this period the state was dualistic, having more 
than one person jointly responsible for governance. This was the case where the Pope 
and the Emperor were jointly responsible for the governance of Christendom, the 
former being the final authority in spiritual matters, while the latter in the secular sphere 
(Alapiki, 2004). A similar form of traditional state was and is still common in many 
parts of Africa and Asia. The priest is the custodian of spiritual matters, while the chief 
or king is the secular head of the community. It has been suggested, however, that in 
these traditional states, conflict and insecurity were endemic (Watkins, 1968). The rise 
of the modern state is traced to the conquest of territories across Europe in the 14
th
 
century (Dalberg and Acton, 1906; Strayer, 1970). In differentiating between the 
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traditional state and the modern state, (Strayer, 1970) suggested a move from 
authoritarian to democratic régimes, and used words such as competent and workable to 
describe the modern state. Neither of these two, however, captures how things work in 
Africa. Ake (1995) characterizes the state in Africa somewhat differently from these 
two. He sums up his views as follows:  
 
“The unique feature of the state in Nigeria, and this is typical of periphery 
capitalist institutions generally, is that the state has limited autonomy. That 
is, the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys little 
independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic class and 
so is immersed in the struggle for class … There may well be a case of 
talking of political administration or government simply instead of [the] 
State. It does not matter what we call it as long as we are clear about its 
objective character and how it differs from the pure ideas of [the] State” 
(Ake, 1995). 
 
This idea of a Nigerian state is not the same as a modern state, especially owing to its 
lack of scalar reach which was also emphasised by the Chinua Achebe when he said 
that: 
 
“In the affairs of the nation there was no owner, the laws of the village 
became powerless” (Achebe, 1966) 
 
Ake was referring to the modern state as the ideal when he mentioned the “pure ideas of 
[the] state”. However, it has also been argued that this form of the state does not work in 
Africa (Callaghy and Ravenhill, 1993; Van Arkadie, 1999). This is not to suggest that 
states in Africa cannot be ‘developmental’ in both their aspirations and economic 
performance (Mkandawire, 2001). William Reno has conceived of the African State as a 
“Shadow State”, with a form of personal rule, where decisions and actions are taken by 
an individual ruler and do not conform to a set of written laws and procedures, although 
these might be present (Reno, 1995). A Shadow State can rely on recognition of its 
legitimacy to undermine formal government institutions for the benefit, interests and 
powers of its rulers (Funke and Solomon, 2002). This calls into question the interests 
that are protected by the state.  
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2.8.3  Differing Perspectives of the State 
 
The projection of the state authority as supreme does not mean that the state always acts 
in the best interests of the society as a whole, although that clearly is the basis upon 
which the modern state is legitimized. Gill (2003) identified three perspectives of the 
state:  
 
1. The State as Partisan. The ‘partisan’ model sees the state as acting on its own behalf, 
pursuing its own institutional interests rather than the interests of any other group. This 
assumes that the state is autonomous from other forces in society. In pursuing its own 
interests, the state may simply override any opposition to it from within society. The 
key factor is that the state is a unitary actor that relentlessly pursues its own interests 
regardless of the interests of other social forces. In practice, it is more likely that the 
state must work with other forces in society to achieve its aims. This may require 
negotiation, bargaining and compromise, enabling others to achieve some of their aims 
in return for being able to gain some of the stakes.  
 
2. The State as Guardian. In this guise, the state acts not to advance its own interests but 
to stabilize the system overall. This conceives of the state as “an autonomous 
institutional force capable of rebalancing the social pressures upon it”. The state is seen 
as keeping in view the best interests of the system as a whole and reacting to 
developments to ensure that the system does not become destabilized. For advocates of 
this view the state is seen as an arena within which different forces, groups and 
individuals struggle for supremacy to implement their ideas. In any event, the state is 
essentially neutral, acting to protect the individual rights of those who constitute the 
community, seeking to stabilize the system and teaming up with various social forces in 
order to do so. 
 
3. The State as Instrument. In this view, the state is conceived as a pliable instrument, 
which is controlled by forces outside it in order to achieve their ends. In this light, there 
is little sense of state autonomy with the state captured and manipulated to meet the 
ends sought by those who capture it. Such a concept of the state fits with Ake’s (1995) 
description of the Nigerian state as having “limited autonomy”. Furthermore, it fits with 
the concept of a shadow state (Reno, 1995) 
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These contrasting views of the state call into question the structure of governance in a 
society, or in other words, how the state relates with other social forces. According to 
Alapiki (2004), there are three main prevailing means through which the state engages 
other societal actors in governance. The organic approach conceives the state as the 
critical factor in the public arena, directly influencing institutional processes and 
affecting outcomes. This approach tends to view the state as a unitary actor, 
autonomous from society, dominating the societal sphere. It is suggested that the 
strength of the state in an environment of conflict depends to a large extent on the social 
control it can exercise (Migdal, 1988). The configurational approach on the other hand 
suggests that the state is not directional or unitary, but provides a framework for social 
groups to form and in which certain types of political decisions are made possible, and 
where other structures of domination are circumscribed. The interactive approach sees 
the state as engaged in transactions between social groups and state institutions. These 
views of the state leave open questions, such as what activities the state engages in, 
according to what guidelines, with what consequences, and what legitimacy does the 
state have. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to understand the structure of 
governance in society further.  
 
2.9  Models of Governing  
 
The fact that the state may have other interests has resulted in an emphasis on the need 
for coordination between different actors for the governance of ecosystems. According 
to Pierre and Peters (2000), there are four structural models of governance. These are: 
governance as hierarchies, governance as markets, governance as communities and 
governance as networks. The term ‘governance’, however, may be inappropriate here, 
as it has been used by some authors to refer to a specific form of governing (Rhodes, 
1996). The term governing is used instead to emphasize the different types of processes 
concerned with the relationships between people and institutions in  government (Rose, 
1973). 
 
2.9.1  Governing by Hierarchies 
 
This form of governing emphasizes the distinction between the state and other organs of 
society. The state is portrayed as distinct from other entities in society. Bearing the 
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interests of the entire society at heart the state will govern by law through the use of a 
traditional command and control mechanism. In practice, however, society is no longer 
exclusively controlled by a central unit like the state. Instead, controlling devices are 
dispersed and material resources and information are shared by a multiplicity of 
divergent actors.  
 
With the advent of globalization and the end of the Cold War came a new vision of 
social governance, which suggested that the dominance of the direct command and 
control approach suggested by the traditional hierarchies is not compatible with reality 
(Giddens, 1998). There have been instances where central command over resources, 
which are scarce, and certain sectors, has been controlled through coordination between 
sectors of the society, especially in times of war. Even though central governments still 
maintain tight hierarchical control over certain resources especially in developing 
countries Pierre and Peters  (2000) hierarchies still yield to the pressures from the civil 
sector, i.e. from the interests of individuals and their need for personal freedom, choice 
and initiative.  
 
2.9.2  Governing by Market 
 
This approach to governing is based on the belief that unfettered markets would not 
only lead infallibly towards high growth but also that these markets, which are self-
contrived and self-enforcing entities free from politics, will solve problems in an 
efficient way (Pierre and Peters, 2000). It suggests that just like consumers have power, 
so does the market approach people in the place of an elected state official who may or 
may not jeopardise collective interest for self-interest. Thus, instead of electing officials 
(as in democracy), market forces will dictate the governing process. The market is 
responsible for optimal resource allocation.  
 
It is suggested that since states on their own are not the appropriate agents for 
environmental decision-making, there is need for policy reforms, which would ensure 
market conditions, which leave much more room to self-organization, prevail 
(Panayotou, 1993). Such a view has been responsible for the promotion of market-based 
policy instruments for environmental governance (Muradian and Rival, 2012).  
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However, actual developments in transition economies are in direct contrast to those 
suggested by this model, as many of these economies have experienced unprecedented 
economic slump, stagnation and slow growth for many years. Furthermore, market 
forces can lead to resource depletion and environmental problems, especially in 
environments of uncertainty, complex interactions and multiple stakeholders (Muradian 
and Rival, 2012). 
 
2.9.3  Governing by Communities 
 
Arguments supporting the idea that ecosystems could not be best governed either by the 
state alone on behalf of the people, or by private entities, whose property rights facilitate 
efficient market regulation, have led to a call for alternative governing regimes (Ostrom 
and Basurto, 2011).  
 
This model of governing argues that the formal state is too big and too bureaucratic to 
deal with issues, and even generates more problems than it purports to solve. Therefore, 
a governing structure without the government (Pierre and Peters, 2000) is suggested. It 
is based on the general idea that communities can, should and are better placed to 
resolve their common problems without state involvement (Etzioni 1995). As such, 
authority should be delegated to society.  
 
This model assumes that members of the community act in a humane, concerted and 
enlightened way. This idea that people are inherently communal, guided by a common 
set of values is far from realistic and, indeed, over-idealistic. This approach tends to 
exaggerate the level of consensus possible in a community and neglects heterogeneity 
and the possible opposition or disagreement within a community, which may lead to 
conflicts (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). Also, those who follow this approach do not 
provide a clear definition of the community for which political governance is to 
function. This approach fits with the calls for decentralization and community 
management of natural resources at low levels, but ignores the myriad of problems at 
the local level that remain unsolved.  
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2.9.4  Governing by Network 
 
The emergence of networks as a model of governing is a reaction to a change in 
practice, evident in the emergence of organised society, the decentralization and 
fragmentation of the state, the blurring of boundaries between the public and private 
spheres and the trans-nationalization of politics (Kenis and Schneider, 1991). Thus, 
rather than the traditional hierarchical command and control models of governance, 
which identify the state as ‘all powerful’, there is a network of public, private, and non-
profit organizations working together to deliver the services that the government itself 
once did in a process of "governing by network" (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004).  
Governing by network recognises that power is shared with other entities in the society 
in a co-governing arrangement. As such, a wide variety of actors (state, communities, 
non-governmental organizations and market entities) are involved in the governing 
process (Rhodes, 1996). The model has been described as more realistic, as it 
adequately captures the reality of governing processes (John, 2000). 
 
This model recognises the government as an active, non-neutral participant in the 
network. Based on the acknowledgement that power is unequally distributed among 
actors in a network, some authors have suggested that the state functions as a steering 
network (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; Kickert, 1995). While this is true to an extent, the 
steering of a network might only be possible in formal and not informal network 
settings through which the actual “rules in use” are developed. Therefore, understanding 
the role of state power within networks requires an understanding of the formality and 
informality of the network itself. By placing other actors on the same footing as the 
state, this model re-designs the foundations of decision-making in society. While in 
formal circumstances, the state can have higher scalar reach and be able to steer the 
network, informal networks are mostly beyond the state’s control.  
 
The expansion of stakeholder participation in development planning since the 1970s is 
symptomatic of the greater involvement of civil society by government in particular, 
that was fore-runner of the more autonomous activities of civil societies that are 
apparent in environmental governance. 
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2.10  Conclusion 
 
The literature reviewed in this chapter has provided rich accounts and several useful 
insights into the state of knowledge concerning the place of institutions and networks in 
environmental management. It is clear that networks and institutional processes have 
important implications for sustainable development. However, considerable progress in 
conceptualizing and explaining how institutions resist change, no consensus exists on 
how institutions actually change, especially when taking networks of actors into 
consideration. This gap exists in part because of a lack of conceptualization of the 
institutional process and the role of networks within it. Furthermore, existing 
institutional theories often are inadequate within the African context. 
 
Interesting questions to be asked, therefore, concern: (a) how institutions are 
established, maintained and changed, and (b) how the many and varied social, economic 
environmental and political institutions, both formal and informal, interact with each 
other, both within and between societies, in complementary and conflicting ways,  in 
order to promote or hinder environmental management.  
 
This review has shown that while there are a number of relevant contemporary models, 
they are missing an elaborate institutional approach for analysing the role of networks 
and institutions in managing complex socio-ecological systems, especially where 
relational factors are important.  
 
Existing theories have not paid adequate attention to the interaction between networks 
and institutions and what this means for the institutional process in environmental 
management. Institutional change must be analysed not only as a given, but as a 
component in the networks of actors and in relation to the numerous communication 
contents that bind these networks together. Of the three schools of new institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism allows for that combination of relational factors, as well as 
power relations that are highly relevant in this thesis. For this approach to be useful, 
however, there is a need for a framework that incorporates networks. Existing network 
theories have not adequately analysed the properties of both networks and their 
relationship to the institutional change process. In response to the literature review, as 
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mentioned previously, I will combine theories of institutional change with a more 
sociological network-driven methodology, in order to analyse institutions and networks.    
 
Creating institutions in order to meet the challenge of sustainability is arguably the most 
important task confronting society. It is also dauntingly complex. The notion that 
mutuality between institutions and networks should be explicitly addressed as part of 
the system of social interests is a contribution that this thesis will make to the discourse 
on environmental decision-making and governance. The next chapter draws on some of 
the literature reviewed above, in order to develop a new framework for the analysis of 
institutional change in a networked environment.  
 
There is need to take an entirely new approach for explaining institutional change by 
applying and extending insights gained from new institutionalism and network theories, 
which up until now had not been integrated to that end. A framework will be created 
that will portray how the formal and informal institutions of actors are intertwined. 
Many developing societies can gain from such an understanding and use the lessons 
learnt to surmount the challenges that stand in the way of the journey towards 
sustainable development.  
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CHAPTER 3   
METHODOLOGY  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter describes the methodology employed to achieve the research objectives set 
out in Chapter 1. Knowledge of institutional change is still embryonic, but different 
approaches have been grouped into 'design' and ‘evolution’ categories by Kingston and 
Caballero (2009), who argued that "building theories in which processes of evolution 
and design are integrated within a broader framework is a priority for current and future 
research". This chapter aims to fill this gap by describing a new Network 
Communication Framework which also addresses another neglected area, namely how 
communication between networks influences institutional change.  
 
3.2  A Network Communication Framework  
 
3.2.1  Rationale  
 
The sustainable management of environments is a major challenge confronting many 
societies, especially in Africa. The repeated actions that constitute institutions (Ostrom, 
2005; Crawford and Ostrom, 2005) play a major role in determining the sustainability 
of environmental management (Young, 2008). Some institutions lead to sustainable 
management, while others lead to environmental degradation. How institutions change 
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to improve sustainability is poorly understood (Phillips et al., 2004; Gatzweiler, 2003). 
Indeed, current theories of institutions are better at explaining how institutions resist 
change than explaining how they themselves change (Hall and Taylor, 1996). It is 
common for laws and other formal institutions to be imposed exogenously, e.g. when a 
state changes its policy and imposes institutions to implement this. This is what 
Kingston and Caballero (2009) refer to as "purposeful design". Yet, the complex 
evolutionary processes in which such institutions are adopted, partially or not at all by 
state and non-state actors, and resisted by their informal institutions, or everyday 
practices, are still poorly understood. 
 
Another complication is that the sustainability of management of any environment 
generally depends on the institutions of numerous actors, who influence one another and 
in turn are influenced by many more actors (Brock and Carpenter, 2007; Rydin and 
Falleth, 2006). On a practical level, these actors interact with each other in a number of 
ways (formally and informally), which present opportunities for environmental 
management to be influenced. Not surprisingly, the impact of group heterogeneity on 
the ability to sustain institutions for community-based resource management is an 
important research area (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). Explanations of institutional 
change must inevitably group all these actors, and this leads to simplification. As the 
theory of policy implementation is still embryonic (Schofield, 2001), a good place to 
begin conceptualizing institutional change involving multiple actors may well be state-
of-the art frameworks for explaining policy change. Thus, the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and Discourse Coalition Framework cluster actors competing to formulate 
policy - and indirectly formal institutions - into coalitions based on shared beliefs and 
values (Sabatier, 1998) or discourses (Hajer, 1995a), respectively. One limitation of this 
approach is that it assumes that individual or group actors are discrete entities, whereas 
many are often members of multiple networks, especially in Africa and other parts of 
the developing world (Morse and McNamara, 2012). So the next advance in 
understanding how multiple actors formulate policies and institutions could well depend 
on new techniques to explain influences from ‘actors-in-networks’. 
 
Making this advance involves a further challenge, because the theory of how the  
activities of actors in networks generate institutions is also underdeveloped, despite 
calls for research in this field (Nee and Ingram, 1998) and a recognition that networks 
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and institutions "mutually shape one another" (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2007). Any 
improved model of institutional change should show how interrelations between 
institutions and networks influence the dynamics of institutions. The advance will also 
have wider implications since understanding the dynamics of network processes is said 
to be the "next frontier" (Barabási, 2009).  
 
A new Network Communication Framework (NCF) is outlined here to help to fill these 
gaps. Building on concepts developed in social network analysis to describe 
communication within networks through various 'flows' (Borgatti et al., 2009), such as 
information and institutions, it assumes that communication between networks involves 
similar processes, and is affected by communication within networks too. As well as 
combining different flows that were previously analysed separately (Kosfeld et al., 
2006), the NCF also allows for interactions between flows, leading to more complex 
effects that mirror real-life situations, especially in an African context. 
 
3.2.2  Actors in Networks 
 
Taking a network approach allows the analysis of how the numerous actors engaged in 
managing any environment interact and influence each other. The Network 
Communication Framework follows the social network analysis (SNA) approach to 
social network conceptualization (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), in which a network is 
"a set of actors (e.g. persons, teams, organizations, concepts, etc) ... often called nodes 
.... connected by a set of ties" (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). This definition is typical of 
SNA's structuralist approach, as it does not differentiate between nodes, which are 
structurally defined, and the actors which fill these nodes. In contrast, in culturally 
oriented research in the field of relational sociology, networks are "culturally 
constituted processes of communicative interactions" (Mische, 2003). Here "culture and 
structure, language and relational ties are fused within a socio-cultural setting" (Mützel, 
2009).  This second approach is a subset of a connectionist stream of research which 
focuses on flows through ties, rather than on how nodes and ties are configured. 
 
Social networks are generally approached in two ways (Garton et al., 1997). First, by an 
ego-centred approach, which considers relations reported by a focal node. Second, by a 
total network approach, based on some specific criterion of population boundaries. In 
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principle, every network is linked to the total network covering the whole of a society, 
but empirical studies usually focus on partial networks with definable boundaries 
(Mitchell, 1969). In the ego-centred approach to boundary definition, a network is 
centred on a particular actor or node (Scott, 1991) and has members (also referred to as 
alters) defined by their relations with the ego (also called the focal node). This approach 
provides a way of examining communication among nodes (egos and their alters), and 
is able to  show the range and breadth of connectivity for each node (Garton et al., 
1997). These positions emerge through analysis of network data which can be mapped 
and measured (Smith, 2001). In a social network diagram, nodes are the points and ties 
are the lines:  a line between two nodes will suggest that a tie exists between the two 
actors. The resulting system of points and lines indicates the nature of structure of the 
total network. Three key measures of centrality in a network are: degree centrality, 
which is the number of ties to a given node; betweenness centrality, which is the 
probability that any node features on the path between two randomly chosen nodes; and 
closeness centrality, which is the sum of distances from one node to all others 
(Freeman, 1979). An alternative approach is to select rules of inclusion, based on 
particular definitional foci, e.g. attributes shared by actors; transactions between actors; 
or specific events or activities (Laumann et al., 1983). 
 
3.2.3  Communication Between and Within Networks  
 
In social network analysis, a tie “establishes a linkage between a pair of actors (or 
nodes)” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  The ties that link nodes in a network are 
commonly divided into four main kinds: (a) similarities, such as location, membership 
and attributes; (b) social relations, such as kinship; (c) interactions, such as talking, 
helping, harming etc., and (d) flows, such as information, institutions, personnel, 
resources and power (Borgatti et al., 2009). 
 
Ties (c) and (d) describe transactions between nodes in a network (Tichy et al., 1979) 
or, from a cultural perspective, communication. Interactions refer to the type of 
communication, e.g. talking, and flows to the content of communication, e.g. 
information, institutions etc. One or more of these transactions can be observed in any 
network. For instance a pair of actors talking can also be exchanging resources at the 
same time. Transactions can serve multiple functions, e.g. mutual understanding; 
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ensuring that one actor complies with another's wishes; and joint activities. As is 
discussed in a later section (3.2.6), communication between state and non-state 
networks is an excellent arena to explore the myriad functions of transactions in the 
institutional change process. 
 
It is assumed in the new framework that communication between nodes in different 
networks can be described in a similar way to communication between nodes within the 
same network. Thus, members of different networks could live in the same village, 
belong to the same family, and employ the same types and content of communication. A 
single actor may also belong to many networks. For example, a government official 
who is a member of the state network may belong to a professional network and also a 
non-state traditional network by virtue of being a chief in his community.   
 
Communication within a network can even be seen as a special case of communication 
between networks, since exogenous influences linked to ties between pairs of nodes in 
different networks are influenced by endogenous influences linked to ties with other 
nodes in the same network (Calvo-Armengol et al., 2011). Flows between networks 
may be unidirectional or multidirectional, while sustained multidirectional flows are 
described as coupled (following Liu et al., 2007). 
  
Communication between networks may be (a) direct and interpersonal or (b) indirect 
and impersonal. Direct communication involves a member of one network meeting a 
member of another. On some occasions the node is common to both networks, and 
called a ‘boundary spanner’ or ‘broker’ node (Allen, 1984; Burt, 2004); on others the 
networks may communicate via a mediator who is a member of neither network and 
often a member of another. For instance, in the interaction between a modern state 
network and a traditional network, a member of a non-governmental organization 
network could be a mediator. The effectiveness of communication to the entire network 
naturally depends on the effectiveness of flows to other nodes. Indirect communication 
involves members of two networks which are spatially separated and causally 
disconnected and yet influence each other e.g. through the mass media, with varying 
effectiveness. Members of traditional networks in remote areas of a country with poor 
access to mass media may not be aware of government policies on the environment or 
of institutions promulgated to realize these until they meet a member of a state network, 
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e.g. a forest guard, trying to enforce these institutions. However, where indirect 
communication lead to ties, they are important as they promote an understanding of 
communication flows.  
 
3.2.4  Principal Categories of Communication Content 
 
Observing communication flows between actors yields empirical data that give 
important insights into relationships between nodes in a network, the overall behaviour 
of a network, and the actors involved.  Positivist studies restrict their inferences only to 
such data, whereas post-positivist studies gain insights by looking at what lies behind 
these data (Fischer, 2003). In the post-positivist Network Communication Framework, 
each category of communication content is assumed to possess multiple levels of 
attributes, which may be inferred from observations. The four categories of 
communication content of most importance to this framework are information, 
institutions, resources and power.  
 
3.2.4.1  Information 
 
The multiple attributes of information include texts, language, narratives and discourse. 
Information transmitted from one node to another consists of written or spoken texts 
conveyed in a common language. From the texts of an actor may be extracted, or 
inferred, the narrative of each actor concerning a given phenomenon. A narrative is a 
set of statements giving a meaningful totality of past and future events (Barton, 2001). 
Narratives are constructed by each actor within the framework of their discourse - "a 
specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced 
and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities" (Hajer, 1995a). (The term 'discourse' is understood in 
different ways, e.g. in the 'Q methodology' its meaning is closer to that of a narrative, as 
defined here  (Takshe et al., 2010)).  
 
So even though two actors may exchange information in a common language, such as 
English, each may understand the same term or text to mean different things, depending 
on their discourse. In most cases, each network has its own discourse. This underscores 
the importance of discourse in the process of institutional change (Antoniades, 2010; 
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Lawrence and Phillips, 2004). Despite this, relatively little conceptual and empirical 
work has focused on how the discourses of actors are involved in institutional change 
processes. By identifying and explaining discourse as an important communication 
content, this framework improves on attempts by much of institutional theory to analyse 
society as “a society without language” (Breton, 1991).  
 
3.2.4.2  Institutions 
 
Institutions are "enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, 
norms and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world" (Crawford and Ostrom, 
2005). Their attributes include formal and informal rules, norms, levels and meanings. 
They are also communicated in networks, e.g. as actors attempt, or are asked, to 
successively reproduce institutions established in nodes at superior scales. Institutions 
are fundamental to any network, which needs rules of inclusion, and Ostrom (2005) 
identified six other generic working rules. Nevertheless, links between networks and 
institutions have received remarkably little study (Beckert, 2010). Ostrom (2005) also 
proposed a hierarchy of levels of institutions that can affect any scale. 
 
Institutions are conceived differently by three schools of new institutionalism (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). The rational choice school focuses on formal institutions, treating them 
as rules that constrain individual and collective choices. Actors take rational decisions 
and their preferences are set exogenously (North, 1990). Historical institutionalism also 
focuses on formal institutions, but people do not follow rules like automatons, and their 
preferences are not set exogenously but socially constructed (March and Olsen, 1989). 
Nevertheless, path-dependency can still occur (Thelen, 1999). In sociological 
institutionalism, institutions include both formal institutions and informal institutions 
that arise from everyday practices, become rules in use, and can undermine formal 
institutions. Of the three schools, sociological institutionalism places most stress on a 
web of informal institutions (Nee and Ingram, 1998). It is also distinctive in providing 
“frames of meaning” that guide human actions and for emphasizing the emergence of 
institutional practices in networks (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Institutions form “symbolic 
and behavioural systems" that create meaning for individuals and shape their discourses 
and preferences (Scott, 1994). The Network Communication Framework is most 
influenced by sociological institutionalism, since while informal institutions play an 
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important role in any social arena, in Africa they are often more important than the 
formal institutions (Teye, 2008), which  may not even be able to function properly 
without their informal counterparts (Atieno, 2001; Bratton, 2007).  
 
3.2.4.3  Material Resources 
 
The idea that social networks convey material resource flows has received considerable 
attention in the literature (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). However, environmental 
management debates tend to revolve around resource inequality between networks, 
while little attention is paid to how material resources link networks. Various material 
resources, e.g. money, food and other natural resources, flow within networks, often in 
multiple directions, e.g. as payments for services and goods. According to Actor 
Network Theory, the flows of resources consolidate the alignment of networks achieved 
by other flows (Latour, 2005), but since resources are already included in social 
network analysis this proposition need not be exclusive to Actor Network Theory. In a 
structuralist conception, Burt (1992) understood material resources primarily in terms of 
the pursuit of instrumental objectives (i.e. to influence a target actor). However, in this 
framework resources also serve relational objectives, in which case they affect both the 
target and the source (Burleson and MacGeorge, 2011). 
  
3.2.4.4  Power 
 
Power is "the production in and through social relations of effects that shape the 
capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate" (Barnett and Duval, 
2005), and can be exercised through other flows, e.g. by imposing discourses and 
institutions, and providing resources. According to Barnett and Duval (2005), there are 
four types of power: compulsory power, in which one actor directly controls another; 
structural power, in which groups of actors control other groups; institutional power, in 
which actors indirectly control others by setting rules; and productive power, in which 
domination is achieved by capturing people's thought processes through language. 
 
Power has been widely conceived as a means of control, whereby it is concentrated in 
an actor and used to control other actors (Kellert et al., 2000). This leads to the notion 
that some actors are powerful and others are powerless. However, it has been suggested 
56 
 
 
that power is fluid and spreads through society (Foucault, 1980). Here power is not only 
held by some people to dominate others, but powerless actors also have some space to 
exercise their own form of power, even if only as a form of resistance. This aligns with 
scholars who have suggested that power is not expressed only as a means of control, but 
also of resistance (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). 
 
3.2.5  Dimensions of Communication Between Networks 
 
All networks in an arena influence each other through the contents of their 
communication, whether they are aware of it or not.  As the basis for a new integrated 
framework for explaining the contribution of design and evolution to institutional 
change, in response to the call by Kingston and Caballero (2009), each communication 
can be considered to have four dimensions: direction, autonomy, adaptation and reach.  
 
3.2.5.1  Direction 
 
The first dimension is direction (Fig. 3.1). Unidirectional communication involves 
imposition, e.g. when a state network tries to impose its discourse or institutions 
(communication content) on a non-state network. It can do this through the various 
mechanisms involved in any power relation, e.g. force, manipulation and persuasion 
(Wrong, 1995). Force involves the use of threats, e.g. the use of police, prosecution etc., 
or of symbolic forms of violence (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977), e.g. stigmatization and 
degradation. In the case of manipulation one actor will strategically impose upon 
another without explicitly making him/her aware of their actual intentions (Easton, 
1958). Persuasion achieves compliance by the presentation of rational arguments that 
appeal to the subject (Wrong, 1995).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. A Diagram Depicting Possible Directions of Communication. 
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Multidirectional communication allows two networks to influence each other. The 
simplest form of multidirectional communication is reciprocity. In coupled relationships 
(Liu  et al., 2007), there are sustained two way interactions which reinforce network 
roles and allows mutual learning, leading to improved coordination and decision 
making, and even to win-win situations. 
 
3.2.5.2  Adaptation 
 
Adaptation measures the degree to which one network accepts flows from another 
without modification. A non-adaptive response (Fig. 3.2) involves full acceptance or 
rejection without modification, but an adaptive response involves some modification of 
flows within the network or those from another network. Adaptation may occur in one 
network or it can occur in both. Adaptation in one network can be seen as a form of 
organizational learning, in which the experiences of some nodes in the network that 
constitutes an organization lead to changes in the institutions reproduced by all nodes 
(Crossan et al., 1999). Adaptation in both networks involves mutual learning. The 
adaptation of communication contents of a network by another represents a unique 
avenue to understand institutional change. Trust and respect towards each other are 
factors that can influence adaptation.  
 
3.2.5.3  Autonomy 
 
Autonomy measures the degree to which endogenous communication within a network 
can resist exogenous transactions from another network. Strong and mutually 
reinforcing (or 'aligning') transactions within a network increase autonomy relative to 
influences from other networks, and affect the likelihood of changing in response to the 
latter. A network having weak ties with other networks, coupled with limited boundary 
spanners, will show high autonomy. 
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Figure 3.2. An Example of Adaptation in Communication. 
 
3.2.5.4  Reach  
 
Reach measures the extent of an influence from a node or network. A strong state would 
have high scalar reach down a network corresponding to the chain of command of its 
organizations, e.g. the headquarters of a state forestry department could ensure that its 
policies are followed perfectly even in the most remote forests in the country (Fig. 3.3). 
Scalar reach also has influences across the hierarchy of another network i.e. from the 
ultimate authority to the lowest ranks of the network. Where there is low scalar reach, 
state influence may be restricted only to a segment of the network e.g. national scale. A 
strong state would also have a high networked reach, so even if it relies on the activities 
of several intermediate networks to implement its policies, the latter are still realized 
perfectly.  
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Figure 3.3. High And Low Scalar Reach in Network Communication. 
 
3.2.6  Combinations of Dimensions of Communication 
 
The four dimensions of communication may be combined to predict a range of different 
outcomes for communications between networks. None of these outcomes are mutually 
exclusive and in many African societies they exist in various complex combinations.  
 
3.2.6.1  Two Networks 
 
The simplest combinations involve communications between two networks that vary in 
direction, autonomy, adaptation and scalar reach. For a developing country with a 
modern state network and a non-state network centred in traditional society (Fig. 3.4 
and Fig. 3.5) the combinations include: 
 
1. In unidirectional, non-autonomous and non-adaptive communication, a modern 
state network with high scalar reach could impose flows of information, institutions etc. 
on a traditional network. Thus, a state forestry department could ensure that non-state 
actors at all scales of a country comply with forestry policy and regulations. This 
describes ideal national policy implementation (Fig. 3.4d and Fig. 3.5d).  
 
2. In unidirectional, autonomous and non-adaptive communication, even if a 
modern state network has moderate scalar reach the traditional network is not passive, 
and therefore successfully resists such attempts at impositions. This describes what 
happens today in many developing countries (Fig. 3.4c and Fig. 3.5c).
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Key: IS = Institution of the state; IT = Institution of the traditional network; IST = Institution of state and traditional network; INT = New traditional institutions 
 
Figure 3.4. Diagram Depicting Communication between Two Networks Based on the Network Communication Framework.  
A. Multidirectional, adaptive, endogenous state with poor scalar reach.  
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In some cases, the strength of traditional institutions is so great the direction of 
communication is reversed. Then a modern state network with poor scalar reach could 
be dominated by a traditional network, as with a neo-patrimonial traditional network 
headed by the Head of State, which is perfectly aligned and reaches all the way down to 
local scale. The result is a 'shadow state' (Reno, 1995, 2000) that subverts the stated 
policy of the modern state (Grainger and Konteh, 2007). 
 
3.  In multidirectional and adaptive endogenous communication, in which a 
modern state network has poor scalar reach, a traditional network can assert its 
autonomy and adapt to the virtual absence of the state at local scale by devising its own 
institutions for sustainable management (Fig. 3.4a and Fig. 3.5a). This describes the 
widespread autonomous management of common pool resources by local communities 
identified by Ostrom (2005).  
 
4.  In multidirectional and adaptive exogenous communication in which a modern 
state network has moderate scalar reach, interactions between state and non-state 
networks could vary state institutions for mutual benefit (Fig. 3.4b and Fig. 3.5b). This 
combination is still poorly understood, and therefore is a particular focus of this study. 
Figure 3.5. Communication between Two Networks Based on the Network 
Communication Framework. 
A. Multidirectional and 
adaptive endogenous 
communication in which 
modern state network has 
poor scalar reach.  
B. Multidirectional and 
adaptive exogenous 
communication in which 
modern state has moderate 
scalar reach.  
 
C. Unidirectional and non-
adaptive communication in 
which traditional network 
resists imposition.  
D. Unidirectional and non- 
adaptive communication in 
which modern state has high 
scalar reach.  
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3.2.6.2  Three Networks 
 
Other combinations are possible when three networks communicate. For example, in 
multidirectional and adaptive communication a state network with moderate scalar 
reach and moderate networked reach could vary institutions through interacting with a 
commercial non-state network, and institutions could be further modified as the 
commercial network interacts with a non-commercial non-state network. These 
relationships could be reciprocal, i.e. each variation occurs independently of the other, 
or coupled, i.e. change occurs because interactions between the state network, 
commercial state network and non-commercial state network are all linked together. 
 
3.2.6.3  Mutual Learning and Mediation 
 
Some pairs of networks adapt by communicating with one another directly and 
undergoing mutual learning (see above). Others require mediation to adapt, i.e. by 
communicating with one another through a third party. One form of mediation involves 
a boundary spanner (Allen, 1977) or broker node (Burt, 2004) which is common to 
both networks and speaks both their languages.  Thus, a state agricultural organization 
may employ extension workers who speak its language and that of the farmers 
(Palacpac, 2009). Other networks may require an intermediate actor that is part of a 
different network. This would be a special case of the above three network arrangement, 
in which the intermediate actor merely facilitates the adaptation. In the regular three 
network arrangement mentioned above, the second network can also facilitate an 
adaptation of the third network that is in its own interests. 
 
3.2.7  Overlaps Between Network Flows in Adaptive Communication Outcomes 
 
When multiple networks, each with at least moderate scalar and networked reach,  
communicate in an adaptive manner within an 'action arena', to use Ostrom's (2005) 
term, the Network Communication Framework predicts that flows in each network are 
modified accordingly (Fig. 3.2). 
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3.2.7.1  Single Flows 
 
The common flows of institutions, discourses, resources etc. in each network will be 
modified to be consistent with mutual adaptation by the two networks. Thus: 
 
1.  A non-state network will acquire some of the institutions promoted by a 
modern state network, but not all of them, and the modern state network's institutions 
will be modified to allow for this.  
 
2. The common discourse of a non-state network will also expand in scope to 
include some of the terms found in the discourse of the modern state network, and vice 
versa. In his Discourse Coalition Framework, Hajer (1995a) identified meta-narratives, 
which he called "story lines", that are consistent with the discourses of all members of a 
discourse coalition, even though each actor constructs a single narrative within the 
framework of their discourse.  Although story lines are consistent with a range of 
similar discourses, in an adaptive situation it would be possible for one actor’s 
expanded discourse to be consistent with a much wider range of narratives, and this will 
be reflected in the texts communicated by that actor. 
 
3.  Whereas a modern state will normally pay employees of state organizations 
regular wages, in an adaptive situation in which flows of resources are multidirectional 
and multi-featured, state employees may make monetary payments to superiors in the 
state network, and receive food or other resources from the network as well as wages. 
 
3.2.7.2  Multiple Flows 
 
In practice, changes in flows of different categories of communication content will be 
synergistic and not independent. Hajer (1995a) has already proposed that discourses and 
institutions mutually reproduce one another, so it is entirely expected that in adaptive 
communication changes in institutions and discourses will be interdependent rather than 
compartmentalized. It would be consistent with this for changes in institutions, 
discourses and resources to be interdependent too. This has implications for the 
empirical observation of adaptation, since mutual adaptation of institutions would be 
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apparent not only in observed changes in practices but also in changes in discourses and 
resource flows. 
 
3.2.8  Advances Made by This Methodology 
 
The Network Communication Framework fills important gaps in explaining institutional 
change, how multiple networks communicate with each other, and how the dynamics of 
networks and institutions are interrelated.  
 
The framework is consistent with other phenomena that are already recognized,  such as 
poor implementation of state policies,  the existence of shadow states,  and the 
autonomous construction of institutions  for common pool management by local 
communities. This provides support to its prediction of the possibilities for adaptive 
communication between two networks.  
 
The framework is also interesting for generalizing Hajer's (1995a) claim about the 
mutual reproduction of discourses and institutions to include other categories of 
communication content, and for showing that relationships between discourses, 
narratives and storylines may be more complex than Hajer initially envisaged. 
 
3.2.9  Testing the Network Communication Framework  
 
Testing the NCF is an absolutely essential part of its development. Testing will help me 
ascertain the usefulness of the framework, check for errors, and point towards areas for 
improvements.  
 
To test the NCF two important factors are essential – appropriate location and data. 
Since the NCF is a generic framework it could be tested in any location where networks 
are important, and multiple interacting actors are exchanging within and between 
networks the various communication contents highlighted in section 3.2.4. The NCF 
could be applied in any country and in any sector. However, in this thesis it will be 
tested in a developing country, and in an 'environment of conflict' where continual 
interactions within and between networks provide a rich source of data. In a developing 
country conflicts should occur between modern society and traditional society, and the 
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modern state will exhibit a wide spectrum in the various dimensions of communication, 
e.g. from poor to high scalar reach.  
 
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria perfectly fits this description. In Africa, networks are 
central to daily living, and the Niger Delta is an environment that is deeply contested by 
various networks. The next chapter provides an introduction to the Niger Delta and the 
people who live there. Chapter 5 describes the methods used to collect the data needed 
to test the NCF in the Niger Delta. 
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CHAPTER 4   
THE ENVIRONMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE NIGER DELTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
To understand the mechanisms relating to the management of the Niger Delta Wetlands, 
it is imperative to have a clear understanding of the geographical conditions within 
Nigeria. This chapter describes the key geographical features of Nigeria (in general) and 
the Niger Delta (specifically). This is used to illustrate the status of wetland 
management institutions in Nigeria as it affects the Niger Delta Wetlands. The first part 
of this chapter presents a compendium of the geography of Nigeria. The trends and 
status of wetlands management in Nigeria with emphasis on the Niger Delta Wetlands 
are then described. The third part situates the Niger Delta in the wider Nigerian context 
by presenting relevant background information describing the regions, the people and 
their history and culture, physical features, and the socio-economic and political profile. 
Finally, an overview is presented of wetland institutions in Nigeria. 
 
4.2  Overview of Nigeria 
 
4.2.1  Location and Land Area 
 
Nigeria, a country bounded by Cameroon and Chad Republic in the east, Niger 
Republic in the north, Benin Republic in the west and the Gulf of Guinea to the south 
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(Fig. 4.1), is Africa’s most populous country and the seventh most populous country in 
the world with a population over 160 million (United Nations, 2011; The Economist, 
2011). Nigeria covers a land area of 923,768 km
2
 enclosed within latitude 4º 1' N and 
13º 9' N; longitude 3º 2' E and 14º 30' E. The widest distance from east to west is about 
900 km and from north to south is about 1,050 km. 
 
4.2.2  Geology and Relief 
 
Over the greater part of the country, surface rocks are those of the pre-Cambrian 
basement complex. The most recent deposits include the sand bars and creeks of the 
coast, the deposits of the Niger Delta area and the estuarine areas of the Cross River 
(Buchanan, 1955). The topography of Nigeria rises steadily inland to some 2000 feet. 
According to Okpoko (1998) there are seven relief regions in Nigeria. These include the 
creeks and lagoons, the swampy Niger Delta, the coastal plains, the river basin troughs 
of the valleys created by the Rivers of Niger, Benue, Gongola, Cross, Kaduna, Sokoto 
and Anambra, the inselberg landscapes of major hills, the Chad basin-areas reaching up 
to 300 m above sea level, and the eastern highlands, a chain of hills with altitude 
varying between 600 m and 2,000 m. Nigeria has three distinct drainage systems, 
including the short swift-flowing coastal rivers (Ogun, Benin the Imo, Cross and 
Anambra Rivers), the inland drainage system of the Chad basin (Yobe and its 
tributaries, Ngadda and Mbuli Rivers) and the long plateau rivers (Niger-Benue 
system). Nigeria contains about a quarter of the Chad basin and 10% of  Lake Chad 
itself (Akintola, 1982).  
 
4.2.3  Climate and Vegetation 
 
Because of its location just north of the Equator, the humid tropical climate in Nigeria is 
associated with the movement of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) which 
controls the tropical maritime air mass (moisture-laden south-west winds blowing from 
the Gulf of Guinea) and the tropical continental air mass (dry and dusty north-east 
winds from the Sahara Desert) (Odekunle et al., 2005). When the ITCZ (the zone of 
convergence of the two air masses) is to the south of the Equator, north-east winds 
prevail over Nigeria, thus producing dry-season conditions. Conversely, with the 
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movement of the ITCZ into the Northern Hemisphere, the rain-bearing south-west 
winds prevails far inland to bring rainfall during the wet season. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Nigeria, Showing the Niger Delta Region. 
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The result is that there is a prolonged rainy season in the far south, while the far north 
undergoes long dry periods annually. The climate of Nigeria, therefore, is normally 
explained in terms of its division into two seasons, the dry season and the wet (or rainy) 
season, the period, length and severity of which vary from the northern to southern part 
of the country. In the drier northern half of the country, temperatures often rise above 
40
o
C in the dry season (between October and April) when there is very little or no 
rainfall with a very low relative humidity. The wet season in Northern Nigeria is 
between July and September. However, the wetter southern part of Nigeria experiences 
two rainy seasons with maximum rainfall in May/June and again in October. Two 
relatively drier periods between December and February and between July and 
September are experienced in the south. Southern locations in the coastal/delta region 
experience an almost all year round rainfall with mean annual rainfall ranging from 
2,000 mm to 4,000 mm. Three major vegetation types can be recognized in Nigeria, the 
swamp forests of the coast belt, the high forests of the humid south and the savannahs of 
the sub-humid belt and the North.  
 
4.2.4  Land and People of Nigeria 
 
Nigeria was formed in 1914 through the amalgamation of two British colonies - the 
Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Northern Nigeria Protectorate. 
However, the history of the people who constitute the present day Nigeria dates back 
about 8,000 years (Breunig, 1996; Falola and Heaton, 2008). Although often portrayed 
as a country with racial and cultural uniformity, Nigeria has an incredible diversity of 
communities and cultures because of the many ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups 
that live within its borders. The country is made up of over 250 ethnic groups speaking 
over 500 languages and thousands of dialects (Akinyele, 2001; Oginni et al., 2010; 
Attah, 1987). The British conquest did not only put ethnic groups with separate and 
independent histories together, it split the country in such a way that one ethnic group 
was dominant in each region. For political and administrative exigencies, these people 
with diverse cultural and religious backgrounds were put into three major nuclei: the 
Hausa-Fulani dominated in the North, the Ibos in the East and the Yorubas in the West. 
Groups which had conflicts long before the arrival of the British were grouped together 
and one made the lord over the other.  
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This regional division subsequently became the basis for revenue allocation and 
administration which has become one of the most contentious issues in Nigeria, often 
taking ethnic dimensions because wide developmental contrasts exist within and 
between the areas. Numerous authors have argued that these various ethnic groups 
never considered themselves part of the same culture (Chandra, 2006; Suberu, 2001) 
and that this general lack of Nigerian nationalism, coupled with an ever-changing and 
often ethnically biased national leadership, have led to a civil war and several internal 
ethnic confrontations between or among members of different ethnic groups (Curry, 
2001). The Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Nigerian-Biafran war, broke out as a 
result of the economic, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions that led the south-eastern 
province of Nigeria to unilaterally declare itself as the independent Republic of Biafra. 
Over the two-and-a-half years (6 July 1967–15 January 1970) that the conflict lasted, 1 
million civilians died in fighting and from famine. Although the Niger Delta region 
geographically fell under the jurisdiction of the secessionists, its people fought on the 
side of the Nigerian Government (Boro, 1982).  
 
Diversity of religious beliefs adds a further element to the cultural pattern of Nigeria. 
Nigeria comprises a number of religions, mainly Christianity, Islam and the traditional 
beliefs (such as Igbe religion in the Niger Delta). Before the foray of missionaries, 
different ethnic groups of Nigeria practised different religions, which were finally 
overpowered by Islam and Christianity. Islam mainly dominated the northern part of 
Nigeria among the Hausa-Fulanis, while Christianity is prevalent in the southern part of 
Nigeria, among the Yoruba and the Igbo ethnic groups. However, it is not uncommon to 
find people practising dual religions, a situation where either Christianity or Islam is 
practised alongside traditional religion. 
 
4.2.5  Political and Economic Structure 
 
Nigeria became an independent nation on 1st October 1960 and a republic (with an 
indigenous President) three years later (on 1st October 1963). A series of “back to back” 
military dictators who seized power in coups d'état was ended in 1999 when Nigeria 
regained democracy, ending almost 33 years of military rule. Nigeria is a federation of 
thirty six States and a Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) (Fig. 4.1) that are further 
divided into 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs). The federal, state and local 
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governments have powers to make laws. Whereas federal laws apply throughout the 
country, the state laws are limited only to the territorial jurisdiction of the state. Where 
there is conflict between any of these levels, the law of higher territorial jurisdiction 
overrides everything else. For instance, federal laws override state laws, while state 
laws override laws made at the local government level. Nigeria’s Federal Bicameral 
Legislature (Senate and House of Representatives) is responsible for making federal 
laws. States and local government areas equally have similar law making institutions. 
 
The varied geographical features influence the types of activities carried out by the 
people. The rainy and forested south has given rise to human activities as fishing, 
hunting and farming (especially root crops) while the dry north supports animal 
husbandry and farming (especially of grains). Up until 1970, agriculture was the main 
source of Nigeria’s foreign exchange, exporting major produce such as cocoa, 
groundnuts, oil palm and timber. Today, with the predominance of the oil sector as the 
major contributor to the nation’s economy, the influence of agriculture has been 
drastically reduced. Nigeria’s economy is heavily dependent on foreign earnings 
generated from the sale of crude oil which was discovered in the Niger Delta in 1956. 
The oil industry contributes about 90% of foreign earnings and 40% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Nigeria is the 5th largest OPEC producer and 11th largest oil producer 
in the world (Amaeshi and Amao, 2009). Nevertheless, the vast majority of the people 
are poor and live in abject poverty. The country has a poor reputation in managing its 
oil resources effectively and efficiently. In a 2010 measurement of degree of corruption, 
Nigeria scored 2.4 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean), making Nigeria 
one of the most corrupt nations in the world (Transparency International, 1999). Other 
natural resources in Nigeria include enormous quantities of tin, coal, iron ore and 
limestone.  
 
4.3  Wetlands in Nigeria 
 
4.3.1  Overview 
 
Oyebande et al (2003) identified fourteen major wetland belts in Nigeria. These include 
the Hadejia-Nguru wetland  and the Niger Delta Wetland. In Nigeria, wetlands are 
estimated to cover about 28,000 km
2
 or about 3% of the land surface area of the country 
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(Garnier, 1967; Uluocha and Okeke, 2004). Hughes and Hughes (1999) divide Nigerian 
wetlands into five categories. The most extensive are the coastal wetlands found in the 
southern region bordering the Atlantic Ocean. These include the Lagos and Lekki 
lagoons and wetlands, the Niger Delta Wetlands, and wetlands of the Cross Rivers. 
These coastal wetlands support large areas of mangrove which are essential for 
stabilizing the shorelines, provide a unique habitat for biodiversity, and serve as carbon 
sinks. Further inland and scattered across the country are the riverine wetlands. These 
include the floodplains of the Niger/Benue, Ogun/Osun, Anambra/Imo, Soko/Rima, 
Komadugu Yobe, Ngadda, Yedseram, and ElBeid Rivers, which are extensively used 
for livestock grazing, farming, and fishing. In addition, riverine wetlands serve as 
important sites for cultural festivals, e.g., the Argungu fishing festival takes place on the 
Sokoto/Rima river system. The portions of Lake Chad located in Northeastern Nigeria 
are another category of wetland. The importance of The Lake Chad Wetlands stems 
from their proximity to the edge of the Sahara Desert where they provide water for more 
than 20 million people living in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger (Gophen, 2008). 
Lake Chad Wetlands are also important for fisheries (Béné et al., 2003). The third 
category from Hughes and Hughes (1999) was interior wetlands not associated with any 
major river system. Most of these wetlands, not associated with river systems although 
seasonal, support a wide variety of livelihood activities including material collection, 
fishing and farming. These include the Clay-Pan Wetlands in northwest Nigeria (Kano 
State). The final category of wetlands in Nigeria is artificial impoundments, including 
Lake Kainji, which are important for electricity generation. 
 
4.3.2  Status of Nigerian Wetlands 
 
In 2000, the Nigerian government indicated support for the statutes developed by the 
Ramsar Convention. This is an intergovernmental treaty with a mission to ensure “the 
conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local and national actions and 
international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable development 
throughout the world” (Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 2012). It is named after the 
Iranian City of Ramsar where the treaty was signed. The Nguru Marma Channel 
Complex in the Hadejia Nguru Wetlands was designated the first Ramsar site in 
Nigeria. Over the next eight years, 10 other sites were designated as Ramsar sites. 
Nigeria’s 11 Ramsar sites (Fig. 4.2) have a total surface area of about 10,700 km2 
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comprising about 38% of total wetland area in the country. Other African countries, 
such as Uganda and South Africa, have only designated about 14% of their total 
wetlands area as Ramsar sites. However, it is important to note that designation on the 
Ramsar list does not necessarily translate to actual wise use of the wetlands. Some 
governments sign up to treaties only in return for bilateral or multilateral donor grants 
(Agrawal, 2007). However, it would probably be beneficial to designate more Nigerian 
wetlands, especially in the Niger Delta, to the Ramsar list. This could serve as impetus 
for environmentalists to push for better wetland policies and laws.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Nigeria Showing the Ramsar Sites (Source: Adedamola Ogunsesan). 
 
Of the 10,700 km
2
 of Ramsar designated wetlands in Nigeria, only about 5% (Apoi 
creek and Upper Orashi) are located in the Niger Delta, which is Nigeria’s largest 
wetland area (Ogon, 2006). The  Mangroves of the Niger Delta Wetlands, which 
support high biological diversity and are currently threatened (Nigerian Conservation 
Foundation, 2006), would clearly benefit by designation to the Ramsar list. Potential 
Ramsar sites here include the Akassa coastal wetlands, Stubbs Creek, and the wetlands 
in the Asamabiri and Kalama areas where several IUCN Red List species occur (Global 
Environment Facility, 2011). Other potential Ramsar sites in Nigeria include Cross 
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River Estuary, Chingurim-Duguma Wetlands, Pepe Ruwa, Wawa Deji, Ologie, Kalmalo 
Lake, Uturu Afikpo, Anam flat, and Yaboro. 
 
Although wetlands have played important roles in the development of Nigeria (Eaton 
and Sarch, 1997; Olomukoro and Ezemonye, 2007), they remain under recognized and 
undervalued (Adekola and Mitchell, 2011). Human settlements concentrate in wetland 
areas in Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, and Nguru. Wetlands are also the basis of popular 
Fadama projects, which are designed to increase the incomes of people using rural land 
and water resources on a sustainable basis  (Agwu and Abah, 2010; Nwachukwu et al., 
2008). These projects support agricultural production, fisheries, livestock grazing, and 
forestry. Some Nigerian wetlands are culturally significant, containing sacred sites and 
places of historical importance (Anwana et al., 2010). Nigerian wetlands also regulate 
and support services such as carbon sequestration, climate regulation, nutrient cycling, 
oxygen production, and soil formation (Acharya, 2000; Uluocha and Okeke, 2004). The 
Hadejia-Nguru Wetland constitutes an important feeding ground for various migratory 
bird species, and almost 1.5 million farmers, herders, and fishermen depend on the 
wetlands for their livelihoods (BirdLife International, 2008). The Niger Delta is home to 
several endemic or near-endemic mammals, e.g., Kinixys homeana i.e. hinge-backed 
tortoises (Luiselli et al., 2006; Obot, 2007), and a large human population here engages 
in fishing, farming, and collection of various food materials such as Bush Mango 
(Irvingia gabonensis), snails (Archachatina marginata), and periwinkles 
(Tympanotonus fuscatus) (World Bank, 1995). Orimoogunje et al. (2009) reported that 
wetlands in Ilesha, south-western Nigeria, are important for commercial and subsistence 
cropping. 
 
Threats to Nigerian wetlands, as identified by Uluocha and Okeke (2004), are both 
anthropocentric and natural. The human factors threatening Nigerian wetlands include 
increasing population pressure, rapid urbanization, mining, oil and industrial waste 
pollution, uncontrolled tilling for crop production, overgrazing, logging, land 
reclamation, and construction of dams, roads, and other infrastructure. Other threats 
include climate change, marine and coastal erosion, subsidence, ocean water intrusion, 
invasion by non-native biota, and desertification and droughts.  
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Increases in waterfront residences, together with an increasing population and land 
shortages, have induced unprecedented wetland reclamation projects in the southern 
areas of Lagos and the Niger Delta (Fig. 4.3a and 4.3b).  In northern Nigeria, water 
flows to the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands have been significantly reduced from the 
construction of the Tiga and Challawa dams, built upstream of the Hadejia and Yobe 
rivers (Barbier, 2003; Thomas and Adams, 1999). In addition, the Lake Chad Wetlands, 
located in the north-eastern region of Nigeria (and shared with the Chad republic and 
Cameroon, was one of the largest in the world but has shrunk considerably due to 
agriculture (Coe and Foley, 2001). The Niger Delta Wetlands, which are the third 
largest wetland in the world (Uluocha and Okeke, 2004; Umoh, 2008) and the largest 
river delta and mangrove ecosystem in Africa (Awosika, 1995), have been degraded due 
to oil and gas exploration, dredging, invasive plant (Nypa palm) infestation, logging and 
reclamation for residential, industrial, and other developments (Adekola and Mitchell, 
2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. An Example of Threats to Wetlands in Nigeria. 
A. Wetland area reclaimed for residential purposes B. A sign post indicating a government sponsored 
wetland reclamation and dredging project  
C. A government approved dumpsite in the wetland D. A part of wetland converted to a dump site by 
traders and nearby residents 
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Past government policies have also encouraged wetland drainage for agriculture and 
infrastructural development, directly impacting wetlands. Agricultural policies such as 
‘Operation Feed the Nation’, or ‘Back to Land’, have led to massive reclamation of 
wetlands for agriculture without recognizing how agricultural production goals may 
impact wetlands and the communities that rely on them. The government also supports 
reclamation of wetlands for residential, industrial, and urban development – the Lagos 
State government actively supported reclamation of wetlands for high-income 
residential areas of Lekki and Aja. When a former president of Nigeria was asked how 
to create space in the Niger Delta, he said “drain the swampy areas” (Oyatomi and 
Umoru, 2009). Thus, one can understand why massive areas of wetland were reclaimed 
for residential purposes during his administration. At a community level, many people 
still view wetlands as wastelands, and convert them to dumpsites (Fig. 4.3c and 4.3d). It 
is, therefore, important that appropriate policies and laws are instituted to address these 
threats, and preserve the ecological health of wetlands so that their ability to perform 
ecosystem functions that provide essential goods and services important to humans is 
maintained (De Groot et al., 2002). 
 
4.4  The Niger Delta Region 
 
Some authors have argued that the Niger Delta is wrongly termed, as the river draining 
into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Nigeria is not on the River Niger alone 
(Preboye, 2005). They maintain that there are many rivers from different sources that 
empty their waters into the basin of the Delta. However, for general usage and wide 
acceptance, the term “Niger Delta” is used in this thesis. 
 
4.4.1  The Niger Delta Environment 
 
The Niger Delta is located in southern Nigeria, in the lower reaches of the Niger/Benue 
River (Fig. 4.1), and extends between latitudes 4
o
2
l
 and 6
o
2
l
 north of the equator and is 
5
o
2
l
 east of the Greenwich meridian (Davies et al., 2009). Geologically, the Niger Delta 
is regarded as a modern delta (under 100 million years old in the Mesozoic era, 
Cretaceous period) (Galloway, 1975; Okonny, 2002). According to Short and Staeuble 
(1967) there are three depositional cycles in the Niger Delta. The first began with a 
marine incursion in the middle Cretaceous and was terminated by a mild folding phase 
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in Santonian time. The second included the growth of a proto-Niger Delta during the 
late Cretaceous and ended in a major Paleocene marine transgression. The third cycle, 
from Eocene to Recent, marked the continuous growth of the main Niger Delta. The 
main geologic formations extending across the whole of the Niger Delta are the sandy 
Benin formation (including the Afam clay), an intervening unit of alternating sandstone 
and shale named the Agbada formation, and a lower shaly Akata formation (Short and 
Staeuble, 1967). The accumulation of sedimentary deposits transported by the rivers 
Niger and Benue (World Bank, 1995), which discharge water, sediment and other loads 
across southern Nigeria and beyond into the Gulf of Guinea, resulted in the formation of 
this complex and fragile delta with a rich biodiversity (Abam, 2001). The Niger Delta is 
regarded as the third largest wetland in the world (Uluocha and Okeke, 2004; Umoh, 
2008), and the largest river delta and mangrove ecosystem with the greatest extension of 
freshwater swamps in Africa (Ajonina et al., 2008; Dupont et al., 2000; Ogon, 2006).    
 
There are over twenty-eight soil types from various soil zones of the Niger Delta (Osuji 
and Nwoye, 2007; Okonny, 2002). The soils vary from sandy in the coastal beach zones 
through alluvial deposits in the freshwater zones to clay further inland (Okonny et al., 
1999). Because of their fertility, these soils are utilized extensively for agriculture. In 
the Niger Delta, the wet season is between March and November, and the dry season 
from December to February. The mean annual rainfall ranges from 2,000 mm to 4,500 
mm and spreads over 8 to 10 months (Oyegun, 1999). The average monthly temperature 
is 27
◦
C (World Bank, 1995). The topographic configuration of the Niger Delta is 
generally flat with a gentle westward inclined geomorphic structure broken in many 
places into hogback ridges and shallow basins (Oyegun, 1999).  
 
The Niger Delta forms an integrated mosaic of aquatic, semi-terrestrial (mangrove and 
freshwater swamps) and terrestrial habitats (Bisina, 2006), which is highly diverse and 
supportive of numerous species of terrestrial and aquatic flora and fauna (Uyigue and 
Agbo, 2007). The three major vegetation formations in the Niger Delta are brackish 
water swamps (comprising mangrove forest and coastal vegetation), fresh water swamp 
forests and riparian forests (Nyananyo, 1999; Nyananyo, 2002). The brackish water 
swamps are dominated by white and red mangroves. Further inland from the coast into 
the fresh water swamp forests floating plants such as vossia cuspidata (hippo grass), 
nymphaea lotus, grasses and sedges begin to dominate. In the riparian forests no species 
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can be said to be dominant, but, the region is home to some rare and endangered animal 
and plant species. Nyananyo (2006) identified 225 plant species in the Niger Delta, 
many of which are important as cultural, food, timber, medicine and industrial 
materials. Apart from its rich flora, the delta is rich in fauna that enhance the 
biodiversity status. The Delta has the richest biodiversity in Nigeria (Ebeku, 2004), and 
is an area of international importance for its ecological riches which include several 
IUCN ‘Red List’ species including some endemic or near endemic mammals (such as 
Kinixys homeana, Home’s hinge-back tortoise) (Luiselli et al., 2006; Obot, 2007).  
Blench and Dendo  (2007) identified about 60 large mammals in the delta. Some of 
these, such as the African elephant (Loxodonta africana), chimpanzee (Pan 
troglodytes), Sclater's guenon, white-throated guenon, and crested genet (Genetta 
cristata) are classified as endangered (Hilton-Taylor, 2000). The Delta is home to the 
Niger Delta Red Colobus (Procolobus pennantii ssp. epieni) listed as critically 
endangered (Oates and Struhsaker, 2008).  Many of these animals have decline due to 
habitat degradation and hunting them for bush meat. 
 
Over 50% of the Delta area is water, with thousands of creeks (Erhabor et al., 2007), 
and over twenty rivers. Collectively,  the Delta accounts for 55% of all fresh water 
swamps in Nigeria (Umoh, 2008). The numerous water bodies of the Niger Delta are 
one of the richest in aquatic diversity in West Africa (Idodo-Umeh, 2003; Abowei et al., 
2006). However, the complex systems of rivers and creeks have shallow entrances, 
rendering them limited for big vessels (hence wide scale dredging and channelization in 
the delta).  
 
4.4.2  People, History and Culture of Niger Delta 
 
4.4.2.1  Definition 
 
When defined based on human geography and hydrology, the Delta Region consists of 
present-day Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States and covers an area about 20,000 km
2
 
(Uyigue and Agbo, 2007; World Bank, 1995). When defined for administrative 
convenience, political expedience and development objectives, the Delta Region 
includes all the oil producing States and extends the land area to 110,000 km
2
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(Ighodaro, 2005). Defined in this way, the Niger Delta consists of nine states (Fig. 4.1), 
with over 37 million inhabitants,  or 22% of Nigeria’s population (Table 4.1).  
 
The nine Niger Delta states contain 185 Local Government Areas. Within these are over 
1,500 communities that act as host to the oil industry (Forest and Sousa, 2006). The 
region is ethnically very varied, typifying the diversity and plurality that gives Nigeria 
its socio-political strength. Ethnic groups include Bini, Efik, Ibibio, Ijo, Isoko/Ukwani, 
Itsekiri and Urhobo. In Bayelsa state alone there are five linguistic groups speaking over 
forty different dialects (Alogoa, 1999). The Niger Delta is generally rural, but includes 
some important Nigerian towns such as Port Harcourt, Warri and Asaba. The population 
is predominantly animist, attaching cultural values to the fauna and flora species in the 
area (Anwana et al., 2010; Adekola, 2011).  
 
Table 4.1. Niger Delta States – Population, Area and Revenue. 
State Population
1
 Area
2
 (km
2
) 
Population 
Density 
(Person/km
2
) 
Revenue 1999-
2010
3 
($) 
Abia 3,367,507 5,420 621 239,676,067,250 
Akwa-Ibom 4,618,077 6,187 746 917,527,162,761 
Bayelsa 2,017,294 10,773 187 746,742,034,056 
Cross-Rivers 3,423,851 21,050 163 254,040,592,464 
Delta 4,867,079 18,050 270 875,924,558,883 
Edo 3,826,689 17,450 219 245,221,636,192 
Imo 4,648,271 5,430 856 275,811,650,027 
Ondo 4,095,948 14,606 280 381,986,908,749 
Rivers 6,152,680 11,077 555 1,162,964,830,783 
Total Niger Delta (3 states) 13,037,053 39,900 327 2,785,631,423,721 
Total Niger Delta (9 states) 37,017,396 110,043 336 5,099,895,441,165 
Nigeria 166,201,023 923,768 180 11,510,806,680,296 
1- Projected at a growth rate of 3.4% based on 2006 census data by National Population Commission  (2006) 
2-Source: MACOS Urban Management Consultants (2010) 
3- Computed based on data published by Federal Ministry of Finance (2011) 
 
The current challenges confronting the Niger Delta have historical roots (Preboye, 
2005) and can only be meaningfully understood within this context. It has been 
suggested that historical accounts can also provide a frame for the analysis of 
institutional structure (Thelen, 1999; Boettke et al., 2010). Four periods can be 
identified in the history of the people of the Niger Delta. First, the early pre-colonial 
period before 1472. Second from 1472-1842, when trade with European merchants 
flourished. The third period, from 1843-1959, was the period when the slave trade was 
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abolished and there was the foray of missionaries and the formalization of British 
domination of the Niger Delta. The last period is from 1960 to the present, during which 
Nigeria has been independent.  
 
4.4.2.2  Pre-Colonial Period 
 
The exact origin of the people of the Niger Delta is highly contested. According to Dike  
(1956), the Niger Delta was practically uninhabited prior to the Portuguese arrival in the 
fifteenth century. However, palynological and archeological evidence suggests concrete 
dates for early settlement in the Niger Delta. Evidence from farming obtained from 
cores taken out of sites near Nembe (present day Bayelsa State) showed that the Niger 
Delta was probably occupied by 2,800 BC (Sowunmi, 1999). Archaeological 
excavations also show  dates as early as 800 AD (Alogoa, 1999) which supersede the 
very recent dates suggested by Dike (1956).  It is believed that as the first settlers 
migrated from the freshwater environment to the coastal salt water swamp they took to 
fishing because of the unsuitable environmental conditions for agriculture. The need to 
supplement feeding with food crops resulted in trade with the hinterland (mainly with 
the surrounding tribes of Ibos, Yoruba’s and Igala’s) where they exchanged their fish 
and salt for agricultural produce (Princewill, 2000; Fentiman, 1996; Alagoa, 1970). This 
led to the building of basic internal structures for trade. These included institutions 
guiding trade routes, markets, networks of relations with producing communities and 
even oath taking as a form of trade treaties. 
 
4.4.2.3  Trade with Europe 
 
The European capitalist revolution of the mid-fifteenth century brought Portuguese 
traders to Bonny and Brass (coastal communities in the Niger Delta). The Portuguese 
were followed by the Dutch, the French and later the English. Delta middlemen 
distributed manufactured goods from European traders in the hinterland and exported 
slaves and palm oil for them to take to Europe. The Atlantic trade transformed the Delta 
into a distribution centre, since the Delta was not suitable for agriculture and with its 
sparse population it could not satisfy European slave demands. Trade contacts enhanced 
the position of community leaders who, being the direct contact with the Europeans, 
were paid fees for rights to trade. These trading elites, who were also rulers of society, 
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were able to readily translate material gains into greater political power. The increased 
volume of material trade occasioned the transformation of fishing villages to trading 
villages.  
 
While this institutionalized form of trade flourished, the Delta was generally peaceful. 
However, skirmishes began with the abolition of the slave trade and British policy to 
“bypass the coastal middlemen and to penetrate to the hinterlands tribes directly” 
(Gallagher, 1950). According to Lord John Russell, the Lord’s Commissioner of Her 
Majesty's Treasury: 
 
“.... to this end the Queen has directed Her Ministers to negotiate 
Conventions or Agreements with those Chiefs and Powers, the basis of 
which conventions would be, first, the abandonment and absolute 
prohibition of the Slave Trade; and, secondly, the admission for 
consumption in this country” (Russell, 1839). 
 
This effort to bypass the Delta middlemen was resisted by the people and chiefs. 
However, resistance was crushed through might, dethronement or banishment. On the 
other hand gifts, such as providing children of community leaders the privilege of 
attending mission boarding schools, were offered to persuade others and as rewards for 
good behaviour. Courting the British also became a source of authority and such leaders 
needing colonial backing became compliant to the colonial administration. The ensuing 
rivalry and disagreements between Delta chiefs eventually polarized leaders making it 
easy for the British to dominate the area.  
 
The abandonment of the Delta also led to an economic downturn for the communities 
that had jettisoned trade in fish to serve as middlemen in the slave trade. In a bid to 
improve the dwindling wealth, leaders pleaded for the Europeans’ presence. However, 
the call for economic development was misunderstood, and missionaries were sent to 
the Delta. Many radical institutions were introduced by the missionaries who introduced 
laws that declared long-standing traditions null and void.  
 
By 1884, the trade had become so important in the international political economy that 
the British began to take active steps to seize control of the area. In 1885, they declared 
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a protectorate of the Niger Delta following their successful treaty making with the 
chiefs of the area. This brought with it intensification of resource exploitation. Control 
of land and other natural resources was vested in the colonial authority. Both the act and 
the content of the new rules were departures from existing institutions whereby land and 
resources were controlled by communities through the lineage.   
 
Oil exploration in Nigeria began in 1937, when Shell D'Arcy (later SPDC) was 
commissioned to carry out a mineralogical survey of Nigeria.  The initial effort was in 
the eastern part of the country. This search was truncated by the Second World War and 
restarted in the 1950s, this time in the Niger Delta as previous searches in the Eastern 
region had not yielded any substantial commercial quantity. The first oil well was then 
dug in Otabagi near Oloibiri in the Ogbia area of Bayelsa State. Exploration has 
increased since then (Appendix 4.1).   
 
4.4.2.4  Independence  
 
At Independence, the people of the Niger Delta were part of the Eastern Region 
dominated by the Igbo ethnic group who were the majority in the government of the 
Eastern Region. In 1967, Rivers State (present day Rivers and Bayelsa State) was 
created as the first administrative unit in the Niger Delta. In 1991, Delta State was 
carved out of the former Bendel State and in 1996 Bayelsa State was created out of 
Rivers State.  
 
The Niger Delta is the source of Nigeria’s crude oil, which represents about 80% of 
national government revenues. Nigeria’s crude from the Niger Delta is “sweet crude” 
that is less corrosive and has lower sulphur content than the “sour crudes” that 
predominate Latin American and Middle Eastern crude. The general rule of thumb is 
that, the “lighter” and “sweeter” the oil, the more valuable it is. However, despite the 
region’s vast oil resources, regarded as the best quality crude oils in the world, the 
region remains poor, with high levels of unemployment (Agbogidi and Ofuoku, 2006; 
Idemudia, 2009). Unemployment and underemployment – at 8.8% and 26.2%, 
respectively – are higher in the Niger Delta than in other regions of Nigeria (Ukiwo, 
2009). Only 27% of the Delta’s population have potable water, 30% have electricity and 
one in three people  is illiterate (Forest and Sousa, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
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This has been described as “a profound paradox of oil wealth and poverty” (Ali-
Akpajiak and Pyke, 2003). Revenue allocation to the Niger Delta states have risen to 
almost four times the annual values at the return to democracy in 1999 with over 44% 
of revenue allocated to the region (Table 4.1; Appendix 4.2). The key question to ask is 
“What have the successive governments in the Niger Delta done with these robust 
allocations?” Some analysts have pointed to the corrupt tendencies of governors of 
Niger Delta states as being responsible for the poor state of affairs in the region, 
considering that under Nigeria's federal system, state governors enjoy wide powers. 
Those running Niger Delta oil rich states preside over monies larger than those of some 
African countries. These monies have either gone into the pockets of the ruling class 
and their cronies, or have been scandalously misappropriated. There have been 
numerous cases of corruption and mismanagement in the region. Recently, a Delta state 
governor was jailed for 13 years for embezzling state funds totalling nearly £50 million 
(Ibiam, 2012). This has led to the suggestion that the problem with the Niger Delta is 
not of revenue allocation, but management. The availability of revenue is one thing, but 
effective utilization of the resources is more important. Despite this, the people of the 
Delta have always felt surcharged by the various revenue allocation formulas in Nigeria.  
 
4.4.2.5  Conflicts in the Niger Delta 
 
The consequence has been conflicts between local communities and private and public 
developers over resource ownership and use, particularly those related to oil activities. 
This began with Issac Jasper Adaka Boro, who dropped out of University in 1966 to 
form the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF). His agitation was for the people to take 
control of the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Niger Delta areas which, he 
argued, benefited mainly the federal government of Nigeria and a remote Eastern 
Nigeria regional government. He was killed under mysterious circumstances in 1968. 
Not much happened until Ken Saro Wiwa’s non-violent agitation focused on un-
remediated environmental damage from decades of indiscriminate petroleum waste 
dumping in the Niger Delta. However, under controversial circumstances, Ken Saro 
Wiwa was arbitrary executed in 1995, along with eight other activists of Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). MOSOP is an organization of the Ogoni 
ethnic minority people of Niger Delta, initiated by Ken Saro Wiwa in 1990 with a 
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mandate to campaign non-violently to seek protection and development of Ogoni land 
(Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, 2010). 
 
The first major conflict occurred in October 1990 at Umuecechem, an oil-producing 
community ten miles east of Ogoni land. The same month MOSOP was established by 
Ken-Wiwa to lead his kinsmen to confront the oil companies and the Nigerian state. 
Since 1995, agitations have increased in scale and taken a violent turn. Violence then 
followed the 1998 Kaima Declaration by Niger Delta youths and the Odi crisis. The 
Kaima Declaration is the communiqué issued at the end of the all Ijaw Youths 
Conference comprising youths drawn from over five hundred communities from over 
40 clans that make up the Ijaw nation and representing 25 representative organizations. 
Following the declaration government sent policemen to several communities in the 
Niger Delta to forestall disruption of oil extraction activities and break down of law and 
order. It was then alleged that Odi youths, protesting the presence of the policemen in 
the village, had killed seven of them. Subsequently, a military operation destroyed the 
community. A list of some of the recent crises in the Niger Delta is presented in 
Appendix 4.3. 
 
Like Boro and Saro Wiwa, many of the notable leaders of Niger Delta agitation are 
accomplished and educated. For example, Henry Okah, leader of the Movement for 
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), is the son of a naval officer, grew up in rarified 
Lagos society, and was educated in the best private school in Nigeria. However, he was 
upset by the contrast of living conditions in the Niger Delta with those his family 
enjoyed in Lagos and subsequently took up arms against the government and the 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) (Walker, 2008).  MEND is one of the largest 
militant youth groups in the Niger Delta. Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the leader of the Niger 
Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDVF), also had a middle-class upbringing and latter 
abandoned his law studies to form the group (De Montclos, 2008) . 
 
The oil companies are seen by the local residents to have failed to give back anything 
for what they have taken out, and to be complicit in human rights abuses carried out by 
government security forces that are deployed to protect their facilities. According to 
Human Rights Watch (1999a), any time there was a protest, the oil companies ran to the 
government for military assistance and it unleashed terror (indiscriminate killings and 
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beatings, arbitrary detentions and extortions, rapes and destruction of properties) on the 
local populace. Violence in the region was exacerbated with the return to democratic 
rule in May 1999. Various politicians capitalized on the weak structures of numerous 
ethnic militias, which were paid and armed for protection with guns which were later 
turned around for criminal acts. Some of the politicians were the same people who were 
complicit in criminal activities in the Delta and often supported some of the abductions 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002). 
 
The conflicts are estimated to cost Nigeria US$ 1 billion a year in revenue, since the  
Niger Delta insurgency has been able to disrupt 60% of oil drilling (and output) by 
blasting pipelines and other oil installations (Forest and Sousa, 2006). Social issues 
presently confronting this region include cases of hostage taking, kidnappings and 
pipeline vandalization (Peterside, 2007; Watts, 2008). These are viewed as a response of 
the local people to the perceived injustice in the distribution of costs and benefits of oil 
exploration. They believe that other regions of the country enjoy the economic benefits 
of the oil development, while local communities directly bear the environmental 
consequences, such as loss of biodiversity (James et al., 2007; Phil-Eze and Okoro, 
2009; Uluocha and Okeke, 2004) and pollution of the water supply (Ekundayo and 
Fodeke, 2000; Okoh et al., 1996). Crude oil theft is another issue confronting the Niger 
Delta. According to the Nigerian Economic Summit Group, there is daily theft of about 
100,000 barrels of oil valued at about US$2.8 million (Ikelegbe, 2006).    
 
4.4.3  Human Impacts on the Niger Delta Wetlands 
 
The Niger Delta environment, including the wetlands, is being impacted by various 
threats (Fig. 4.3; Appendix 4.4). Four of these - oil and gas exploration, dredging, 
invasive plant infestation and wetland reclamation - are identified as the main threats 
eroding the Niger Delta ecosystem (Adekola and Mitchell, 2011). 
 
4.4.3.1  Oil and Gas Exploration and Development 
 
The scale of the operation in the Niger Delta is large, with over 1,500 oil wells drilled in 
159 oil fields and more than 7,000 km of pipelines over the Niger Delta region (Ene-Ita, 
2009). Shell Petroleum Development Company alone operates over 31,000 km
2
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(Amnesty International Publication, 2009). The Niger Delta’s fragile environment has 
been highly stressed through these activities. The consequence of the exploitation of oil 
and gas exploration in the Niger Delta has been widely blamed as a main threat to the 
integrity of the wetland (Obot, 2007; Uluocha and Okeke, 2004; Zabbey, 2004). The 
process involved in oil and gas exploration in the Delta involves sophisticated 
technology to detect and determine the extent of deposits. This involves clearing 
seismic lines of any patch of wetland and dynamiting for geological excavation. The 
detonation of dynamite in an aquatic environment stuns fish and other faunal organisms. 
Destabilization of sedimentary materials associated with dynamite shooting causes 
water turbidity, blockage of filter feeding apparatus in benthic fauna and reduction of 
photosynthetic activity due to reduced light penetration (Zabbey, 2004).  
 
Oil spill incidents have occurred in various areas and at different times in the Niger 
Delta region. Available records indicate that approximately 6%, 25%, and 69%, 
respectively, of total oil spilled in the Niger Delta area, were in land, swamp and 
offshore environments (Nwilo and Badejo, 2006). Some major spills are the GOCON’s 
Escravos spill in 1978 of about 300,000 barrels, SPDC’s Forcados Terminal tank failure 
in 1978 of about 580,000; barrels and the Texaco Funiwa-5 blow out in 1980 of about 
400,000 barrels (Nwilo and Badejo, 2006). According to Obot (2007), recent estimates 
are that between 9 million and 13 million barrels (1.5 million tons) of oil has spilled in 
the Niger Delta ecosystem over the past 50 years. Two states in the Delta, Rivers and 
Delta, suffer about 300 major oil spills per year (O’Hara, 2001). Between 1976 and 
1997, there were 5,334 reported cases of crude oil spillages releasing about 2.8 million 
barrels of oil into the land, swamp, estuaries and coastal waters of Nigeria (Dublin-
Green et al., 1998). The sources of these spills include pipeline leakage and rupturing, 
accidental discharges, discharges from refineries and sabotage (illegal bunkering). 
According to Nwilo and Badejo (2006) 50% of oil spills is due to corrosion, 28% to 
sabotage and 21% to oil production operations. One percent (1%) of oil spills is due to 
engineering drills, inability to effectively control oil wells, failure of machines, and 
inadequate care in loading and unloading oil vessels. When it comes into contact with 
water, oil forms a layer which prevents oxygen dissolving in water and so interferes 
with the healthy functioning of the ecosystem. Crude oil also contains toxic 
components, which can cause outright mortality of plants and animals as well as other 
sub-lethal impacts (Zabbey, 2004).  
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Like oil spillage, gas flaring associated with oil production has continued unabated in 
the Niger Delta. Gas flares contain over 250 toxins such as benzene (Zabbey, 2004) 
which are responsible for loss of vegetation and total burning of the Delta’s mangrove 
vegetation that includes a population of endangered and endemic species (Obot, 2007). 
Flaring natural gas from oil fields as a by-product of crude oil production is also a 
common sight that dominates the skyline in the Niger Delta. Local people have 
complained of respiratory problems such as asthma and bronchitis – health conditions 
caused by physical or chemical agents associated with crude oil production. The flares 
also contribute to acid rain and are said to have contributed more greenhouse gases than 
all of Sub-Saharan Africa combined (Friends of the Earth International, 2004). 
However, community efforts to halt or reduce gas flaring in the delta have proved 
unsuccessful (Bienen, 2005). 
 
4.4.3.2  Wetland Reclamation 
 
Population increase, industrialization and urbanization have resulted in an increased 
demand for space for housing and other infrastructure. Consequently, the government 
has been forced to reclaim marginal lands in the swamps of the Niger Delta (Abam and 
Okogbue, 1993). Wetland reclamation remains one of the top developmental priorities 
for states in this region (Wolf et al., 2002). Central government support for reclamation 
is also strong (see Fig. 4.3b). Multinational companies, particularly those in the oil and 
gas industry, also reclaim wetlands for their use (Etuonovbe, 2007). Reclamation 
activities change the area from its natural state, radically affecting the provision of 
ecosystem services and impacting upon the flora and fauna in the delta. Extensive 
pressure is also exerted on the wetland from road building and forest clearing for 
agriculture. For example, there is a plan to develop about 30,000 hectares of wetland for 
mechanized farming for large-scale commercial rice, cassava and other associated crop 
production and processing (UK Trade and Investment, 2011). Information on the exact 
extent of wetland reclaimed is scarce. 
 
4.4.3.3  Dredging 
 
Dredging involves the relocation of underwater sediments and soils. In the Delta it is 
carried out for various social and economic development reasons such as construction 
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and maintenance of waterways, transportation infrastructures and for reclamation and 
soil improvements. Some of these activities are very large scale. The impending 
dredging of the river Niger from Baro in Niger State to Warri in Delta State would see 
over 570 km of channel dredged (Ogah and Odita, 2009). During dredging, sediment, 
soil, creek banks and vegetation along the way are removed and deposited as dredge 
spoils. Government and oil companies are mainly responsible for dredging (Ohimain et 
al., 2004), some local businesses are also involved (Etuonovbe, 2007). Although 
dredging is variously regarded as a major problem confronting the Delta (James et al., 
2007; Ohimain et al., 2004) little information is available on the exact extent of the 
problem. Ohimain et al. (2007) indicated that a major oil-producing company generated 
approximately 20 million m
3
 of spoil between 1990 and 1996. Dredging significantly 
degrades water quality and can harm fisheries. Rim-Rukeh et al. (2007) and Ohimain et 
al. (2008) showed that dredging is responsible for physiochemical changes in the water 
of the delta, particularly in the pH, the total dissolved and suspended solids, 
conductivity, turbidity, sulphate content, dissolved oxygen, oxygen demand (as 
biological oxygen demand) and chemical oxygen demand. These activities can cause the 
removal of sub-tidal benthic species and communities (such as reduction in the 
population density and taxa of zooplankton), the release of organic matter, nutrients 
and/or contaminants on aquatic organisms, and disrupt the ambient chemical/physical 
conditions (such as reduction in light penetration and primary production) (Nayar et al., 
2007). 
 
4.4.3.4  Invasive Species  
 
Nypa palm, introduced from Singapore into the Niger Delta as part of a trial plantation 
in 1906 has become an invasive species (Enemugwem, 2009; King and Udo, 1997). The 
plant outcompetes and displaces a number of indigenous species (Laë et al., 2004) 
reducing their growth and survival rate and causing decline and extinction of indigenous 
plant populations in large areas of the mangrove ecosystem. Nypa palm has led to a 
decrease in genetic diversity through the loss of genetically distinct populations and 
hybridization with native species. It has assumed a dominant status in the creeks, 
especially in such areas as the basin of Idua, Assang (Oron Bar), Jaja Creek, Ikineto 
Creek, Parrot Island, Alligator Island, Strong Face Creek, Uya Oro Creek, Ikot Abasi, 
Andoni and Bonny Rivers (Federal Environmental Protection Agency, 1999). It has also 
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impacted adversely on the socio-economic activities of coastal communities, as it 
hinders fishing, navigation and fuel wood supply (Isebor et al., 2001). The habitat for 
migrant marine turtles in Alaska Beach, one of the known turtle nesting areas, is 
infested with the weed which sheds leaves and fruits in such abundance that it 
constitutes an obstacle to the turtle population in the surrounding water (United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2007). Local use of, and economic benefits from the plant are 
minimal (Udofia and Udo, 2005). Hyacinth (Eichhornia sp.) is another invasive species, 
though its pressure is minimal compared with Nypa palm, especially towards the coast 
because it is intolerant to salt water (Akinyemiju, 1987). 
 
4.4.3.5  Discussion  
 
These four main impacts vary in importance across the Niger Delta. Oil development is 
most prevalent in oil-producing communities such as Bonny, Ogoni and others along 
the creeks, whilst reclamation activities are most common in urban centres such as 
Yenegoa and Port Harcourt. Other impacts on the Niger Delta includethe indiscriminate 
use of fertilizer resulting in eutrophication (Obire et al., 2008); the rapid growth of 
aquaculture (fish, snail, crabs) which converts mangrove area to shrimp ponds as an 
economic activity, with consequent wetland impacts (Davies et al., 2009; Zabbey et al., 
2010); climate change (Uyigue and Agbo, 2007); industrial and domestic effluents 
(Ajao and Anurigwo, 2002); unsustainable hunting and overfishing (Luiselli, 2003; 
Phil-Eze and Okoro, 2009); and damming activities (Abam, 1999) (Appendix 4.4). 
According to Abam (1999) there are 49 dams in the Niger Delta catchment area with a 
combined reservoir capacity of 36 million cubic metres.  
 
4.5  Wetland Institutions in Nigeria 
 
Many countries have special programmes and institutions focusing on wetlands, but 
none exist for Nigeria. The lack of focus on wetlands is evident in the lack of specific 
legislation targeted at wetlands. However, Nigerian laws and other institutions that 
relate to wetlands can be discussed under three periods: pre-colonial (before 1830), 
colonial pre-Independence (1830 to 1960) and the period from independence in 1960 to 
the present day.  
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4.5.1  Pre-Colonial Period (Before 1830) 
 
Many local communities in Nigeria managed their wetlands long before the advent of 
colonial rule (Alagoa, 1971; Berkes et al., 2000; Etkin, 2002; Sarch, 2001). 
Management regimes were mostly driven by traditional and religious motives and 
conducted through the designation of traditional reserves and harvesting periods. For 
instance, traditional institutions in Oporoma in Bayelsa State (in the Niger Delta) have 
long regulated human activities on Boupere Lake.  The lake is normally closed to 
fishing, logging, farming, or any other human activity until the time the leaders (the 
King and Inkiye - the traditional spiritual leader) give permission. Breaking these 
informal laws is considered taboo. Similar institutions still exist throughout Nigeria, and 
local communities respect them. During a recent informal discussion in the Niger Delta, 
many locals suggested that when faced with either traditional institutions or formal 
laws, they would honour the traditional informal institutions since potential 
repercussions were viewed as being of greater severity. This can benefit wetland 
management, although some aspects of traditional practices may be detrimental to 
wetland integrity. Yet, most communities still perceive wetlands as wastelands and tend 
to treat them as such (Fig. 4.3d). 
  
4.5.2  Colonial Period (1830 to 1960) 
 
The first formal law governing wetland management in Nigeria can be traced back to 
the creation in 1897 of a Department of Woods and Forests for the Colony and 
Protectorate of Lagos. Wetlands and forests are often interlinked and interact to produce 
healthy and productive ecosystems, although functional differences exist. As such, 
forestry laws will not always address challenges faced by wetlands.   
 
In 1901, the first Forest Ordinance to regulate the sale of timber concessions and 
minimize exploitable girth limits was enacted (Okali and Eyog-Matig, 2004). This law 
was targeted at controlling the exploitation of some timber products such as African 
mahoganies (Khaya anthotheca) which are abundant in the wetland areas of Benin, 
Degema and Lagos. Forestry fees and export taxes were also imposed on exported logs 
and concessionaires were required to replant 20 tree seedlings at each stump site.  
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It was not until 1916 (after the 1914 amalgamation of the northern and southern 
protectorates to form the Nigerian state) that the foundation for nature conservation laws 
in Nigeria was established with the Forestry Ordinance of 1916. The principal activities 
of the Forestry Department at that time were the selection and demarcation of suitable 
sites as forest reserves, and the preparation of working plans (Okali and Eyog-Matig, 
2004). Under the Ordinance, forest reserves could be established by the central 
government and subsequently handed over to local authorities for management. In the 
same year, the Wild Animals Preservation Act of 1916 also came into force to ensure 
the preservation of indigenous wildlife (Anadu, 1987). Other relevant legislation during 
this period were the Forestry (Southern Provinces Native Authorities) Rules of 1943, 
the Forestry (Northern Provinces Native Authorities) Rules of 1951, the Forestry 
(Northern Region Native Authorities) Rules of 1955, the Eastern Region Forest Law of 
1955, the Forestry Regulations Eastern Region of 1956, the Forestry Ordinance with 
Amendments, and the Northern Region of 1960 (Ebeku, 2004).  
 
Although these colonial acts did not specifically target wetlands, they covered various 
aspects of wetland ecosystem services, including trees and wild animals. Their 
effectiveness was diminished because the policies were not really intended for the 
sustainable management of natural resources, but to secure a constant supply of timber 
for colonial infrastructure and export (Hogendon, 1975). For instance, exploitation of 
timber intensified in Nigeria during and after the Second World War to meet wood 
shortages in Europe (Bee, 1990; Okali and Eyog-Matig, 2004).  
 
4.5.3  From Independence in 1960 to the Present Day 
 
4.5.3.1  1960 to 1979 
 
When Nigeria gained Independence in 1960, most of the nature conservation laws 
followed prior colonial practices in focusing on forestry and wildlife conservation. As a 
result, legislation relied largely, as far as its substantive content was concerned, on the 
structure and provisions of the Forestry Ordinance. Some of the legislation during the 
early period of Independence included the Northern Nigeria Wild Animals Law of 
1963, the Eastern Nigerian Wild Animals Law of 1965, and the Western State Forestry 
(amendment) Edict of 1969 (Ebeku, 2004).  
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During this period, there were a number of oil industry regulations with sections 
addressing issues of the pollution of land, water and air. These regulations, if properly 
implemented, could serve the purpose of protecting wetlands, especially those of the 
Niger Delta. Some of the legislation promulgated in colonial times was amended in the 
early years after independence.  
 
While these laws look good on paper, the government does not enforce them because 
they would affect the oil industry and the elites. The rising influence of crude oil during 
this period also brought in a wave of legislation aimed at continued exploitation of 
natural resources, some of which ran counter to sustainable development. An example is 
the Land Use Act of 1978, which nationalized all land and vested its management in the 
state governments. The law provides that occupancy can be revoked if the land is 
required for mining or oil sector activities (Constitutional Rights Projects, 1999). This 
law makes it easy to continue exploitation of wetlands to the benefit of the ruling elites 
and multinational companies, and wetland areas under control of local communities 
have been acquired and reclaimed for various purposes.  
 
4.5.3.2  From 1981 to the Present  
 
In 1981, a bill came before the then Federal House of Representatives for the 
establishment of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency but the bill was not 
enacted. The discovery of five ship loads of toxic waste of Italian origin in 1988 at the 
small port town of Koko in the Niger Delta became the catalyst that spurred the 
government into action and the populace to greater environmental awareness. The 
government’s response was swift and decisive with the immediate promulgation of the 
Harmful (Toxic) Wastes Criminal Provisions in Decree 42 of 1988. Furthermore, the 
Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) was created by Decree 58 in 1988. 
There has since been a series of laws and legislation aimed at conserving and protecting 
the environment in Nigeria (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2. Post Independence Laws That Affect Wetland Management in Nigeria. 
Name of act Year Summary of law Possible implication for Wetland management 
The Navigable 
Waterways 
Declaration Act 
1985 Prohibits the taking of such natural resources as sand, gravel or stone from 
rivers, creeks, lakes, lagoons and intra-coastal waterways. It also bans the 
erection of permanent structures within the right of way or the diversion of 
water from wetlands. 
Control resource extraction from wetland and wetland diversion 
River Basin 
Development 
Authority 
1986 Established River Basins Development Authorities which will ensure that 
surface and underground water resources are used for agriculture, irrigation, 
forestry and fisheries with utmost environmental care. The agencies are to 
develop and keep comprehensive and an up-to-date data of all water resources. 
Protects wetlands from adverse human activities. In addition, it encourages the 
collection of important data needed for the wise use of wetlands. It is the lack of 
such readily available data and information that has been blamed for wetland 
degradation (Bamford et al 2002)   
Petroleum 
Regulation Act 
1988 It requires operators (license holders) to implement acceptable precautionary 
measures, while relevant authorities must provide equipment for preventing the 
pollution of inland, territorial waters or high seas from oil or related fluids. 
Protects both inland and coastal wetlands against pollution from oil pollution and 
makes it mandatory for operators to take precautionary measures; opens up 
opportunity to legally challenge oil pollution due to poor equipment’s. 
Harmful Waste 
Act 
1988 Prohibits carrying, depositing and dumping harmful waste on any land and 
waters of Nigeria. 
By this act wetlands should be protected from harmful waste including waste from 
oil exploration that may affect human physical and mental health. By the act’s 
definition of gas flaring is a "harmful waste" and as such this activity goes contrary 
to the act and can be challenged in the law courts 
Federal 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
 
1988 Established the Federal Environmental Protection Agency as the first 
environmental regulatory and enforcement agency to promote natural resource 
conservation in the country.   
Formally established a government agency for coordinating activities on wetland 
conservation and ensures that laws such as EIA Decree No. 86 of 1992 and other 
aforementioned which have implications for wetlands are thoroughly enforced. 
However, bureaucracy, frequent changes of administrative heads and non-release of 
budgetary allocations at the right time have affected the agency and instead of been 
an enforcement agency it has become another administrative entity. 
Endangered 
Species Act 
1990 Prohibits extinction and over exploitation of wildlife especially those on 
endangered species list through conservation and management of Nigeria's 
wildlife 
Encourages conservation of important biodiversity of wetland areas, for example, the 
Niger Delta Pigmy Chimpanzee is protected by this legislation. 
Environmental 
Impact 
Assessment 
Decree no. 86 
1992 This is probably the most widely recognized environmental law in Nigeria. The 
law mandates that an EIA must be conducted for projects or any activity that is 
likely to affect the environment or have environmental effects. In schedule 3, it 
makes an EIA mandatory for any activity relating to the drainage of a wetland, 
wild-life habitat or of virgin forest covering an area of 100 hectares or more. 
It ensures that any developments in wetland areas, irrespective of their size, are well 
screened through the EIA process. 
Inland Fisheries 
Decree 
1992 Regulates inland fishing through restricting the use of fishing gear, prohibiting 
certain fishing methods (such as the use of explosive substances, noxious or 
poisonous matter and electricity for fishing), prohibiting exportation or 
importation of live fish, and controlling closed areas, restricted seasonal fishing 
and construction of dams in inland waters. 
This law can be applied to the protection of wetland areas by preventing over-fishing 
and the use of destructive fishing methods as well as protecting wetlands from the 
introduction of invasive fish species. However, this legislation seems outdated and in 
need of updating if it is to achieve its aim. For example, the penalty for fishing with 
prohibited fishing gear stipulates a fine of N500 (about $3) which was substantial in 
1992, but is too meagre to serve as deterrent today. 
The Water 
Resource Decree 
1993 Vests the rights and controls of water resources within the Federal Government. 
The policy states that the government will ensure the application of appropriate 
standards and techniques for the control, protection and management of water 
resources for the watering of animals, irrigation, agricultural purposes, domestic, 
and non-domestic uses such as the generation of hydro-electric energy, 
navigation, fisheries and recreation. The government will also ensure safe 
disposal of sewage, effluent and water-borne wastes, and control and prevent 
damage to watershed areas, protect inland and estuarine fisheries as well as flora 
and fauna and ensure that the possible consequences of particular water 
development proposals on the environment are properly investigated and 
considered before approval. 
This legislation makes it a moral duty of government to protect wetlands. 
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Table 4.2 (Cont ….) 
Name of act Year Summary of law Possible implication for Wetland management 
The National 
Inland Waterways 
1997 Established the National Inland Waterways Authority with the responsibility, 
among others, of prescribing offences relating to the obstruction and pollution of 
waterways (such as rivers, creeks, lakes, tidelands and lagoons) in addition to 
prescribing the penalties for such offences. The agency is also responsible for 
ensuring that an EIA is conducted for any navigation and dredging activities 
within inland water and its rights-of-way. 
Makes it mandatory for EIA to be conducted for developments in wetland areas. 
The National Park 
Service Decree 
(first promulgated 
in 1976) 
1999 Enabled the establishment of National Parks to enhance ecological processes 
and life support systems through the permanent preservation of its natural 
condition to the greatest possible extent, to protect and preserve its cultural and 
natural resources and values, and to ensure that its use shall be naturally based 
and ecologically sustainable. 
Wetland areas are established as National Parks as a means of protecting them. 
Niger Delta 
Development 
Commission Act 
2000 This established the NDDC with the aim, amongst other things, of tackling 
ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil 
mineral in the Niger Delta region. 
NDDC, as one of the richest governmental parastatals in Nigeria, can contribute 
funds necessary for the protection of the Niger Delta wetlands. This may ameliorate 
the challenge of lack of funds frequently complained of by stakeholders. However, 
the huge budgetary allocation has exposed the commission to corrupt practices and 
frequent changes in leadership has limited policy direction and has proved inimical 
to achieving its goal of sustainable development of the Niger Delta wetlands. 
The Coast and 
Inland Shipping 
Act 
2003 Stipulates the nature and type of vessel engaged in fishing on Nigerian coastal 
and inland waters. Section 22 of the Act requires specified types of vessels, 
including fishing trawlers, to register on the Special Register for Vessels and 
Ship Owning Companies. 
By this act, heavy ships that are capable of disturbing the benthic flora and fauna can 
be regulated out of wetland zones especially around coastal wetlands. 
National 
Environmental 
Standard and 
Regulation 
Enforcement 
Agency Act 
2004 Established NESREA to regulate and enforce environmental standards through 
protecting and developing strategies for quality environment, biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable development of Nigeria’s natural resources. 
After the scrapping of FEPA, Nigeria lost all environmental regulation; this act 
creates again the regulation of activities in freshwater environments. The agency can 
also liaise with relevant stakeholders within and outside Nigeria on matters 
regarding the enforcement of environmental standards, regulations, rules, laws, 
policies and guidelines and as such benefit from international best practices from 
Ramsar commission and other agencies working to protect wetlands. 
National Oil Spill 
Detection and 
Response Agency 
Act 
2006 Established NOSDRA which is expected to restore and preserve Nigeria’s 
environment by ensuring the best oil field, storage and transmission practices in 
exploration, production and use of oil in the quest to achieve sustainable 
development in Nigeria. 
An enforcement agency targeted at the activities of oil operators in the Niger Delta 
wetlands. Unlike other established agencies, this agency can focus specifically on 
cleaning up the wetlands without being side-tracked by other functions.  
The Nigerian 
Minerals and 
Mining Act. 
2007 Intended to monitor and ensure that mine operators comply with Nigerian 
environmental requirements. This Act prohibits water pollution or water courses 
during mining operations and ensures the reclamation and rehabilitation of 
mining sites. 
Since wetland areas are rich in natural resources, this act goes a long way to protect 
these ecosystems from contamination. However, according to the act, “minerals” 
means “any substance whether in solid, liquid, or gaseous form occurring in or on 
the earth, formed by or subjected to geological processes including occurrences or 
deposits of rocks, coal, coal bed gases, bituminous shale, tar sand, any substances 
that may be extracted from coal, shale, or tar sands, mineral water, and mineral 
components in tailings and waste piles, but with the exclusion of petroleum and 
waters without mineral content” . This detailed description conspicuously leaves out 
mining for petroleum products, the biggest threat to the Niger Delta wetlands. 
However, mining activities for kaolin, gravel, silica sand, bauxite, river sand and 
clay are covered. 
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None of these specifically and comprehensively deal with wetlands by addressing 
wetlands in their own right. Rather, wetland management is merely covered in general 
forestry laws and, more recently, nature conservation laws. The lack of even a specific 
wetland policy document in Nigeria is an indication that wetlands have not yet been 
given the adequate attention they demand in Nigeria. On the other hand, the sheer 
number of laws that relate to wetland ecosystems suggests that the reason for wetland 
degradation is not the lack of laws or policy documents, but weak enforcement of 
existing ones. A close look through the laws, especially in the post-Independence era, 
revealed that much of it was aimed at establishing organizations, e.g. the River Basin 
Development Authorities, National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency, and National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency. This was 
probably done with the hope that relevant institutions would be generated and enforced. 
Instead, various organizations were created with often conflicting duties, which may 
have led to no action or even friction among the organizations. 
 
4.5.4  Other Institutions Governing Wetlands in Nigeria 
 
4.5.4.1  International Conventions 
 
During this later period of post-Independence, Nigeria signed and domesticated five 
international laws, treaties and agreements that are central to the regulation and 
management of wetlands (Table 4.3). The Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), is the one directly 
addressing wetlands, aiming at conservation and sustainable utilization. However, the 
adoption of these conventions has not necessarily translated into actual wise use of 
wetlands. By signing, domesticating and designating a Ramsar site, Nigeria received 
substantial international financial support from donor agencies, such as Birdlife 
International, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the Ramsar Convention 
Secretariat and Wetlands International. With this support, and basking in the euphoria 
of designating a Ramsar site, a National Wetlands Unit was established in the Federal 
Ministry of Environment. The unit existed for about seven years but was subsequently 
scrapped and/or merged with other units. This might have affected the process of 
developing a national wetland policy, which has been in draft form since about 2001. 
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Table 4.3. International Conventions Relating to Wetland Management. 
Conventions Year 
Signed 
Aim /Remark 
Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) 
1974 
 
Aims to ensure that the international trade of wild animal and 
plant specimens does not threaten their survival. 
Implemented in Nigeria as Endangered Species (Control of 
International Trade and Traffic) Act 1985 
Convention for Co-operation 
in the Protection and 
Development of the Marine 
and Coastal Environment of 
the West and Central African 
Region 
1981 The convention (also known as the Abidjan Convention) 
provides an important framework through which national 
policy-makers and resource managers implement national 
control measures in the protection and development of the 
marine and coastal environment of the Region. 
Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals 
(CMS) 
1987 Aims to conserve terrestrial, marine and avian migratory 
species throughout their range. Also known as CMS or the 
Bonn Convention. 
Convention on Biological 
Diversity 
 
  
    
1994 Aims to conserve biological diversity, sustainable use of the 
components of biological diversity, and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources. This convention was the basis of the National 
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 2003 
Cartagena Protocol on Bio-
safety  
 
    
2000 Aims to ensure the safe handling, transport and use of living 
modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology 
that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking 
into account risks to human health. 
Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance 
Especially As Waterfowl 
Habitat 
2001 An international treaty for the conservation and sustainable 
utilization of wetlands. Also known as the Ramsar 
convention 
 
Another relevant international convention is the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, aimed at ensuring that international trade 
of wild animal and plant specimens does not threaten their survival. There are a number 
of endangered species found in wetlands across Nigeria, especially in the Niger Delta. 
There is also the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals, aimed at conserving terrestrial, marine and avian migratory species throughout 
their range. The Hadejia-Nguru Wetland is prominent because it is a nesting ground for 
migratory birds. The signing of these conventions was mostly a result of international 
pressure on the federal government, such as the conditions for financial aid, in which 
the country is required to adopt the principles of the convention in exchange for bilateral 
and multilateral donor grants (Sand, 1999; Agrawal, 2007). The government often signs 
conventions without fully appreciating their real aims. This may explain why, despite 
being a signatory on conventions including Ramsar, there is as yet no specific document 
or legislation addressing wetlands management in Nigeria.  
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4.5.4.2  State and Local Government Laws 
 
During this period, especially after 1999 (the return to democratic rule), some of the 
thirty six states and seven hundred and seventy four local governments have enacted 
relevant laws on conservation of natural resources. Most of these generally follow the 
federal laws. For example, according to the FEPA Act, each state in the country is 
expected to set up its own environmental protection body for the protection and 
improvement of the environment. Likewise, state laws take lead root from federal laws, 
which are also direct outcomes of the colonial forest laws. For instance, in Cross Rivers, 
one of the Niger Delta states, the government has set up a task force on deforestation 
and enacted a law on forest management through timber bans. None of the identified 
state government laws and policy documents specifically addresses wetland as a unique 
ecosystem but instead lumps it with forestry laws. Besides, these state laws can only 
operate under the federal laws.  
 
4.5.4.3  Private (Voluntary) Initiatives 
 
There is a trend in Nigeria for private establishments to adopt environmental regulations 
as part of their cooperative social/environmental responsibilities. Statements made by 
operators in the oil industry are of most interest, considering the fact that their activities 
produce great stress on Niger Delta Wetlands. For example, Shell’s Sustainability 
Report 2006 asserted that they would end “routine gas flaring everywhere in the world 
by 2008” (Royal Dutch Shell plc, 2006), but this is yet to come to fruition in Nigeria. 
There is also the voluntary adoption of the ISO 14000 (Environmental Management 
System) by other local and multinational oil companies. These initiatives are usually 
defined in the company’s mission and environmental policy statements and are an 
independent voluntary contribution to improve the environment. To appreciate their 
commitment to preventing oil spill, in November 1981, eleven major oil companies 
collectively established the Clean Nigeria Associates, an outfit with the primary aim of 
combating oil spills in members’ or third party areas of operation (Nwilo and Badejo, 
2006). The outfit is equipped with the equipment required for fast and effective spill 
response, in addition to the technical expertise and equipment in its repository readily 
available to complement individual members’ requirements when combating oil spills 
(Nnubi, 2008). Despite this, routine oil spills by the same organizations continue 
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unabated in the delta. The voluntary measures appear to be mere publicity 
statement/documents because actual actions are not a reflection of the statements. 
 
4.5.4.4  Discussion 
 
The first mention of wetland legislation was in the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) Decree No. 86 of 1992. No other policy document or legislation specifically 
mentions wetlands, which is indicative of the low relevance given to wetlands in 
environmental decision making in Nigeria. The focus has been on establishing 
organizations to enforce environmental laws, but some of these are caught up in 
bureaucracy, corruption and interference to protect vested interests in the oil industry.  
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the geography of the Niger Delta wetlands, the 
complex human impacts on them, the emergence of conflicts over these impacts, and 
the formal institutions which could be used to regulate these impacts. The myriad 
institutions and networks at play at various scales (national, regional and local) in this 
environment of conflict, coupled with the weak to strong nature of the Nigerian state, 
make the Niger Delta an ideal context in which to test the Network Communication 
Framework.  
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CHAPTER 5   
METHODS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter describes the methods that were used to test the NCF framework, by 
applying it to the management of the Niger Delta wetlands in Nigeria. The chapter 
outlines the research approach and investigative methods that were used in this study.  
 
5.2  Location of Study 
 
5.2.1  Bayelsa State 
 
The main field study was conducted in Bayelsa State – one of the core Niger Delta 
states (Asuni, 2010). Bayelsa State was created on October 1, 1996 out of the old Rivers 
State. There are eight Local Government Areas: Nembe, Ogbia, Yenagoa, 
Kolokuma/Opokuma, Southern Ijaw,  Sagbama and Ekeremor. 
 
Bayelsa State is geographically located within latitude 4
o 
15
l
 North, 5
o
 23
l
 South and 
longitude 5
o
 22
l
 West and 6
o 
45
l
 East (Bayelsa State e-Governance Office, 2012). It 
shares boundaries with Delta State on the North, Rivers State on the East and the 
Atlantic Ocean on the West and South (Fig. 4.1). Bayelsa state, with an area of about 
21,110 square kilometres, lies in the heaviest rainfall area in Nigeria, with a long rainy 
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season and a short dry season (from November to March). More than three quarters of 
the state is covered in wetlands with vegetation characterized by mangrove forest.  
 
A diversity of languages is spoken in Bayelsa State. These have been subdivided into 
two Ijoid languages (Nembe-Akaha and Izon (comprising 19 different dialects and 
inland Ijaw); the Edoid group (Southern Edoid and Delta Edo); and the central Delta 
languages (Alogoa, 1999). The predominant religions are Christianity and Traditional 
worship. The major occupations of the people are fishing, farming, palm oil milling, 
logging, palm wine tapping, local gin making, trading, carving and weaving. Bayelsa 
State is also a major oil and gas producing state, contributing over 30% of Nigeria’s oil 
production. Oloibiri, in the Ogbia Local Government Area, is where oil was first struck 
in Nigeria in commercial quantities in 1956. 
 
5.2.2  Choice of Communities 
 
At least one community from each of the eight local government areas in Bayelsa state 
was selected for data collection (Table 5.1). The sites were selected based on the 
occurrence of wetlands in the area and the presence of diverse pressures (identified 
through an initial literature review). Table 5.1 provides a description of the 19 sites and 
the nature of data collection in each site. Data were also collected from relevant 
organizations outside Bayelsa State, mainly in Abuja and Port Harcourt.  
 
At the start of the field work I sourced the list of settlements and their population from 
the National Population Commission. I was given a list that was based on the 1996 
census when Bayelsa State had only three Local Government Areas (LGA). Although 
this list is somewhat outdated, it was still useful for site selection. With the help of my 
field assistants and a staff in the commission I was able to identify the current LGA of 
each of the settlements. One criteria was to select sites from each of the current eight 
local government areas in Bayelsa state, taking into consideration other factors, such as 
occurrence of wetlands in the area and the presence of diverse pressures as well as 
logistic, ease of study and available funds. Having teased out settlements based on these 
criteria, I then randomly selected  twenty settlements covering all the local government 
areas with the intention of administering all the data collection instruments in all twenty 
settlements. However, for reasons of time and logistics it was only possible to visit  
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Table 5.1. Details of Sample Settlements. 
Settlement 
Local Government 
Area (LGA) Population 
Linguistic 
group Nature of Environment 
Main Human 
activity Main pressure Data collection activity 
Akassa Nembe 2,511 Nembe-
Akaha 
Coastal  Fishing Coastal erosion  Key informant interviews 
and informal discussion  
Amassoma Southern Ijaw 71,516 Izon Creeks and swamps 
crossing the low-lying 
plains 
Material collection, 
farming and fishing 
Resource extraction, e.g. 
logging 
All 
Angiama Southern Ijaw 15,708 Izon Riverine Fishing and material 
collection  
Oil exploration  All 
Apoi Southern Ijaw 1,583 Izon Creek Forest Fishing, Logging Oil exploration, deforestation All 
Biseni Yenagoa 7,315 Inland Ijo Freshwater swamp forests 
and lowland rainforest 
Material collection Oil exploration  Key informant interviews  
Ekeremor Ekeremor 20,370 Izon Saltwater swamp Fishing Excessive resource  
exploration/extraction  
Key informant interviews 
and informal discussion  
Kaima Kolokuma/Opokuma 17,174 Izon  Riverine Farming and Fishing Land reclamation  All 
Odi Kolokuma/Opokuma 23,020 Izon Riverine Farming and fishing Land reclamation  All 
Odioma Nembe 9,492 Nembe-
Akaha 
Coastal  Fishing Oil exploration  All 
Ogbia Ogbia 11,675 Central 
Delta 
Riverine Material collection Land reclamation, oil 
exploration  
All 
Ogobiri Sagbama 4,518 Southern 
Edoid 
Freshwater swamp forests  Fishing and material 
collection  
Excessive resource 
exploration/ extraction  
Key informant interviews  
Okodia Yenagoa 7,381 Inland Ijo Freshwater swamp forests 
and lowland rainforest 
Material collection Oil exploration  Key informant interviews  
Okpoama Brass 29,353 Izon Coastal Fishing Coastal erosion and oil 
exploration  
All 
Oloibiri Ogbia 24,108 Central 
Delta 
Riverine Material collection  Oil exploration  Key informant interviews 
and informal discussion  
Onyioma Southern Ijaw 4,192 Izon Riverine Fishing and material 
collection  
Oil exploration  All 
Oporoma Southern Ijaw 20,822 Izon Riverine Fishing and material 
collection, logging 
Oil exploration  All 
Twon 
Brass 
Brass 28,273 Nembe-
Akaha 
Coastal Fishing Oil exploration  Key informant interviews 
and informal discussion  
Yenagoa  Yenagoa 17,112 Izon  Freshwater swamp 
forests, relatively higher 
land 
Farming Land reclamation  All 
Zarama Yenagoa 8,317 Delta 
Edoid 
Creek Material collection  Invasive plants and Land 
reclamation  
All 
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nineteen settlements and administer all instruments in just twelve of these settlements. 
The twelve settlements were those where procedures for gaining consent were 
straightforward and there were limited language barriers. The dialect spoken in 
Sagbama and Ekeremor LGAs is different from that understood by my field assistants, 
and before I could identify contacts in these settlements time and logistics constrained 
the administration of the household questionnaire. This explains why household 
questionnaires were not administered in Ekeremor and Sagbama LGAs. However, I still 
visited these sites for interviews and informal discussions.  
 
5.3  Types of Approaches 
 
According to Creswell (2003), research may involve qualitative, quantitative, or mixed 
approaches.  
 
Qualitative study is defined as an inquiry process of understanding a social or human 
problem, based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, and 
reporting the detailed views of informants (Creswell, 2003). Quantitative research is a 
type of research that explains phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analyzed 
using mathematically based methods (in particular statistics). The qualitative approach 
is said to be useful as an exploratory research technique providing descriptions of how 
people experience a given research issue, thereby effective for getting deeper 
understanding of specific situation (Gorman and Clayton, 2005; Bogdan and Biklen, 
2007). It can be criticized for being subjective and not allowing for generalization 
(Dornyei, 2007). The quantitative approach, on the other hand, does permit 
generalization, predictions and comparison (Kraniz, 1995), but is less flexible (Johnson  
and Christensen, 2012).  
 
There has been widespread debate in recent years regarding the relative merits of 
quantitative and qualitative strategies for research. Some researchers see the two 
strategies as entirely separate and based on alternative views of the world  (Hughes, 
1997). Others suggest the possibility to combine these strategies within their research 
projects as the ‘best of both worlds' (Bryman, 1988). The latter school of thought 
encourages a mixed approach. Exponents of this suggest that there are no `paradigm 
103 
 
 
 
wars', in which quantitative and qualitative research are seen as belligerent and 
incompatible factions. Instead, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and can 
be combined if appropriate (Morgan, 1998; Maanen, 1979; Patton, 1990).   
 
Mixed approaches are being increasingly employed (Brannen, 2010), though many 
terms are used to describe them, often with slightly different words or phrases which 
can be sometimes confusing (Creswell et al., 2003).  One of their chief advantages is 
triangulation (Denzin, 2009), which increases the credibility and validity of results 
(Baxter and Eyles, 1999) – though this view has been contested on the grounds that, 
even if results from different data sources tally, there is no guarantee that inferences 
involved will be accurate (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). So triangulation must not 
only be concerned with corroboration, and there are at least three other possibilities 
(Hammersley, 1996; Brannen, 2011). These include: elaboration or expansion (the use 
of one type of data analysis adds to the understanding gained by another); initiation (the 
use of a method sparks new research questions that can be pursued using a different 
method); complementarity (each type of data analysis enhances the other); and 
contradictions (qualitative data and quantitative findings conflict). These multiple 
meanings of triangulation justify using a mix of qualitative and quantitative approach 
here. 
 
In this study mixed approaches are seen as complementary, in that they provide 
different perspectives and answer different questions within one broad area. Qualitative 
methods, such as participant observation, in-depth interviews, content analysis and 
focus group discussions were useful for obtaining a specific type of data, especially 
those relating to behaviour in customary contexts, individuals’ personal histories, 
perspectives, and experiences and eliciting data on the cultural norms and discourses of 
groups. For instance, through interviews and content analysis, the narratives and 
discourses of actors were uncovered. In contrast, quantitative data were collected using 
questionnaires, e.g. it was possible to quantify the monetary contribution of various 
wetland ecosystem services to local community livelihoods. 
 
Creswell (2003) identified three strategies to use mixed methods: sequential procedure, 
concurrent procedure, and transformative procedure. The approach adopted here is 
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consistent with concurrent procedure, which is a multi-stranded design in which both 
quantitative and qualitative data are collected independently at the same time or with a 
time lag (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). This does not suggest that I have 
oversimplified the procedures by reducing this research to phases. Data collection began 
with informal discussions to gain further insights that can help improve data collection 
instruments (such as questionnaires and interview guides etc). There was an initial 
questionnaire interview with stakeholders to identify scenarios, and then subsequently a 
group discussion/workshop to discuss the scenarios with them. In this way participants 
were also involved in agenda setting.  
 
5.3.1  Interviews 
 
To avoid ambiguity and ensure a high rate of return, a face-to-face approach was the 
preferred mode of data collection for all instruments. In a few instances where for 
logistical reasons this was not possible, telephone or email correspondence was used.  
 
There are three fundamental types of research interviews: structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured. Structured interviews essentially comprise verbally administered 
questionnaires, in which a list of predetermined questions is asked, with little or no 
variation and no scope for follow-up questions to responses that warrant further 
elaboration. These fit with the household questionnaires used in this study. Unstructured 
interviews contain questions which can be changed or adapted to meet the respondent's 
intelligence, understanding or belief. Unlike a structured interview, they do not offer a 
limited, pre-set range of answers for a respondent to choose, but instead advocate 
listening to how each individual person responds to the question.  
 
I personally administered the majority of the data gathering tools, except for a few 
questionnaires administered by two field assistants in communities which were far off 
and which I could not revisit because of time constraints (Fig. 5.1). Although the 
majority of my respondents could communicate in English or Pidgin English, I still 
needed an initial conversation to be made in the local dialect by field assistants. I 
sometimes asked for assistance from field assistants during interviews with participants 
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who were more fluent or comfortable in another language (i.e Ijaw) which I cannot 
speak. 
 
Figure 5.1. The Author Conducting an Interview. 
 
5.3.1.1  Structured Interviews 
 
In this study, structured interviews were used to administer household questionnaires, 
whose principal aim was to identify the main ecosystem services provided by the 
wetlands and highlight the worth of these services to local residents. Information was 
sought from households on such issues as: the quantity of resources collected from 
wetlands, the associated benefits and costs, and people's knowledge, perceptions, 
attitudes and concerns about wetlands (Appendix 5.1). In order to be sure that the 
questions were clear and appropriate, a draft questionnaire was pre-tested on four 
A. Interview with loggers B. Interview with a community leader 
C. On a trip to a Niger Delta community D. Interview with fishermen  
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volunteers living near my base. The questionnaire was also revised after an initial 
reconnaissance survey and informal interviews. 
 
The household was used as the unit of analysis, with the questionnaire survey 
administered to the head of each household. Households in the sample frame were 
selected from each of twelve sample settlements in the Niger Delta region. Samples 
from each settlement were selected, based on the proportion of their population in the 
entire sample frame. The initial intention was to administer 350 questionnaires with no 
more than 20% of this allocated to any one settlement. A systematic sampling approach 
was adopted to select respondent households. In this approach every nth household is 
chosen from the settlement. For example, every 10th household starting from an 
household adjudged to be in the centre of the community. This was repeated in all the 
twelve communities selected for household questionnaire.  In the end, a total of 283 
households were visited for face-to-face interviews.  
 
5.3.1.2  Unstructured Interviews 
 
Unstructured interviews contain several key questions that help to deﬁne the areas to be 
explored, while also allowing the interviewer or interviewee to diverge in order to 
pursue an idea or response in more detail. This interview format provides participants 
with some guidance on what to talk about, which many find helpful. The ﬂexibility of 
this approach, compared to structured interviews, also allows for the discovery or 
elaboration of information that is important to participants but may not have previously 
been thought of as pertinent by the researcher.  
 
Unstructured interviews (Appendix 5.2) were used to collect data from various types of 
respondents. First, in-depth interviews were held with representatives of key categories 
of groups. These categories, with the number of informants shown in brackets, were 
government (15), local (11), corporate (5), non-governmental organization (6), 
academia (3), multilateral organization (1) and media (1). Organizations within each 
group were selected based on their relevance and participation in issues relating to the 
management of the Niger Delta wetlands. Some organizations were purposively  
identified based on literature review and researchers knowledge of the area before 
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beginning field work; others were selected through a "snowballing" approach, which 
identifies hidden populations for whom adequate information is not readily available 
(Faugier and Sargeant, 1997). The respondent from each organization was in a position 
to know the issue being discussed very well.  
 
Interviews were personally administered, with responses noted down on each interview 
guide. Some were also digitally recorded if the respondent agreed to this. Interviews 
lasted 2 hours 30 minutes on average and sought to explore how various actors value 
wetland ecosystem services; their institutions (origins and changes); and their 
narratives, networks and major areas of interaction.  
  
Some government representatives showed little interest and told me to interview a 
subordinate. While this was helpful in that it gave me opportunity to interview some 
field staff, I was still very much interested to hear from the “key” staff. In a few 
instances, I was persistent and successful.  
 
There were also some officials with whom I had made an appointment but on arriving at 
their office found that they were either out of office, needed more time or suggested I 
call again. The Ecological Funds Office refused to participate for example, and 
numerous efforts made to interview staff at various oil companies were not successful 
despite, emails, calls and visits. A total of 43 interviews were conducted across all actor 
categories. 
 
Members of each actor group were asked if they were aware of, and supported, different 
categories of institutions. Awareness means that informants were able to spontaneously 
mention aspects of this institution. Support means that informants believe in the main 
aspects of an institution, whether or not they adopt it. If an informant could not 
spontaneously mention a particular institution, they were given an explanation of its 
main tenets. For example, a forest law was described as a “state law that regulates the 
size, quantity and type of wood that can be cut down”. If the informant could still not 
identify an institution, it was concluded that they were unaware of it and they were not 
asked if they supported it. Informants were also asked to identify what influences their 
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choice of institutions. This relied on open-ended questions, except for local informants, 
for whom a questionnaire with a list of seven pre-defined attributes was used. 
 
In addition, a number of key informants were also identified and interviews held with 
them too. At the beginning of the field work, I identified various groupings in local 
communities and within these groups I identified key informants, who were preferably 
the head of their group. Key informants included the chairmen of associations of timber 
dealers, hunters and fishermen, as well as community leaders and youth leaders. Sixteen 
local community key informants were interviewed in depth. Twenty more local 
respondents were also interviewed in depth, selected from respondents to questionnaire-
based interviews. Based on responses from the first 126 questionnaires, and on 
knowledge gained during field interactions and discussions, I identified the five main 
local uses (and user groups) of wetland ecosystems as farming, fishing, hunting, 
material collection and logging. Subsequent data collection was targeted towards these 
groups, and 5-6 respondents from each group were selected for in-depth interviews .  
 
I also held informal interviews with other local people, including loggers, military men, 
and a local youth who regarded himself as an ex-militant. There were no predetermined 
questions and the interview “went with the flow”.  
 
5.3.1.3  Focus Group Interviews 
 
Focus groups are groups of usually 6-10 selected individuals who  are brought together 
to discuss a specific topic of interest (Powell et al., 1996). The interviewer only serves 
as a moderator (or group facilitator) who introduces topics for discussion and helps the 
group to participate in a lively and natural discussion.  
 
Although I had a list of key themes (Appendix 5.3) which I expected to be covered 
during discussions, this did not interfere with the direction that participants took the 
discussion, as I had approached focus groups with an open mind and as few 
preconceptions as possible about what participants were likely to say or not say. The 
sessions began with a welcome, followed by overview of the topic of interest and then 
the discussion procedure. Participants were told that they were the experts, their 
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opinions mattered the most, and I had come to learn from them. I ensured that my 
participation was minimal, only clarifying issues when necessary, especially on points 
that remained unclear after the structured and unstructured interviews. 
 
Five focus group discussions were held in this study, one for each of four wetland user 
groups (excluding loggers), and one bringing together a representative from each actor 
category. Between six to eight participants were carefully recruited to cover a wide 
social spectrum. Depth of knowledge expressed during structured interiews and 
availability played a major role in participant selection.  The discussions, which lasted 4 
hours on average, allowed participants to agree or disagree with each other, so as to 
provide insights into the range of opinions and ideas about an issue, and the 
inconsistencies and variation that exist in a community in terms of beliefs, experiences 
and practices. 
 
5.3.2  Direct Field Observations 
 
Participant observation involves the researcher participating in a situation, while at the 
same time recording what is being observed. The phenomenon being observed can 
include practices, behaviours, environmental conditions etc. that are of interest to the 
researcher. Of the four types of participant observer identified by Gold (1958), in this 
case the type employed was "observer as participant", in which the observer has only 
minimal involvement in the social setting under study. Observations were made 
throughout this study when collecting data, in order to understand the context of actors' 
discourses. I also visited communities to observe how fishing and material collection 
are carried out, and took notes and photographs. 
  
5.3.3  Secondary Data Sources 
 
Secondary data sources are those already in existence for which permission is often 
needed to secure access. Because of the nature of this study, it relied heavily on official 
documents and reports from various organizations, literature from non-governmental 
organizations, national and local governments, as well as journals, books and 
conference presentations,  newspaper, radio and television reports, essays and memoirs, 
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private business briefing notes and communiqués by local communities websites, as 
well as podcast and webcasts.   
 
Such sources were particularly important for identifying texts to represent the main 
types of narrative about the Niger Delta wetlands. As it was not until the 1990s that 
counter narratives to the dominant modernist narrative of oil production achieved public 
prominence only texts published since 1990 are analysed here. The narratives of local 
communities were identified by analysing communiqués of meetings by local 
communities, such as the Ogoni Bill of Rights, presented by MOSOP to the federal 
government in 1990, and the Kaiama Declaration, issued after the Ijaw youth 
conference, held in the town of Kaiama on 11th December 1998. 
 
For some of these sources, a formal application for access had to be made to the 
relevant organization (for example, population data), but in other instances they were 
made readily available for me to make copies.  
 
5.3.4  Data Analysis and Presentation  
 
Data collected in this study were rich and extensive. Digitally recorded data were 
transcribed and saved in MS Word documents. This was done using the function in 
NVIVO 8 that enabled me to play content more slowly. NVIVO is software that 
supports qualitative research. My intention was to use this software to analyse 
qualitative data, and I attended training for this. However, it was time consuming as I 
had not built in the necessary database such as codes and links into NVIVO from the 
onset of my research. Therefore, I resorted to the manual transcription of qualitative 
data. I also attempted to use Dragon (a speech recognition software), but also found this 
time consuming for the software to recognize my accent.  
 
Data analyses depend on the nature and purpose for which the data had been collected. 
Qualitative data were subjected to detailed content analysis using markers to identify 
and highlight statements quoted in the Results Chapters (7 and 8). Two main tools were 
utilized to analyse quantitative data: UCINET for network analysis and SPSS for 
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statistical analysis. Quantitative data were presented using descriptive statistics and 
graphs constructed using MS Excel.  
 
5.4  Researcher's Diary 
 
This section provides an account of field data collection between 13th June and 15th 
November 2010. Although there were prior contacts and visits to the field, no data were 
collected until this time.  
 
The first four days were spent in Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria, firming up interview 
appointments with government agencies and ministries which had been previously 
identified before commencing the field study. The procedure was to apply to the 
executive head of the agency/ministry. A letter of introduction obtained from the 
departmental postgraduate research tutor at the University of Leeds was presented with 
a brief application letter stating the nature of the interview and the type of questions to 
be asked. In most instances I received a positive response, referring me to the most 
relevant official in the organization. I then visited the official and arranged a time for 
the interview. The officials also gave me their telephone numbers so I could send them 
reminders when the interview date was near. All the officials found suitable time slots 
in the first week of August. Interactions with these officials enabled me to identify other 
organizations I was not aware of. For example, the Director of the Federal Ministry of 
Environment, Abuja, introduced me to the Head of the Community and Social 
Development Centre in Bayelsa State.  
 
I then travelled to the Niger Delta state of Bayelsa, the first of the three states where I 
initially planned to collect data. The Department of Geography, Niger Delta University, 
was my research base during the field work. This link was facilitated through 
professional contacts, as I worked for a sister university and so was welcomed as a 
colleague. Through the help of university staff I found two students to employ as field 
assistants. They served as guides and translators and also assisted in administering a few 
household questionnaires.  
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The next few days were used to firm up interviews with officials of organizations in 
Bayelsa State, following a similar approach to that used in Abuja. As part of my starting 
strategy I also had informal discussions with university staff knowledgeable about 
conducting research in the state. Through these discussions I was able to identify some 
communities of interest based on my site selection criteria. At this point it became clear 
that studying in three states would not be feasible, considering time and logistics. I had 
originally thought that field studies in three states in the Delta would represent various 
points of view, especially based on the ethnic distinctions between the states. However, 
on the assumption that differences were minor I concentrated only on Bayelsa, but with 
day trips to wetland communities in Delta State (Sapele) and Rivers State (Ahoada). 
Besides, it has been suggested that the institutions of one area in the Niger Delta are 
derived from those of others (Alagoa, 1971). 
 
My first contact with local communities was for the purpose of testing data gathering 
tools. The draft questionnaire was tested with a number of adjustments made before the 
actual survey. This enabled me to assess my plan with possible field realities and gain 
additional knowledge. My first trip within Bayelsa State was to Oporoma, an oil 
producing community where I spent a day having extensive informal discussions with 
local people, including some of the chiefs.  
 
I then commenced household questionnaire administration, visiting various 
communities, usually returning to my base as there was no suitable accommodation in 
most of the sites. After personally administering about 126 questionnaires, I halted 
questionnaire administration to spend a week meeting government officials in Bayelsa 
state. The following week I travelled back to Abuja to fulfil appointments fixed at the 
beginning of the field work. Most interviews went smoothly, however some officials 
failed to keep their appointments, and I had to reschedule these for near the end of field 
work when I would be in Abuja again. I then moved back to Bayelsa state with a 
stopover in Port Harcourt (Rivers State), where some relevant non-governmental 
organizations and government agencies have their offices. On returning to Bayelsa state, 
I began interviewing key informants and representatives of local communities, and 
concluded household interviews and interviews with representative of organizations. 
Throughout these activities I also interviewed other people informally. During visits to 
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organizations, I collected their key publications and other documents. I spent the last 
week of field work reviewing Nigerian environmental laws at the International Centre 
for Nigerian Law. Throughout the field period, I visited nineteen communities. 
Interviews were held in all these communities but questionnaires were only 
administered in twelve (Table 5.1). 
 
Data collection required travelling through difficult terrain, around swamps and creeks, 
and covering long distances (up to 600 km/370 miles). This made my work difficult and 
more costly than initially anticipated.  
 
5.5  Ethical Issues 
 
I recognized the significance of ethical considerations in conducting my research, 
following established guidelines for dealing with ethical issues in social science 
research. I applied for, and received, clearance for ethical review from the University of 
Leeds. According to Hay (2010), ethical considerations should address issues of privacy 
and confidentiality, informed consent, and harm to participants.  
 
First, I ensured that participants were not coerced into participating in my research, but 
participated voluntarily after being informed of the procedures and possible risks 
involved (if any). This was done verbally before beginning data collection. Participants 
were allowed to withdraw from the research at any time if they so wished. In the case of 
observation, permission was sought from the person concerned (for example while 
observing fishermen), and from the head of the group, i.e. from the village head when 
observing activities in a community. The confidentiality of participants was guaranteed 
and in no part of the report would names be mentioned. Respondents would not be put 
in harm’s way, physically or psychologically. Finally, efforts were made to organize 
workshops at the end of the research to share findings with respondents verbally and 
through a synthesis report. This was ethically justified and also provided valuable 
feedback that benefited subsequent analysis. A later section (Section 9.5) provides 
further insights into the rigours of fieldwork and ethical challenges faced and how they 
were handled.  
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5.6  Conclusions 
 
To address the goals of this study this chapter described the overall study design, and 
the various methods used to collect and analyse data. The next chapter focuses on the 
benefits and costs of ecosystem services in the Niger Delta, while Chapters 7 and 8 
present the results obtained when the Network Communication Framework was tested 
in the Niger Delta.  
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CHAPTER 6   
DISTRIBUTION OF WETLAND BENEFITS AND COSTS ACROSS 
NETWORKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter evaluates the benefits and costs associated with using the Niger Delta 
wetlands, thereby complementing the discussion in Chapter 4 of the physical geography 
of the wetlands and the policies and institutions involved in their management. The way 
in which these benefits are realized has become a major issue. The inequitable sharing 
of benefits and costs amongst the various groups is generally seen as the underlying 
cause of conflict in the management of the wetlands (Akpan, 2010; Omeje, 2005).  
 
The aim of this chapter is not to present a full-scale economic analysis of ecosystem 
services derived from the wetlands. Instead, it focuses on what the distribution of 
benefits and costs can contribute to understanding the management of such complex 
ecosystems. To do this, it divides all the groups involved into three main categories – 
local communities, government and the corporate sector – which it portrays as being 
linked in three networks. The first section looks at the monetary benefits for each of 
three major networks (local community, government and corporations). This is followed 
by a section describing the cost of each network’s activity in the wetlands. The final 
section aggregates the benefits and costs of wetland use across the three main networks 
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and describes how these are distributed among them. Benefits and costs are expressed in 
monetary terms so that their distributions are expressed on a common basis.  
 
6.2  Data Sources and Description 
 
To characterize wetland resources, comprehensive data accounting for each network’s 
benefits and/or costs is required. However, not all of these data are readily available for 
the Niger Delta. While information on governmental and corporate network benefits are 
available from secondary sources (websites, reports and budgets), little is known of the 
benefits accruing to local communities. Therefore, it became imperative to collect data 
to assess the value of the wetland benefits for the local people.  As such, this chapter is 
based on a mix of primary and secondary data.  
 
In order to estimate (in monetary terms) the benefits local people derive from their use 
of the Niger Delta wetlands, data were first collected for the purpose of identifying the 
main ecosystem services provided by the wetlands. The identification and selection of 
these services weres based on a review of the relevant literature, personal experience 
and informal interviews, complemented by an initial questionnaire survey. Then, using 
the year 2009/2010 as a baseline, the present use and non-use values of ecosystem 
services provided by the Niger Delta wetlands to local residents were estimated from 
data collected through the questionnaire (Appendix 5.1). The household (the number of 
people living together, sharing the same facilities, such as a kitchen and a toilet, and 
who feed from the same cooking facility) was used as the unit of analysis for the survey, 
with the questionnaire administered to the head of each household. Households in the 
sample frame were chosen by first purposively selecting twelve settlements (see Table 
5.1) in the Niger Delta region to cover the wide range of economic activities taking 
place in the wetlands. Then, a representative sample of households was randomly 
selected from each settlement based on their population. A total of 283 households in 
twelve communities of the Niger Delta region were visited for face-to-face interviews 
between July and November 2010.  
 
The number (percentages) of households that indicated that they derive an ecosystem 
service from the wetlands gave an indication of its importance. The responses were then 
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organized based on the categorization of ecosystem services into (a) provisioning 
services; (b) regulating services; (c) cultural services and (d) supporting services 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003). In order to estimate the magnitude of each 
main ecosystem’s provisioning service (use value) respondents were asked to quantify 
the amount harvested (used), while the average price was generated through group 
discussions and visits to local markets. For non-use values of the other ecosystem 
services a stated preference approach was used in contrast to the price-based approach 
used for provisioning services. This is because the other classes of ecosystem services 
often do not have a market price.  
 
6.3  Direct Economic Benefits of the Wetlands to Local Communities 
 
6.3.1  Biographical Data  
 
A set of biographical data was collected for the sample of 283 respondents, 70% of 
which are male with an average age of 50 years (Appendix 6.1). 31% of respondents do 
not have any formal education. With about 34% of respondents considering themselves 
as unemployed, the main occupation is farming (28%) followed by the civil service 
(16%). About 30% of households have other income sources that are not derived 
directly from the wetlands. The average monthly household income amounted to 
N21,700 ($145) (1 Naira (N) is equivalent to approximately 0.0067 US dollars ($))  
When related to an average of six people per household this indicates that the daily per 
capita income falls below the commonly used poverty threshold of $1 per person per 
day (Anand and Sen, 1997). This emphasizes the critical role that ecosystem services, 
particularly those of a provisioning nature, are expected to play in livelihoods.  
  
Unsurprisingly, provisioning services emerged as the most important category of 
ecosystem service to local residents. The collection of materials such as snails, edible 
insects and food is the provisioning service from which all households derive a benefit. 
This is followed by fishing (89%), crop production (86%), hunting (57%) and logging 
(9%). The wetland, however, is also used as a source of cultural services. It is a place 
for recreation by 31% and spiritual worship by 26% of respondents. The importance of 
ecosystem regulation services was mentioned by 15% of respondents, while 6% 
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mentioned benefiting from the supporting services of the wetlands (Appendix 6.1). 
Most households benefit from the multiple services provided by the wetland. For 
example, an household with a farmland (cropping) will also fish and collect materials 
from the wetlands. These activities are carried out by several members of the household.  
In the next section, the monetary value of these services is presented.  
 
Although the term ‘ecosystem services’ as such was unfamiliar to the respondents, they 
recognized the concept, especially in the case of provisioning and cultural services. On 
the other hand, regulating and supporting services were poorly recognized. The mention 
of provisioning and cultural services cut across all education groups; however, 82% of 
those indicating regulating services and 65% of those indicating supporting services had 
at least a post-secondary/university degree. This suggests that knowledge of these non-
use services is dependent on the respondents’ level of education. Generally, all 
respondents were aware of the availability of the wetlands in their environment. They 
associated the wetlands with the presence of fish, forest, raffia palm, wild animals and 
water.  
 
6.3.2  The Monetary Value of Material Collection  
 
The collection of materials such as spices, wild food, insects, medicinal plants, and fire-
wood (Fig. 6.1) is the service from which all households in the Niger Delta region 
derive a benefit. One respondent described the wetlands as a place where “you just go to 
and pick what you want”. This is indicative of the diverse materials available in the 
wetlands that support the livelihoods of the local residents.  
 
Access to the wetlands in order to collect these materials is generally open to all. There 
are some materials, however, for which access is restricted, especially to non-natives 
(people who are Nigerians but not indigenous to the community). These people will be 
required to pay an amount of money before they can be permitted to collect some of 
these materials. A non-native snail collector reported that the registration fee (for the 
community to acknowledge you and allow you into the wetlands to collect materials) is 
N4,500 ($30). A monthly arrangement payment is N3,000 ($20), while for an annual 
permit the fee is N10,000 ($66). 
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Figure 6.1. Selected Materials Collected from the Niger Delta Wetlands. 
 
Collection of some of these materials is seasonal, while others can be found all year 
round. Bush mango is widely collected between May and August; snails and crabs 
during the rainy season; while sand mining, palm weevil and art and craft materials can 
be found all year round. Whilst most of these materials are collected throughout the 
year, their periods of abundance are seasonal. For example, shrimp are abundant 
between June and September when households may collect up to a basket per day using 
Snail Bark of trees collected as chewing stick 
Material used for local sleeping mat Kolanut 
Palm weevil roasted as Bayelsa suya Ogbono 
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basket traps. The collection of spices, medicinal plants, wild food and insects are female 
and children-dominated, while the collection of wood and material extraction is male 
dominated.  
 
The economic value of material collection in the Niger Delta wetlands is estimated at 
$4,266 per participating household (Appendix 6.2). The gross financial value generated 
by the 283 participating households is $1,207,245. Of this, 75% is in cash income, while 
the remainder is used for other purposes such as subsistence use, as gifts to neighbours 
and relatives and for making other products. On account of the diversity in type of 
materials collected, the economic cost and time spent on each activity can differ widely. 
There are some materials that only require buckets to be collected in the backyard, 
while others need specialized tools and labour. For most of the materials, the economic 
cost is associated with cutlass, buckets, baits or poison, torchlight, canoes, paddles and 
bags. Taking cost into consideration, the net financial value of material collection in the 
Niger Delta wetlands is estimated at $1,051,101 for the 283 households or $3,714 per 
participating household. The average time spent collecting materials (excluding sand 
mining) is 5.5 hours per day per household. For sand mining most respondents spend 
about 10 hours a day on the activity.  
 
Materials collected from the wetlands have diverse uses in the local communities. 
Spices have multiple uses as they play an important role in food preparation. They also 
have medicinal value, which includes a cure for the common cold and hypertension. 
Wild foods are very important in income generation and for subsistence household use. 
Bush mango is highly priced in the market and is a delicacy for most people in Nigeria. 
Palm weevil is an insect that yields high economic value when roasted. Popularly called 
Bayelsa suya, it is becoming a national delicacy craved by many visitors to the state. 
Although some communities in the Delta do not eat snails, which are also highly priced, 
they collect them all the same and sell them to traders from as far away as Lagos. Apart 
from being a delicacy, the fluids contained in the mantle cavity have medicinal values. 
The other marine and freshwater molluscs also constitute an important food source and 
their shells are used as reinforcement for concrete (Fig. 6.2). Shrimps, which are rich in 
protein, minerals and vitamins, are utilized as condiments for soup and pottage. Art and 
craft materials are used in the home or sold for cash. These include baskets, fish traps, 
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mats and brooms. The palm wine and native gin collected from the palm trees are 
important for medicinal and cultural activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Shells Used for Concrete Reinforcement. 
 
The collection of medicinal plants is another main use to which the wetlands are put. 
Some of the materials collected and eaten (such as Kolanut and Aziza) have diverse 
medicinal uses. Informal interviews with three traditional doctors (in Odi, Zarama and 
Yenagoa) revealed the main medicinal plants collected from the wetland (Appendix 
6.3). The practitioners see an average of four patients per day and charge between 
N1,000 ($7) and N5,000 ($33) per consultation, most of which are midwifery- and 
massage-related. The indication is that this form of health care is predominant in places 
with no transport, such as in the interior where residents cannot often go to town for 
western style treatment. In some instances, they indicated that nurses in hospitals 
recommend some of these native remedies. When checked with ethno-biological 
knowledge, a number of these plants were found to be used for similar cures in western 
medicine (Maduka and Okoye, 2002; Odebunmi et al., 2010). This underscores the 
importance of traditional medicine in the overall health of the people who live in rural 
areas. To avoid double counting, since these materials are already valued as food or 
material collection, medicinal plants are not included in the monetary valuation.  
 
6.3.3  The Monetary Value of Fishing  
 
The Niger Delta is home to a wide variety of fish species. About 196 species belonging 
to 105 genera in 46 families have been identified (Otobotekere and Sikoki, 1999). These 
species are spread across the various eco-regions from the freshwater in the inland to the 
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saline water around the coastal region. This makes fishing a dominant aspect of the 
Niger Delta economy. Fishing grounds/ponds/lakes are generally under the ownership 
of the community, compound or family. Open access fishing can be carried out in open 
swamps and flooded areas around the homestead. Access to community ponds is open 
to members of the community. Likewise, the family-owned fishing grounds are open to 
members of the family. Non-natives are mostly required to seek the permission of the 
compound, community or family head and they are often required to pay a small fee. It 
is now common practice for owners of fishing grounds to lease them out to experienced 
non-native fishermen. About 4% of fishing households indicated that they depend on 
fishing grounds they had on lease.  
 
Fishing takes place all year round, but the fish catch is highest in the dry season when 
the wetlands are not flooded. The reduced water levels during this period make fish 
harvesting easy. Most of the fishermen spend more time fishing during the dry season 
compared to the rainy season when they take to another wetland activity. The excess 
catch is processed by drying, smoking, roasting or frying to preserve them for sale or 
use during the period of fish shortage. There are a variety of fishing methods in the 
Delta. Common fishing gear includes the use of traps, hook and line and drifting gill 
nets. The use of spear or cutlass, cast net, lift net and fence is also common. Dynamite 
and poisonous substances, though prohibited and punishable is often used by some 
members of the communities. Men who are mostly engaged in commercial fishing are 
responsible for setting the nets (especially cast nets and lift nets), while women mostly 
collect fish consumed for household subsistence and are the processors and traders in 
fish. The fish is mostly sold on the spot to traders who come in from as far as Lagos. 
Generally, fishing in the Delta is an activity engaged in by all, irrespective of age or 
gender. There are no formal fishing associations. However, because commercial fishing 
can hardly be performed by an individual it is common for fishermen to call on other 
fishermen to work with them. In the end, they will be paid in cash or the yield will be 
shared.  
  
The economic value of fishing in the Niger Delta wetlands was estimated at $4,139 per 
participating household (Appendix 6.4). The total gross financial value by the 251 
participating households is estimated at $1,038,815. Of this, 80% was used to generate 
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cash income, while the rest was used for household subsistence, as gifts to neighbours 
and relatives and in exchange for other services, such as labour. The economic cost 
incurred while engaged in fishing relates to the purchase of traps and nets, baskets, 
containers, cutlass, and canoes/paddles. About 15% of the gross value of fishing goes to 
offset the economic cost of fishing. This brings the net financial value for the fishing 
households to $854,409; $3,404 per participating household. On average, about 8 hours 
of household labour is spent daily on fishing. This includes the time spent by fishermen 
commuting to and from their homestead, setting their gear and eventual landing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Some Fish Species Common In The Niger Delta Wetlands.  
 
Fish are the most abundant and easily available source of animal protein for 
consumption and income generation in the Niger Delta (Allison and Okadi, 2009). 
Therefore, fishing is an important source of livelihood (household income) for many 
households in the region, as the economic activities of the whole population are either 
dependent on or related to it. The above valuation is based on the sale of freshly-caught 
Tilapia (Tilapia guineensis) Flying fish (Exocoetidae) 
Lung fish (Protopterus annectens) Snake-Head (Channa channa) 
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fish. When fish is processed (dried, smoked, fried or roasted), however, the net value 
can increase by up to 25%.  
 
6.3.4  The Monetary Value of Crop Production  
 
Varieties of crops are cultivated in the Niger Delta wetlands. Cassava, cocoyam, maize, 
sugarcane, yam and different varieties of leafy vegetables are some of the major crops 
(Fig. 6.4; Appendix 6.5). Each cropping household has access to an average of three 
plots, each measuring about 0.11 ha. For most households, at least one of the plots is 
located in close proximity to their homestead where they mainly cultivate food crops, 
such as leafy vegetables, plantain and pepper, as well as some tree crops, such as 
orange. The majority of plots are acquired through inheritance (72%) and the remainder 
are leased, especially from native land-owners to non-native cropping households.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Some Crops Common In The Niger Delta Wetlands.  
 
A typical cropping season begins with the clearing of  farmland towards the end of the 
dry season, usually between November and February, while cultivation begins at the 
start of the wet season around March. The common cropping system in the region is 
Leafy vegetables Plantain 
Oil palm Cocoyam 
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traditional bush fallowing, in which the farmer cultivates a plot, usually for about one to 
three years, and then abandons it temporarily (for a period of three to ten years) to allow 
the plot to regain soil fertility. However, rapid population growth and land shortage 
have drastically reduced the amount of arable land available to farmers, reducing fallow 
periods considerably and in most cases, continuous cultivation has emerged.  
 
Intercropping of yam, cassava, maize, okra and pepper is widespread in the wetlands. 
Mono-cropping, where a single crop is cultivated year after year, is also practised. 
Agroforestry is also observed, in which case farmers integrate tree crops (such as oil 
palm and rubber) into their farmland. Labour expended on farmlands is predominantly 
household labour. There is a widespread specialization and division of labour along 
gender lines. Men are involved in the more strenuous farm activities, such as land 
clearing and cultivation of crops such as oil palm, rubber and yams, while the women 
are mainly responsible for weeding, harvesting and cultivation of crops such as pepper 
and okra. Although there are no formal cropper associations, it is common for other 
croppers, friends and relatives to pitch in to help each other when the need arises. In 
exchange, the benefiting household will offer similar help or give a part of the yield in 
appreciation.   
 
Crop production in the Niger Delta wetlands is significant in terms of its contribution to 
household income and subsistence, but is also important in terms of exchange with 
neighbours and relatives and the role of some crops as medicinal ingredients. The 
economic value of crop production in the Niger Delta wetlands (Appendix 6.5) was 
valued at $5,340 per participating household and $15,632/ha in gross financial value. 
The total gross financial value generated by the 242 cropping households is $1,292,228. 
Of this amount, about 51% is in cash income, while the remainder was used for other 
purposes, mainly household subsistence. The economic costs associated with cropping 
in the wetlands range from farm tools and implements (hoe, cutlass, shovel, axe, spade, 
wheel barrow, knife, baskets and sacks), to planting materials (seeds) and agrochemicals 
(fertilizer). Also, households have canoes and paddles used for transportation. If costs 
are taken into consideration, the net financial value of crop production in the Niger 
Delta yields $4,825 per participating household or $14,596/ha. This cost does not 
include household labour for which money is not paid, but includes externally hired 
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labour for which money is paid. An average cropping household spends about 18 hours 
a day on farm activities, which include land clearing, planting, watering/irrigation, pest 
control, fertilizer application and harvesting.  
 
6.3.5  The Monetary Value of Hunting  
 
The wildlife component of the Niger Delta wetlands is distinct as it harbours a wide 
variety of animal species, some of which have only recently become known to science. 
These animals occur across the varied ecological regions within the Delta. Access to 
hunting grounds abides to the same rules as material collection.  
 
Game hunting is predominantly a male-dominated activity, conducted all year round. 
Women are involved in the sale of game animals, which are sometimes cut into pieces 
(if not sold on the day of catch) and sold in the market (for the bigger animals). Fresh or 
live animals are more higher priced. Hunting is one wetland activity that is somewhat 
regulated through local associations. These associations basically regulate the activities 
of hunters who use Dane guns for hunting. Alternatively, small-scale hunters using traps 
are not regulated. About 13% of the hunting households have a professional hunter. 
Hunters are also imbued with traditional powers believed to protect them against wild 
animals. 
 
There are about 24 commonly hunted animals in the wetlands (Appendix 6.6). The 
economic value of hunting in the Niger Delta wetlands accrues a gross financial value 
of $5,468 per participating household and a total of $88,410 for all 162 participating 
households. Of the total gross financial value, 69% is generated as cash income, while 
the remainder is used mainly for household subsistence. The economic cost associated 
with hunting includes the buying of Dane guns, traps, cutlass, torchlight’s, spears, dogs 
and bags. Taking the costs into consideration, the net financial value of hunting in the 
Niger Delta wetlands is $473 per participating household. An average of 4 hours per 
day is spent hunting by each household. In addition to being an important source of 
income, game hunted in the wetlands is eaten by the local residents as it supplies 
necessary meat protein. Game is also an important source of hides and skin used in the 
production of local drums, while the horns are used for fashioning local trumpets. 
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6.3.6  The Monetary Value of Logging  
 
A distinction is made between wood collection for fuelwood and logging, in that the 
former relates to wood collection for energy, while logging is restricted to the collection 
of wood for use as timber. Logging for timber in the Niger Delta wetlands is the 
provisioning service least used by  local residents. This is because logging has never 
been a widespread activity among the natives. Even when the natives cut down trees it 
is either to build their own huts or to make canoes, none of which are of a grand scale. 
However, there is a considerable number of non-resident individuals and companies 
who log in the wetland region. Access to logging grounds is controlled by communities 
and the families who own the land. Mostly, the forested lands are leased to loggers 
(most of whom are non-natives) for a fee. At best, the natives serve as a source of 
labour to the loggers.  However, this is changing as the natives are now becoming aware 
of the economic value of timber. This is a fast growing activity. As one respondent put 
it:  
 
“Before now our people are not interested in wood, even if you tell the chief 
he will say is it not just wood, allow them to take it, but now even the chiefs 
are selling the land and giving it out on lease” (Resident of Oporoma 
community).  
 
Eleven of the twenty-six logging households are non-natives of the communities within 
which they operate. This number (26) relates only to logging households that are 
resident within the community. Field observation and discussions reveal that the 
majority of the main loggers in the Niger Delta wetlands come from outside the Niger 
Delta and do not necessarily reside there. This group often has the backing of the 
military and logs lands located far away from residential zones, without the knowledge 
of the landowners. According to one respondent, his family have fallen victim of these 
external loggers: 
 
“I woke up in the morning only to hear that our family land has been 
destroyed by some people who came with the army (military officers).” 
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Logging is a predominantly male-dominated activity carried out throughout the year, 
including the rainy season. As one respondent put it: 
 
“We log a lot during the wet (rainy) season because during flood period, 
you can load (float) your logs or planks easily and free from restriction as in 
the dry period” (Logger in Amassoma community). 
         
Logging is not directly regulated at the local level. There exist associations of traders in 
sawn wood. These associations act to regulate the activities of traders of sawn wood and 
labourers who cut down trees. Normally, all types of tree can be logged, except for 
economically valuable tree crops, such as the Bush mango tree.  
 
Based on the assumption (derived from personal observation) that an average log has a 
length of 20-30 meters and a trunk diameter of 06-0.9 meters, the economic value of 
logging in the Niger Delta wetlands is estimated to be $6,045 per participating 
household (Appendix 6.7). The total gross financial value for the twenty-six logging 
households is $157,175, of which 96% was used to generate cash income. The 
economic cost of logging relates to the cost of canoes used for transportation, axes, 
machetes, rope, machines, labour and fuel for boats. If the economic cost is taken into 
consideration, the net financial values of logging in the Niger Delta wetlands will yield 
$4,114 per participating household.  
 
Apart from sawnwood, logged treeshave many other uses. For example, mangrove trees 
are rich in tannin used for the manufacture of inks, while the African oil bean is used as 
a medicinal plant. Logged woods are also used in canoe and paddle construction, the 
making of traditional masks, mortar and pestle, planks and electric poles. Sawdust is 
also collected and used for cooking and other artefacts. The economic value presented is 
only of the fresh log. The economic worth of the wood, however, will increase after 
being sawn or used in canoe construction. It takes about 6 months to make an averagely 
sized canoe and about a year to construct a big one.  
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6.3.7  Aggregate Value of Provisioning Services  
 
Based on the monetary value of each provisioning service derived from the Niger Delta 
wetlands, the aggregate monetary value of wetland provisioning services for the 283 
households in the sample was estimated at $3,783,928 for gross financial value, 
$3,256,837 for net financial value and $ 2,591,632 for cash income (Table 6.1). On the 
assumption that the 283 households are a reliable sample of all households in the Niger 
Delta, in terms of the composition of provisioning services which they harvest, the 
mean net financial value or provisioning services is $11,508 per household per annum. 
Note that these estimates are  based on yields from one section of the Niger Delta and 
different values may be derived for tribes elsewhere in the Delta. For instance, farming 
assumes considerable importance in the drier landward part of the Niger Delta than the 
swampier zone characterized by extensive creeks. The valuation is also based on the 
price of the actual service collected from the wetland. In most cases, however, there is 
an added value since the materials are mostly used to make other products. For instance, 
cassava cropping is popular because it is used for making garri, fufu and starch, which 
are popular West African foods made from cassava tubers. Finally, some provisioning 
services have not been valued because their value is judged negligible e.g. grazing. 
Some livestock grazing takes place in the Delta but involves mainly small animals such 
as sheep, goats, pigs and rabbits.  
 
Table 6.1. Aggregate Value of the Niger Delta Wetlands Provisioning Services.  
Activity 
 
 
Number of 
participating 
households 
(PPH) 
 (n = 283) 
Gross 
financial 
value 
 ($) 
Net 
financial 
value 
 ($) 
Cash 
Income  
($) 
Gross 
financial 
value/PPH 
($) 
Net 
financial 
value/PPH 
($) 
Cash 
Income/PPH 
($) 
Material 
collection  283 1,207,246 1,051,101 900,813 4,266 3,714 3,183 
Fishing 251 1,038,815 854,509 826,045 4,139 3,404 3,291 
Cropping 242 1,292,282 1,167,714 652,997 5,340 4,825 2,698 
Hunting 162 88,410 76,552 60,938 546 473 376 
Logging 26 157,175 106,961 150,839 6,045 4,114 5,802 
Total 3,783,928 3,256,837 2,591,632       
Average (N=283) 13,371 11,508 9,158       
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One factor identified by respondents as important for their continued benefits from the 
wetlands are social relationships that enable individuals (friends and relatives) to help 
one another when need arises. This is because most of the activities are carried out in 
groups. According to a fisherman in Zarama, interviewed while fishing with his 
colleagues:   
 
“I could not have got this much if I have tried to come here alone … maybe 
I will just use hook and it will take me days before I can catch this much 
…… every one person is important even if one of us is not here today, it 
will affect us … it is also important because when things are difficult we 
come together to share among ourselves.”  
 
The importance of social relationships is supported by a correlation analysis using SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Version 14). This showed a significant 
correlation between respondents who indicated that they rely on their social network to 
maximize benefit (Pearson correlation = 0.857).  
 
6.3.8  Non-Use Values 
 
Cultural, regulating and supporting services are also derived from the wetlands.  
 
The Niger Delta wetlands serve as an important source of cultural services. They have 
significant spiritual and religious value to about 26% of the respondents. Shrines are set 
up in lakes and forests for spiritual worship. An example is the case of the Boupere 
Lake, which is an important sacred lake with spiritual value to the residents of Oporoma 
(Adekola, 2011). There are also numerous cultural festivals that relate either directly or 
indirectly to the wetlands (Bayelsa State Art Council, 2006). Local residents also 
mention the wetlands as a place for recreational swimming. The wetlands are also an 
important place of study for local and international scholars. Some of the provisioning 
services derived from the wetlands are important components for cultural services. For 
example, canoes and masks, which are made from logged woods, are essential 
components of cultural and spiritual activities. Likewise, some of these sacred lakes and 
forests are home to diverse flora and fauna some of which are considered sacred by the 
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local residents. This underscores the interconnectedness between the various categories 
of ecosystem services.  
 
Residents of the Niger Delta also benefit from regulating services of the wetlands. This 
is recognized by 15% of the respondents. The wetlands regulate air quality, climate, 
water quality, flood and erosion and serve as a source of waste treatment. One 
respondent recognized that shrimps, which are provisioning services important for the 
human diet, also regulate the population of fishes, such as croakers, catfish, and 
threadfins. Shrimps therefore occupy a very strategic position in maintaining the 
ecological balance between the wetlands and aquatic environments. On the other hand, 
the distribution of shrimps is greatly influenced by the presence of sediments.  
 
Although, they are the least recognized from the ecosystem services, some of the local 
residents (6%) recognize the benefits of supporting services. A respondent identified the 
role of the crown of wetland trees in supporting undergrowth and protecting animals 
through the provision of tree cover.  
 
To estimate the non-use value of the Niger Delta wetlands, I used the stated preference 
method (Hanemann, 1994; De Groot et al., 2002) to explore respondents’ willingness to 
pay (WTP) for the improvement of the quality of the wetlands so that they can secure 
the benefits from the wide-ranging ecosystem services of the wetlands, and their 
willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for foregoing these services during the 
improvement period. Willingness to pay is the maximum amount that an individual 
states they are willing to pay for a good or service, while willingness to accept is the 
minimum amount they would be willing to accept (as compensation) to forgo it 
(Whittington, 1998; Hanemann, 1991). 
 
The stated-preference methods use specially constructed questionnaires to elicit 
estimates of the WTP or WTA (see Appendix 5.1, section E) in attempt to solve the 
problem of non-use valuation by capturing benefits that may not be sold on the market. 
There are two categories of stated preference methods: contingent valuation methods, 
which focus on the valuation of a non-market good as a whole; and choice modelling 
methods, which focus on valuing specific attributes of a non-market good (Fujiwara and 
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Campbell, 2011). The contingent valuation method is used in this thesis. There is a 
considerable literature on the complexity, problems and sometimes controversial 
application of the stated preference approach (Deshazo and Fermo 2002; Diamond and 
Hausman 1994). There is a risk of people overstating or understating their responses 
under such experimental comditions. Also, using contingent valuation might result in 
speculative value estimates which might suffer from income constraints expected in 
such poor society. However, stated preference approaches are also identified as a 
reliable source of valuation information (Carson et al. 1996). 
 
The first key task in gathering the respondents’ stated preference was to describe a 
scenario and ensure that they understood it. The stated preference aspect of the survey 
was divided into two sections: the first asked for the bid of the respondents and the 
second elicited the reason behind their bid. Also, the contents of the key concepts, such 
as ecosystem services (including regulating and supporting services), were explained to 
the respondents beforehand, and their enquiries about the questionnaire were answered 
during the interview. In all, 267 of the 283 household questionnaires were adjudged 
complete. The remainder included respondents who refused to take part for personal 
reasons, such as the length of the interview. In addition, nine respondents gave a protest 
value of zero during the elicitation of willingness to pay. These were not included in the 
willingness to pay analysis. One respondent said:  
 
“This is what our fathers live on that allowed them to train their children, 
build their house and marry their wives so why should they tell me to pay 
anything.” 
 
The mean willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) compensation 
were estimated at $284 and $4,576 respectively. Although the WTP is small and none 
of the households was willing to pay as much as the mean value of provisioning 
services, 97% of households were happy to make a financial contribution towards the 
quality improvement of the wetlands. The average WTA ($4,576) is low compared to 
the average gross financial value, net financial value and cash income at $13,371, 
$11,508 and $9,158 respectively. By implication, the local residents themselves appear 
to undervalue the worth of the ecosystem to them. The average willingness to pay is 
133 
 
 
 
closest to the average cash income, which suggests that the subsistence value of the 
wetlands seems to be suppressed by the improvement of the quality of the Niger Delta 
wetlands environment. This implies that the respondents are only willing to pay much to 
continue to benefit from the wide-ranging ecosystem services of the wetlands. This is 
due to the fact that the majority believe that it is their right to have free access to the 
wetlands.  
 
Respondents asked for high compensation (Appendix 6.8) mainly because they have the 
impression that the government and the oil companies make a lot of money from the 
region, hence they should be able to meet higher demands. This was an important factor 
that influenced the willingness to accept, while willingness to pay was mostly 
influenced by the fact that respondents did not trust that such a fund would be 
judiciously used and not fall into the hands of corrupt government officials.  
 
The estimate for overall non-use value is considerably lower than the estimate for the 
use value and suggests it may be less reliable; hence the value is set at zero. Therefore, 
to plot the benefit flow from the local communities that is comparable to that of other 
networks, I relied on the net monetary value of provisioning services. Based on an 
estimate of $11,508/household/year for 2,172,842 households, a population of 
13,037,053 people in the Niger Delta (Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States) (Table 4.1), 
and a mean household size of six people (Appendix 6.1), I estimate the total benefit 
from provisioning services alone, derived by the local community, to be in the region of 
$25 billion.    
 
6.4  Direct Economic Benefit of the Wetlands to Governmental Networks 
 
The Niger Delta environment has always played a crucial role in the Nigerian economy. 
During the colonial era, the region provided access for the import and export of 
essential commodities between Nigerians and the European traders. Until the 1960s, the 
Delta was globally renowned as the second largest producer of palm oil, after Malaysia, 
which even obtained its first palm seedlings from the Delta (Initiative for Public Policy 
Analysis, 2010). The importance of the Niger Delta to Nigeria became higher still after 
the discovery of huge oil and gas reserves, which today make Nigeria the world's sixth 
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largest exporter of crude oil. The importance of the Delta’s crude oil has pushed 
agriculture, the traditional mainstay of the economy from the early fifties and sixties, 
into the background. By 1970, petroleum exports accounted for 58% of the country’s 
export value, rising in the 1980s to 97%, 94% in 1990, and 95% in 2001 (Akpabio and 
Akpan, 2010). Presently, it is widely believed that the Niger Delta, which is the 
storehouse of petroleum resources, accounts for more than 80% of Nigeria’s revenue 
and more than 90% of its total export value (Etekpe, 2007; Frynas, 2000). The Niger 
Delta is estimated to have 37 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of January 2010, 
with a production capacity of around 2.9 million barrels per day (bpd) (US Energy 
Information Administartion, 2011). Based on an estimated total government revenue of 
N1.01 trillion ($6.73 billion) in 2010 (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2011) and the fact 
that about 80% of this would have been generated from the Niger Delta, it is estimated 
that the annual revenue to the Nigerian government from the Niger Delta is $5.38 
billion (Appendix 4.2).   
 
6.5  Direct Economic Benefit of the Wetlands to Corporate Networks 
 
The major corporate sector in the Niger Delta is the oil and gas industry. There are 7 
major oil companies operating in the Niger Delta (Appendix 4.1). Benefits to corporate 
groups have steadily increased since 1958 when Shell-BP Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria Limited, at the time the sole concessionaire, discovered crude oil 
in the Niger Delta. In 1958 when the first oil field came on stream production was 5,100 
barrel per day (bpd). Today this is over 2.9 million bpd.  
 
Specific data on the profit of oil companies operations in Nigeria is not available. 
However, it is suggested that about 57% of the annual oil revenue is paid to the 
Nigerian government (this is the Nigerian government’s revenue from the Niger Delta) 
while the oil companies take 43% (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012). Therefore, revenue accruing 
to the  corporate network is estimated as $4.06 billion in 2010, based on the $5.38 
billion government revenue from the Niger Delta in 2010.  
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6.6  Distribution of Benefits   
 
It is generally suggested that benefits derived from the Niger Delta wetlands may not be 
distributed uniformly and increase disparities within and across groups. Such disparities 
in social equity are a key factor in power relations. This section evaluates how derived 
benefits are distributed between the networks.  
 
6.6.1  Distribution of Benefits Accruing To Local Community Networks   
 
The majority of provisioning benefits derived by local people accrue directly to them 
and are retained for subsistence and cash income, whilst indirectly, provisioning 
services support residents farther afield, beyond the Delta. Buyers of wetland products 
include traders from major Nigerian cities, such as Port Harcourt and Lagos. About 30% 
of total local cash income is from traders from outside the host state. Ecosystem 
services, particularly food production, timber, and fisheries, contribute significantly to 
local employment and national economic activity. However, government receives little 
from these benefits, as most locals pay hardly any taxes, and basic food items such as 
cassava, maize, rice, and fish, are VAT free (Ajakaiye, 1999). A direct flow of local 
benefits to other networks is, thus, negligible to non-existent.  
 
6.6.2  Distribution of Benefits Accruing to Government Networks   
 
It is widely argued that the benefits of oil exploration and production that have accrued 
to the government have not trickled down to local communities (Watts, 2004; Oviasuyi 
and Uwadiae, 2010). The major factor governing the sharing formula is derivation:  the 
proportion of the nation’s wealth given back to the source region. Successive 
governments (especially military governments) have unilaterally abrogated the 
derivation principle that existed before the discovery of oil in commercial quantities and 
imposed an authoritarian system. Before crude oil became an important source of 
revenue to the Nigerian government (i.e. pre-1960), derivation was 100%, meaning that 
host communities had almost total control of the benefits from the resources found in 
their area. However, subsequently this changed to as little as 1.5%, after the volume of 
agricultural exports from the three main regions (groundnut from the Hausa-Fulani in 
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the North, cocoa from the Yoruba in the South West and palm oil from the Igbo in the 
South East) declined from a share of more than 80% at independence to less than 4%, 
while that of oil rose to 95% in the 1970s (Ikpeze et al., 2004). Other factors, such as 
population and land area in which these major regions had a competitive advantage 
became the basis of revenue sharing. Derivation to host communities did increase in 
1999, but only to 13%.  
 
Concerning the allocation of overall government revenue to different regions over the 
years, benefits to the Niger Delta were minimal. For instance, capital allocation to the 
region in the Third National Development Plan, (1975-80) showed that while other 
regions had allocations of up to 38%, the Niger Delta region had the lowest  allocation 
of just 6% (Akpabio and Akpan, 2010). This is despite the fact that the majority of 
revenues originated from the region. The disparity is worsened by the fact that these 
monies, intended for infrastructure and social services, do not actually get to the people 
because of corruption  (Obi, 2010; Elebeke, 2012). While the proportion of national 
revenue accruing to the Niger Delta states has increased since 1999, it is not clear how 
much of this reaches local communities because the process is hardly transparent or free 
from corrupt practices.  
 
Based on the estimated total government revenue of $5.38 billion generated from the 
Niger Delta in 2010, I estimate that about 20% was directly allocated to the Niger Delta 
states (Appendix 4.2). There are no direct flows of benefits from the government to the 
corporate sector. Indirectly, the government contributes to the maintenance of a safe 
working environment for the oil industry, deploying its troops to the facilities. However, 
it is on record that the oil companies also pay for some of these services (Brock, 2012; 
Frynas, 2001).  
 
6.6.3  Distribution of Benefits Accruing to Corporate Networks   
 
The corporate network contributes to the Nigerian economy by generating revenues for 
the government, as well as paying taxes and royalties. In addition to the above, the 
corporate actors pay a statutory contribution of 3% of their annual budget to a regional 
developmental agency, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), whose 
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mission is to develop the Niger Delta. The NDDC was established in 2000 with the aim 
of facilitating the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a 
region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and 
politically peaceful. In 2010, SPDC paid $161 million to the Niger Delta Development 
Commission.  
 
Corporate actors also support community projects directly. In 2010 SPDC and SNEP 
provided more than $22.85 million to local community projects (Shell International 
Petroleum Company, 2011). This represents about 1.3% of corporate actors’ profit. In 
addition, the corporate sector in Nigeria employs thousands of Nigerian employees and 
contractors, even if it is generally argued that this favours people from the three main 
regions who are employed in the top cadre, compared to the indigenes of the Niger 
Delta who are employed in the lower cadre and as casual staff. Oil companies also assist 
local communities by funding projects implemented by non-governmental 
organizations.  
 
Benefits from the corporate networks are widespread, with foreign nations benefiting 
from the oil products they import from the Niger Delta. The USA is the largest importer 
of Nigeria's crude oil, accounting for about 43% of the country's total oil exports. This 
is about 10% of the overall U.S. oil imports. Other destinations of crude oil from the 
Niger Delta include India, Brazil and Spain (Fig. 6.5). There is evidence that these 
countries and MNOCs influence government policices by infiltrating relevant 
government departments (Smith, 2010). 
 
6.7  Costs Associated With the Activity of the Principal Networks 
 
These benefits come at a cost, which may not be equitably shared among the different 
actors. Local communities, in particular, could lose out because they have less power in 
the decision-making processes (Adams and Hulme, 2001).  
 
To estimate the environmental costs of activities I need to place a monetary value on the 
consequences of the pressure in a two-step process. First I quantify the environmental 
degradation. In this case I consider only the main impacts e.g. changes in soil 
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productivity. Secondly, I make a monetary valuation of the consequences e.g. the cost 
of soil productivity losses using the avoided cost, replacement and substitute cost 
methods. These are all related methods that estimate monetary values, based on either 
the costs of avoiding damages due to lost services, the cost of replacing ecosystem 
services, or the cost of providing substitute services. Other costs, such as foregone 
benefits as well as psychological and emotional costs, hospitalization and deaths are not 
included.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Nigeria Crude Oil Exports by Destination (% 2010). 
  
 
6.7.1  Costs Associated With Local Network Activities 
 
The main consequences of local community activities include changes in soil 
productivity and decline in forest cover (Adekola and Mitchell, 2011). It has not been 
possible to estimate this cost because of lack of reliable data. The majority of the cost 
generated by the local community is borne by the local communities and government. 
Costs such as that of family labour or the value foregone when land is used for 
productivity management has not been included.  
 
139 
 
 
 
6.7.2  Costs Associated With Governmental Network Activities 
 
The government is generally responsible for dredging and the reclamation of wetlands, 
which result in increased incidences of flooding and erosion. This is carried out as part 
of oil and gas exploration to facilitate activities of the oil companies.  
 
6.7.3  Costs Associated With Corporate Network Activities 
 
The main pressure of corporate network activities in the Niger Delta results largely in 
ecosystem and biodiversity loss. The cumulative cost of environmental degradation due 
to oil extraction in Ogoniland alone is $1 billion (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2011). This translates to an average of $19 million a year since oil 
extraction began there in 1958. Extrapolating from the 1,000 km
2
 of Ogoniland to the 
entire 39,900 km
2
 of the Niger Delta gives an annual cost of $753 million. Of this, the 
Niger Delta States spend about $187 million a year on remedial work (about 14% of 
their revenue). So local communities bear on average a cost of $566 million, which 
accounts for a large share of the cost of ecosystem degradation resulting from the 
activities of the corporate sector. Apart from biodiversity loss, corporate actors are 
responsible for  burning down farmlands, pollutings water and destroying crops by 
floods and pests. The implications of these changes are economic (less food for 
households; less money for food, medicine and sending children to school); emotional 
(inability to assist relatives and neighbours) and social (poor health and religious 
desecration). The cost of this degradation is particularly serious for the local 
communities as most households have little capacity to adapt to change. Locals 
indicated that they somehow cope, as government assistance is minimal. When asked 
how they do so, respondents revealed that they switched activities or relocated to a less 
affected area.  
 
Although no quantitative relationships have been established, costs also flow to other 
regions, both within and outside Nigeria. These costs do not include those resulting 
from oil and gas related conflicts, which is estimated as costing $4 billion yearly 
between 1996-2004, when 500 people died every month (Okolo and Etekpe, 2010) and 
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on which Royal Dutch Shell spent almost 40% of its $1 billion global security budget 
between 2007 and 2009 (Brock, 2012).  
 
6.8  Aggregating Cost and Benefits of Niger Delta Activities 
 
The data that currently exists allows only an estimate of the ‘static’ benefits and costs of 
wetland ecosystems use, as there are substantial uncertainties associated with these 
benefits and costs estimates However, the estimate is likely to be conservative because 
many costs are not included.  
 
The local community network derives a substantial part of their net benefits directly 
from the wetlands. The costs associated with exploiting ecosystem services are not 
known. The oil extraction activities which contribute to the government and corporate 
network generate a high cost, and about 75% of this cost  is borne by the local network. 
Such disparities feature prominently in the discourse and institutions of the three main 
networks. 
 
The distribution of benefits and costs is influenced by existing regimes and institutions. 
This implies that proposals concerning payments for ecosystem services, which suggest 
that the safeguarding and increasing of flow benefits will contribute to well-being and 
poverty alleviation (Wunder, 2008) are gross oversimplifications.  
 
6.9  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has roughly estimated the benefits accruing to the three main networks – 
local communities, government and corporate – for exploiting the Niger Delta and the 
costs which they generate. The way in which these benefits and costs are distributed is a 
matter of great political debate, as will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. What is clear, 
however, is that the annual value of provisioning services to local people ($25 billion) is 
about three times the value of oil production, but local communities also have to bear 
about 75% of the environmental costs of oil extraction which altogether are equivalent 
to about 19% othe oil industry revenue.  
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CHAPTER 7   
NARRATIVES, DISCOURSES AND NETWORKS IN THE NIGER 
DELTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
In highly contested environments, such as the Niger Delta, various actors attempt to 
implement a range of management practices. The Network Communication Framework, 
described in Chapter 3, aims to explain the overall impact of multiple actors by viewing 
them not as discrete agents but as members of multiple interacting networks. One 
category of content that is communicated within and between networks comprises 
institutions, and the evidence for this analysed in Chapter 8. This chapter provides the 
first part of the test of the Network Communication Framework by analysing the 
evidence for the complementary communication of information. 
 
The way in which different actors use particular environments can be linked to 
differences in perception. Each actor has a different discourse, which is “a specific 
ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and 
transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities" (Hajer, 1995a). According to the Discourse Coalition 
Framework (DCF), groups compete to be the dominant coalition that determines policy 
and preferred management practices. Each coalition clusters around a story line of a 
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problem. This is “a condensed sort of narrative" (Hajer, 2005) that is consistent with the 
discourses of all member groups (Hajer, 1995a). A narrative, constructed within each 
actor's discourse, is a set of statements giving a meaningful totality of past and future 
events (Barton, 2001). The DCF implicitly assumes that generally only one narrative of 
a problem is constructed within one discourse, though there is flexibility for relatively 
similar discourses to be consistent with a common story line. Explaining the impact of 
multiple actors on an environment is more challenging if actors are not as discrete as the 
DCF assumes but function as members of multiple interpersonal networks. This chapter 
tests a prediction by the Network Communication Framework that in such conditions 
discourses are more heterogeneous in content and consistent with multiple narratives. 
The mix of discourses will vary along a spectrum from one in which contested 
environments can escalate to "environments of conflict" - complementing  the 
"economies of violence" of Watts et al. (2004) - to mutuality at the other extreme, 
though conflict will be the most visible outcome. 
 
This chapter begins my analysis of contested environments in the Niger Delta by 
examining the diversity of narratives held by the main actors involved, and linking these 
to their discourses and the networks of which they are members.  It focuses on the 
narratives of government; two main non-state groups competing to use environments - 
the corporate (private business) sector and local communities; two groups with 
advocacy or mediating roles - non-governmental organizations and multilateral 
organizations; and two groups with professional roles - academic groups who should in 
principle have disinterested narratives or provide technical support to land users, and 
journalists who should provide unbiased reporting of facts.  
 
The first part of this chapter outlines the principal public narratives about managing the 
Niger Delta as identified from published texts. Part two describes the narratives of 
actors interviewed in field studies. Part three uses these data to make inferences about 
informants' discourses. Part four uses other data collected in field studies to identify the 
structure of the networks of these actors. Part five compares the network membership of 
informants with their discourses. The main finding is that most informants do subscribe 
to multiple narratives and that these can be linked to the multiple networks of which 
they are part.  
143 
 
 
 
7.2  Niger Delta Narratives 
 
This section identifies and compares a range of narratives that have been published in 
various written and spoken texts since 1990. Oil spills and other forms of environmental 
degradation have featured in narratives about changes in the wetland ecosystems of the 
Niger Delta ever since crude oil exploration and production began there in 1956 (Nwilo 
and Badejo, 2005; Omotola, 2006). However, it was not until the 1990s that these 
counter-narratives to the dominant modernist narrative of oil production achieved public 
prominence and moved to the centre-ground of local and international debates. So only 
texts published since 1990 are analysed here. 
 
The narratives are structured according to the following questions. First, how are the 
causes of wetland change in the Niger Delta explained? Second, what solutions are 
possible to improve the Niger Delta environment? Third, how are the various actors 
involved represented in these narratives, e.g. as victims, villains, victors, heroes etc.? 
Fourth, what is downplayed or left unsaid? Fifth, which ecosystem services or resources 
are emphasized?  
 
7.2.1  Government Narrative 
 
The government narrative portrays the challenges facing the Niger Delta as part of those 
expected in the process of regional development. Economic, infrastructural and human 
capital developments are therefore seen in turn as the panacea to the Niger Delta 
problem (Table 7.1). Thus, the governor of Delta State suggested that: 
 
“To solve the Niger Delta problem there are many things that must be done. 
The greatest solution is economic development" (Uduaghan, 2008). 
 
The President of Nigeria (Goodluck Jonathan) also declared that to solve, transform and 
develop the Niger Delta region: 
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Table 7.1. Texts Representing the Government Narrative. 
 
a. Development 
 
i. “To solve the Niger Delta problem there are many things that must be done. The 
greatest solution is economic development. (Uduaghan, 2008). 
 
ii. ‘It is essential for us to widen our development base … many of our essential 
human needs can be met only through goods and services provided by industry’ 
(Jonathan, 2012). 
 
b. Actors as Partners 
 
i. “....the strong support of international agencies, particularly the contributions of 
the United Nations Development Programme, The World Bank, DFID (UKs 
Department for International Development) and the European Union …. The oil 
companies, being major players in the region are significant contributors to the 
successful completion of the Master Plan. Indeed, of importance are the contributions of 
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) who not only partnered with us but 
also went as far as to assign its staff to work on the project” (Niger Delta Development 
Commission, 2006). 
 
c. Environmental Constraints 
 
i. “You have rightly noted the challenges we have in this region in terms of 
security and development. You know we have a difficult terrain that makes 
development very difficult, that was the major reason the NDDC was set up as an 
interventionist agency  …… Amnesty proclamation, and subsequent post-Amnesty 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, is the sincerest, 
boldest and most profound effort by any Federal Government of Nigeria since 1960 to 
address the agitation for fairness, equity and development in the oil-bearing Niger 
Delta” (Oboh, 2012)  
 
d. Need for Regulation  
 
i. “The Petroleum Industry Bill is an attempt to bring under one law the various 
legislative, regulatory, and fiscal policies, instruments and institutions that govern the 
Nigerian petroleum industry. The Bill is expected to establish and clarify the rules, 
procedures and institutions that will entrench good governance, transparency and 
accountability in the oil and gas sector. It aims to introduce new operational and fiscal 
terms for revenue management to enable the Nigerian government to retain a higher 
proportion of the revenues derived from operations in the petroleum industry” 
(Ndubuwa, 2012) 
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“Policies are being put in place to fast-track developments of the region 
through construction of the East-West Road, rehabilitation of abandoned 
railway system and building  power plants” (Jonathan, 2012). 
 
This narrative downplays neo-colonial and socio-political factors implicated in the 
problems of the Niger Delta. It usually avoids categorizing actors, but when it does it 
generally portrays all actors as partners. Thus, Timi Alaibe, former Director of the 
Niger Delta Development Commission, referred to: 
 
“The strong support of international agencies, particularly the contributions 
of the United Nations Development Programme, The World Bank, DFID 
(UK Department for International Development) and the European Union 
…. The oil companies, being major players in the region are significant 
contributors to the successful completion of the Master Plan. .... Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) ... not only partnered with us but 
also went as far as to assign its staff to work on the project” (Niger Delta 
Development Commission, 2006). 
 
The government narrative also emphasizes environmental constraints on development. 
Christian Oboh, Managing Director of the Niger Delta Development Commission, 
recently said that: 
 
“You have rightly noted the challenges we have in this region in terms of 
security and development. You know we have a difficult terrain that makes 
development very difficult” (Oboh, 2012).  
 
Although the official government narrative emphasizes the need for regulation, the 
seriousness of institutional failures as cause of  wetland degradation is downplayed. 
While government has initiated various institutions to improve sustainability of 
management of the Niger Delta environment (see Chapter 4), senior government 
officials have downplayed and deflected the focus away from the environmental 
challenges facing the Niger Delta. Thus, the Minister of Environment, while reiterating 
the present administration’s commitment to developing relevant institutions promoting 
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sustainable development, adequate management and development, identified the 
environmental challenges facing the country and needing urgent regulation as including: 
 
“Deforestation, arising from tree felling, without replenishment for various 
purposes; land degradation as a result of oil and other resource exploitation 
activities; erosion of coastal areas of large areas in southern Nigeria, the 
flood plains of the major rivers in the country, and some flat low-lying 
urban areas; the menace of pollution, solid, toxic and electronic wastes; the 
incremental and devastating effects of recurring oil spills, the unrelenting 
surge of the Sahara desert and drought downwards into the country, and the 
impact of climate change, against which no country as yet has any apparent 
bulwark" (Mailafia, 2012). 
 
7.2.2  Local Narrative 
 
The beginning of a coherent local narrative, representing those circulated by people 
living in the Niger Delta concerning the social and environmental ills which confront 
them, can be linked to the establishment of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) and its proclamation in 1991 of the Ogoni Bill of Rights. This 
narrative, which associates the environmental, social and economic development 
impediments that underpin the crises prevailing in the Niger Delta with the repression of 
local people, was popularized in the numerous texts of local activists who presented 
them to the wider world. For example, in 1993, Ken Saro Wiwa sent an address to the 
Third General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.  Here 
'local community' is used as a general term, and so groups such as the Niger Delta 
Volunteer Force (NDVF) and MOSOP are considered as part of the local community 
network because this is the constituency they generally claim to represent.  
 
Central to the narrative is colonial and neo-colonial domination by Britain. According 
to the Ogoni Bill of Rights: 
  
"[The Ogoni people] laid claim as a people to their independence which 
British colonialism had first violated and then handed over to some other 
147 
 
 
 
Nigerian ethnic groups in October 1960...  The Ogoni Bill of Rights rejects 
once and for all this incompetent indigenous colonialism … that in 1951 we 
were forcibly included in the Eastern Region of Nigeria where we suffered 
utter neglect" (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, 1991). 
 
Similar claims are made in the Kaima Declaration of Ijaw Youths (the Ijaw are another 
group of peoples in the Niger Delta) and by a local chief (Table 7.2a). 
 
Colonial and neo-colonial domination has, in this narrative, also left the Niger Delta 
deprived, in spite of the immense wealth generated in the region. Economic injustice is 
both absolute, and relative to that of other peoples in Nigeria (Table 7.3b).  Indeed, 
peoples from other regions (especially the three main tribes of Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba) 
are perceived as part of the neo-colonial cliques depriving Niger Delta peoples of their 
rights. This is enumerated in the Derivation Principle (see Chapter 6), which specifies 
the share of oil revenues accruing to oil producing areas: 
 
"The Principle of Derivation in Revenue Allocation has been consciously 
and systematically obliterated by successive regimes of the Nigerian state. 
We note the drastic reduction of the Derivation Principle from 100% (1953), 
50% (1960), 45% (1970), 20% (1975) 2% (1982), 1.5% (1984) to 3% (1992 
to date)" (Ijaw Youths of the Niger Delta, 1998). 
 
The international community is not portrayed as a "third sector" independent of colonial 
or Nigerian states, but as inextricably implicated in the neo-colonial cliques:  
 
"What has happened and is happening to the Ogoni is strictly not the fault of 
the Nigerian elite and Shell Company alone; the international community 
has played a very significant role in it. If the Americans did not purchase 
Nigerian oil, the Nigerian nation would not be, nor would the oppressive 
ethnic majority in the country have the wherewithal to pursue its genocidal 
intentions...There is a sense in which the “Nigerian” oil which the 
Americans, Europeans and Japanese buy is stolen property …. Therefore, 
these buyers are receiving stolen property" (Wiwa, 1992). 
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Table 7.2. Texts Representing Colonial and Economic Aspects of the Local Narrative. 
 
a. Colonial and Neo-Colonial Domination 
 
i.  Ogoni Bill of Rights: The Ogoni people “laid claim as a  people to their 
independence which British colonialism had first violated and then handed over to some 
other Nigerian ethnic groups in October 1960...  The Ogoni Bill of Rights rejects once 
and for all this incompetent indigenous colonialism … that in 1951 we were forcibly 
included in the Eastern Region of Nigeria where we suffered utter neglect (Movement 
for the Survival of the Ogoni People, 1991). 
 
ii. Kaima Declaration: "It was through British colonization that the Ijaw Nation 
was forcibly put under the Nigerian State …for the economic interests of the 
imperialists, the Ijaw ethnic nationality would have evolved as a distinct and separate 
sovereign nation, enjoying undiluted political, economic, social, and cultural autonomy 
… the division of the Southern Protectorate into East and West in 1939 by the British 
marked the beginning of the balkanization of a hitherto territorially contiguous and 
culturally homogeneous Ijaw people into political and administrative units, much to our 
disadvantage (Ijaw Youths of the Niger Delta, 1998). 
 
iii. Local Chief: "It was through the British colonial administration that the Niger 
Delta, which would have grown up as a distinct and separate sovereign country 
enjoying total economic, cultural, social and political autonomy, was put under the 
Nigerian state as minorities who suffer cultural economic, psychological and social 
political deprivations" (Evilewuru, 2006). 
 
b. Economic Injustice 
 
i. Kaima Declaration: "The principle of Derivation in Revenue Allocation has 
been consciously and systematically obliterated by successive regimes of the Nigerian 
state. We note the drastic reduction of the Derivation Principle from 100% (1953), 50% 
(1960), 45% (1970), 20% (1975) 2% (1982), 1.5% (1984) to 3% (1992 to date) (Ijaw 
Youths of the Niger Delta, 1998). 
 
ii Local Chief: "Crude oil from Niger Delta is the lifeblood of Nigeria’s economic 
wealth. It built the dual carriageways across other parts of Nigeria; it continues to build 
the extravagant physical structures in Nigeria's new capital city of Abuja.. The total 
length of flyovers and bridges in dryland Abuja is more than the length of all bridges in 
the Niger Delta put together" (Evilewuru, 2006). 
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Table 7.3. Texts Representing International and Citizenship Aspects of the Local 
Narrative. 
  
a. Role of the Wider International Community 
 
i. Saro Wiwa (1992): "For what has happened and is happening to the Ogoni is 
strictly not the fault of the Nigerian elite and Shell Company alone; the international 
community has played a very significant role in it. If the Americans did not purchase 
Nigerian oil, the Nigerian nation would not be, nor would the oppressive ethnic majority 
in the country have the wherewithal to pursue its genocidal intentions. Indeed, there is a 
sense in which the “Nigerian” oil which the Americans, Europeans and Japanese buy is 
stolen property …. Therefore, these buyers are receiving stolen property". 
 
ii. Ogoni Bill of Rights: "It is the intention of the Ogoni people to draw the 
attention of the American government and people to the fact that the oil which they buy 
from Nigeria is stolen property and that it is against American law to receive stolen 
goods….. The Ogoni people will make representation to the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund to the effect that giving loans and credit to the Nigerian 
Government on the understanding that oil money will be used to repay such loans is to 
encourage the Nigerian government to continue to dehumanize the Ogoni people and to 
devastate the environment and ecology of the Ogoni and other Delta minorities among 
whom oil is found" (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, 1991). 
 
iii. Critique of a 1995 World Bank report on the Niger Delta by a local activist: 
"Neatly excluded from the report (World Bank, 1995) is discussion of the exacerbation 
of environmental and social problems by the destructive macroeconomic policies 
institutionalized by the IMF, IFC, and World Bank, in service to western predatory 
capitalism" (Harmon, 1997). 
 
b. Citizenship Alienation 
 
i. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta: discussions must go beyond 
"mere provision of electricity and water" and focus on the political marginalization of 
the Ijaw because "we believe that we have to seek first our political freedom and every 
other thing will follow" (Ofehe, 2009).  
 
ii.  Urhobo Historical Society (1999): "No Oron man has ever been appointed or 
elected a governor of a state and from 1984 till date, none of our sons and daughters has 
been deemed fit to hold ministerial position in spite of the fact that successive regimes 
in the country have zoned key positions to Akwa-Ibom State." 
 
iii.  Urhobo Historical Society (1998): "The Summit notes the total marginalization 
of Urhobos in government, federal parastatals (including those located in Urhobo land) 
and the oil companies." 
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Table 7.4. Other Texts Representing the Local Narrative. 
 
a. Local People as Victims 
 
i. Wiwa (1992): "I have watched helplessly as they (local communities) have been 
gradually ground  to dust by the combined effort of the multinational oil company, Shell 
Petroleum Development Company, the murderous ethnic majority in Nigeria and the 
country’s military dictatorships". 
 
b. Ecosystem Provisioning Services Are Secondary to Oil Production 
 
i. Kaima Declaration: The degradation of the environment of Ijawland by 
transnational oil companies and the Nigerian State arise mainly because Ijaw people 
have been robbed of their natural rights to ownership and control of their land and 
resources through the instrumentality of undemocratic Nigerian State legislations..... 
The political crisis in Nigeria is mainly about the struggle for the control of oil... 
resources which account for over 80% of GDP, 95% of national budget and 90% of 
foreign exchange earnings. Of which 65%, 75% and 70% respectively are derived from 
within the Ijaw nation (Ijaw Youths of the Niger Delta, 1998). 
 
ii. Ogoni Bill of Rights: "The result of such unchecked environmental pollution and 
degradation are that (i) The Ogoni can no longer farm successfully. Once the food 
basket of the eastern Niger Delta, the Ogoni now buy food (when they can afford it); (ii) 
Fish, once a common source of protein, is now rare. Owing to the constant and 
continual pollution of our streams and creeks, fish can only be caught in deeper and 
offshore waters for which the Ogoni are not equipped. (iii) All wildlife is dead. (iv) The 
ecology is changing fast. The mangrove tree, the aerial roots of which normally provide 
a natural and welcome habitat for many a sea food - crabs, periwinkles, mudskippers, 
cockles, mussels, shrimps and all - is now being gradually replaced by unknown and 
otherwise useless plants (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, 1991). 
 
c. Local Control as a Solution 
 
i. Ogoni Bill of Rights: "The Ogoni people …. in particular demand political 
autonomy as a distinct and separate unit within the Nigerian nation with full right to (i) 
control Ogoni political affairs; (ii) use at least fifty per cent of Ogoni economic 
resources for Ogoni development; (iii) protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from 
further degradation; and (iv) ensure the full restitution of the harm done to the health of 
our people by the flaring of gas, oil spillages, oil blow-outs, etc. by the following oil 
companies: Shell, Chevron and their Nigerian accomplices" (Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni People, 1991). 
 
ii. Kaima Declaration: "…. but to demand and work for Self Government and 
resource control for the Ijaw people ..finally, Ijaw youths resolve to set up the Ijaw 
Youth Council (IYC) to coordinate the struggle of Ijaw peoples for self-determination 
and justice" (Ijaw Youths of the Niger Delta, 1998).  
 
iii. Urhobo Historical Society (1999): "Every region should control its resources 
100% from which it will allocate funds for running the central government". 
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"The Ogoni people will make representation to the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund to the effect that giving loans and credit to the 
Nigerian Government on the understanding that oil money will be used to 
repay such loans is to encourage the Nigerian government to continue to 
dehumanize the Ogoni people and  devastate the environment and ecology 
of the Ogoni and other Delta minorities among whom oil is found" 
(Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, 1991). 
 
This element is also apparent in the Kaima Declaration and in a critique of a World 
Bank report by a local community activist (Table 7.3a). 
 
External influences that lead to economic injustice are institutionalized in ways that 
undermine the citizenship of people living in the Niger Delta, who are effectively 
treated as aliens on whom policies and political processes are imposed whether they like 
them or not. Thus, a spokesperson for the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta argued that discussions must go beyond "mere provision of electricity and water" 
and focus on the political marginalization of the Ijaw because "we believe that we have 
to seek first our political freedom and every other thing will follow" (Ofehe, 2009). This 
element is also found in two communiques of another local group (Table 7.3b). 
 
People of the Niger Delta are viewed in this narrative as victims and other actors as 
villains (Table 7.4a). For example, Saro Wiwa (1992) wrote that: 
 
"I have watched helplessly as they (the local communities) have been 
gradually ground  to dust by the combined effort of the multinational oil 
company, Shell Petroleum Development Company, the murderous ethnic 
majority in Nigeria and the country’s military dictatorships". 
 
Central to this is the almost exclusive dependence of the Nigerian state on a single 
commodity – crude oil: 
 
"The political crisis in Nigeria is mainly about the struggle for the control of 
oil... resources which account for over 80% of GDP, 95% of national budget 
and 90% of foreign exchange earnings. Of which 65%, 75% and 70% 
respectively are derived from within the Ijaw nation" (Ijaw Youths of the 
Niger Delta, 1998). 
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So the interests of oil companies play a greater role in government policy than those of 
farming and fishing communities in the Niger Delta which harvest renewable 
provisioning services of ecosystems that feature strongly in the local narrative: 
 
"The results of such unchecked environmental pollution and degradation are 
that (i) The Ogoni can no longer farm successfully: once the food basket of 
the eastern Niger Delta, the Ogoni now buy food (when they can afford it). 
(ii) Fish, once a common source of protein, is now rare. Owing to the 
constant and continual pollution of our streams and creeks, fish can only be 
caught in deeper and offshore waters for which the Ogoni are not equipped. 
(iii) All wildlife is dead. (iv) The ecology is changing fast. The mangrove 
tree, the aerial roots of which normally provide a natural and welcome 
habitat for many a sea food ..... is now being gradually replaced by unknown 
and otherwise useless plants" (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People, 1991).  
 
Central to the solution element of the narrative is for local people to control their 
resources (Obi, 2007), and this inspires agitation for concessions in respect of self-
determination, regional autonomy and resource control (Ifeka, 2001; Ikelegbe, 2006). 
This text is found in virtually all community communiqués and texts, including the 
Kaima declaration, the Oron Bill of Rights (Table 7.4c) and the Ogoni Bill of Rights: 
 
"The Ogoni people …. demand political autonomy as a distinct and separate 
unit within the Nigerian nation with full right to (i) control Ogoni political 
affairs; (ii) use at least fifty per cent of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni 
development; (iii) protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further 
degradation; and (iv) ensure the full restitution of the harm done to the 
health of our people by the flaring of gas, oil spillages, oil blow-outs, etc. by 
the ... oil companies... and their Nigerian accomplices" (Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People, 1991). 
 
Implicit in this demand for autonomous resource control is that local communities 
possess the requisite knowledge to manage their environments. Reference is made to the 
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idea that their forefathers who first inhabited the Delta had traditional knowledge which 
has been passed down to their successors.  
 
One thing missing from the local narrative is any acknowledgement that local 
communities degrade wetland ecosystems. During field observation, I did see local 
people using chemicals for fishing.  
 
7.2.3  Corporate Narrative 
 
The other principal group of land users is the corporate sector. The longstanding 
corporate narrative has been one of exploiting untapped natural resources of the Niger 
Delta in the interests of development of the country and the region. For example, 
according to the Managing Director of ExxonMobil Nigeria, Mark Ward: 
 
"Nigeria’s hope for realizing growth and creating new jobs is to put in place 
an enabling environment for investment in the oil and gas industry and now 
is the time for government and the  industry to partner and achieve this 
vision" (Tene, 2012). 
 
However, in response to criticism in the local narrative a new corporate narrative has 
evolved which incorporates additional features. 
 
The first new element is lack of culpability (Table 7.5b). Shell Petroleum Development 
Company, the main oil company operating in the region, claimed in 2009 that it is not 
responsible for some 80% of the pollution in the oil-rich wetlands area (Cable News 
Network, 2009).  
 
This is supported by an assertion of criminality, e.g. Mutiu Sunmonu, Managing 
Director of the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) has said 
that: 
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Table 7.5. Texts Representing Internal Aspects of the Corporate Narrative. 
 
a. Exploiting Resources for Development 
 
i. Expressing dismay that in the last 20 years Nigeria has declined in its exploration 
activity. Managing Director of Total Nigeria, Guy Maurice, noted that the capacity of the 
Nigeria to renew its exploration activity will determine the nation’s energy future (Total, 
2012). 
 
ii. Mark Ward (ExxonMobil Nigeria):"Nigeria’s hope for realizing growth and creating new 
jobs is to put in place an enabling environment for investment in the oil and gas industry and 
now is the time for government and the  industry to partner and achieve this vision" (Tene, 
2012). 
 
b. Lack of Culpability 
 
i. Shell Petroleum Development Company claimed it is not responsible for some 80 percent 
of the pollution in the oil-rich wetlands area (Cable News Network, 2009).  
 
c. Corporate Sector as Heroes 
 
i. Chevron (2011): "Chevron will be joining the U.S. Agency for International 
Development in contributing $50 million to the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) 
Foundation, which Chevron established to address the socioeconomic challenges facing the 
area. Chevron's $25 million commitment is drawn from a $50 million endowment we 
created in 2010 to launch the NDPI Foundation. Since 2005, Chevron has provided funding 
to the Niger Delta Development Commission, a government agency tasked with the 
responsibility of developing the Niger Delta …. [This has] generated approximately 200 
projects in more than 400 communities, villages and chiefdoms and benefited some 600,000 
community members. CNL supports the process by providing funding for governance, 
administration, and project and partner costs. Local Nigerian non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are essential to the process. NGOs are providing technical assistance 
and are helping to resolve conflicts that arise in the communities" (Chevron, 2011). 
 
ii. Shell International Petroleum Company (1993): "We have a programme of continuing 
improvement to facilities and environmental performance, and of community assistance in 
infrastructure, health, agriculture and education ... This commitment is not cosmetic or 
token, it is something which has been established over many years ….. Although 
community development is a responsibility of government, SPDC has been running formal 
community assistance programmes for more than 25 years. These are carried out in 
consultation with the communities. They include building roads, providing water and health 
facilities, assisting with agricultural development and offering educational scholarships" 
 
iii. Total (2006): "contributing to the development of communities where [we] operates and 
their neighbours. …… The company provides skills development for youths, scholarship 
awards, upgrades of educational infrastructure, water supply, electricity, health, roads, 
income generating projects and agriculture. ….. More projects will be undertaken in the 
coming years to ensure sustainable development of the host communities”.
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Table 7.6. Texts Representing External Aspects of the Corporate Narrative. 
 
a. Criminality 
 
i. Mutiu Sunmonu, responding to a UNEP report on assessment of oil spills in 
Ogoniland: "What is happening in Ogoniland is however not typical of the rest of the 
Niger Delta. SPDC stopped producing oil in Ogoniland in 1993 and shut down oil 
production there because of threat and violence against our staff and facilities. Much of 
the oil field equipment have either been vandalized or stolen. And SPDC joint venture 
facilities there are subject to multiple attacks by oil thieves. In the first four month of 
2011 for instance, there were 8 separate attacks on SPDC joint venture pipelines which 
cross Ogoniland resulting in social disruption, damage to the environment and loss of 
revenue to the country. Though UNEP does not comment on the causes of spill in the 
report, a UNEP report from summer 2010 made it clear that theft and illegal refining is 
causing widespread environmental damage in Ogoniland (Sunmonu, 2011). 
 
ii. Royal Dutch Shell (2012b): "Urgent action is still needed to tackle the oil theft 
and illegal refining by criminal gangs which continue to cause the majority of spills. 
Although mostly occurring in a few areas, the environmental impact of these activities 
is severe. In one case, in the Imo River area, we chose to shut down our operations in 
2011 because of the environmental and social damage these oil thieves were causing." 
 
b. Poverty 
 
i. Royal Dutch Shell (2010): "Why do these illegal activities continue? These men 
do it to survive,  but they don’t earn much. Poverty in the Niger Delta is widespread. 
The real winners are the organized criminal gangs." 
 
c. Failure of State Institutions 
 
i. Royal Dutch Shell (2012b): "Around 80% of this continuous flaring took place 
in Nigeria, where the security situation and lack of government funding has previously 
slowed progress on projects to capture the gas." 
 
ii. Mutiu Sunmonu (2011): ”We also need the authorities to take concerted action 
to curb the illegal activities, in particular oil theft and refining, that are exacerbating so 
many of the environmental and social issues. Unless these activities are brought to a 
halt, any action we take will be of limited impact. … .. until effective action is taken to 
curb all illegal activity there is little that can be done to bring an end to the problem of 
spill, we are talking  with our partners, government and NGOs about how to solve this 
problem and SPDC will work with the Nigerian government on the next step to help 
clean Ogoniland ” (Sunmonu, 2011). 
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"Crude theft is terrible for the environment, a lot of spills are occurring 
because of violence and vandalism, a lot are occurring because of crude 
theft" (Royal Dutch Shell, 2010). 
 
This has been repeated in other texts by Mr Sunmonu and by the parent company, Royal 
Dutch Shell (Table 7.6a).  
 
Criminal behaviour is facilitated in two ways, according to the narrative. First, by the 
poverty of local people, which causes them to cooperate with organized criminal gangs:  
 
"Why do these illegal activities continue? These men do it to survive. They 
don’t earn much. Poverty in the Niger Delta is widespread. The real winners 
are the organized criminal gangs" (Royal Dutch Shell, 2010). 
 
Second, by the failure of state institutions, though the language used is less critical than 
that used to describe local communities. For example, in its 2011 sustainability report, 
Royal Dutch Shell (2012b) reported that: 
 
"In Nigeria, .... the security situation and lack of government funding has 
previously slowed progress on projects to capture the gas." 
 
From such statements it is clear that the corporate narrative portrays the various actors 
differently. Local communities are villains who engage in illegal oil theft and sabotage 
despite receiving a lot of support from corporate actors. The government is perceived as 
incompetent, owing to the failure of state institutions, and at the same time as a partner 
together with non-governmental organizations. Corporate actors are portrayed as heroes 
who are trying to correct local and government failures by providing development to the 
local communities and cleaning up spills not caused by their activities. According to 
Chevron (2011):  
 
"Chevron will be joining the U.S. Agency for International Development in 
contributing $50 million to the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) 
Foundation, which Chevron established to address the socioeconomic 
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challenges facing the area. Since 2005, Chevron has provided funding to the 
Niger Delta Development Commission, a government agency tasked with 
the responsibility of developing the Niger Delta …. The memorandums 
have generated approximately 200 projects in more than 400 communities, 
villages and chiefdoms and benefited some 600,000 community members". 
 
Shell communicates this element of the narrative too (Table 7.6c) 
 
Oil companies portray themselves as victims, e.g. “We face various risks in our Nigerian 
operations. These risks include security issues surrounding the safety of our people” 
(Royal Dutch Shell, 2012a). 
 
Two solutions are recommended in the narrative. First, further exploitation of crude oil 
in the Niger Delta will ensure economic growth that will help solve the social and 
economic problems faced by Nigeria and the Niger Delta. Second, local people are 
uneducated and poor, with primitive institutions, and need education to improve their 
environmental awareness, and capacity to sustainably manage the environment: 
 
“There has got to be a lot of education there.....for the people to appreciate 
what this is doing to the environment and what it is doing to their economy” 
(Royal Dutch Shell, 2010). 
 
7.2.4  Non-Governmental Organization Narrative 
 
The narrative of non-governmental organizations views problems in the Niger Delta as a 
human rights/environmental justice challenge which requires their advocacy (Table 
7.7a). This narrative is generally critical of the Nigerian state. For example:  
 
“The Government of Nigeria bears significant responsibility for the impacts 
of oil pollution in the Niger Delta. The government has failed to enforce 
existing laws and regulations to prevent pollution and hold the oil industry 
to account, meaning they are freely flouted by companies like Shell without 
any concern for the consequences” (Amnesty International, 2012) 
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“The Niger Delta has for some years been the site of major confrontations 
……. resulting in extra-judicial executions, arbitrary detentions, and 
draconian restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, association, 
and assembly” (Human Rights Watch, 1999a). 
 
This narrative is also critical of the multinational oil companies. In 2009, the Socio-
Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) brought a case before the 
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice against the Federal Government and six oil 
companies over alleged violation of human rights and associated oil pollution in the 
Niger Delta. SERAP, had alleged that:  
 
“Violations of the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right 
to food, to work, to health, to water, to life and human dignity, to a clean 
and healthy environment; and to economic and social development – as a 
consequence of: the impact of oil-related pollution and environmental 
damage on agriculture and fisheries; oil spills and waste materials polluting 
water used for drinking and other domestic purposes; failure to secure the 
underlying determinants of health, including a healthy environment, and 
failure to enforce laws and regulations to protect the environment and 
prevent pollution” (SERAP, 2010).  
 
Yet, this narrative also portrays the oil multinationals as helpless victims of a weak 
Nigerian state (Table 7.8a). So Human Rights Watch (1999) stated that: 
 
“The multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria face a difficult 
political and economic environment, both nationally and at the level of the 
oil producing communities where their facilities are located.” 
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Table 7.7. Texts Representing Human Rights and Government Aspects of the Non-
Governmental Organization Narrative. 
 
a Human rights/environmental justice challenge 
 
i. "This report is an exploration of human rights violations related to oil 
exploration and production in the Niger Delta…… The Niger Delta has for some years 
been the site of major confrontations ……. resulting in extra-judicial executions, 
arbitrary detentions, and draconian restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, 
association, and assembly (Human Rights Watch, 1999b) 
 
ii. Human Rights Watch (1999) found: "repeated incidents in which people were 
brutalized for attempting to raise grievances with the companies; in some cases security 
forces threatened, beat, and jailed members of community delegations. Most of the 
companies cited in the report failed publicly to criticize security force abuses related to 
their operations." 
 
iii. Popular actress and activitist: “Oil pollution has destroyed the livelihoods of tens 
of thousands of people who depend on the environment to make a living and feed their 
families” (Jalade-Ekeinde, 2012).  
 
b Government and corporate entities bear significant responsibility 
 
i. “The Government of Nigeria bears significant responsibility for the impacts of 
oil pollution in the Niger Delta. The government has failed to enforce existing laws and 
regulations to prevent pollution and hold the oil industry to account, meaning they are 
freely flouted by companies like Shell without any concern for the consequences” 
(Amnesty International, 2012) 
 
ii. "We want to highlight the need for the multinational oil companies to stop the 
devastation of the Niger Delta and for the Nigerian government to enact laws that will 
compel them to respect the people and their environment," (Olukoya, 2001)  
 
iii. “Shell must face up to the overwhelming body of evidence demonstrating that 
for decades the company has failed to properly prevent or address oil pollution in the 
Niger Delta, leaving communities exposed to sustained violations of their economic, 
social and cultural rights. The company cannot continue to make excuses – affected 
communities need a comprehensive clean up of pollution and proper compensation for 
what they have lost” (Amnesty International, 2012) 
 
iv. Niger Delta Youth Parliament: “The crime against the people of the Delta was 
made possible only through a pattern of collaboration that took place over the heads of 
the indigenous peoples, collaboration between exploiting petroleum companies, backed 
by corrupt regimes that held sway at the critical point of intersection between 
exploitation and resource environment” (Akasike, 2012). 
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Table 7.8. Texts Representing Oil Company, Internal and Sustainable Development 
Aspects of the Non-Governmental Organization Narrative. 
 
a. Oil multinationals as helpless villains  
 
i. “The multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria face a difficult political 
and economic environment, both nationally and at the level of the oil producing 
communities where their facilities are located (Human Rights Watch, 1999a)” 
 
ii.  One of the major factors that led to these massive protests had to do more about 
the issue of mismanagement, corruption and bad governance in the sector. So, there was 
a need for government to address those issues of accountability and so on. This will 
greatly enhance the activities of the oil multinationals. 
 
b. NGOs as well intentioned groups  
 
i.  "[We are] dedicated to the study, conservation and management of the natural 
resources of the Niger Delta and to the improvement of the quality of life of its people" 
(Niger Delta Wetland Centre, 2012). 
 
ii. "[We are] a voluntary Non - Governmental organization. ….  working in the 
swamps to confront the challenges to protect the Niger Delta communities and 
environment. …. engaged in a working collaboration with other local and foreign 
NGOs, government/private sectors,  ….. towards preserving and conserving natural 
resources and the general environment, and striving to achieve sustainable 
development" (FEPEN, 2008). 
 
c. Sustainable development as panacea  
 
i. "[We are] a Non-Governmental Organization clearly committed 
towards promoting environmental conservation and sustainable development in the 
Niger Delta Region (Save Earth Nigeria, 2010) 
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The main solution recommended in this narrative is a call for sustainable development 
(Table 7.8c). Thus in 2004, a group of NGOs under the coordination of the Earth Right 
Institute established a Niger Delta Fund Initiative as a solution to the Niger Delta 
problem with the objective of: 
 
“a transparent and equitable distribution of resource rents and royalties for 
integrated restoration and sustainable development of Nigeria's oil bearing 
communities” (Earth Rights Institute, 2004). 
 
The non-governmental narrative focuses on all ecosystem services, but tends to place 
emphasis on those services with global benefits, such as biodiversity: 
 
“Both at this local level and at the national and global levels, people are 
recognizing the need for formal protection of significant portions of land to 
ensure that there are places where natural resources in the form of 
ecosystems and biodiversity are kept in their natural state, and to prevent the 
kinds of deterioration that leads to erosion, flooding, and water and air 
pollution and conflict” (Niger Delta Wetland Centre, 2012). 
 
7.2.5  Multilateral Organization Narrative 
 
The narrative of multilateral organizations recognizes that there is a crisis in the Niger 
Delta but is more even-handed than NGOs in identifying causes (Table 7.9). 
Multilateral organizations portray themselves as non-political, non-ideological and non-
partisan intermediaries in tackling the crisis. For example, the UN Environment 
Programme (2011) referred in a study of oil spills in Ogoniland to: 
 
“Lack of trust between actors; political tensions between communities; 
regional and national governments;…. UNEP in the end agreed to undertake 
the study as it represented the only tangible option for possibly breaking the 
decades of deadlock”. 
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Table 7.9. Texts Representing the Multilateral Organization Narrative. 
 
a. "We were confronted with a unique challenge: lack of trust between actors; 
political tensions between communities; regional and national governments; gaining 
access to Ogoniland; security considerations and technical and logistical challenges. 
Despite imperfect conditions, UNEP in the end agreed to undertake the study as it 
represented the only tangible option for possibly breaking the decades of deadlock 
while providing the government and stakeholders with a potential foundation upon 
which trust might be built and action undertaken to remedy the multiple health, 
environmental and sustainable development issues facing millions of people in 
Ogoniland and beyond" (United Nations Environment Programme, 2011). 
 
b. "The report examines the major obstacles to sustainable development in the 
Niger Delta and presents strategic options for overcoming them. Sustainable 
development will require a balance between accelerated economic growth and 
environmental protection to ensure that the people of the Niger Delta benefit as much as 
possible from the exploitation of their resources" (World Bank, 1995). 
 
c. "This new support demonstrates the importance the EU attaches to its relations 
with Nigeria as the dominant political and economic force in West Africa and a key 
player on the African continent. The grant will assist Nigeria to consolidate peace in the 
Niger Delta, improve governance, reduce poverty and make progress towards the 
attainment of the Millennium Development Goals" (European Commission, 2012).
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In the multilateral narrative lack of accountability and transparency has led to a general 
lack of trust. This explains the mindset behind a project in the Niger Delta funded by a 
national development aid agency which aims to:  
 
“Strengthen transparency and accountability in the Niger Delta beginning with 
selected LGAs and diverse communities in the states of Delta, Bayelsa and 
Rivers” (Department for International Development, 2012).  
 
The World Bank (1995), in one of its earliest reports on the Niger Delta crisis, 
recommended a “middle way” solution:  
 
“Sustainable development will require a balance between accelerated 
economic growth and environmental protection to ensure that the people of the 
Niger Delta benefit as much as possible from the exploitation of their 
resources”. 
 
A similar approach was taken recently by Andris Piebalgs, European Commissioner for 
Development, in describing a new EU funding programme: 
 
“The grant will assist Nigeria to consolidate peace in the Niger Delta, improve 
governance, reduce poverty and make progress towards the attainment of the 
Millennium Development Goals” (European Commission, 2012) 
 
Also inherent in the multilateral narrative, and in the above quotation, is the idea that 
Nigeria is a developing country needing assistance.  
 
This narrative ignores the role of imperialism in both the exploitation of resources in the 
wetlands and in lending support to the state and multinational oil corporations.  
 
7.2.6  Academic Narrative 
 
The academic narrative is the most disinterested of all narratives described here. It 
portrays the Niger Delta environment as a complex system comprising both complex 
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ecosystems and interdependent multiple uses and users, about which knowledge is very 
limited (Table 7.10a). For example, Twumansi and Merem (2006) stated that: 
 
“Current attempts to assess the state of the environment and the environmental 
stewardship of economic development along the Niger Delta ecosystem are 
often handicapped by the lack of complete access to a comprehensive regional 
environmental information system.” 
 
This narrative generally avoids dogmatic characterizations of actors. Instead it recognizes 
that all actors have a tendency to be classed as victims, villains or heroes, depending on 
the perspective. Thus, Michael Watts (2008) has stressed that both local people and oil 
companies contribute to the Niger Delta crisis:  
 
"The field of violence operates at a number of levels.   There are a number of 
insurgent groups engaged in armed struggle against the state and the oil 
companies. There are  also  inter-community  (both  inter-ethnic  and  intra-
ethnic) conflicts,  often  driven  by  land  and  jurisdictional  disputes  over  
oil-bearing  lands (and correspondingly  over  access  to  cash  payments  and 
rents  from  the  oil  companies). Oil  companies  have  a  long  history  of  
doing  very  little  in  the  name  of  community development.  It  was  only  in  
the  wake  of  Ken  Saro-Wiwa’s  death  that significant resources were 
deployed, but the rhetoric  of corporate social responsibility obscures a much 
more pernicious set of practices.” 
 
Chatham House (2012) emphasizes the duality of the Nigerian government: 
 
“While outwardly Nigeria projects an image of power, influence and control, 
its inward reality contradicts this. Despite a huge domestic market and great 
entrepreneurial acumen, the country is held back by corruption, poverty and 
unaccountable government. Institutions often lack the capacity to deliver 
public services to the people". 
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Table 7.10. Texts Representing the Academic Narrative. 
 
a. Complexity and Uncertainty 
 
i. Current attempts to assess the state of the environment and the environmental 
stewardship of economic development along the Niger Delta ecosystem are often 
handicapped by the lack of complete access to a comprehensive regional environmental 
information system. The design of a regional environmental information system on the 
ecology of the Niger Delta will serve as a decision support tool for policy makers, oil 
sector and research by facilitating data collection capabilities of users and access to a 
state of the art technical infrastructure of relevance to the management of the coastal 
zone (Twumasi and Merem, 2006) 
 
ii. While the Nigerian government’s approach to the militant agitation linked to the 
natural resources conflict is cosmetic, it appears to be completely silent on the issue of 
climate change to which the region has been exposed because of the natural resources 
exploration. Nigeria does not appear to have considered any policies apropos climate 
change or global warming (Ayodele, 2010). 
 
b. Multiple Actor Labels 
 
i. "The field of violence operates  at  a number of levels.  There are a number of 
insurgent groups  engaged in  armed struggle  against the state  and the oil companies. 
There are  also  inter-community  (both  inter-ethnic  and  intra-ethnic) conflicts  often  
driven  by  land  and  jurisdictional  disputes  over  oil-bearing  lands (and 
correspondingly  over  access  to  cash  payments  and rents  from  the  oil  companies). 
Oil  companies  have  a  long  history  of  doing  very  little  in  the  name  of  
community development.  It  was  only  in  the  wake  of  Ken  Saro-Wiwa’s  death  that 
significant resources were deployed but the rhetoric of corporate social responsibility 
obscures a much more pernicious set of practices" (Watts, 2008). 
 
ii. "Impacts from drilling and field development include land taken for access and 
locations and flaring of gas, disposal of wastes, chemicals and sludge and spills. Since 
the majority of the local population depend on rapid logging of forests for survival, the 
concept of sustainable management arouse less enthusiasm. The political system at both 
local and national levels failed to provide any form of sustainable development for the 
majority of the population" (Joab-Peterside, 2007). 
 
iii. “While outwardly Nigeria projects an image of power, influence and control, its 
inward reality contradicts this. Despite a huge domestic market and great 
entrepreneurial acumen, the country is held back by corruption, poverty and 
unaccountable government. Institutions often lack the capacity to deliver public services 
to the people" (Chatham House, 2012). 
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The academic narrative often emphasizes the need to quantify corporate impacts on 
various ecosystem services, but has so far not addressed the uncertainties involved. 
Recommended solutions include both techno-centric and participatory approaches 
(Okoh, 2007; Twumasi and Merem, 2006). 
 
7.2.7  Media Narrative 
 
The mass media have given extensive coverage to the Niger Delta since the return to 
democratic rule in 1999. The media narrative portrays the challenges facing the Niger 
Delta as a conflict between two sides – the elite minority and the poor majority. In this 
view, the elites of society are responsible for the problems in the Niger Delta because 
they only seek to enhance their own economic fortunes.  
 
So the media narrative portrays the Niger Delta as a classic case of failure of leadership 
and corruption. Thus, in an editorial, The Nigerian Tribune (2012) wrote: 
 
“In Nigeria, oil has been of benefit mostly to members of a tiny elite and the 
companies that have worked with them. Oil has become a weapon of 
oppression by the ruling class and the few individuals referred to as “the oil 
cabal”…..Oil has been exploited in Nigeria always against the majority 
interest". 
 
The media narrative often juxtaposes competing claims without making any effort to 
look for the truth behind the claims. Although media narratives often stress the 
complexity of the situation, and draw upon the views of all sides, myths such as 
“reliable source or informant” are used to downplay and cover up, their inability to 
effectively investigate and explain claims made by competing sides.  
 
7.2.8  Discussion 
 
These diverse narratives, summarized in Table 7.11, illustrate how groups compete for 
discursive hegemony in the Niger Delta, and to be recognized as the 'normal' way of 
understanding the challenges facing the region. Diplomatic attempts to resolve this
167 
 
 
 
Table 7.11. Summary of Niger Delta Wetland Narratives. 
Narrative type  Problem definition Solution  View of other actors Downplayed or left unsaid Land management focus  
Government 
narrative 
Niger Delta problems, while 
magnified by extreme 
environments, are typical of 
development challenges faced by all 
nations. 
Continuing economic 
development is the key. 
Current problems will be solved by working 
with all other actors as partners. 
Myths, such as "Rome was 
not built in a day", are used 
to hide inadequacies. 
Provisioning services and oil. 
Local narrative  Colonial and neo-colonial 
domination is at the root of 
environmental degradation, 
economic injustice and alienation of 
citizens in the Niger Delta. 
Local people should control 
wetland ecosystem services as 
they own the wetlands and have 
traditional knowledge needed 
for management. 
Government and other actors have connived 
to impoverish the Niger Delta. Local people 
are victims. So government, multinational 
companies and other actors are morally 
obliged to provide development assistance.  
The role of local people in 
degrading wetlands is not 
acknowledged. 
Provisioning  and regulating 
ecosystem services. 
Corporate 
narrative 
Local people are uneducated and 
poor, and so engage in criminal 
practices that lead to environmental 
degradation and other socio-
economic problems which 
government is not tackling. Oil 
companies are not culpable. 
Enhancing oil production in the 
Niger Delta will provide 
economic growth to solve the 
region's problems.  Locals must 
be educated to improve 
environmental awareness and 
national patriotism.  
The corporate sector are heroes working 
with other actors to improve living standards 
in the Niger Delta. They are also victims of 
kidnapping and attacks. Locals are 
dangerous and untrustworthy. Government is 
trying to enforce the law but is failing. 
Operational spills and 
leakages are downplayed. 
Crude oil extraction. 
Non- 
Governmental 
narrative 
The Niger Delta faces major 
environmental justice and human 
rights challenges as a result of 
international capitalism and a weak 
Nigerian state. 
Sustainable development. 
 
NGOs are well-intentioned groups dedicated 
to making the world a better place for the 
poor, marginalized and downcast by being 
advocates for them. Social elites cause 
problems in the Niger Delta to enhance their 
own economic fortunes.  
Colonial and neo-colonial 
links of NGOs are 
downplayed. 
All ecosystem services. 
Multilateral  
Organization 
narrative 
The Niger Delta crisis results from 
political tensions and a general lack 
of trust. 
Sustainable development, by 
balancing economic growth and 
environmental protection, will 
reduce poverty and conflict. 
Multilateral organizations are non-political 
and non-partisan groups who can be 
intermediaries between other actors.  
A neo-liberal approach to 
ecosystem services, and the 
ambiguity of 'sustainable 
development', are both 
downplayed. 
Oil and all ecosystem 
services. 
Academic 
narrative 
Socio-economic and environmental 
problems in the Niger Delta have 
many causes,  Degrading activities 
of locals and oil companies are only 
one side of the story. Other factors, 
such as climate change and 
flooding, are important too.  
Technological solutions and 
participatory approaches are 
both important. 
All actors can be classed as victims or 
villains. It is best to avoid general 
categorizations.  
Uncertainty of their data and 
information.  
All ecosystem services.  
Media narrative A two sided conflict between the 
elites and the masses. In their bid to 
enhance their economic fortunes, 
the elites who are also the leaders 
have compromised the integrity of 
the Niger Delta environment.  
A need for national referendum 
to enable all ethnic nationalities 
determine how to  
The elites who are the minority are “bad”, 
while the masses are helpless. The media is 
non-partisan and tell the story from a neutral 
perspective with the aim of uncovering the 
truth.  
Reliability of information is 
downplayed, using myths 
such as “a reliable source” 
Oil. 
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contest, by recognizing the existence of more than one plausible interpretation of reality, 
often require considerable ambiguity. If, however, the diversity of narratives is 
embraced it sheds much valuable light on the processes underlying these environments 
of conflict. 
 
7.3  Analysis of Actors’ Narratives 
 
I then undertook interviews to see how these public narratives correspond to the 
everyday narratives of individuals and draw inferences about their discourses. The 
competing public narratives of the Niger Delta, reviewed above, would normally be 
expected to fully coincide with the narratives of actors representing the relevant groups.  
However, given the ambiguity and complexity of the Niger Delta, and the networking of 
actors, I  also tested for more complex linkages. 
 
7.3.1  Information on Interviewees 
 
The unit of analysis for interviews was the “organization”. To represent the diversity of 
organizations involved in managing the Niger Delta wetlands actors were divided into 
seven main organizational categories (the number of informants are shown in brackets): 
government (15), local (11), corporate (5), non-governmental organization (6), 
academia (3) multilateral organization (1) and media (1) (Table 7.12). 
 
At least one person from each organization was interviewed, and this was usually the 
person within the organization who takes decisions about managing the Niger Delta 
wetlands. Forty-two semi-structured interviews were held. For some organizations more 
than one informant was interviewed, but analysis here is based on the interview with the 
most senior official. Thus, two National Oil Spill Detection Agency staff were 
interviewed -  a director and a chief scientific officer - but analysis here is based on the 
responses of the director, who is the senior of the two. 
 
Of the forty two informants 88% were male and 12% female, with a mean age of 49 
years. This mirrors the male-dominated public and private sectors in Nigeria. Of these 
respondents (including locals), 69% have at least a university first degree.  
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Table 7.12. Information on Interviewees. 
Actor 
category 
No. of 
Inform-
ants 
Mean 
Age 
 
Sex 
M:F 
(%) 
Average 
years of 
education1 
Average 
number 
of years with 
organization 
Organizations 
(No. of interviewees in brackets if >1) 
Government 15 47 93: 7 20 9 Bayelsa State Ministry of Environment; 
Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation; National Oil Spill 
Detection Agency; Community and 
Social Development Agency; Federal 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism; 
Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs; 
Federal Ministry of Water Resources; 
Niger Delta Development Commission; 
National Environ-mental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency 
Federal Ministry of Environment (3); 
Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
Local 
community 
11 50 82:1
8  
3 13 Chairman Timber Dealers Association; 
Chairman Hunters Union; Vice 
Chairman Fishermen Union, Youth 
leader (2), Community Head and two 
elderly community leaders (male and 
female). 
Non-
governmental 
organization 
6 47 71: 
29 
18 7 Living Earth Nigeria; MPO Dore; 
Nigerian Conservation Foundation; 
Niger Delta Wetland Centre; Pro-Natura 
International (Nigeria); WWF/Wetland 
International 
Multilateral 
organization 
1 49 100:
0 
22 10 United Nations Development 
Programme 
Corporate 5 52 100: 
0 
20 10 Shell Petroleum Development Company 
(3); Yenagoaoils Resources (Nigeria) 
Ltd; Bavaria Enterprises Nigeria Ltd 
Academia 3 47 100:
0 
19 8 Rivers State University of Science and 
Technology  and Niger Delta University 
(2) 
Media 1 47 100: 
0 
14 15 Journalist 
Total  42 49 88:1
2  
17  10  
1Years of education was calculated as follows: no formal education (0); primary (6); secondary (12); OND (14); HND and BSc (16); 
MSc (18); PhD (22).  
 
This profile resulted from placing emphasis on interviewing people who have 
significant decision making responsibility and are highly involved in the mission of 
their organization in the Niger Delta. No official interviewed was below level 8 (senior 
cadre). (Administrative officers at grades 1-7 are junior staff (such as clerks, drivers, 
typists, security personnel and cooks), while levels 8 – 17 are regarded as senior 
administrative staff. Level 17 is the peak of the Nigerian civil service and includes 
directors or permanent secretaries.) 
 
Informants have worked for their organizations for 10 years on average, and so had 
sufficient knowledge to understand and respond to questions. None of the local 
respondents hold a university degree, but have lived most (if not all) of their lives in the 
Niger Delta region and are very knowledgeable about how things work there. 
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Informants were asked about their organization's activities in the Niger Delta wetlands; 
their ideas and understanding of what constitutes a wetland and the benefits it provides; 
their perceptions of challenges facing the Niger Delta region and solutions to these 
challenges; interactions between organizations; and perceptions of trust, influence and 
importance of other organizations (Appendix 5.2). The names and organizational 
affiliations of informants are withheld, as explained in Chapter 5. 
 
7.3.2  Government Actors 
 
As expected, the government narrative was the most popular among the fifteen 
government informants, being adopted by fourteen of them (93%). However, one 
member of this group did not use the government narrative. This might be because the 
organization he represented had been established as a World Bank funded project and 
had only been recently converted into a government agency.  
 
The most popular additions/alternatives were the multilateral organization narrative, 
adopted by eleven informants (73%), the non-governmental organization narrative, 
adopted by eight informants (53%) and the corporate narrative, adopted by eight 
informants (53%) (Table 7.13). Two informants adopted six of the seven narratives, 
another two adopted five narratives, three adopted four narratives, four adopted three 
narratives, three adopted two narratives, and one actor had only one narrative. 
 
Typical of the government informants exhibiting six narratives was GOV8, who 
emphasized the government’s attempts to secure economic and infrastructural 
development in the Niger Delta region: 
 
“Government provides medical services for the aged and children; education 
is free; and the state government pays for all candidates sitting for NECO 
and WAEC examinations. Workers in state organizations, in addition to 
having their regular salary paid monthly, earn double salary in December. 
The people are now seeing the benefit of government; all this is from oil 
money.” 
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“Although I cannot say we are there yet, you need to know that successive 
governments have tried to stem the crisis in the Niger Delta and this 
government in particular, together with various foreign partners, have done 
a lot for the Niger Delta region …. At least people can also see the effort 
and investment made into the Amnesty programme …. There can be no 
meaningful development without peace. Let them give government time; 
government needs time to right the wrong that has been done for many 
years.  After all Rome was not built in a day. We are not there yet, but by 
God's grace we shall get there.” 
 
GOV8 also exhibited use of the corporate narrative, by downplaying the role of the oil 
companies in degrading the Niger Delta environment. Indeed, he ranked social 
problems over environmental degradation as the main challenge facing the region: 
 
“Sustainable development will require a balance between accelerated 
economic growth and environmental protection to ensure that the people of 
the Niger Delta benefit as much as possible from the exploitation of their 
resources”. 
 
“The agitation, kidnapping and bombing go hand in hand. Most of the 
suspects, currently in various cells across the commands, who were arrested 
for kidnapping, have confessed that there is no crime they cannot commit, 
as far it will fetch them money. So don’t be surprised that this set of people, 
if allowed to be in society, can be used to cause terrorism like using 
explosives.” 
 
“Some of the companies are trying I know. They have supported us in 
building community health centres throughout the Niger Delta. This benefits 
people in the regions, many of whom live in remote villages and easily die 
from treatable diseases like malaria. Shell also have a scholarship dedicated 
to Niger Delta students alone.” 
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Table 7.13. Actors and their Narratives (by number). 
Actor 
Category 
 
Number 
of 
Actors 
 
Narratives Held by the Specified Number of Actors 
Government Local Corporate Non-
Governmental 
Organization 
 
Multilateral 
Organization 
 
Academic Media 
Government 15 14 5 8 8 11 3 4 
Local 11 4 11 2 4 3 1 1 
Corporate 5 2 1 5 3 3 3 0 
Non-Governmental 
Organization 
6 1 4 
 
3 6 6 4 0 
Multilateral 
Organization 
1 
1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 
Academic 3 0 3 0 2 2 3 0 
Media 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 42 23 25 18 24 25 15 6 
 
The same informant also used the local narrative. While calling for the cooperation of 
the local people to enable government to pursue its development objectives in the 
region, he argued that the present money from the Derivation allocated to the region 
will not make much impact. As such he suggested that in the long run the government 
should look into increasing the Derivation or granting the people control over their 
resources:  
 
“These states (Niger Delta states) simply do not have enough money to meet 
basic needs. The truth of the matter is that the oil-bearing states of the Niger 
Delta need more funds to develop the area. Government will have to plan to 
increase Derivation to the Niger Delta and later allow all states to control 
their resources.” 
 
His suggested solutions to the problem included:  
 
“Strengthening governance practices and institutions that engender an 
environment that promotes accountability and transparency …….. [and] 
liberalization of the downstream oil sector in order to attract investors.” 
 
This is consistent with the non-governmental narrative which suggests that government 
is corrupt and economic liberalization is needed. He also suggested 
 
“A need to set up an organization to promote probity, transparency and 
accountability in governance of the Niger Delta”.  
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This is consistent with the multilateral organization narrative that portrays the crisis in 
the Niger Delta as a general lack of trust among actors. 
 
Other informants adopted the corporate and non-governmental narratives on the 
weakness of government. For example:  
 
"A lot of staff are ready to work but don't have the training.....Personnel 
costs remain high, leaving no funds for other expenses such as training. If 
they can provide us with the training abroad and give us enough attention 
our agency can stop this destruction (in the Niger Delta)" (GOV9). 
 
"Even if the best legislations are enacted .....this will not improve the status 
of our environments. We lake the transparency and political will in 
government" (GOV23). 
 
An interesting use of the partnership element of the government narrative was displayed 
in explaining to local people the government's relationship to the oil companies: 
 
"There was a time when we visited a community in the Delta. They 
complained and we told them that the oil companies are visitors to the 
Nigerian government, so we cannot send them away. This is what I always 
tell them when they want me to stop oil production. It is like a son chasing 
away his father's visitors. It is not possible" (GOV6). 
 
7.3.3  Corporate Actors 
 
All five corporate informants adopted the corporate narrative. Three also adopted the 
academic, multilateral and non-governmental narratives, two adopted the government 
narrative and one adopted the local narrative. None adopted the media narrative. Three 
informants adopted four of the narratives, while the remaining two adopted two 
narratives.  
 
The responses of one of the corporate actors with four narratives, identified as BUS2, 
are now discussed to highlight how his narratives were identified. He referred to various 
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aspects of the corporate narrative, especially those emphasizing the role of oil theft and 
sabotage in the degradation of the wetlands, downplaying operational leaks and 
emphasizing the contribution of the corporate actors in the development of the Niger 
Delta region:  
 
"These adverse fallouts of petroleum production have become inevitably 
synonymous with the Niger Delta environment, but by virtue of the fact that 
oil production must continue in the region if the tempo of economic 
development in Nigeria must be sustained, I wonder at times why we can't 
look around and see how actions of others contribute to the degradation of 
the environment …. These people (locals) have their own share of 
destroying their environment, have you been reading newspapers lately? I 
will advise you to read what the army is now saying they found out in the 
creeks of the Niger Delta. Recently, the Joint Task Force unearthed and 
destroyed over 600 illegal refineries here in the Niger Delta." 
 
“My company is committed to contributing to regional development of the 
Niger Delta …. and we spend a lot annually on projects promoting our 
biodiversity guidelines that ensure protection of the flora and fauna … In 
2005, we spent about $32 million on community projects in the Niger 
Delta." 
 
In describing the challenges facing the region, the informant pointed out that there are 
several factors responsible for degradation of the Niger Delta wetlands. This is 
suggestive of an academic narrative in which the local community narrative and the 
corporate narrative are but two sides of a multifaceted story:  
 
"The reasons for this kind of environmental decline are numerous and 
complex, …… Population factors also play a significant role. Today, the 
population of the Delta has increased significantly compared to what it was 
when oil was discovered here. So it is not a single factor, it is the combined 
effects of booming population growth and economic and technological 
development that are threatening the wetlands." 
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The informant also refers to the failure of government institutions in influencing the 
current state of compliance of the oil companies to existing institutions:  
 
"The lack of genuine commitment on the part of our leaders has slowed 
down a genuine drive toward making right the wrong that has been done for 
many years. Even when the companies want to act, the laws are just not 
there … There is too much confusion among the regulators, they all operate 
different legal regimes. This patchwork of several incompatible and 
conflicting laws is causing more problems than it is able to solve …. The oil 
companies receive the blame but we forget that they can only operate within 
the laws of the federal republic of Nigeria." 
 
Yet BUS2 also adopts the government narrative by praising the government and 
highlighting its efforts in developing the Niger Delta region: 
  
“The on-going efforts of the Federal Government to rehabilitate former militants 
in the Niger Delta are commendable and all hands must be on deck to ensure that 
the efforts of the government in this regard are not in vain.” 
 
Other corporate informants adopted the non-governmental and multilateral narratives on 
the need for sustainable development as panacea. For example:  
 
“We mobilize resources to promote sustainability in the Niger Delta…. Our 
biodiversity projects promote sustainable consumption patterns and 
economic development. We also partner with communities, to develop 
Biodiversity Action Plans (BAP) to conserve forest reserves” (BUS7).  
 
“Government needs to do more to fight corruption in the oil industry” 
(BUS8).  
 
7.3.4  Local Actors 
 
All eleven local informants adopted the local narrative. Adoption of other narratives 
was less pronounced: four adopted the government narrative and the non-governmental 
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narrative, three adopted the multilateral narrative, two the corporate narrative and one 
the media narrative.  One informant adopted five narratives, three adopted three 
narratives, five adopted two narratives and one adopted just one narrative.  
 
LOC1, an informant with five narratives, is quoted for purposes of illustration. 
Marginalization of the Niger Delta region, in this informant's view, was evident in its 
neglect before crude oil was discovered, even by the colonial authorities:  
 
"Most of the early oil prospecting was done in the Onitsha, Oweri, Benin 
and Ondo areas. Even the government did not see anything good with the 
Niger Delta then, and they called our area “the white man’s grave”. But the 
story changed after they found oil in Oloibiri here in Bayelsa state." 
 
"We know how far [oil companies] go to stop spills in [western] countries. 
But in Nigeria, oil companies ignore their spills, cover them up and destroy 
our people's livelihood and environments. ….. All because they want to 
increase their profit, at the detriment of other people’s life." 
 
The neglect continues, despite a recent spill in his community: 
 
"As the community leader, I have not seen anyone in my community since 
the incident occurred. No NNPC official, no AGIP official has visited us …. 
They have destroyed our land, water, palm trees and streams. We are rural 
dwellers but here, the people have not taken the laws into their hands.  If it 
were not for chiefs and elders here we wouldn’t have been calm like this. 
My people would have acted otherwise but for the community chiefs who 
calmed frayed nerves. We want a quick response of payment to affected 
persons and families otherwise we will take our protest to the Presidential 
Villa, Abuja." 
 
In repeating the government narrative, he was full of praise for government and 
emphasized the role of environmental constraints:  
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"The present government has tried, and they seem to have changed their 
former divide and rule and violent approach to the problem in the Niger 
Delta. We know there are problems (making reference to the difficult terrain 
in the Niger Delta) and this government has not shied away from those 
problems. The state government has made enormous achievements in 
infrastructural development and opened up those communities that were 
hitherto difficult to reach, I pray/hope they will do more and we will support 
them." 
 
Despite this, LOC1 also adopted the corporate narrative when he acknowledged the 
contributions of the oil multinationals: 
“We should also mention areas where they (the oil multinationals) are 
trying; no matter how little it is…. SPDC awards scholarships to students at 
post-primary and tertiary levels. They also provided us with pipe-borne 
water, and with electricity by donating a generator to the community”  
By calling for help from foreign governments he also repeated the multilateral narrative: 
"The government alone is not capable of curbing the restiveness. .... so they 
do need the assistance of foreign governments who can provide technical 
and  logistical support. These foreign people have satellites, so they can see 
things that are going on that the government doesn’t know about." 
 
He further stated that that:  
 
“Government and the oil companies have cheated us for too long” 
 
This is consistent with the non-governmental narrative which suggests that the 
challenges facing the Niger Delta is a result of longstanding injustice to the local 
people. Other local informants adopted the non-governmental and multilateral 
narratives: 
 
“We can achieve one Nigeria based on equity and fairness when the 
leadership is transparent and accountable to the people" (LOC9). 
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“We will continue to struggle until they can guarantee our right to live in 
our environment and meet our livelihoods” (LOC12). 
 
Another informant (LOC6) adopted both the local and corporate narratives, stating that:  
 
"The efforts of local fishermen are yielding far below expectation. Many 
fishermen were forced out of business for the greater part of the year due to 
pollution of the Atlantic“.  
 
LOC6, again uncharacteristically, stressed the degrading activity of local community 
members whom he called “radicals and hawks”. This narrative is more characteristic of 
the corporate narrative: 
 
"Because of their ignorance and love for money, our people have also joined 
them in destroying the wetlands which have long been an important part of 
our life, since the times of our forefathers. Now the wetlands face serious 
abuse and we are all in serious danger. The people join the oil companies in 
illegal mining and dumping waste in the wetlands while others have turned 
them into agricultural fields. The worst destruction these wetlands face is as 
a result of the current construction of both residential and commercial 
buildings." 
 
7.3.5  Non-Governmental Organization Actors 
 
The non-governmental organization narrative was adopted by all six non-governmental 
informants. They all also adopted the multilateral organization narrative. Four 
informants adopted the local community and academic narratives, three the corporate 
narrative and one the government narrative. One informant adopted six narratives, three 
informants adopted four narratives, and two adopted three narratives.  
 
NGO4, who adopted six narratives, typifies the non-governmental organization 
narrative in referring to his organization's work in improving the life of the Niger Delta 
people: 
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"Ours is a non-profit organization that carries out research, natural resources 
management and human development activities. It implements goal-directed 
project activities for community driven development actions to contribute to 
the protection of global environment and improve the quality of life and 
alleviate poverty in the Niger Delta." 
 
The informant also emphasized the failure of government institutions: 
 
"One lesson I have learnt from these episodes in the Niger Delta is that 
change has to come from the very top. All the environmental laws and 
legislations have come to naught because they were actually designed to 
fail.  No matter how self-righteous a person is, his effort would always be a 
drop in the ocean when surrounded by a multitude of political demons. He 
can only go as far as his boss wants him to go. To combat the continued 
degradation of the Niger Delta environment, government will need to 
remove all impediments for all relevant policies to be updated to capture the 
essence of what is happening to the Niger Delta Region today, without 
which, the sustainable development in that area would only be a stunted 
development. No sustainability whatsoever." 
 
The informant also adopted the academic narrative in referring to the diversity of 
impacts on the wetlands and the potential for scientific solutions: 
 
"Let us leave the problem of the oil companies. What people need to know 
is that unlike what happened before, there are now a lot of important 
industrial activities causing pollution here in the Niger Delta. When you 
visit most of our communities you will see massive logging using heavy 
machinery. At the same time a lot of agricultural plantations and fish farms 
are springing up. Apart from this there is the problem of global warming 
and government is not doing anything about these as well." 
 
"I don’t believe policies are the most effective way to get compliance with 
best practices. It is good to have a policy as a guideline but it will be useful 
only to those who are already convinced…. We should increasingly 
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encourage the adoption of selected tools of modern science and technology 
to energize development activities and empower people to access external 
resources, such as renewable energy technologies and especially solar 
energy … [and] biotechnology applied to selection and domestication of 
indigenous biodiversity." 
 
The local narrative is also evident in the idea that local communities are victims of 
connivance between the multinational oil companies and the Nigerian elites: 
 
"Although the Niger Delta has contributed enormously to the Nigerian 
national economy the people of the Niger Delta have suffered from 
environmental degradation of their land and the displacement of their 
communities and have received no benefits from over 50 years of oil 
extraction. There seems to be connivance between the government and the 
oil companies, whereby government and oil companies do not replicate 
what obtains overseas where an industry transforms a whole. This is why 
resource control agitation needs to be given serious consideration in the 
Nigerian polity." 
 
The informant's emphasis on the developmental activities of corporate actors is typical 
of the corporate narrative: 
 
"In places they have provided people with 24 hour electricity and 24 hour 
water. Even when I am in Abuja, I don’t get 8 hours of electricity." 
 
"Shell has adopted an approach that concentrates efforts on promoting 
economic empowerment, human capital development, healthy living, and 
basic services in the Niger Delta." 
 
The informant also repeats the government narrative in suggesting that the Niger Delta 
is facing a developmental challenge that will be overcome: 
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"This is not the first time we have had a crisis in the Niger Delta …. I think 
this latest one is just part of the challenges facing a developing country like 
ours and we will overcome it also." 
 
By suggesting that “the deregulation of the downstream and upstream sector (of oil 
production in Nigeria) will also create more jobs for the people (in the Niger Delta) and 
grow the economy”, NGO4 is adopting the multilateral organization narrative which 
suggests a neo-liberal approach to the management of resources.  
 
Other informants adopted the academic narrative when they suggested:  
 
“Because of their low elevation, the coastal zones are at risk from flooding, 
rising sea levels and coastal surges” (NGO3). 
 
“There is now agricultural productivity and diversification of the traditional 
farming patterns by introducing modern approaches. Introduction of 
mechanized farming and fishing are good for the economy but bad for the 
environment, the people fertilizer application and indiscriminate spraying 
pesticides have effect on the environment and their produce” (NGO1). 
 
7.3.6  Academic Actors  
 
The academic narrative was adopted by all three academic informants. They all also 
adopted the local narrative. Two also adopted the non-governmental and multilateral 
organization narratives, but none adopted the corporate and governmental and media 
narratives. Two informants adopted four narratives, and one adopted two narratives. The 
responses of academic informant ACA1, who exhibited four narratives, are used for 
illustration. This informant stressed that continued failure of the oil industry to conform 
to regulations was the fault of the government, not the oil companies:  
 
"Shell has adopted an approach concentrating efforts on promoting 
economic empowerment, human capital development, healthy living, and 
basic services in the Niger Delta." 
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"There are laws but no honest people to implement these laws. If you see the 
Ministry of Environment … most of them just sit in Abuja. The way the 
Federal Ministry of Environment is run is wrong; the Ministry should carry 
the component states along so they can make their inputs." 
 
In the same vein, the narrative of ACA1 used the multilateral narrative when he 
suggested that:  
 
"The solution is to drive sustainable growth in the region. This will require a 
good regulatory framework that will attract private sector investment in the 
region and ensure that the integrity of the environment is maintained with 
strong focus on people-centred development that respects the needs of the 
people. In addition to present use, government should promote responsible 
and sustainable tourism to promote the conservation of the wetlands. This 
means that the people can also benefit from tourism, because visitors will 
buy things and pay for various services." 
 
Climate change was expressed as a factor having caused changes in the wetlands: 
 
"The wetlands are now endangered due to climate variability. There was a 
recent paper that showed that some of the problems we face here in the 
Niger Delta are actually a result of the poor rainfall regime upstream in 
Niger." 
 
This is consistent with the academic narrative which suggests that other factors are 
responsible for the degradation of the Niger Delta environments.  
 
To buttress his use of the local narrative, ACA1 depicted the local people as victims:  
 
“The region holds the most vulnerable people living far below poverty level 
as shown by recent statistics …What the Niger Delta needs is an agenda that 
will put an end to illiteracy, joblessness, poverty, vicious circle of man-
made devastation on daily bases” 
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7.3.7  Multilateral Organization Actor 
 
The multilateral organization informant adopted five narratives.  
 
Characteristic of the multilateral narrative, MUL1 praised the effort of his organization, 
suggesting that it is a non-partisan organization and only ”plays an advisory role to the 
government in promoting good governance and nothing more”. He went on to say:  
 
“Our projects support investments in an effective, sustainable and 
participatory manner and we have also promoted systems for both 
institutional and participatory monitoring and evaluation of investments, 
including poverty reduction indicators related to the Millennium 
Development Goals.” 
 
By equating the challenge facing the Niger Delta to other developmental challenges 
facing other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, MUL1 is adopting the government 
narrative, which suggests that the challenge facing the Niger Delta is similar to other 
regional development challenges:  
 
“Our projects focus on the issues not only in the Niger Delta, but also other 
counties in Sub-Saharan Africa where projects are enabling them to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals”. 
 
MUL1 was also critical of the Nigerian government and the multinational oil companies  
 
“We cannot deny the fact that the Nigerian government and the oil 
companies have sometimes responded harshly to local unrest …. They are 
all complicit in abuses committed in the region” 
 
This is consistent with the non-governmental narrative. 
 
While narrating his experience on a recent visit to the Niger Delta, MUL1 said: 
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“I saw the incredible difficulties the people have to live with. I heard many 
stories of how oil spills have virtually rendered every piece of land 
unproductive. Knowing that this is the life of the people, you cannot but ask 
yourself if they are a part of Nigeria”. 
 
MUL1 showed his use of the academic narrative when suggesting that the focus should 
not be on environmental pollutants alone:  
 
“The increasing attention to environmental pollutants is great, but we also 
need to realize another important feature we observed in the region is the 
almost complete absence of forests in some areas that were previously 
forested”. 
 
7.3.8  Media Actor 
 
The single media informant adopted only two of the seven narratives: those of the 
media and government. MED1 described the Niger Delta as:  
 
“A picture of man‘s inhumanity to man ….These people are rendered 
wretched and miserable even though their lands and waterways are part of 
the gold mine, the nation‘s breadbasket … The elites and state governments 
in the oil-producing region are responsible. These powerful individuals in 
and outside of the region are also responsible for the ill, the indifference and 
the calamities that have come to characterize the region”. 
 
This narrative is consistent with the media narrative that paints a scenario of a two-sided 
conflict between the elites and the masses.  
 
MED1 also advocated the “initiation of transformative projects that will bring human 
development to the Niger Delta region”.  Such statements are consistent with the 
government narrative which calls for the economic development of the Niger Delta as 
key solution.  
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7.4  Making Inferences about Discourses 
 
The results of these interviews, summarized in Table 7.14 and listed in full in Appendix 
7.1, show the heterogeneity of narratives adopted. Of the forty two interviewees, at least 
half adopt the local, government, multilateral and non-governmental narratives. The 
academic, corporate and media narratives are less popular (36%, 43% and 14%, 
respectively). Although some actors adopted just one narrative, three actors adopted six 
of the seven. The wide uptake of different narratives indicates that they have become 
entrenched in everyday life in the Niger Delta and are considered legitimate. 
 
Table 7.14. Actors and their Narratives (in %). 
 
Actor 
Category 
Narrative Types (%) 
Government Local Corporate Non-
Governmental 
Organization 
 
Multilateral 
Organization 
Academic Media 
Government 93 33 53 53 73 20 27 
Local 36 100 9 36 27 9 9 
Corporate 40 20 100 60 40 60 0 
Non-
Governmental 
Organization 
17 67 
 
50 100 100 67 0 
Multilateral 
Organization 100 
100 0 100 100 100 0 
Academic 0 100 0 67 67 100 0 
Media 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 
Total 55 60 43 57 60 36 14 
 
The findings also lead to interesting inferences about the discourses of informants. 
 
First, the discourses of local, corporate, multilateral and non-governmental informants 
are all entirely consistent with the assumed narratives of the groups for whom they 
work. Second, in all the actor groups, informants have discourses consistent with more 
than one group narrative. Government employee discourses are also consistent with the 
non-governmental narrative (which is unexpected) and with the corporate narrative, 
which is understandable from the encroachment of the neo-liberal paradigm into 
government operations. Non-governmental informant discourses are also highly 
consistent with local and academic narratives, which is understandable given their 
distance from government and corporate narratives. Corporate informant discourses are 
also consistent with the non-governmental narrative (which is unexpected) and with the 
academic narrative, which is understandable given its techno-centric element. Local 
community informants have the least diverse discourses of all, being most consistent 
with the government narrative (which is unexpected) and with the non-governmental 
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narrative, which is expected given the support which local communities in the Niger 
Delta receive from non-governmental organizations. Given the often close partnerships 
of academic, non-governmental and governmental agencies with multilateral 
organizations, the discourses of the informants from these groups are highly consistent 
with the multilateral organization narrative.  
 
7.5  Informant Discourses and Network Relations  
 
7.5.1  Network Composition  
 
Each of the forty-two informants was also interviewed to gather data about how their 
personal networks affect management of the Niger Delta wetlands. They were asked to 
identify their immediate partners (alters) and their organizational affiliations, and then 
presented with a list of relevant organizations (Appendix 5.2) and asked whether they 
interacted with anyone working for these. If so they were asked to name these contacts. 
They were also requested to indicate on a scale of 1 (weakest) to 5 (strongest) how 
strong these interactions/relationships were. This helped to explore the multiple ties that 
exist in social networks. For the purpose of this analysis these scores were transformed 
to binary (0s and 1s), by converting all ties less than 2.5 to 0 and all ties greater than 2.5 
to 1. The conversion was made to reduce complexity as the initial intention was to 
explore strength of ties.  
 
To generate each actor's structural location so it could be compared with their narratives 
the resulting network data were analyzed in UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) - a software 
package (https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home) for analysing social 
network data that is part of the NetDraw network visualization tool. Using the ego 
network of GOV8, an example of the structure of the network generated is presented in 
Appendix 7.2. 
 
This comparison helped to ascertain the relationship between the narratives of the 
informants and the structure of the network to which they belong. Most respondents 
were able to identify alters by organization but not by name. So in discussing the 
possible influence of an actors’ ego network on their discourse, it was decided to limit 
analysis to one informant from each organization. Since more than one informant was 
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interviewed for some organizations, the analysis in this section is based on the actor 
informant mentioned most, and where this is not available, the most senior of the actor 
informants was selected. Altogether thirty-three informants were included in the 
network analysis.  
 
Sixty-one alters were identified (Table 7.15). Twenty two (36%) were government 
actors and 11 (18%) non-governmental actors. Another eleven were local actors, six 
(10%) were corporate actors, five (8%) were multilateral actors and four (7%) more 
were in the 'other' category. While most informants identified interactions with 
academic and media actors, they are often not able to provide the name of their 
organization. Hence all mentions of media and academic actors are grouped as a single 
alter. The number of alters per informant ranges from two to 44, with a mean of 20. 
This indicates that actors involved in managing the Niger Delta wetlands generally have 
quite large personal networks.  
 
The location of alters of informants from the various categories was identified (Table 
7.16). All of the government informants have at least one alter from the government and 
local groups. Also, at least one informant from all the other groups has a government 
actor in their ego network. The main alters for corporate actors are those from similar 
organizations as well as government and local actors, those for international 
organizations are from similar organizations, and the main alters for locals and the 
NGOs are locals. So most of the alters of local people come from among themselves 
and from government actors. 
 
Table 7.15. Alters in Actor Informants Ego Networks. 
Actor category 
Number of actors 
from actor category 
Number of alters 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Average 
Government 22 3 42 20 11 
Local community 11 12 44 25 8 
Non- governmental 11 9 36 19 8 
Corporate 6 12 32 21 7 
Multilateral 5 16 27 21 5 
Academic 1 26 26 26  
Media 1 13 13 13  
Others 4 2 12 7 4 
Total  61 2 44 20 9 
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Table 7.16. Percentages of Informants by Network Category Having Alters in Eight 
Networks (% = all infpormants have all alters in this category in their network).  
Alters in 
ego 
network 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 Informants 
 Government Local Corporate Nongovernmental Multilateral Academic Media Others 
Government 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Local 100 100 100 64 60 100 100 75 
Corporate 64 82 100 55 20 100 100 25 
Non-
governmental 64 91 83 100 100 100 100 50 
Multilateral 59 55 17 100 100 100 0 0 
Academic 32 45 50 64 80  0 0 
Media 23 18 50 18 0 0  25 
Others 27 91 17 18 0 0 100 50 
 
The nature of interactions in networks varies. For instance, the most common form of 
interaction between non-governmental organizations and local actors is through 
information dissemination and advocacy (Table 7.17). NGOs are also increasingly 
commissioned by corporate actors to undertake consultancy work and by government 
agencies to dispense funds or services to local communities. Non-governmental 
organizations also approach corporate actors to seek funds for their activities.  
 
Table 7.17. Nature of Interactions between Actors. 
 Government Local Non-governmental Corporate Others 
Government Policy development 
and administrative 
issues, fact finding, 
funding 
Complaints about 
spill issues, 
project planning, 
management, land 
acquisition 
Advocacy, funding 
requests 
Policy development, 
project development 
Media briefing 
Local   Resource use 
activities, 
community 
meetings 
Information 
dissemination, advocacy, 
training, memoranda of 
understanding, socio-
economic development 
issues, disbursement of 
aid, fact finding, 
research 
Legal matters, spill 
control, complaints  
Research data 
collection 
Non- 
governmental 
  Project planning and 
implementation, 
conferences, funding 
Training, memoranda 
of understanding, 
disbursement of funds 
to locals, consultancy 
Consultancy, 
conferences 
Corporate    Press releases, 
conferences 
Consultancy, 
business  
Others     Collaboration  
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7.5.2  Linking Narratives with Network Structures 
 
I next tested for relationships between actors' narratives and the structures of their 
networks, using tools in UCINET to calculate key indices. This analysis is based on 33 
informants who were interviewed to determine their narratives and who were also 
included in the network.   
 
Generally, the larger the size of an actor's ego network, the more opportunities they 
have to communicate with other types of actors. The number of alters an ego is 
connected to defines their degree centrality. The number of alters to which informants 
are connected network ranged from 12 to 44 with a mean of 25 (Table 7.18). The size of 
the informants ego network was significantly correlated with the number of narratives 
they use (r = 0.594) (Table 7.19). 
 
Table 7.18. Variables in the Ego Networks of Informants. 
Ego Network Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Degree centrality (Size) 33 12 44 25 9 
Egonet Density 33 0.43 0.79 0.59 0.06 
Betweenness 33 0.04 6.26 1.57 1.73 
Closeness  33 51.28 75.95 61.48 6.34 
Homophily  33 0.00 0.67 0.36 0.16 
 
Table 7.19. Correlation Analysis between Network Variables of Actors Informants and 
Their Discourses. 
Network Structure 
Indices 
Number of Discourses Used 
Pearson correlation, r Sig. (1-tailed), p N 
Degree centrality (Size) 0.594** 0.000 33 
Egonet Density 0.582** 0.000 33 
Betweenness 0.560** 0.000 33 
Closeness 0.582** 0.000 33 
Homophily -0.372* 0.015 33 
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
 
On the other hand, the higher the network density, the stronger or more cohesive the ties 
are, and the more difficult it is to communicate with other groups and access their 
narratives. The ego network density ranged from 0.43 to 0.79 with a mean of 0.591 
(Table 7.18). Network density would be expected to be negatively associated with the 
number of narratives, but here a positive correlation (r = 0.582) was found (Table 7.19). 
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Another network measure relevant to this study is homophily, namely the tendency of 
informants to relate with alters similar to them. This should reinforce the ability of 
actors in one group to share that group's narrative and be less exposed to other 
narratives. Here the proportion of close associates in informants ego networks ranged 
from 0 to 0.67 with a mean of 0.36 (Table 7.18).  As expected, this was weakly, but 
significantly, negatively correlated with the number of an informant's narratives (r = - 
0.372) (Table 7.19). 
 
The number of organizations in each actor category for which five informants had alters 
were tabulated and the percentage of organizations in which each actor had alters was 
calculated (Table 7.20; Table 7.21). For example, GOV 8 had alters from 100% of local 
communities for which the other four actors had alters. The percentage of alters for each 
actor was then compared with the presence of different narratives. This showed that 
where an actor has at least 45% of all alters from a group in their ego network they tend 
to adopt the narrative corresponding to that group. This is illustrated using the narratives 
and network structure of actor informants within each category with the maximum 
(GOV8, BUS2, and MUL1, LOC1 and NGO 4) and minimum (BUS1, GOV4, LOC5 
and NGO3) number of discourses. 
 
The actor GOV8 with 42 alters has all (100%) of the local community actors, corporate 
and academic actors in their network, 68% of the government actors, and 45% of non-
governmental actors in his ego network. This actor had narratives corresponding to all 
of these groups. However, GOV8 does not have any alter from the media group and did 
not adopt the media narrative (Table 7.20). 
 
The case of LOC5, who adopted only the local narrative, strengthens this finding. While 
LOC5 has alters from all other groups, these were less than 45% of actors from this 
group. On the other hand, for the local actors with whom the actor had 91% as part of 
his ego network, he shared the same narrative (Table 7.20)  
 
The narratives of actors were also compared with their tribal affiliations. All the 
informants that are natives of the Niger Delta region (irrespective of their group 
affiliation) shared the local narrative. On the other hand, only 11% of actors who are not 
natives of the Niger Delta shared the local narrative. One of these is an informant who 
has worked and lived most of his adult life in the region.  
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Table 7.20. Association between Narrative Acquisition and Percent of Alters in the 
Networks of Five Actors. 
Actor 
Category/ 
Narratives 
GOV8 LOC1 BUS2 NGO4 MUL1 
% 
alters 
Narrative 
present? 
% 
alters 
Narrative 
present? 
% 
alters 
Narrative 
present? 
%  
alters 
Narrative 
present? 
% 
alters 
Narrative 
present? 
Government 68 Yes 68 Yes 64 Yes 45 Yes 45 Yes 
Local 100 Yes 91 Yes 36 No 91 Yes 55 Yes 
Corporate 100 Yes 100 Yes 83 Yes 50 Yes 17 No 
Non-govern- 
mental 45 Yes 55 Yes 55 Yes 45 Yes 55 Yes 
Multinational 60 Yes 60 Yes 20 No 100 Yes 60 Yes 
Academic 100 Yes 100 No 100 Yes 100 Yes 100 Yes 
Media 0 No 0 No 0 No 0 No 0 No 
Others 25 na 75 na 25 na 50 na 0 na 
 
 
Table 7.21. Association between Narrative Acquisition and Percent of Alters in the 
Networks of Four Actors. 
Actor 
Category/ 
Narratives  
GOV4 LOC5 BUS1 NGO3 
%  
alters 
Narrative 
present? 
%  
alters 
Narrative 
present? 
%  
alters 
Narrative 
present? 
%  
 alters 
Narrative 
present? 
Government 45 Yes 23 No 27 No 23 No 
Local 9 No 91 Yes  73 Yes 0 No 
Corporate 17 No 17 No 50 Yes 33 No 
Non- 
governmental 27 No 27 No 0 No 45 Yes 
Multinational 40 No 20 No 0 No 60 Yes 
Academic 0 No 0 No 0 No 100 Yes 
Media 0 No 0 No 0 No 0 No 
Others 0  25  0  0  
 
7.6  Conclusions 
 
1. This chapter has identified the diverse public narratives of major stakeholder 
groups concerning the causes of, and possible solutions to, the economic, social, 
political and environmental problems facing the Niger Delta region. 
 
2. Although these narratives would normally be expected to fully coincide with the 
narratives of actors representing the relevant groups, interviews with individuals from 
each group have shown that their everyday narratives are far more heterogeneous. Of 
the forty two interviewees, at least half adopted the local, government, multilateral and 
non-governmental narratives. Although some actors adopted just one narrative, three 
actors adopted six of the seven. 
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3. This provides support for the Network Communication Framework, which 
predicts that when actors are members of a variety of networks, communication within 
and between these networks will influence their discourses and narratives more than 
was inititally thought. 
 
4. Indeed, further questioning suggested that if an actor has at least 45% of 
immediate partners, or alters, from a group in their personal, or ego network they tend 
to adopt the narrative corresponding to that group. 
 
5. These findings shed valuable new light on the influence of multiple actors on 
environmental management in the Niger Delta. The next chapter takes this further by 
analyzing the communication of institutions within and between networks and the 
impact this has on institutional change. 
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CHAPTER 8   
INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS IN THE NIGER DELTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
The role of institutions, or repeated practices (Crawford and Ostrom, 2005), in ensuring 
sustainable environmental management and sustainable livelihoods in Africa is 
receiving wide attention (Markelova and Swallow, 2008; Massuanganhe, 2008; Koku 
and Gustafsson, 2003). Existing state institutions are believed to have been rendered 
ineffective and ambiguous by compromised parliaments, traditional leaders and police 
(Collier and Gunning, 1999; Poteete, 2009), and traditional indigenous institutions are 
not recognized by the state. This has led to claims by policy makers, non-governmental 
organizations, professionals and others that Africa needs "strong institutions" (Roe and 
Nelson, 2009; Obama, 2009). In recent years there has also been increasing concern 
about so-called "illegal logging" which is in breach of state institutions (Alemagi and 
Kozak, 2010; Hansen and Treue, 2008). Yet such views ignore how actual institutions 
originate, and make many assumptions about the potential to modify state institutions, 
and about the exclusiveness of state institutions even within governments. 
 
The view taken in this chapter is that it is necessary to transcend such assumptions and 
to look instead at the institutions that actually exist in Africa. This can reveal the 
presence of complex sets of institutions, including quite stable hybrid institutions that 
are formed by interactions between different types of institutions. This chapter explores 
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institutional interactions of this kind that are apparent in the management of the Niger 
Delta wetlands. Using the Network Communication Framework described in Chapter 3, 
which integrates institutional change through design and evolution, as called for by 
Kingston and Caballero (2009), it explains how these interactions emerge and help to 
coordinate resource use among actors with diverse interests, prevent conflicts, and 
promote synergies between state and traditional institutions.  
 
The Niger Delta of Nigeria has become an archetypal case of what Buhaug and Gates 
(2002)   have called a “zone of conflict”, and its wetlands, which have been called “one 
of the most endangered ecosystems in the world” (Nigerian Conservation Foundation, 
2006), pose very sharply the crisis of rule and legitimacy in environmental 
management. Conflict centres on the long struggle between the institutions of local 
communities, on the one hand, and those of the Nigerian state and oil multinationals, on 
the other, with actors such as multilateral and non-governmental organizations serving 
as intermediaries. The institutions of these actors are, however, multi-faceted and 
complex because they share diverse interrelated and sometimes opposing narratives (see 
Chapter 7). It is no exaggeration to say that institutional interactions within the Niger 
Delta strike to the very heart of the management of the wetlands. Yet while state and 
traditional unidirectional non-adaptive institutions are well documented, the genesis and 
mechanisms of multidirectional adaptive institutions, which bring some semblance of 
stability and are analysed in this chapter, remain undocumented and not well 
understood. 
 
8.2  Institutions Affecting the Management of Niger Delta Wetlands 
 
8.2.1  Fourfold Framework 
 
The Network Communication Framework (NCF) described in Chapter 3 follows 
Richards (1996) in recognizing that in African societies the chains of command of 
government ministries, stretching from national scale to local scale and composed of 
modern formal state institutions, can be complemented by chains of traditional 
(indigenous) institutions that also stretch from national to local scales. Traditional 
institutions may be found in the practices of employees in state organizations, neo-
patrimonial networks serving the Head of State and other indigenous networks, and in 
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the practices of staff of domestic or foreign commercial bodies whose chains of 
command are populated by formal institutions too.  
 
 
Figure 8.1. Mechanisms of Institutional Formation based on the Network 
Communication Framework. 
 
The NCF allows modern state institutions and traditional institutions reproduced in 
networks to interact with and influence one another. This can occur horizontally, e.g. 
between networks, and vertically, e.g. when formal institutions transmitted from 
national scale encounter indigenous institutions at lower scales. Communication 
between networks has four dimensions: direction, autonomy, adaptation and reach.  
 
Classifying institutional outcomes using axes of (a) scalar reach and (b) direction and 
adaptation highlights four main categories of institutional outcomes (Fig. 8.1): 
 
1. Unidirectional and non-adaptive state institutions with high scalar reach. This is 
the ideal in which modern state policies are perfectly implemented (Fig. 8.1d). 
 
2. Unidirectional and non-adaptive institutions in which the modern state network 
has poor to moderate scalar reach (Fig. 8.1c). This describes real situations in which 
A. Multidirectional and 
adaptive  outcome in which 
modern state network has 
poor scalar reach. Traditional 
networks evolve own 
institutions.  
B. Multidirectional and adaptive  
outcome in which modern state 
has moderate scalar reach. State 
and non state vary institutions 
for mutual benefits. 
 
C. Unidirectional and non-
adaptive  outcome in which a 
modern state has poor to 
moderate scalar reach. 
Traditional institutions resist 
state institutions. 
D. Unidirectional and non -
adaptive  outcome in which 
modern state has high scalar 
reach.  
 
Direction/Adaptation   
Scalar Reach  
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policies of the modern state are poorly implemented. Traditional institutions resist state 
instititutions , and if they have high scalar reach themselves they can form a 'shadow 
state' that dominates institutions of the modern state, even if it has moderate scalar 
reach. 
 
3. Multidirectional and adaptive institutions in which the modern state network has 
poor scalar reach. Traditional networks evolve their own institutions to fill the vacuum 
(Fig. 8.1a). 
 
4. Multidirectional and adaptive institutions in which the modern state network has 
moderate scalar reach. Hybrids of state and non-state institutions evolve for mutual 
benefits (Fig. 8.1b). 
 
While the third category has been highlighted and documented by Ostrom (1990, 2005), 
in numerous studies of the emergence of institutions for managing common pool 
resources, the fourth category has until now remained unnoticed. It is relevant to the 
phenomenon of "illegal logging" (Alemagi and Kozak, 2010)  because it refers to actual 
rules in use that transcend the dichotomy between "legal" and "illegal" actions since 
government actors are involved in their formation. The rest of this section outlines the 
two well-known types of unidirectional non-adaptive institutions, and then discusses in 
more detail the two types of multidirectional institutions. 
 
8.2.2  Unidirectional Non-Adaptive State Institutions 
 
Unidirectional non-adaptive state institutions for managing the Niger Delta wetlands are 
easier to identify because they are better documented (Table 8.1). Some date back to the 
colonial era but are still in force today. Chapter 4 contains detailed information about 
specific aspects of these state institutions.  
 
The first law to regulate the sale and management of timber concessions was enacted in 
1901, after a Department of Woods and Forests for the Colony and Protectorate of 
Lagos was established in 1897 (Okali and Eyog-Matig, 2004). The law controlled the 
exploitation of timbers such as African mahogany (Khaya anthotheca) which is 
abundant in the Niger Delta.  
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The first national Forest Ordinance, and the foundation for nature conservation laws in 
contemporary Nigeria, was not enacted until 1916, after the northern and southern 
protectorates were amalgamated to form the Nigerian state in 1914. Under the Forest 
Ordinance, forest reserves could be established by central government and delegated to 
local authorities for management. The Wild Animals Preservation Act also came into 
force in 1916 to protect indigenous wildlife (Anadu, 1987). Further conservation related 
statutes were introduced throughout the colonial era (Ebeku, 2004).  
 
After Nigeria gained independence in 1960, most nature conservation laws followed 
colonial practices in focusing on forestry and wildlife conservation. Consequently, the 
provisions of the Forest Ordinance were maintained, supplemented by new regulations 
and amendments as necessary (Table 8.1). The most important new land legislation was 
the Land Use Act of 1978, which nationalized all land, vested its management in state 
governments, and allowed occupancy to be revoked if land was required for mining or 
oil extraction and processing.  
 
Since 1960, a number of laws to regulate the oil industry have been enacted which, if 
properly implemented, could protect wetlands in the Niger Delta today. For example, 
the Petroleum Act of 1969 contained rules for safe drilling, storage and handling of 
mineral oils, stipulated that storage tanks should be constructed to contain leakages, and 
regulated the discharge of noxious gases from tanks. The Oil Pipelines Act of 1965 
aimed to prevent pollution of land and water crossed by oil pipelines. The Oil in 
Navigable Waters Regulations of 1968 aimed to prevent the discharge of crude oil into 
territorial or navigable waters. The Petroleum Refining Regulations of 1974 regulated 
construction of oil storage tanks to minimize damage resulting from leakage. The 
Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage Act) of 1975 made it illegal to 
sabotage the distribution of petroleum products. The Associated Gas Reinjection Act of 
1979 outlawed gas flares. 
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Table 8.1. Nigerian Legislation Containing State Institutions Relevant to Wetlands 
Management. 
 
Date Title  
 
Colonial Period 
 
1916 Forestry Ordinance     
1916 Wild Animals Preservation Act 
1943 Forestry (Southern Provinces Native Authorities) Rules   
1951 Forestry (Northern Provinces Native Authorities) Rules   
1955 Forestry (Northern Region Native Authorities) Rules   
1955 Eastern Region Forest Law   
1956 Forestry Regulations Eastern Region   
 
Post-Independence Period 
 
1960 Forestry Ordinance with Amendments  
1963 Northern Nigeria Wild Animals Law   
1965 Eastern Nigerian Wild Animals Law   
1969 Western State Forestry (amendment) Edict   
1969 Petroleum Act   
1967 Petroleum Regulation   
1965 Oil Pipelines Act   
1968 Oil in Navigable Waters Regulations   
1974 Petroleum Refining Regulations   
1975 Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage Act)   
1978 Land Use Act   
1979 Associated Gas Reinjection Act  
1985 Navigable Waterways Declaration Act  
1986 River Basin Development Authority Act 
1988 Petroleum Regulation Act 
1988 Harmful Waste Act 
1988 Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act 
1990 Endangered Species Act 
1992 Environmental Impact Assessment Decree 
1992 Inland Fisheries Decree 
1993 Water Resource Decree 
1997 National Inland Waterways Act 
1999 National Park Service Decree 
2000 Niger Delta Development Commission Act 
2003 Coast and Inland Shipping Act 
2004 National Environmental Standard and Regulation Enforcement Agency Act 
2006 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency Act 
2007 Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 
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Since 1980 these laws have been joined by sixteen other major pieces of legislation that 
affect wetland management, including a 1988 law that established a Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (Table 8.1). So Nigeria is certainly not lacking in 
formal state institutions for sustainable wetland management, but the difficulty lies in 
enforcing these. 
 
Following the return to democratic rule in 1999, only a few of the 36 states and 774 
local governments have enacted their own laws on conserving natural resources. Most 
generally follow federal laws, e.g. according to the Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency Act of 1988 each state was expected to set up its own environmental protection 
body for the protection and improvement of the environment. In Cross River State, one 
of the states in the Niger Delta, the government has set up a task force on deforestation 
and enacted a law on forest management through timber bans. No state legislation or 
policy specifically addresses wetlands as a unique ecosystem, but instead they are 
treated as forests and therefore subject to forest laws.  
 
Since 1980 the Nigerian government has signed and ratified several international 
conventions relating to wetlands, most notably the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance (2001), but also the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1974); the Convention for Co-operation 
in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West 
and Central African Region (1981); the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals (1987); and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
(1994) together with its Cartagena Protocol on Bio-Safety (2000). Yet no extra 
legislation has been passed to facilitate implementation of commitments to any of these 
conventions. The National Wetland Policy is the most direct consequence but has been 
in draft form since 2001. 
 
8.2.3  Unidirectional Non-Adaptive Traditional Institutions 
 
Local communities in the Niger Delta managed the wetlands long before formal 
institutions were introduced (Alagoa, 1971; Anwana et al., 2010; Ogon, 2006). Their 
traditional institutions still continue, but are difficult to identify as they are poorly 
documented. 
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Traditional political institutions that govern ownership of land in the Niger Delta are 
associated with autonomous kingdoms or clans. Within each kingdom there are about 
seven communities, each further divided into about eight compounds. Each compound is 
made up of up to fifty families, each of which in turn could actually comprise seven 
nuclear families.  
 
The highest political authority in the community is the council of chiefs, with 
representatives elected from each compound. They are supported by the community 
development council and the youth association. The council of chiefs is presided over 
by the Amanyanabo (King or paramount ruler), who has authority over the kingdom and 
is deferred to on all political and resource use issues.  
 
Lands and fishing grounds are collectively owned and administered by this tightly knit 
political structure. Access to and use of resources owned by compounds and families 
are generally open to members of that group. Non-members need the permission of the 
compound or family (represented by the compound or family head) to access and use 
the resource. All authority on the ownership of lands, fishing grounds and other 
resources is vested in the Amanyanabo. Within the village, the authority of compounds 
over members is strong and rights over compound resources are secured against the 
rival claims of neighbouring communities by the clan. These traditional political 
institutions mirror the pre-colonial institutions in the Niger Delta (Alagoa, 1971).  
 
Other institutions, driven by traditional religious motives, regulate traditional reserves 
and harvesting periods in the wetlands. Religious ideas underlying these institutions 
bind the kingdoms together, since they refer to the combined spiritual well-being of the 
entire region. These institutions are presided over by Inkiye (priest or traditional 
spiritual leader), who decides the times of periodic festivals; when fishing grounds are 
opened and closed to fishing; restrictions on fishing and logging in sacred lakes and 
forests, respectively; and farming types and seasons. Ideally, in the Niger Delta 
permission to harvest any resource should be sought from the priests as well as from 
political leaders. There are grievous consequences for breaking these rules, which 
include sickness and even death. Another type of traditional religious institution 
prohibits the killing and eating of some wetland fauna, especially crocodiles which, 
according to a local hunter, never harm local people. Traditional institutions in the Delta 
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consider the crocodile a sacred animal which must be protected.  The hunter tells of 
elders saluting the crocodile as Oh-dau (father).  
 
A third category of traditional institutions governs relations between individuals using 
the wetlands. Thus, trade in wetland ecosystem services is governed by the institution of 
oath taking. All individuals, including migrant traders in the kingdom, are required to 
take an oath to cement trade agreements.  
 
8.2.4  Multidirectional Adaptive Endogenous Institutions Where the State has Poor 
Scalar Reach    
 
8.2.4.1  Origins 
 
Multidirectional adaptive institutions emerge endogenously as 'rules in use' in response 
to the lack of effective exogenous institutions at a particular scale. In the Niger Delta 
they govern land ownership and access to wetland resources. Under traditional 
institutions resources cannot be sold to individuals or companies since they are 
communal properties, so state agencies must approach local communities to seek 
permission whenever they require communal lands. However, communities often 
refused access to lands, even when it was not some of the choicest, and this prompted 
the introduction of formal institutions, such as the Land Use Act 1978. Consequently, 
the two sets of institutions were at odds, and this often led to conflicts. Local 
communities maintained their pre-colonial societal organization whereby ownership of 
farm lands, fishing ponds etc is vested in compounds and not individuals, while the 
government used the Land Use Act 1978 to forcibly displace local communities and 
assign the land to oil companies instead. 
 
In response to these conflicts, and the inability of the state to enforce its institutions, 
previous institutions have been transformed into a set of informal networked rules 
rooted in the exchange of mutual influences, intermediaries and entanglements of power 
between actors. Thus, new institutions governing the sale of wetland plots emerged as a 
result of interplay between willing local sellers and willing buyers who buy land from 
locals instead of relying on forceful acquisition backed by the state. Access to and 
transfer of ownership of land and other resources now takes place outside the influence 
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of local community and government institutions. For oil companies this includes lands 
needed for oil exploration and exploitation, pipelines, staff housing estates, and 
transportation infrastructure. Other groups acquire wetland plots to harvest timber, catch 
fish or reclaim wetland to construct roads and other infrastructure.  
 
This prevalence of this type of institution was especially highlighted by respondents in 
Oporoma, where the sacred Boupere Lake was sold by the community leadership to an 
oil company. This is corroborated by a recent report which indicated that a community 
leader in the Niger Delta sold a sacred site (cemetery) to senior officers in the State 
Security Service, Army, Navy and Police (Agbakwuru, 2012).  
 
8.2.4.2  Mechanisms 
 
Under the new institutions, private entities requiring land are expected to apply to 
communal owners, i.e. to the clan through the King, or the compound head if the land is 
family land. Alternatively, actors may approach the clan through intermediaries, such as 
a politician, businessman, chief or even the paramount leader. This process is usually 
more effective than following traditional and state institutions, e.g. the land in question 
may even include sacred sites in the wetlands that should be protected by traditional 
institutions and state laws. Some land might not have been released without such 
informal exchanges.  
 
The application is considered by members and conditions are imposed as necessary, e.g. 
loggers are often not permitted to cut some economic tree crops. So when land was sold 
by the Oporoma community to the Nigerian AGIP Oil Company Limited (the operator 
of a joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation), AGIP was warned 
of the consequences of violating the Boupere Lake.  
 
Narratives used in the open in the presence of members of the clan mostly suggested 
that the land would be put to a use that would benefit local economic development 
needs, e.g. health centres and schools, employment for local youths, and monetary 
compensation to the community. Any possible negative impacts were downplayed. The 
comment of an elderly woman in Oporoma as to why she supported acquisition of land 
by the Nigerian AGIP Oil Company Limited clearly illustrates this: 
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“When they came, they said they will give us development, they gave us a 
generator for the community [the community had not had electricity since 
1975], but they did not say that they will destroy Boupere. I am beginning to 
see clearly their plot to destroy our culture and wipe us out to deprive us of 
our land. They were not honest enough to tell us that this would happen”.  
 
Similar institutions can emerge when non-governmental or governmental actors need 
land in the wetlands. This process is often mediated by non-governmental actors who 
are trusted by local communities and help them to develop their ‘community 
development action plans’, often under contract to corporate actors. For example, the 
New Nigeria Foundation (a non-profit, non-governmental organization) facilitated 
negotiation of a Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) between Chevron 
Nigeria Limited (CNL), communities in the Niger Delta and state governments. The 
outcome of the negotiation became a preferred template for CNL’s negotiations with 
other community councils of chiefs (New Nigeria Foundation, 2009).  
 
8.2.4.3  Exchanges of Materials 
 
To cement these agreements, adequate compensation is paid. It is reported that oil 
companies pay up to N25,000,000 ($166,000) for land (land to build supporting 
infrastructure) and loggers pay up to N30,000 ($150) to gain access to log for wood., 
depending on negotiations.  
 
The fate of these informal payments to communities through their leaders is often 
difficult to trace. While some community members said they have benefited from such 
payments in the past, others claimed they have not. In most cases the money is not 
accounted for. It is believed that the amount that oil companies pay to communities is 
far higher than the formal fees they would have paid to the government had they 
followed formal institutions. 
 
By providing clans with such developmental projects in exchange for their support to 
acquire communal lands, clans become enrolled in the oil company's network. In 
response to the question on how AGIP gained access to land in one of the communities, 
a community leader shook his head in sign of pity and said “we were deceived”.  He 
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indicated that they were invited to the AGIP offices through officials from other groups 
who served as intermediaries and informed the community that the company had made 
arrangements to transform the community and make it the pride of the whole Niger 
Delta if they gave AGIP the land. He suggested they kept good and constant contact 
with the company until the lake was polluted. This attests to the fact that some 
government officials, as well as officials from other actor categories, served as conduits 
between local communities and corporate actors. The statement above suggests that this 
may occur unconsciously (Table 8.2). 
 
Table 8.2. Interview With Community Leader in Oporoma on Boupere Lake. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gaining access to the wetland often involves exchanges with key individuals in the clan, 
such as paramount leaders (Table 8.3). Thus, according to a local youth who said he did 
not support the sale of the land adjacent to the Boupere Lake in Oporoma:  
 
 
Researcher: So … what happened? 
 
Response: When they (AGIP) first approached us for the land, we were not 
interested. We were concerned that their activity was too big and not good for our 
environment. Some people also reminded us that we had the lake close by the land 
they wanted to acquire.  
 
Researcher: Okay 
 
Response: But when they came back again, this time, they came with different 
people telling us the potential of their project and what the community stands to 
benefit. 
 
Researcher: Who are the people they came with? 
 
Response: They helped us with generator and also built a road for us ……. 
 
Researcher: That is good, but who are the people they came with? 
 
Response: I don’t know them, but I think they are from government and different 
places (suggesting non-governmental organizations). 
 
Researcher: Okay, they came with them to the community? 
 
Response: Yes, the first time those from government invited us to their office 
(AGIP) ….. In the end, we agreed for them to have the land, but we gave them 
conditions, most of which they have broken. 
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Table 8.3. Interview With a Local Youth in Oporoma about Boupere Lake. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: What has been the response of leaders of your community to this 
pollution (Boupere)? 
 
Response: There are people who are now playing a double game. I will say they trying 
to favour themselves. The categories involved are all these politicians; the community 
leaders and government as well, because they know the truth. Some of them are 
professionals already, they come to the site and at the end of the day, they cover up 
their report in favour of the oil company, the government, or the avoidance of 
problems. These people cover up some of these issues.  
 
Researcher: You mean members of your community that are in positions of authority? 
 
Response: That is why I said the issue is relating to the politicians who are the leaders, 
then the community leaders as well as the companies. These are people who have 
agents to gain from the oil production, and want to ensure that there are people who 
protect their interests. That is why I am saying the oil companies improvise the divide 
and rule tactics, where some people are favoured and some people are antagonized, so 
this group of people cuts across the political class, the community leaders as well as 
the oil company. So it is a kind of collaboration.  
 
Researcher: That means you may not re-elect them again? 
 
Response: They are not chosen, they are self-made. They just projected themselves as 
concerned citizens or they are the people protecting the interest of the community. 
That is how they project themselves and get known by the SPDC or other oil 
companies as well as politicians.  
 
Researcher: But why won’t the other community members act? 
 
Response: All the other farmers are always silent because they are busy at their farm 
site, working either in the river fishing or in the farm, so they are not always contacted. 
So these people often project themselves as the real farmers and at the end of the day 
they betray the community. They even have agents in the community council of chiefs 
and youth organization, they even sponsor some of these leaders. The SPDC sponsors 
some community leaders, the youth president, CDC chairman and even the council of 
chiefs, and at the end of the day when these people are at the helms of affairs they 
cover up some of these sensitive issues. These are the areas we trying to address. It is a 
kind of tripartite arrangement involving all these different sections. 
 
Researcher: So why do they do this? do they exchange things, like …? 
 
Response: Yes things are exchanged for either personal benefit, or the interests of the 
group or SPDC, because maybe the international laws that requires them to carry out 
cleanups or remediation. They are trying to avoid the cost, they use local groups to 
protect their interests and they cover up and spill sites remain. And during the flood 
season, the flood is spreading the oil to other areas, destroying the ecosystem both 
plant and marine ecology. That is why I am saying it is tripartite. I cannot mention 
names but they themselves they know themselves. This is what is happening and 
making the wetland degraded, we want the wetland area to be well preserved. 
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“It was obvious from the onset that all they wanted was our oil, I knew 
nothing good was going to come out of the agreement with AGIP. I am sure 
that they paid the council members a N5 million ($33,000) bribe".  
 
Such payments, which are not recognized by existing institutions, include monetary 
payments, gifts of cars and houses, the renovation of palaces, holidays abroad for family 
members etc. Once the support is secured of a key member of the community - often 
someone who is highly educated and has political capital within the clan - it becomes 
easier to gain the support of the whole clan.  
 
Continuous interactions between representatives of the interested party and the 
community are essential, to take care of any challenges that may arise during 
community consultations. For instance, in some cases, the land required may belong to 
a family, whose consent will be needed. During these interactions, materials will 
continue to be exchanged, either as payments or narratives to placate any section of the 
community that might be unhappy with the land request. The poor living standard of 
local actors often encourages them to put personal profit over other considerations. 
Some of these exchanges fuel conflicts in the communities, as claimed by an 
independent report commissioned by Shell, in which it was stated that Shell “feeds 
conflict by the way it awards contracts, gains access to land, and deals with community 
representatives" (Shell Petroleum Development Company, 2003).  
 
8.2.4.4  Enforcement 
 
If sections of the community, or individuals, decide not to take payment and oppose the 
sale of the land, pressure will be put on them by the leaders of the community. If they 
still refuse, the Land Use Act may be invoked, and they will not get any compensation. 
They may even be subject to litigation. For example, a local hunter-cum-farmer refused 
to release his land to a government agency for the construction of infrastructure, even 
though the request was supported by community leaders. He claimed that overnight 
“some unknown persons wilfully destroyed and burnt my land and properties”. He 
believed that the culprits were backed by the traditional ruler who had initially pleaded 
with him to release the land, indicating that the government agency would employ him 
afterwards. After complaining to the chief he was arrested by police and on his return 
was informed that his land had been acquired under the Land Use Act 1978.  
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Government officials who are incorruptible and want to follow the formal institution 
may experience similar treatment. For example, a government actor mentioned the case 
of an official stationed in the field who reported the illegal activities of a community 
leader to his superior. The commissioner (the head of a state ministry) said that he “will 
personally handle it”. A few days later the commissioner telephoned, said that he had 
spoken to the community leader and advised the official to “just leave him (the 
community leader) alone”. He asked rhetorically: “Do you think tomorrow that boy (the 
official in the field) will go there again or will he come and report again? If they give 
him something, he will just collect his own share and keep quiet”. When asked to 
explain why government actors might become entangled in extra-legal exchanges that 
subvert state institutions, the official suggested that maybe the commissioner had 
received “instructions from above” and did not want to lose his job. This suggests the 
influence which traditional institutions have through the chain of command of the state 
network.   
 
If a private actor acquires land outside these arrangements, and chooses to follow formal 
state institutions, they could also face sanctions, including frequent confrontations with 
the communities, destruction of property and disruption of activities. This might explain 
why some communities can behave confrontationally to one oil company operating in 
their area and yet be friendly to another. 
 
8.2.4.5  Institutionalization 
 
An endogenously evolved institution provides an avenue for frequent monitoring of 
compliance that is central to its functioning and perceptions of its legitimacy. By 
institutionalizing the norm of discretionary rights as informal obligations, the institution 
appears to practitioners to be a legitimate protocol for gaining access to wetland. As it 
does not appear unethical to the actors who collude to subvert pre-existing institutions, 
it further stabilizes the system. When asked why corporate actors go through local 
people, and not the state as enshrined in the law, two corporate informants pointed to 
the bureaucratic nature of government activities and the fact that government 
organizations also follow the same approach.  
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After corporate actors, such as oil companies, paid off clans, their leaders and youth 
groups, others soon followed suit. So throughout the 1990s there were frequent 
instances of youth gangs extorting payments from oil companies in exchange for 
uninterrupted activities in communities (Oruwari, 2006). This has now become the 
norm throughout the Niger Delta. 
 
With the constant expansion of activities in the Niger Delta and high demand for 
wetland plots, such practices have become repetitive and thereby institutionalized. This 
leads to the building of trust in the institution and the clan that makes it easier to acquire 
more land from the same clan or from another clan. Corporate actors are willing to pay 
more than they would if they followed the formal institution since it reduces their 
transaction cost (e.g. by avoiding public protests) and ensures they gain access to the 
land needed.  
 
8.2.4.6  Benefits 
 
Local communities enjoy some developmental benefits from the new endogenously 
evolved institutions, while the operations of corporate actors are not disturbed by these 
communities. Owning land gives local people a sense of identity and membership in 
social groups, while selling land gives them a sense of fulfilment and participation in 
the process of exploration and exploitation of oil. This is evident in the words of a 
fisherman who represents his family in the local community development council: 
 
“We were compelled by the actions of the government who deal with us 
mercilessly if we refuse to release the land. They continuously harass us 
with the army so we have no choice. At least if we sell to them we can get 
some money to develop the community and get them to make promises to 
us. Though all the good words and all their promises are soon broken” 
(Resident of Zarama Community). 
 
Communities of oil bearing areas in the Niger Delta still feel dispossessed of their local 
resources by the Land Use Act 1978 and have been able to introduce these institutions 
to get some benefit from their own land. Their discontent is apparent in the Kaiama 
Declaration of December 1998 which declared that:   
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“We, the youths of Ijawland, hereby make the following resolutions to be 
known as the Kaiama Declaration: 1. All land and natural resources 
(including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw 
communities and are the basis of our survival. 2. We cease to recognize all 
undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of the right to 
ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted 
without our participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree 
and The Petroleum Decree etc.”(Ijaw Youths of the Niger Delta, 1998) 
 
There is evidence that communities whose lands have been acquired in this manner are 
more peaceful than communities whose land was acquired through the imposition of the 
formal legislation of the Land Use Act 1978. Of all the major conflicts in the Niger 
Delta, majority are in communities where land has been acquired through formal state 
institutions. Despite the desecration of the sacred Boupere Lake, the community still 
maintains a semblance of peace with AGIP. Moreover, as these institutions take root in 
society, they may reduce inter- and intra-organizational tensions that often pervade 
governmental agencies in Nigeria. As the institutions require interactions between 
multiple actors, they are also not undermined by duplication and overlap between 
jurisdictions that characterizes state organizations. 
 
8.2.4.7  Evolution of Institutions of Resistance 
 
Local communities employ democratic institutions to protest about their inequitable 
treatment, but these institutions have also been supplemented by institutions evolved by 
local youths. 
 
Local communities seek legitimacy for their discourse through the same kind of 
campaigning strategies found in Europe. This involves forming various organizations, 
such as MOSOP, writing letters to politicians, and issuing communiqués of meetings to 
governments and media houses. These communications are picked up by the media, 
disseminated and discussed locally and internationally.  
 
However, a confrontational dimension was introduced by youths in the year 2000, and 
has resulted in the institutionalization of resistance (otherwise known as militancy) as a 
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means of protest and of governing access to resources in the Niger Delta. This is treated 
here as an important evolved endogenous institution in its own right. 
 
Youth violence became pronounced after the 2003 state and federal elections when 
politicians seeking re-election were unable to adequately compensate the youths whom 
they had recruited, armed and used as political thugs. These youths then became free 
agents, letting themselves loose on the oil fields. In contrast to the texts of the 
democratic campaign groups, messages from youths include threats.  Thus, a popular 
Niger Delta youth leader, Alhaji Mujahideen Asari-Dokubo said in 2004 that he has 
10,000 men ready to reclaim the resources of the Niger Delta for its people (Wiwa, 
2006). He also suggested that local people have the right to engage in “illegal oil 
production” 
 
"The people who own the oil have a right to take the oil which has been 
stolen from them by a small clique in Abuja for the advancement and 
betterment of that clique that siphons this money to foreign bank accounts in 
Europe and the United States and the Caribbean ……..The oil belongs to us. 
We're not stealing it. It is the Nigerian state stealing our oil from us" 
(Dokubo, 2004).  
 
Local youths now demand financial payments to allow oil companies to explore for and 
extract oil and gas without interruption. While the traditional authorities provide access 
to lands, these youths ensure uninterrupted activities in the wetlands, and also enjoy 
widespread support among local people. Failure to be consulted and compensated can 
result in kidnapping and other criminal acts targeted against the oil companies. Indeed, 
oil companies do not just pay negotiated prices for uninterrupted activities, they also use 
youths as security guards, and as their voices within local communities. Consequently, 
youths are often provided with arms and ammunitions to confront any rival group that 
may wish to threaten oil and gas exploration activities in the Delta. Even state 
governments comply with this institution. For example, in a recent television broadcast, 
the governor of Rivers State (the largest state in the Niger Delta region) revealed that he 
has paid youths  large sums of money from the state coffers to keep the state peaceful 
(Amaechi, 2010). There is also evidence to link the youths to local politicians and 
traditional rulers. 
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8.2.5  Multidirectional Adaptive Exogenous Institutions When the State has Moderate 
Scalar Reach  
 
8.2.5.1  Origins 
 
Multidirectional adaptive exogenous institutions originate outside the Niger Delta but 
subsequently evolve through interplay between modern state institutions with moderate 
scalar reach and non-state (traditional) institutions.  Logging, oil and gas exploration, 
infrastructure development and other activities in the wetlands are subject to laws 
outlined in Section 7.2.2 that should be enforced by government agencies. Institutions in 
these laws should govern how people use the wetlands, and acceptable relationships 
between individual actors. Yet, over the years these institutions have been transformed 
through continual interactions between actors, generating a system in which formal and 
informal institutions are intertwined as rules in use, made possible by communication 
between relevant networks. Under these rules, users of the wetlands often engage in 
activities prohibited by existing formal state and traditional regimes for mutual benefits. 
Thus, loggers might harvest more than the number of trees specified in the forestry 
laws, or fell restricted species and sell traditional sacred sites. Oil companies flare gas, 
dump industrial waste and spill oil in the environment. This subverts existing laws and 
enables actors to benefit economically to a level that would not have been possible 
otherwise.  
 
8.2.5.2  Mechanisms 
 
In multidirectional adaptive communication actors follow some aspects of state 
institutions and vary other aspects for the mutual benefit of actors in the modern state 
and non-state networks. Thus, a state official may enforce a state institution and expect 
a non-state actor (e.g. a logger) to indicate their desire to engage in this form of 
institution. This is facilitated by the state officials’ overbearing enforcement of state 
institutions even beyond the provisions of the law. For instance, a state official may 
destroy illegally logged trees even though they are not permitted to do so under the law. 
In other instances the official can interprete and enforce the law in a manner that makes 
even legitimate activity look illegal. One informant said that: 
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“I cooperate with them [forest official]. If not I am not able to feed my 
family …. As for the police if we don’t cooperate they will accuse us of 
overloading our lorry even when it is not overloaded. They use this as an 
excuse to detain us”.  
 
The state official will also emphasize the power he wields and the potential impact on 
the livelihood of the logger should he bring the full weight of his power to enforce the 
modern state institution. The comment of another informant illustrates this: 
 
“They have the authority to arrest us ….. This is what they are employed to 
do ….. They also know things are difficult and we cannot survive without 
logging”.  
  
A show of interest does not necessarily set the institution in motion. The state official 
may behave as though he/she is not interested or even prove difficult. As detailed by an 
informant who narrated his first experience with an official of the state..  
 
“He [state official] said he will speak to his boss on my behalf  …… after 
about a week he told me  I was lucky and that his boss has agreed for my 
name to be added to the list” 
 
There is no suggestion that he actually seeks the permission of his superior before 
enlisting any new member. All that is necessary is to make the logger aware of aspects 
of state law that need to be kept. For instance, most loggers are aware that despite 
varying of state institutions they are not under any circumstance allowed to burn forest 
as this may have detrimental effects given that oil is extracted nearby.  The same 
informant also indicated that during the one week period he had to wait, he was allowed 
to conduct his activity with some restriction. He believed that during this period, the 
official was trying to learn more about him.  
 
The official makes it a point of duty to inform the loggers that what they are paying is 
not for him, but that a part will go into state coffers as a payment for logging permits 
while another part will go to his superior in the office. Such explanation may in the long 
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run make some of the loggers feel the official is not really getting much and may even 
increase or provide occasional increase.  
 
Once both parties agree to work for mutual benefits by varying state institutions, 
institutionalization of this practice is made easy. The first time an actor participates in 
this institution is probably the single most important step in the institutionalization 
process.  
 
Although the institutional mechanism is illustrated here in relation to "illegal logging", 
similar mechanisms also emerge when state officials are expected to enforce pollution 
laws on oil companies. The only difference might be that in the case of oil the 
mechanism may be facilitated from a higher scale of the state network than for illegal 
logging. Such institutions make it easier for oil companies responsible for pollution to 
dodge their responsibility, by allowing them to vary institutions e.g. by paying minimal 
compensation to communities affected by oil spills while ignoring remediation. 
 
8.2.5.3  Exchange of Materials  
 
The adaptation of prevailing institutions is facilitated by the exchange of materials 
between actors. Such exchanges, which are also not permitted by law, may involve not 
only junior field officials, but also senior officials who should enforce laws. An 
interview with a logger informant revealed that all loggers (legal and illegal) in and 
around the wetland make monthly monetary contributions which are delivered to senior 
officers at the Forestry Department. This is in addition to money they need to pay to 
junior field staff every time they transport their produce from the wetland to the market. 
He also suggested that highly placed loggers pay senior officials directly.  
 
Junior field staff are expected to make returns to senior officers in order to keep their 
jobs in the field. Failure to make such returns may result in them being replaced and 
sent back to work in offices where they will not get such benefits. Senior staff also 
compensate field staff with continued postings to the field and also gifts.  
 
By making these payments loggers are able to cut down unlimited numbers of trees, 
including those of restricted species, and are not compelled to replant trees either. A 
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senior forestry official argued that money paid by the loggers is the official permit fee 
and is always remitted to the government coffers: “I’m not aware that they pay money 
to our officials; the money they pay goes to the government coffers and is receipted; it 
is official government revenue”. However, another official acknowledged that these 
exchanges do take place: “In some cases our officers on patrol resort to collecting 
money from loggers in the full glare of all to see.” He also said some staff threatened 
loggers with the connivance of police officers who use guns when enforcing laws. 
 
It was not possible during this study to trace the fate of these payments, but it is 
believed that most end up with officials, since three logger informants suggest that 
payments they make are not receipted. Apart from payments to forestry staff, it was 
learned that loggers pay between N10,000 ($66) to N12,000 ($80) per month to security 
officers (police and army) who patrol roads to prevent illegal activity. Vehicles 
conveying logs are allowed to pass through security check points without being checked 
if security officers are on board. The officers concerned will also share some of the 
money with their colleagues.  
 
Actors have found these exchanges increasingly useful for facilitating their activities in 
the wetland. One logger informant, describing his first experience in these exchanges, 
told how it is now a rule to him: 
 
“We fought (referring to a confrontation between him and a government 
official) and argued till he destroyed all of my wood (despite having his 
permit and complying with the formal institution); it was after he spoiled 
some of my wood with a hammer that one man from the village told me I 
should have given him some money. The next time when I came, even 
before he asked for my permit, I just gave him his own share (money) …..  
When he left (was transferred) I was not happy because he was already like 
my brother you know”.  
 
At some point, institutions become so widespread that they take on an air of legitimacy 
and the government is powerless to prevent such transactions. Once the foundations 
have been laid in this way they structure interactions that continue irrespective of which 
personnel are involved. The same informant mentioned that when dealing with a new 
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official: “I was careful because I do not know if he will cooperate, but I still find a way 
to give him and (he) collects”.  
 
Similar practices occur in interactions between oil companies and officials responsible 
for regulating their activities in the wetlands. Two senior government officials 
confirmed that they have good working relationships with oil companies, who recently 
sponsored them to train abroad, in what was their first trip overseas. Interestingly, one 
of these officers was accused by a representative of a non-governmental organization of 
conniving with oil companies by not reporting illegal oil spills to the government. He 
believes he is a contractor to oil companies operating in the area. Although illegal, it is 
not uncommon for a government official to also own a private company that does work 
for oil companies. It is often common knowledge that officials are awarded such 
contracts in exchange for their support.  
 
Corporate actors are happy to participate in these exchanges as they allow them to carry 
out activities that are illegal under existing laws. For example, the logger informant said 
his wood is not checked for compliance once he makes these payments, even though he 
might have cut down some restricted species, such as Abura (Mitragyna ciliata), which 
is scarce and one of the most highly priced timber species in the wetlands. 
 
Exchanges occur between groups as well as individuals. Thus, logging companies and 
oil companies may provide infrastructure and facilities for governmental organizations 
which are supposed to regulate their activities. Such practices have become so 
widespread that they are widely perceived to be legitimate.  
 
8.2.5.4  Enforcement 
 
The institution is enforced by the members of both the state and non-state networks, 
who may punish any defaulting actor. As such, there is both an internal and external 
mechanism for addressing and sanctioning violations of the institutions since all actors 
are made aware of what is and is not permissible.  
 
If a logger chooses for any reason not to comply with the tenets of this rule in use, it is 
likely that his activities in the wetland will be hindered. This was the situation with the 
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informant cited above -  his produce was destroyed because of his refusal to make the 
exchange as expected by the rule in use. His own colleagues may  also ignore him as a 
“persona non grata”. If a government official chooses not to align with this institution 
he might end up being transferred or even victimized by his superior. The loggers 
whose activity will be affected will not only by-pass him but can also make requests to 
his superiors for him to be transferred and sanctioned. It was suggested that a previous 
official was transferred as punishment:  
 
“He collected money but did not deliver everything to his boss, so they 
moved him back to the office … It was when the other one also misbehaved 
that he was brought back”.  
 
The networks not only enforce institutions, they also act to defend their members from 
victimization when they feel this is not justified.  
 
8.2.5.5  Institutionalization  
 
The systematic communications that flow between state and non-state networks soon 
gain social approval through their appeal to a large section of the society who see such 
arrangements as beneficial to both networks. While recognizing that the current practice 
does not fully match, and even violates, aspects of modern state institutions, a senior 
government official emphasized aspects of the law that is being kept and the benefit to 
the loggers: 
 
“Despite the shortage of staff we are experiencing we are able to stop them 
[loggers] from indiscriminate burning ……. If we have to fully enforce the 
law it means they cannot feed their family” 
 
With such approval across networks, the institution assumes legitimacy in society. The 
legitimacy is further enhanced by the fact that high ranking members of society, 
including politicians, state officials, judges and big businessmen, participate in these 
institutions.  Institutionalization of this practice is also entrenched by the operation of 
have its own systems of accountability and enforcement.  
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8.2.5.6  Benefits 
 
Under formal laws actors have restricted access to wetland for activities such as 
logging, and the only way loggers can gain access to satisfy their interest is to engage in 
an adaptive institutional arrangement with the government officials who are willing to 
vary state institutions. Within this arrangement aspects of the formal laws are built into 
the informal arrangements. For instance, the forest officials buy seedlings to replant and 
the loggers are not under any circumstance allowed to cut these down. This informal 
arrangement enables exchanges that are based on reciprocal relationships between 
loggers and government officials. This informal arrangement also protects some 
selected aspects of state institutions protecting the wetlands. 
 
In 2009, the effort of the Bayelsa state government to enforce the forestry law of the 
state “in order to put a stop to illegal felling of trees” led to a temporary interruption in 
the existing informal institution. Obviously, the government did not officially recognize 
an effective solution that had taken time to work out through efficient interactions 
between loggers and state officials. Activities that hinder this informal regime and 
access to forested parts of the wetland affected loggers. When these logging patterns are 
affected, the loggers are forced to use destructive means.  This was exactly what 
happened when the government posted more forestry officials to the wetlands to enforce 
the law. The loggers resorted to going into marginal forests to evade government 
officials and prosecution. To get to these sites, they set fire to a large area of the 
wetlands, something they would not have done under the multidirectional institutional 
arrangement.  
 
8.2.6  Institutions of Memoranda of Understanding  
 
Another example of adaptive exogenous institutions involves the signing of Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoU). These are agreements in which oil companies commit 
themselves to invest in social projects and programmes in communities, and host 
communities agree not to attack oil facilities and provide a peaceful operating 
environment. Ordinarily, the state is responsible for the development of the 
communities and they establish the rules of the game. However, with the MoU, the 
institution of the state is varied to enable the creation of a single central leadership 
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board - a Cluster Development Board, or CDB - whose leadership is drawn from the 
local elite and community representatives, the companies, state and local governments, 
and civil society. The agreements reached are ceremonial and their informal institutions 
are not legally binding.   
 
When these agreements are signed either freely, or as is often the case, in the heat of a 
crisis that impeded operations of oil companies (Faleti, 2009), state institutions are 
easily relaxed by officials to enable oil company activities to continue. This is the case 
where some locals are allowed to engage in oil prospecting or the state turns a blind eye 
to illegal activities in a community. To seal the agreements, companies usually part with 
some “rentier dividends” (Omeje, 2006) and other benefits (such as jobs, contracts, and 
scholarships), most of which are handed over to community leaders and other members 
of the  CDB. Thus, the MoU can easily turn into another form of rentier accumulation 
through opportunistic mechanisms. In other instances, benefits go directly to 
communities through the building of schools, health centres etc.  This can also be 
viewed as institutionalizing the corporate social responsibilities of private enterprises. 
 
8.3  Awareness of and Support for Institutions 
 
To gain a better understanding of these four categories of institutions, members of each 
actor group were asked about their awareness of, and support for, selected institutions 
from each category. Awareness means the ability of informants to spontaneously 
mention aspects of this institution. Support means that an informant believes in the main 
aspects of an institution, whether or not they adopt it or have adopted it in the past. If an 
informant was unable to spontaneously mention aspects of the institution, they were 
provided with an explanation of its main tenets. For example, a forest law was described 
as a “state law that regulates the size, quantity and type of wood that can be cut down”. 
If the informant was still unable to identify an institution, it was concluded that they 
were not aware of it and they were not asked if they supported it. The overall level of 
awareness and support for multidirectional adaptive and unidirectional non-adaptive 
institutions was calculated on the assumption that all informants in each category are 
aware of, or supported, the institutions.  
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The results show that government actors are poorly aware of unidirectional non-
adaptive traditional institutions (Table 8.4). Only 13% of government informants were 
aware of local traditional religious institutions governing use of Niger Delta wetlands, 
for example. They were more aware of institutions that had emerged through interplay 
between actors (multidirectional adaptive institutions) than those imposed without 
interplay (unidirectional non-adaptive institutions). Thus, the average awareness of 
multidirectional adaptive institutions was 93%, but awareness of unidirectional non-
adaptive institutions was only 59%. Levels of support followed a similar pattern: 61% 
of government informants’ supported multidirectional adaptive institutions but only 
40% supported unidirectional non-adaptive institutions. 
 
Non-governmental and corporate actors were more aware of all categories of 
institutions than government informants. The lowest level of awareness of non-
governmental informants was 67% for local traditional religious institutions. Their 
levels of awareness of multidirectional adaptive and unidirectional non-adaptive 
institutions were both high: 100% were aware of multidirectional adaptive institutions 
and 94% of unidirectional non-adaptive institutions. As with government informants, 
multidirectional adaptive institutions and unidirectional non-adaptive institutions 
received moderate support (54% vs 50%, respectively). Awareness among corporate 
informants resembled that of non-governmental informants: 89% were aware of 
unidirectional non-adaptive institutions and 100% of multidirectional adaptive 
institutions. Their support for unidirectional non-adaptive institutions was, at 72%, only 
slightly lower than for multidirectional adaptive institutions (75%).  
 
Local actors are the least aware of forest laws, even though these are some of the oldest 
formal laws governing wetland use. Only 37% of the local informants were aware of 
forest laws. They intuit what is in existence and what is acceptable, but most are not 
interested or bothered by the laws. Like all other actor categories, local actors were 
more knowledgeable about multidirectional adaptive institutions than unidirectional 
non-adaptive institutions and supported the former more than the latter. They were 
aware of the right of their community and traditional rulers to sell land to willing buyers 
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Table 8.4. Institutional Awareness, Support and Satisfaction for Four Actor Groups. 
Institutional 
mechanism 
Examples  
Government actors 
 (N=15) 
Local actors (N=27) 
Corporate actors  
(N=6) 
Non-governmental 
actors (N=6) 
Multilateral actors  
(N=1) 
Academic actors 
 (N=3) 
Media actors (N =1) 
Aware 
Support  
Aware 
Support 
Aware 
Support 
Aware 
Support 
Aware 
Support 
Aware 
Support 
Aware 
Support  
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Unidirectional 
non-adaptive 
state institutions 
Land Use Act 15 3 12 25 1 24 6 4 2 6 0 6 1 1 0 3 0 3 1 0 1 
EIA Law 14 10 4 10 3 7 6 5 1 6 4 2 1 1 0 3 2 1 1 0 1 
Forestry laws 10 3 7 17 9 8 6 5 1 6 3 3 1 1 0 3 2 1 1 1 0 
Unidirectional 
non-adaptive  
traditional 
institutions 
Local/communal 
land ownership  
9 2 7 26 23 3 6 4 2 6 4 2 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 
Communal 
religious 
institutions  
2 1 1 24 21 3 4 3 1 4 4 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 
Communal 
method of  
resource 
extraction  
3 2 1 13 9 4 4 2 2 6 2 4 0 0 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 
Multidirectional 
adaptive  
endogenous 
institutions  
Institution of  
land sale by 
communities 
13 10 3 27 27 0 6 6 0 6 4 2 0 0 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 
Institution of 
militancy 
15 5 10 27 17 10 6 2 4 6 0 6 1 0 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 
Multidirectional 
adaptive  
exogenous 
institutions  
Varied state 
institution 
exchanges 
15 12 3 27 23 4 6 4 2 6 3 3 1 0 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 
Memorandum of 
Understanding 
13 10 3 27 21 6 6 6 0 6 6 0 1 1 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 
Total 
  
Aware  
% 
Support 
% 
 Aware
 % 
Support 
% 
Aware 
% 
Support 
% 
Aware 
%  
Support 
% 
Aware 
%  
Support 
% 
Aware 
%  
Support 
% 
Aware 
%  
Support 
% 
  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Unidirectional 59 40 60 71 57 43 89 72 28 94 50 50 50 100 0 100 61 39 50 33 67 
Multidirectional 93 66 34 100 81 19 100 75 25 100 54 46 75 33 67 100 67 33 100 100 0 
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and that they and the families own the land and should control it.  They were also aware 
of traditional institutions for protecting crocodiles, establishing sacred lakes and forests, 
and harvesting materials.  
 
Some local informants agreed that traditional methods of harvesting resources are not 
always the best. Six informants who participated in a group discussion with fishermen 
admitted to previously using traditional fishing institutions in the wetlands which they 
now regard as destructive, e.g. using chemicals and poisons extracted from oil palm and 
raffia palm trees. They claim to have stopped using this institution after being 
encouraged to do so by a non-governmental organization, which informed them about 
the health and environmental hazards of their actions. Yet field observations showed 
that many fishermen still use this practice because it is easier, quicker and less stressful.  
 
During a similar group discussion with hunters, they were asked if they would kill any 
animals that are “endangered species”. Three of them said they would because the 
animals were given to them and their forefathers by God, so they see no reason why 
they cannot hunt any animal. Others cite ecological reasons similar to those used by the 
fishermen. The increased ecological awareness of local actors seems to be responsible 
for the high proportion of local actors who do not support traditional institutions for 
harvesting resources from the wetland. Although fewer local informants supported the 
customary land ownership institution, this was attributed to a lack of trust in communal 
or family custodians of the land. According to an informant who does not support this 
institution:  
 
"They will just collect money and not tell other people, before sharing it 
with their friends and family”.  
 
In the same vein, the three informants who do not support traditional religious 
institutions cite their Christian beliefs as the reason for this. They also suggested that 
these institutions are archaic and not relevant in a modern society.  
 
Although all local actor informants are aware of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) institution and most support it, others do not support it as they claim that the oil 
companies do not always comply with the content of these agreements. During a recent 
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community protest about the refusal of an oil company operating in the area to sign a 
MOU with them, the Youth President of the community association said: 
 
“We are here to block the company because of their neglect of the people of 
Orukun, and entire Mbo.... We don’t want them to continue with their work 
except they come down and sign the memorandum of understanding …. 
Before any operation goes forward, the work should stop; that’s our 
position.” (Etim, 2012).  
 
On the institution of militancy in the Niger Delta, many local informants claim they do 
not support unprovoked violence, yet they tacitly support the activities of those 
involved. This is reflected in the statement by a local youth who claimed he previously 
participated in “militancy” and a community leader.   
“It was not our intention to kidnap and bomb them (referring to oil 
companies). But you know that as freedom fighters, fighting for our 
rights we can do anything ….. If we don't fight they will destroy us” 
(local youth) 
“You cannot fully blame our youths, we have to plead with them and 
keep telling them every time to give government a chance. But we 
have governments that never learn from past mistakes. Hopefully this 
one will be different” (community leader) 
 
Seventeen local informants supported this approach. The remainder did not do so 
because of the violence or because, as they claimed, they realized that youths are 
actually out to enrich themselves and not to better the community. One informant said: 
“Do you think they are fighting for the development of their communities or for 
themselves? Some of them have limousines and choice houses in Port Harcourt”.  
 
Overall, it is clear that multidirectional adaptive institutions are popular with all actor 
groups, enjoy the greatest level of support, and bring the greatest satisfaction to people 
across all networks. Local actors suggested that unidirectional non-adaptive institutions 
are not helping their activities and often lead to conflicts among the various resource 
users. From the survey, the majority of respondents claimed that unidirectional non-
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adaptive institutions have influenced their access to important ecosystem services 
through either destruction or restrictions. In contrast, few users saw opportunities in 
unidirectional non-adaptive institutions to fully realize the potential for tourism in the 
wetlands or for protecting biodiversity by designating Ramsar sites in the Delta.  
 
8.4  Explaining the Choice of Institutions 
 
To understand what influences the choice of institutions for using and managing Niger 
Delta wetlands, a  list of six pre-defined attributes was presented to local informants in 
283 households with an option of further open-ended discussions, and informants from 
other actor categories were asked open-ended questions.  
 
The results indicated that local actors generally adopt institutions that maximize their 
economic benefits from the wetlands (Table 8.5). The next most important factors are 
the risk implications of their actions, e.g. if it will lead to catastrophic damage to the 
environment or human life, and the potential repercussions for themselves and their 
immediate family if they break the rules. The repercussions associated with disobeying 
unidirectional traditional institutions are viewed more seriously more than those for 
other categories of institutions. A local fisherman, explaining why he will choose to 
obey the local institution governing forests and sacred lakes rather than state formal 
laws restricting access to same resource, reasoned that the latter will only lead to his 
imprisonment or fine, but the former might lead to his death and the destruction and 
disgrace of his family. This suggests that religious beliefs also influence adoption of 
institutions, but with the rising popularity of Christianity an increasing number of local 
people no longer believe in some traditional institutions and so are willing to risk the 
repercussions. Consideration of the social networks of other actors involved is another 
influential factor.  
 
Corporate actors generally adopt any institution that does not interfere with business 
operations. This can be inferred from the statement by an oil company informant: 
 
“It must be clear to the youths that the Niger Delta region cannot develop if 
they continue to disrupt production activities of the oil companies and 
destroy the capacity of the government to export oil. It is discouraging if the 
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uninterrupted activities of the company cannot be guaranteed …. They will 
continue selling off their concessions in Nigeria” (BUS7). 
 
Table 8.5. Average Ranking of Factors Influencing Local Actors’ Adoption of an 
Institution. 
Factor Average rank (1 highest, 6 least) 
Profit maximization 1.6 
Risk avoidance 3.2 
Repercussion/punishment 3.4 
Upholding biodiversity and natural environment 4.0 
Protection of cultural values 4.3 
Ethnic/religious and social considerations 4.5 
 
Another inference is that monetary payment or inducement is not a major challenge for 
corporate actors provided it ensures business continuity.  
 
Non-governmental actors are influenced by the need to avoid conflict with other actors 
and ensure consistency of the institution with their organizational mission statement. 
For example: 
 
“We stand by what we believe and do not show different loyalties nor do we 
take sides… This is why we have been able to maintain good working 
relationship with local communities and the oil companies" (NGO2). 
 
The flexibility of institutions to be adaptable to local realities is another important 
consideration for non-governmental actors. One informant suggested that one of the 
issues she would like resolved in the management of the wetlands is: 
 
"The issue of whether or not the Land Use Decree is to be enforced (i.e. the 
State is the landlord) or whether the community (as landlords/owners) can 
use/sell/exploit their land without permission. It is unacceptable if land 
belonging to identifiable peoples and communities is forcibly taken away to 
make way for a so-called development with virtually no compensation to the 
people who are alienated from their lands, and rendered internally displaced 
persons but lacking all the rights and privileges accorded them by UN 
conventions.” (NGO4).  
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One government informant suggested that he can sympathize with poor, uneducated 
people who violate formal laws, but not with those who know that their actions are 
forbidden under the law. Another informant commented that it is difficult if not 
impractical for him to enforce in the field some state laws which are not well 
understood by local people and which he himself finds complicated:  
 
"I know....what the law states, but it is not possible for me to stop the people 
from living their lives; some of them do not even understand why someone 
will tell them not to cut down some trees ….The people believe they are the 
true guardians of the forest …. Until the government understands and makes 
these laws relatively simple and easily understood by local people and those 
who work in local areas, such as loggers and farmers, enforcement will be 
difficult” (GOV1). 
 
Also evident from this statement is another factor influencing government actors’ 
choice of institutions – the ability of local people to benefit from the environment. 
GOV1  suggested that he would relax his enforcement if the actions of local people 
were designed to sustain their livelihoods.  
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that individuals from the various groups are willing to 
participate in multidirectional adaptive institutions.  
 
8.5  Important Factors in the Institutionalization Process 
 
The institutionalization process is complex and influenced by various factors. Five key 
requirements are discussed here: opportunities for formal and informal interactions; the 
exchange of materials; trust building and learning; transaction costs of interactions; and 
the involvement of key persons.  
 
8.5.1  Opportunities for Formal and Informal Interactions 
 
Central to institutional change is the possibility for formal and informal interactions 
between actors. It is difficult to distinguish between where one interaction starts and 
another begins, but while formal interactions are important for agenda setting, it is 
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during informal interactions that policies and other far-reaching agreements are made 
which ordinarily would be impossible during formal interactions.  According to a local 
youth:  
 
“After we meet in the open they (the chiefs) meet them (officials of Nigerian 
AGIP Oil Company Limited) behind (closed doors), saying they want to 
iron out some important points. Before we know it they have agreed with 
them”.  
 
This was how he explained how land adjacent to the sacred Boupere Lake was given to 
the Nigerian AGIP Oil Company.   
 
In these informal settings, actors are able to act as themselves, which they might not do 
in formal settings. According to a government official:  
 
“You know sometimes even we government officials have to behave like the 
politicians, and speak what the people want to hear even though we don’t 
really believe it. Some people want to show off, so that people can see that 
they are working even though they know that what they are saying is not 
possible. They (the officials) do not really believe in what they are arguing 
for (in a formal setting), but when we meet them later (in informal settings) 
they are able to tell us that if they don’t behave like that the people will kill 
them." 
 
To support this point, an NGO official said that:  
 
“Informal interactions are actually more effective for our work here. In 
public (formal settings), there is a lot of playing to the gallery or suspicion 
of motives, and unwillingness to share information….. from research, on 
sources of funding etc. But you know if you meet them later, the things they 
cannot tell you or want everybody to hear they can tell you”.  
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Apart from supporting the assertion that informal settings are important when actors 
interact, this suggests that there is often suspicion and lack of trust in formal settings 
which is often not the case in informal interactions.   
 
8.5.2  Exchange of Materials 
 
Informal interactions also make possible the exchange of materials between actors that  
fall outside formal institutions. These exchanges are not limited to tangibles such as 
money and gifts of houses, but also include local and foreign training trips, medical 
trips, contracts, employment etc. In a society where poverty is high, salaries cannot 
sustain households and staff training is almost non-existent, any offer of this kind will 
be strongly considered. All government officials regard their salary, training and 
facilities provided by government as inadequate. As one government official pointed 
out: “You see these people (the oil companies) know what they want and know how to 
get it”. Another government official, justifying his department's close relationship with 
multinational oil companies, said:  
 
“Government will not provide us with the materials and funds needed to 
work ….  Do you want me to work with my teeth? ……., They don’t give us 
materials, they don’t give us anything, even the salary is difficult for them to 
pay us and now you think it is not good for us to relate with the oil 
companies … My brother, it is crucial for us to have good relationships with 
people who can help us”.   
 
A senior NGO official describes how poor support from government agencies for their 
field staff is responsible for corrupt practices and sabotage of formal institutions:  
 
“Their staff have been turned into beggars. They (referring to military 
personnel) are sent from far places to this place and yet they don’t pay their 
entitlements  when due. In the process of looking for help they come across 
these thieves and thugs who will offer them heaven and earth … They don’t 
know when they will get their entitlements and cannot reject these offers 
because at the end of the day government might not be able to pay them …. 
This is why enforcement has suffered”.  
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Exchanges may include NGOs too. An NGO official agreed that they get a lot of 
support from the multinational oil companies and complained of the difficulty in getting 
any financial assistance from government. Most of their projects are sponsored by 
multinational oil companies, and some NGOs also double as contractors to oil 
companies to fund their activities. Another NGO official said: 
 
"At one point we wanted to do a programme (in the Niger Delta) that will 
benefit the people. We approached a government organization but were 
bluntly declined. We then went to the oil companies and without stress they 
agreed to support the project." 
 
These material exchanges achieve two purposes. First, they act as personal favours to 
the people receiving them, to supplement their livelihoods, for reasons stated above. 
Second, they serve as a form of protection, enabling actors to overcome possible 
obstacles from rival actors. For instance, it is speculated that oil companies have paid 
rival youth groups to protect their operations in the region. This money is used to 
purchase guns to protect oil facilities. It is believed that oil companies also bought 
weapons for the Nigerian military in the guise of corporate social responsibility. The 
weapons are then used to protect oil facilities and harass local people who protest about 
their activities in the Delta. The military see such gifts, e.g. guns, speedboats, 
helicopters etc., as supportive of their mission. A representative of the Inspector General 
of Police said, when receiving these items, that: “With these provisions by the oil 
companies we feel pretty much empowered to carry out our duties."  
 
It is reasonable to conclude that the exchange of materials  persuades people to work 
against formal institutions and to sustain informal institutions in use. This suggests that 
the concept of exchange of materials should be expanded to include formal exchanges 
between employers and employees in the form of salary and training, for it is because of 
the inadequacy of these formal exchanges that informal exchanges have become so 
important. 
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8.5.3  Trust Building and Learning 
 
Formal and informal interactions also enable trust building and learning, which 
facilitate repetition of multidirectional adaptive institutions. When actors lack trust they 
become suspicious of each other’s position and actions, but by building trust actors 
establish a minimum degree of cooperation and so strict and overzealous enforcement 
and scrutiny is avoided.  
 
Actors will always prefer to interact with those with whom they have built trust, 
irrespective of the economic cost. This explains why a logger informant suggests that 
even though he pays more to transport his produce through a route manned by officials 
whom he trusts, he prefers to remain with this route rather than trying to go through an 
alternative route where he is not well known by officials. He said apart from the fact 
that one of the officers is a friend of one of his relatives, they have built a social bond 
because they often socialise together and he often gives the official a lift in his car. 
 
While social, cultural and religious affinities enhance trust, mutual learning and 
understanding, enhanced by repeated practices, are also essential. For example, a local 
chief stated in an interview that his community will only allow oil companies with 
whom they have engaged in the past, and trust, to buy lands within the clan, even if 
other companies offer a higher price. That there is more to these exchanges than 
economic benefits is shown by the example of Shell in Ogoniland where, despite 
promises of massive development, local communities have so far refused Shell 
permission to resume production. A leading member of the community said  that: 
 
"We do not trust them because past incidents show that the company 
consistently under-reports the amounts and impacts of its carelessness.”  
 
This underscores the importance of past practices and learning in trust building and 
institutionalization. Actors build on past experiences to determine if others are 
trustworthy or not.  In this process the repetition of actions is important. For instance, 
the more an actor engages in exchanges in a network the more trust is built. Of the three 
logging informants interviewed, the one who engages in weekly interactions with 
forestry officials trusted them more than did the other two who met officials less 
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frequently. This can in the long run even reduce the volume of exchanges. The logger 
informant also suggested that because of the bond between him and the forestry 
officials, there are times when he does not have the required exchange amount of money 
to exchange, yet the official allows him to make payments at other times or to conduct 
his activity without payment. In appreciation, when he has more cash in hand, he buys 
him food or may decide to pay more than usual to demonstrate to the officer that he still 
a willing and regular participant in the institution.  
 
Another way to cement trust in networks is to be proactive with such exchanges and not 
just wait to make exchanges during the activities. A local informant praised the 
activities of an oil company who, though not operating in the community, have 
introduced an “educational programme to the people in a bid to ..... reduce the gap of 
illiteracy”. The company has also awarded scholarships to local people, and he 
perceives it as the only oil company  which is “trying to fix the problem because they 
are focused on trying to do the right thing”. The only other organizations who received 
similar praise from local people were non-governmental organizations.  
 
Learning is important in building trust where there is no pre-existing social bond. 
Regular interactions between actors enables them to learn by observing the behaviour of 
others and the outcomes of this behavior. Past practices that were mutually acceptable 
and had understandable benefits are continued, but practices that have proven 
“unhelpful” are not repeated. 
 
8.5.4  Transaction Costs of Interactions 
 
Actors generally engage in institutions in which the costs they incur do not outweigh the 
benefits. Where the cumulative transaction cost of adopting an institution is higher than 
that of adopting an alternative institution then the latter is chosen. Interviews with actors 
across all categories suggest that the transaction costs of following formal institutions 
tend to outweigh those of informal institutions.  
 
One factor that raises the transaction cost of interacting with government is physical 
distance. Most government agencies responsible for managing the Niger Delta wetlands 
have offices in the region, but most decisions are made in the capital Abuja, about 600 
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miles away. Leading governmental representatives hardly ever visit the region, and a 
government official heading one of the key units responsible for conservation in the 
Niger Delta stated that he has never been to the wetlands. From the perspective of a 
government enforcement officer in the Delta, officials in Abuja like to retain 
responsibility for decision making, because if  "they award the contract, they will get all 
the benefit." Physical distance increases the cost of following formal institutions. For 
example, after a recent oil spill in his community, a local hunter met representatives of 
the local government, NGOs and the oil company, but nobody from the federal or state 
governments. When he tried to  complain to the Niger Delta Development Commission 
that his fish pond and farmland were polluted he was directed to the State Ministry of 
Environment, who in turn sent him back to the Niger Delta Development Commission.  
At this stage he was told that the responsible body was the National Oil Spill Detection 
Agency in Abuja, but as he could not afford to travel there he had to drop his complaint. 
 
The complexity of government also raises the transaction cost of interacting with 
government organizations. The structures of even single government organizations are 
often in constant flux, and a government official also highlighted the lack of integrated 
planning and the difficulty of cooperating with other ministries: “We meet them but 
they don’t cooperate”. The lack of a coordinated strategy by government  thus creates a 
situation in which the enforcement system within agencies works against stated formal 
institutions and transaction costs within government are too high. Half of the local 
people interviewed had difficulty determining whom they should meet when they have 
issues about the management of the wetlands. An academic commented that: 
 
“Government enjoys creating many organizations that end up confusing 
themselves to know who is responsible for what and make the work of those 
of us interested in the environment difficult, because if you go here they tell 
you to go there and this is how they keep throwing you up and down”.  
 
Another aspect of complexity is the need to engage in cumbersome procedures. A 
logger informant stated that the procedure for gaining a permit is too burdensome for an 
illiterate person like him, who only works to support his family. If he were to follow 
formal rules to gain permits to fell trees in the wetlands, he would have to queue for 
hours in the local bank to make the legally required payment for the permit. He would 
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then take the receipt to the ministry to put in his application, and wait for weeks or 
months for his permit to be approved, assuming that he is one of the few successful 
ones. He also pointed out that permits will not be granted unless a bribe is paid. 
Acquiring the permit does not offer him anything more than he gains by participating in 
an informal interaction. Indeed, both those with permits and those without permits still 
have to make the 'normal' exchanges with the field staff.  
 
This was confirmed by an oil company informant who suggested that, despite payments 
made to government to acquire land in the Niger Delta, his company is often 
disappointed because it does not receive the best lands. However, it can gain access to 
such lands through informal interactions with local communities. So in exchanges in 
networks where trust building is an important factor, the transaction cost is significantly 
reduced. This makes these exchanges attractive to actors, and explains why oil 
companies are willing to pay more through these networks to secure their activities than 
to adopt formal state institutions that do not satisfy their needs.  
 
8.5.5  The Role of Key Persons in Networks 
 
In an environment where multidirectional adaptive institutions are built on trust 
generated in formal and informal settings, key persons have  sufficient understanding of 
the processes and people that they have to manage and interact with. The key persons 
are thus in a position to make a difference to practices at both individual and collective 
levels. This is achieved through interventions where they apply their knowledge and 
utilize techniques and processes, as well as material and symbolic resources, to achieve 
the desired change in individual and group behaviour. 
 
Because of the unequal hierarchical relationships that often exist in Africa, there are two 
categories of key persons in the society that play important roles in the 
institutionalization process: those at the top and those occupying mid to low-level 
positions. These hierarchies are assumed to be pyramidal in nature, hence there are 
more people at the bottom than at the top. While those at the top are important in 
cementing the process, those at the bottom are the 'foot soldiers' responsible for 
exercising multidirectional adaptive institutions. An example is a low-level forestry 
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official who provides feedback to his superior which influences how things are done. 
These lower level key persons are as important as those at the top of the hierarchy.  
 
Key persons at the top of the network also belong to diverse networks, including those 
with strong links to oil companies. They include the past and present heads of the 
Petroleum Resources Ministry, staff in other agencies who were former directors of oil 
companies, and family members of people with business interests in the oil and gas 
sector.  
 
While most informants tended to ignore low-level key persons, they emphasized the 
importance of top ranking and middle level officials. The key persons are those who set 
the climate for practices based on the interests of the organization.  
 
The level of adoption of multidirectional adaptive institutions is greatly influenced by 
the way in which the key person uses their managerial ability to influence behaviour in 
the organizational setting. This process is often used in organizations, not only for 
formal purposes, but to also give lower level officials - especially - a sense of worth and 
unambiguous perceptions of what the organization stands for and what the 
organizational culture is (“the way we do things around here”). 
 
At other times, the perceived interest of the top level key person also influences the 
behaviour of other actors. A government official said that: 
 
“When Jonathan (current president of Nigeria) came into power, we think 
he was going to protect us (indigenes of the Niger Delta) and that he will 
act to help the Niger Delta region, but what did we get, nothing. Being that 
I am personally concerned about the environment, I saw this as an 
opportunity to do the right thing, but we soon realize that there is no 
difference as the oil companies still basically have their way”.  
 
To buttress this point an NGO official recalled an exchange with military personnel: 
 
"In the early days of the Yar-Adua regime (a former president of Nigeria), 
shortly after the swearing in, they expected that illegal bunkering will 
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continue since most of them are from the north (from where the president 
came), and they didn’t do anything to stop them, but they were surprised 
the regime made an effort to stop bunkering." 
 
These instances suggest that, given the understanding by subordinates that at the highest 
levels of decision making informal interactions are having sway, they will become 
relaxed and will hardly focus on achieving the stated institution but focus instead on 
achieving agency objectives.  
 
The role of key persons was regarded by most informants as the ‘golden thread’ that 
runs through the multidirectional adaptive institutionalization process. The implication 
was clearly that, without interactions with key persons, multidirectional adaptive 
institutions could not be very successful. A junior official described the informal 
approach by his superior in handling a crisis between local communities and oil 
companies as "articulating ideas,  persuading, and cajoling and coercing”. 
 
It also seems that effective two-way communication (verbal or symbolic) between the 
key person and the other members of his group (especially those lower down the 
pyramid) is regarded as a prerequisite for institutionalization to succeed. In this study, 
most informants that indicated that they have informal discussions with key persons in 
their organization on a regular basis suggested that these discussions enable them to use 
real life situations to help to solve problems and make decisions. 
 
8.6  Linking Institutional Support with Network Structures and Narratives 
 
A test was made, using a tool in UCINET, for the relationship between the institutions 
supported by informants and the structures of their networks. The results showed that 
the size of the informant’s ego network was positively correlated with the number of 
multidirectional institutions they support (r = 0.743). On the other hand, the ego 
network density was negatively correlated (r=-0.565) with the number of 
multidirectional institutions they supported (Table 8.6). This suggests that, because of 
the difficulty communicating with informants with strong density, it is less possible for 
them to adopt multidirectional institutions. Finally, there was a positive correlation 
between the number of multidirectional institutions supported by informants and the 
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number of narratives they adopt. This suggests that the more narratives an actor adopts, 
they more likely they are to support multidirectional institutions.  
 
Table 8.6. Correlation Analysis between Network Variables of Informants and Their 
Support for Multidirectional Institutions and their Narratives.  
Indices 
 
Number of Adaptive Institutions Supported 
Pearson correlation, r Sig. (1tailed), p N 
Degree centrality (Size) 0.743** 0001 33 
Egonet Density - 0.565** 0.001 33 
Betweenness 0.567** 0.001 33 
Narratives  0.495** 0.004 33 
 
Support for multidirectional adaptive and unidirectional non-adaptive practices by 
informants was also analysed. Findings showed that multidirectional adaptive 
institutions were initially controversial but came to be adopted by many individuals and 
organizations. Despite their informality, the multidirectional adaptive institutions spread 
quickly through cohesive ties among members belonging to the same network, and are 
now more widespread than unidirectional non-adaptive institutions. Support for 
unidirectional non-adaptive institutions does not appear to be linked to  networks; 
instead, informants support them because that is what their organization expects.  
 
Networks provide a compelling answer for support for institutions. Of the 22 informants 
who interact more informally than formally, 17 of them support all four multidirectional 
adaptive institutions. On the other hand, of the 11 informants who interact more 
formally than informally, 9 support at least 4 of the unidirectional non-adaptive 
institutions. Multidirectional adaptive institutions spread from one individual to another 
across various networks because informal networks have no strict boundary, unlike the 
formality associated with the unidirectional non-adaptive institutions. This suggests that 
informants who indicated they interacted informally with actors from other groups were 
the conduits through which multidirectional adaptive institutions spread. Unidirectional 
non-adaptive institutions, in contrast, are not easily circulated because they only exist in 
formal settings. 
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8.7  Conclusions 
 
1. This chapter has examined institutions in the Niger Delta in the framework of 
the Network Communication Framework. It found that unidirectional non-adaptive 
traditional institutions are well established but often not complied with, for while they 
have evolved endogenously they are increasingly seen as archaic. Unidirectional non-
adaptive state institutions - the archetypal 'institutions by design' - are plentiful but also 
not widely followed, as they are imposed exogenously by actors who mostly lack 
knowledge of local conditions.  
 
2. Two categories of evolutionary institutions predicted by the Network 
Communication Framework were found to be prevalent and popular in the Niger Delta. 
The first are multidirectional adaptive endogenous institutions where the state has poor 
scalar reach, and include the evolution of institutions through the interplay between 
traditional institutions and the institutions of oil companies. These correspond 
generically to the autonomous evolution of institutions in the vacuum created by the low 
scalar reach of state institutions, identified by Ostrom (2005), but in this case they do 
not necessarily lead to sustainable environmental management. 
 
3. The other form of evolutionary institution has been identified here for the first 
time. Multidirectional adaptive exogenous institutions when the state has moderate 
scalar reach originated outside the Niger Delta but subsequently evolved through 
interplay between modern state institutions and non-state (traditional) institutions. They 
are found in the widespread circumvention of forest laws and underline the simplicity of 
the concept of "illegal logging". 
 
4. When actors representing the main categories of groups in the Niger Delta were 
questioned they showed good awareness of, and support for multidirectional adaptive 
institutions. Support for unidirectional non-adaptive institutions was generally lower. 
 
5. The most important factor influencing the adoption of multidirectional adaptive 
institutions was found to be profit maximization. Moreover, the number of 
multidirectional institutions supported by an actor was found to be positively correlated 
with the size of their personal network. 
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6. There is evidence to show that multidirectional adaptive institutions are more 
attractive because they provide an opportunity for inputs to occur from a wide range of 
actors, so that their practices, customs, values, and beliefs can be taken into account. 
This increases the likelihood that these institutions will be consistent with local 
conditions, attitudes, and practices.  
 
7. Multidirectional adaptive institutions also provide an opportunity for all parties 
involved to determine how much they can pay or accept in exchange, and when and 
how it should be paid. The informality of these institutions ensures flexibility, so they 
can be modified in response to changes in the preferences of the actors adopting them.  
 
8. However, while multidirectional adaptive institutions are effective, they may not 
necessarily lead to environmentally optimal outcomes, and this neatly represents the 
contrast between the ideal of purposely designed institutions and the reality of evolved 
institutions. 
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CHAPTER 9   
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.1  Introduction  
 
This thesis sought to understand the roles of networks and institutions in environmental 
management, particularly in an African context. In doing so, a new model – the 
Network Communication Framework (NCF) - was designed (Chapter 3) and 
empirically tested in the Niger Delta wetlands in Nigeria (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). In 
this chapter, the salient findings of this research are summarized and conclusions are 
drawn based on the research findings. Also presented in this chapter are personal 
reflections and insights gained from the researcher’s experiences throughout the process 
of this study. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research and 
suggestions for achieving more sustainable management of the Niger Delta wetlands.  
 
9.2  Summary of Findings 
 
This study aimed at gaining new insights into how institutions governing the 
management of the environment are adopted wholly, partially or not at all by state and 
non-state actors. Situating this approach within theories of institutional change enable 
the conceptualizing and testing of  a new framework for understanding institutional 
change, whereby networks interact via four important communication contents 
(information, institutions, material resources and power) and four dimensions of 
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communication (direction, autonomy, adaptation and reach). The framework shows that 
the four dimensions of communication may be combined to predict a range of different 
outcomes for communications between networks. Based on this, four combined 
outcomes involving communication between two networks were identified. The first is 
unidirectional non-adaptive communication, whereby a modern state network imposes 
communication content on non-state networks. The second is unidirectional non-
adaptive communication, whereby even though a modern state network has high scalar 
reach it is resisted by traditional networks. The third is multi-directional adaptive 
endogenous communication, according to which a modern state network has poor scalar 
reach and a traditional network is able to assert its autonomy and adapt to the virtual 
absence of the state at the local scale by devising its own institutions for sustainable 
management. The fourth is multi-directional adaptive exogenous communication in 
which a modern state network has moderate scalar reach and state and non-state 
networks modify state institutions for their mutual benefit. Together, these 
combinations represent some of the institutions that govern the management of the 
environment in many societies, especially in Africa. While the first two types of 
institutions are well documented (Koku and Gustafsson, 2003; Adekola et al., 2012; 
Mafabi, 2000), and the third is highlighted in the works of the late Eleanor Ostrom (see 
Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 2005, Ostrom 2008) , the genesis and mechanisms of the fourth 
remain wholly undocumented and poorly understood. In order to gain further insights, 
the Network Communication Framework was tested using the case study of the Niger 
Delta wetlands in Nigeria. This provides a suitable study site considering its position as 
an ecosystem with attention spanning diverse networks.   
 
Seven distinct groups represented by networks were identified as relevant to the 
management of the Niger Delta wetlands: government, local communities, corporate, 
non-governmental, multilateral and academic organizations, and the media. Each 
network has distinct public narratives about managing the Niger Delta wetlands. In this 
study, network membership was found to have an overwhelming influence on the 
narratives of actors. Although actors have a latent narrative of the main network they 
belong to, they also belong to other networks with which they interact. Such 
relationships facilitate multidirectional communication between actors from diverse 
networks, i.e. between state and non-state networks. This led to actors adopting 
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narratives that correspond to those of the other networks to which they belong, while 
still retaining the narratives of their own network.   
 
Unidirectional non-adaptive state institutions are not widely followed, as they are 
imposed by actors who mostly lack knowledge of local conditions. Unidirectional non-
adaptive traditional institutions are well established, but are often not complied to 
because they are perceived as archaic. Multidirectional adaptive institutions are more 
popular across all networks because they provide an opportunity for input to be 
transferred from a wide range of actors. As such, their interests, practices, customs, 
values, and beliefs can be taken into account.  
 
Adaptive institutions characterized by multidirectional flows of communication content 
between state and non-state networks bring some semblance of stability to the 
management of the Niger Delta wetlands. This type of communication blurs differences 
between state actors and non-state actors and enables them to negotiate terms that are 
mutually beneficial. Synergy between state and non-state networks, which result in 
some form of stability in the management of the environment, was shown to be possible 
through multidirectional communication, where both networks negotiate and engage in 
mutually beneficial practices. These have resulted in non-state actors gaining access to 
more resources and better meeting their livelihood requirements than they ordinarily 
would if they had followed formal state institutions. On the other hand, they have halted 
a number of activities that could degrade the environment, such as burning wetland 
vegetation to gain access to wetland services such as timber. Also, part of the materials 
given in exchange is used for purchasing seedlings for replanting. In addition to the 
materials exchanged, opportunities for formal and informal interactions, trust-building 
and learning, the transaction costs of interactions and the role of key persons within 
networks are important factors in the institutionalization process between state and non-
state networks. 
 
This study also found that the distribution of benefits and costs from the Niger Delta 
wetlands is unevenly distributed with local communities having to bear about 75% of 
the cost of oil extraction which is almost 20% of the revenue/profits of the oil industry 
(Chapter 6). This disparity sheds some light on the interactions between the various 
networks.   
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9.3  Discussion  
 
Most existing theories of institutions focus more on explaining how institutions resist 
change, rather than how they actually change (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This situation is 
partly due to the fact that research on institutions has focused either on 'design' or 
‘evolution’ with little attention on building theories that integrate the processes of 
evolution and design within a broader framework (Kingston and Caballero, 2009). 
Furthermore, existing theories do not explain how communication between networks 
influences institutional change. This is because research into institutions and networks 
has proceeded on largely separate trajectories and little effort has been made towards 
understanding the mutuality between institutions and networks (Owen-Smith and 
Powell, 2007). New institutionalism has emphasized the importance of theory-building 
as opposed to description, and exploring dynamic, as opposed to static interaction. 
More specifically, sociological institutionalism, which posits that institutional 
processes should be seen in the light of culturally specific practices, emphasizes not 
just formal rules but also informal norms, symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral 
templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ that guide human action (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). New institutionalism in sociology is a particularly promising prism 
through which to understand much of social behaviour and change (Nee and Ingram, 
1998). Despite these useful contributions, most institutional theorists have provided 
limited explanations for the interactions between networks and institutions. 
Consequently, there is still no model that can be used to analyse the process of 
institutional change in environmental management involving multiple actors. Any 
improved model of institutional change should show how interrelations between 
institutions and networks influence the dynamics of institutions. 
 
Given the limitations of the existing institutional change models, the first aim of this 
study was to design a framework for analyzing the institutional change process in 
environmental management involving multiple actors. As the central parameter was the 
network, the first step taken by the author was to outline a new approach to modelling 
networks (Chapter 3). This was based on the social network analysis perspective, 
which defines a network as “a set of actors (e.g. person(s), teams organizations, 
concepts etc) … often called nodes connected by a set of ties” (Borgatti and Foster, 
2003). Based on this perspective, a new framework called the Network Communication 
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Framework (NCF) was devised. It addressed the main shortcomings of existing 
institutional change theories, especially their (a) failure to explain interaction (as well 
as mutuality) between institutions and networks (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2007);  (b) 
their neglect towards building theories in which processes of evolution and design are 
integrated (Kingston and Caballero, 2009); (c) their lack of explanation regarding the 
communication between networks by incorporating flows that have been analysed 
separately.  
 
In addressing the communication between networks and allowing for interactions 
between flows, the author has used concepts developed in social network analysis in 
order to describe communication within networks through various 'flows' (such as 
information and institutions, power and materials) (Borgatti et al., 2009). It was 
assumed that flows (communication) between networks involve similar processes, and 
are also affected by communication within networks (see Section 3.2.3). As well as 
combining different flows that were previously analysed separately (Kosfeld et al., 
2006), the NCF also allows for interactions between flows, leading to more complex 
effects that mirror real life situations, especially in an African context.  
 
The framework identified the flows that link networks together (Section 3.2.4). These 
flows are the principal categories of communication content in a network. All networks 
in an arena influence each other through the contents of their communication, whether 
actors are aware of it or not. As the basis for a new integrated framework that explains 
the contribution of design and evolution to institutional change, and in response to 
Kingston and Caballero (2009), each communication can be considered as having four 
dimensions: direction, autonomy, adaptation, and reach (Section 3.2.5). In doing this, 
the NCF was able to predict various institutional outcomes (Section 3.2.6).  
 
The simplest combinations involve communications between two networks that vary in 
direction, autonomy, adaptation and scalar reach. For a developing country with a 
modern state network and a non-state network centred in traditional society, four 
institutional outcomes were predicted. In unidirectional, non-autonomous and non-
adaptive communication, a modern state network with high scalar reach could impose 
flows of information, institutions etc. on a traditional network. The second is also 
characterized by unidirectional, autonomous and non-adaptive communication. Even 
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though a modern state network has high scalar reach, the traditional network is not 
passive and can, therefore, successfully resist such attempts at imposition. This 
describes what happens today in many developing countries. In multidirectional and 
adaptive endogenous communication, in which a modern state network has poor scalar 
reach, a traditional network can assert its autonomy and adapt to the virtual absence of 
the state at local scale by devising its own institutions for sustainable management. This 
describes the widespread autonomous management of common pooled resources by 
local communities as identified by Ostrom (2005). In multidirectional and adaptive 
exogenous communication, in which a modern state network has moderate scalar reach, 
interactions between state and non-state networks could modify state institutions for 
their mutual benefit. The first two involve the design of institutions, while the latter two 
concern their evolution. This fits with Kingston and Caballero’s (2009) ‘design’ and 
‘evolution’ categories. Thus, this is the first time that a framework has been developed 
to integrate processes of institutional evolution. This framework also provides a 
platform for analyzing the institutional change process in environmental management 
involving multiple actors. 
 
As a way of testing the robustness of this new framework and in order to explain the 
role of networks and institutions in environmental management, the second aim of this 
thesis was to use the designed framework to test its applicability in the management of 
the Niger Delta wetlands in Nigeria. In fulfilling this aim, data were collected through 
various means (see Chapter 5). The NCF was specifically used to test two categories of 
content that were communicated within and between networks: information and 
institutions. The first category aimed at testing the NCF by analysing the evidence for 
the complementary communication of information (Chapter 7). This was followed by an 
analysis of institutions as carriers of communication content. The relevant evidence for 
this was analysed in Chapter 8.  
 
The empirical findings are largely consistent with the predictions of the NCF. Each 
network was found to have public narratives concerning the causes of, and possible 
solutions to, the economic, social, political and environmental problems facing the 
Niger Delta region. Although these narratives would normally be expected to coincide 
fully with the narratives of actors representing the relevant groups, interviews with 
individuals from each group have shown that their everyday narratives are far more 
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heterogeneous. In-depth interviews were held with forty two representatives of the key 
groups. These included government (15), local (11), corporate (5), non-governmental 
organization (6), academia (3), multilateral organization (1) and media (1). Out of the 
forty two interviewees, at least half adopted the local, governmental, multilateral and 
non-governmental narratives (section 7.3). Although some actors adopted just one 
narrative, three actors adopted six out of the seven. The results also suggested that if an 
actor has at least 45% of immediate partners, or alters, from a group in their personal, or 
ego network, they tend to adopt the narrative corresponding to that group. Such 
adoption of narratives is characteristic of communication both within and between 
networks. This provides support for the Network Communication Framework, which 
predicts that when actors are members of a variety of networks, communication within 
and between these networks will influence their discourses and narratives. 
 
It was found that wetland management in the Niger Delta followed the four 
institutional outcomes predicted by the NCF (Chapter 8). It was also shown that 
unidirectional non-adaptive traditional institutions are well established but are often not 
complied with. In spite of their endogenous evolution, they are increasingly seen as 
archaic. Unidirectional non-adaptive state institutions - the archetypal 'institutions by 
design' - are plentiful but also not widely followed, as they are imposed exogenously 
by actors who, for the most part, lack knowledge of local conditions. The two 
categories of ‘evolution’ institutions predicted by the NCF were also found to be 
prevalent in the Niger Delta. The multidirectional and adaptive endogenous 
communications were also identified, however they were found to often lead to 
opportunism by “community leaders” and sometimes conflict with a poor scalar reach 
state struggling to enforce its institution. Most importantly, the fourth institutional 
arrangement predicted by the NCF for the first time was widely found among all 
networks.  
 
A second form of evolutionary institution has been identified here for the first time. 
Multidirectional adaptive exogenous institutions originate outside the Niger Delta but 
subsequently evolve through the interplay between modern state institutions and non-
state (traditional) institutions. They are found in the widespread circumvention of forest 
(wetland) laws and underline the simplicity of the concept of "illegal logging". When 
actors representing the main categories of groups in the Niger Delta were questioned 
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they showed good awareness of, and support for, multidirectional adaptive institutions. 
Support for unidirectional non-adaptive institutions was generally lower. The most 
important factor influencing the adoption of multidirectional adaptive institutions was 
found to be profit maximization. Moreover, the number of multidirectional institutional 
outcomes supported by an actor was found to be positively correlated with the size of 
their personal network. There is evidence to show that multidirectional adaptive 
institutional outcomes are more attractive because they provide an opportunity for 
inputs to be transferred from a wide range of actors, so that their practices, customs, 
values, and beliefs can be taken into account. This increases the likelihood that these 
institutions will be consistent with local conditions, attitudes, and practices.  
 
Multidirectional adaptive institutional outcomes also provide an opportunity for all 
parties involved to determine how much they can pay or accept in exchange, and when 
and how this sum should be paid. The informality of these institutions ensures 
flexibility, so they can be modified in response to changes in the preferences of the 
actors adopting them. However, while multidirectional adaptive institutional outcomes 
are effective, they may not necessarily lead to environmentally optimal outcomes. This 
neatly represents the contrast between the ideal of purposely designed institutions and 
the reality of evolved institutions.  
 
Based on this evidence (Chapters 7 and  Chapter 8) it is evident that environmental 
management depends in large measure on the networks and communication content of 
actors.  
 
9.4  Relationship with Previous Research   
 
Several studies have focused on explaining the process of institutional change (North, 
1990; Traxler et al., 2001; Pierson, 2000b) and have shown the importance of such 
changes in environmental management (Young, 2008; Hoffman, 1999). However, so far 
a general methodological framework to analyse institutional change involving multiple 
actors is still lacking. Besides, no one has attempted to build theories in which 
‘evolution and design’ are integrated (Kingston and Caballero, 2009). Although 
Kingston and Caballero (2009) rightly called for such a framework, they provide very 
few indicators about how this can be done. Nor did they foresee the complexity and 
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myriad institutions that can emerge from such integration. This thesis presents such a 
methodological framework, and the applications it presents can provide guidance in 
future research efforts to further understand the role of networks in the process of 
institutional change. The new Network Communication Framework for understanding 
institutional change presented in this study addresses the failure to explain interaction 
between institutions and network. This framework embraces an important area of 
research (integrating processes of evolution and design in one framework) needed for 
understanding institutional change.  
 
Beyond the focus on economics (rational choice), history (path dependence) and 
sociology advocated by the dominant schools of new institutionalism, (Hall and Taylor, 
1996) the current study has also unravelled the importance of discourses of actors in the 
institutionalization process. These discourses have been largely overlooked by many 
scholars, even though there is now a newest “new institutionalism” - discursive 
institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008; Kulawik, 2009; Schmidt, 2010). While the discursive 
institutionalism emphasizes the role of ideas and discourse in providing a more dynamic 
approach to institutional change (Schmidt, 2008), like many other models it fails to 
integrate other communication contents in explaining institutional change and focuses 
only on “ideas”.  
 
This study also shows that a good way to understand institutions and explain how actors 
adopt institutions wholly, partially or not at all, is to employ a framework that allows for 
the analysis of all possible communication contents and takes into consideration the 
dimensions of communication in a network. This is a departure from current theories 
which have tried to explain institutional change while focusing only on one 
communication content. It is concluded that institutional change must not only be 
understood in terms of rational choice, history or sociology, instead detailed attention 
needs to be paid to how networks and their communication contents (especially 
information, material exchange, institutions and power) are important factors in the 
process of institutional change. 
 
This study showed how the discourse of networks expands in scope to include some of 
the terms found in the discourse of other networks, and vice versa. This shows that it 
would be possible for one actor’s expanded discourse to be consistent with more than 
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one narrative reflected in the texts communicated by that actor. This contrasts with the 
Discourse Coalition Framework (Hajer, 1993), which implicitly assumes that one 
discourse is consistent with only one narrative. This study has shown that in an African 
context where most actors are members of multiple networks, they are bound to 
advocate a discourse that is more heterogeneous in content and consistent with multiple 
narratives.    
 
While it is established in this study and elsewhere that the social network of actors has 
an influence on their behaviour (which emphasizes sociological institutionalism), I also 
found that profit maximization does to some degree influence the behaviour of actors 
which is consistent with rational choice institutionalism. This underscores the call for 
greater interchange among the three schools of new institutionalism by Hall and Taylor 
(1996). See also Thelen (1999), who has called for similar interchange between 
historical institutionalism and radical choice institutionalism.  
 
The findings have demonstrated the importance of the Network Communication 
Framework in predicting the prevalence of multiple institutions for environmental 
management, especially in the context of a developing country. This calls into question 
much analysis which has narrowly focused on formal state institutions and traditional 
indigenous institutions as though these are the only institutions that exist in the society 
(Berkes et al., 2000; Cortner et al., 1998; Dixon and Wood, 2007; Maconachie et al., 
2009). This conception is also widespread in many international organizations, such as 
the Ramsar Convention (2010), which suggests that state laws recognizing traditional 
institutions will make for effective wetland management. Such a narrow conception 
does not properly represent reality on the ground. This study underscores the need to 
look deeper into how things work in reality and the possibility of unearthing other 
institutional categories which need to be taken into consideration when managing 
environments. The result of this study tallies with the sociological dimension of 
institutionalism, which showed that even though institutions are not socially optimal, 
they become legitimate in as much as they are popular within the social context in 
which they are developed. This downplays the emphasis by some scholars on the fact 
that imported institutions can become endogenized (Bayart, 1996). However, evidence 
shows that such institutions lack widespread acceptance and legitimacy across all actor 
categories. This calls into question many western constructed institutions that are 
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imposed on African cultures, and expalins why such institutions have failed to achieve 
their aims.  
 
This study follows others (e.g. Bell et al., (2012)) who have called for greater clarity 
about the participatory approach to development (Chambers, 1983) that has been the 
dominant development paradigm since 1980. Paradoxically, while unidirectional 
institutional outcomes are generally not participatory they are often promoted by 
organizations that emphasize participatory approaches. On the other hand 
multidirectional institutional outcomes that are participatory receive very little or no 
attention, and are even regarded as “bad”. For example, the general concept of “illegal 
logging” is often used by many governments, multinational and nongovernmental 
organizations. In view of prevalence and participatory nature of multidirectional 
institutional outcomes, it is time to reconsider the place of concepts such as “illegal 
logging” which in reality can be participatory.  
 
Perhaps the reason why such inconsistencies are now emerging between participation 
and the sustainability of development is that participation was vital to moderate the top-
down approach to development that was common when states were all powerful in 
governing, but the shift to networked governance (Rhodes, 1996) has fundamentally 
changed the overall social setting. Consequently, while previously rural people in 
developing countries had their development planned for them by outsiders, now they 
have the autonomy to assert their own development aspirations and institutions. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the importance of the Network Communication 
Framework in explaining why the Niger Delta wetlands are degraded despite the 
numerous formal state institutions that have been designed over the years. Given the 
importance and influence of multidirectional institutional outcomes in the management 
of the Niger Delta wetlands, it has been concluded that any analysis of wetland 
management in terms of unidirectional non-adaptive institutional outcomes alone, and 
one which ignores multidirectional adaptive institutional outcomes, is inappropriate and 
will not yield an accurate picture of how things work in an African context. While 
strengthening formal state institutions and recognizing traditional institutions are 
important, concentration on these unidirectional non-adaptive institutional outcomes 
alone is not likely to result in better management of the Niger Delta wetlands. 
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Management efforts must be accompanied by greater multidirectional communication 
between networks. It is hoped that such processes, if made transparent, can help in the 
improvement of the management of the wetlands.  
 
9.5  Personal Reflections on the Research Process 
 
During this study, especially during the data collection and analysis phase, I faced a 
number of ethical challenges. In Chapter 5, I discussed the place of ethics in terms of 
informed consent and the guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality in this research.  
One challenge pertaining to informed consent faced during this research was the 
appropriateness of written informed consent as widely promoted in the western world, 
compared to verbal consent, which is preferred and accepted in African societies. This 
challenge was most obvious while interviewing informants in communities of the Niger 
Delta. There was practically no way to receive written consent from the majority of 
informants, mainly because many were illiterate. I considered the option of thumb 
printing, but quickly rejected this as it might have raised suspicions considering that 
thumb printing in this society is associated with very serious and formal issues, such as 
election voting and bank withdrawals. In the end, I decided to follow the general 
approach of getting consent from the community leader who appointed a member of the 
community to guide me during my stay there. This was done after explaining the full 
details of the research to the community leader. Despite the fact that the community 
leader had given his consent to conduct interviews in the community and mandating a 
local to inform all households to be of assistance and cooperate with me, I ensured that I 
also received similar verbal consent from all the interviewees. Given the cultural 
difference between what the university expects (in terms of written consent) and what 
seemed appropriate in the community, I believe I have been able to adapt to this 
challenge, while still maintaining high ethical standards.   
 
Another ethical challenge during this research that also relates to consent involved an 
instance when a senior official with whom I had been interacting mandated a 
subordinate officer who had no prior knowledge of my study to attend to me. Although 
he [the subordinate] felt obligated to participate, I observed that he was not too 
comfortable. I started by explaining to him that he was not bound to participate and that 
he had a choice. He understood me and asked for further information before deciding 
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whether or not to participate. I made sure I provided him with all the information and 
sought out his own consent. He accepted to participate but requested for the interview to 
take place on another day. Even though this was not very convenient considering 
research logistics, I was able to fit in this interview. Reflecting on this incident, I 
believe this might be a common ethical dilemma confronting researchers in societies 
where hierarchical divisions are prevalent. Under such circumstances, I believe it would 
have been unethical to obtain data from the official if he had not provided an informed 
consent for himself.  
 
Another core ethical principle relevant to research is maintaining the anonymity and 
confidentiality of the informants. Considering that the nature of this research involved 
the investigation of informal exchanges that are generally secretive and may even be  
regarded as illegal, it was important to ensure the anonymity of the informants and the 
confidentiality for the information provided. After all, this was one of the conditions on 
which the majority of the informants granted their consent to participate in this research. 
While I have anonymized my informants by withholding their names and specific 
information on their organizational affiliations, I found that there were instances where 
the availability of more specific information would have rendered the information being 
conveyed clearer.  
 
Generally, it is not considered ethical to provide incentives to informants in order for 
them to take part in research. During my field data collection, there were instances 
where informants perceived the research to have a business purpose and requested 
incentives before they would accept to participate. In such instances, the purpose of the 
research as an academic one was re-emphasized, as well as the fact that the researcher 
was a student and not a government official or contractor. This seemed to work in most 
instances and where it did not, informants were advised that such incentives could not 
be provided. Although as a mark of appreciation a token (maximum £2) was offered to 
the majority of the informants at the end of the interview, they did not have prior 
knowledge of this. During one of the focus group discussions, for the purpose of 
logistics, the informants were requested to travel. In this case, they were informed 
beforehand that their transportation and subsistence costs would be covered.  
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It has been argued that ethical challenges faced when conducting research in a 
developing country can differ considerably from similar studies conducted in a 
developed society (Benatar, 2002). My experience supports this assertion. As I collected 
data in the field, I was faced with ethical challenges which were not covered in the 
literature focusing on developed society scenarios. Hence, I had to improvise what I 
believed was best practice. This calls for an expansion of the literature into the 
complexities associated with the ethics of research in developing countries.   
 
It is generally agreed that the positionality of a researcher vis-à-vis the researched can 
significantly lead to bias from the researcher, as well as the researched, if not properly 
managed (Herod, 1999). My position as a young Yoruba-speaking Nigerian from the 
south-western part of the country registered as a research student at a foreign university, 
previously lecturing in a local Nigerian university, returning home to conduct fieldwork, 
was a bit tricky; not least the fact that my research relied on interviews with people from 
a cross-section (ethnic, religious, professional, cultural and economic) of Nigerian 
society.  
 
My experiences, some of which I describe here, resonate with theoretical debates on the 
"insider-outsider" perspective of positionality (Griffith, 1998, Kikumura, 1998). It has 
been argued that "insiders" (researchers who study a group to whom they belong) have 
an advantage because they are able to use their insider knowledge and are more likely to 
be perceived as neutral, and therefore be given information that would not be given to 
an "outsider” (Abu-Lughod, 1988, Hill-Collins, 1990). A counter-argument suggests 
that "outsiders" that do not belong to a group have a greater degree of objectivity and 
ability to observe behaviour without distorting its meaning. This aids these researchers 
in gaining access to different levels of information (Fonow and Cook, 1991). However, 
it has also been suggested that the general binary implied in the "insider–outsider" 
debates is in reality a boundary that is not only highly unstable, but also one that is 
subject to the dynamism of positionalities in time and through space (Mullings, 1999, 
Ward and Jones, 1999). My experience during this study fits with the latter assertion. 
There were times and places where I found myself being an "outsider" from multiple 
points of view, a situation which disturbed access to certain types of information and 
informants.  
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To illustrate this point, I briefly recount here my experience with two particular 
categories of informants. Firstly, while interviewing officials of a State Ministry, the 
majority of whom were literate and professionals in environmental management, I felt I 
should position myself as a privileged insider, because we shared similar attributes, 
such as professional affiliation and academic status. However, these same people 
considered me an "outsider". One of these officials, the most senior and one who 
claimed to have studied in the United Kingdom, asked me if there were no wetlands in 
the Western part of Nigeria (referring to my place of origin in Nigeria). He was adamant 
that he would not participate in the interview. Rather he informed me that all the 
information I needed was on the Ramsar website. He then mandated other staff not to 
participate in interviews. It appeared that in this instance there was suspicion of the 
underlying reasons for my interest in the topic of the Niger Delta wetlands. This could 
be understandable considering tension in the region. Over the course of my study, there 
was a fear that I might not be a student and that the intention of the study was aimed at 
gathering information that could be used against the people of the region.  
 
On the other hand, in local communities with which I had very few similar attributes, 
i.e. I did not speak the local language and the majority of the informants were illiterate 
and elderly, I could be represented as an "outsider" in a more ‘predictable’ sense, as 
little in my background would have ‘endeared’ me to these informants. However, some 
of my most informative discussions came from these particular categories. 
Nevertheless, among the same group of informants there were instances where people 
had perceived me as an “outsider”. In one of these instances, an informant demanded an 
incentive to participate in the interview. His reasoning was that I was a privileged 
Nigerian with better economic status. Consequently, the notion of a stable "insider-
outsider" binary comes into question. As a whole, my positionality within the 
communities was quite fluid, depending on the circumstance and the group. While 
household heads were generally welcoming, local professionals, such as loggers, treated 
me with some level of suspicion, thinking that I could be a government official 
disguised as a research student!  
 
My field assistants, who were students of the State University, introduced me as a 
“student conducting research in the Niger Delta”. This seemed to remove any suspicions 
towards me because local people are generally friendly and sympathetic towards 
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students. I also observed that the fact that the introductions were made in the local 
language, understood by my informants, helped them feel more comfortable. As such, 
most local household respondents treated me like they would normally treat a local 
student conducting research.  
 
A dimension of positionality that was evident during household interviews was the age 
difference between the researcher and the researched. As most respondents were 
elderly, they tended to position me as “young”, some even referring to me as “my son”. 
While I tried to downplay such differences, it was difficult considering the propriety of 
showing some level of respect towards the elders, which is common in  Nigerian 
culture. Some local informants also perceived me as advanced, more educated and 
knowledgeable than them. Hence, they tended to be formal, not wanting to be seen as 
less knowledgeable. One such informant asked my assistants if they were saying the 
right thing (this was at the beginning of the interview). In this case, I informed the 
respondent that they were the knowledgeable ones, and that I was there to learn from 
them. Subsequently, I made sure that I explained this to the informants at the beginning 
of all interviews. This worked well to make them more relaxed and less formal. In 
addition, I realized that having a 5-10 minute chat and general discussion (jokes and 
sharing life experiences) before the interview helped the informants feel relaxed and 
enthusiastic when responding to my questions. However, the result was that the 
interviews often took longer than anticipated.  
 
While my positionality as an insider with most households could have been influenced 
by the presence of my field assistants who were Ijaw speaking and indigenes of  
Bayelsa State, this was not the case in one community. This community had a different 
origin and language and had in the past clashed with the community from which my 
assistants originated. Here, I was initially treated with suspicion until at the request of 
the community leader I was assigned a local youth to accompany me during the 
interviews, while my assistants took some needed rest. This was effective in dissipating 
suspicions.  
 
Local loggers and field officials were the most difficult to interview, considering the 
secretive nature of their practices. I had to show my university ID card and in one 
instance, an informant requested to see my international passport to confirm that I truly 
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did have a visa for the United Kingdom. Even so, some of them were reluctant to 
provide detailed information about some issues relating to their informal institutions. It 
took days of constant informal interaction for me to build rapport with them before they 
accepted to participate. Still, the majority refused to have their interviews recorded. 
 
My interaction with government officials proved sometimes challenging in terms of 
power relations, as they believed they were more knowledgeable and some even saw the 
interview as an opportunity to educate me. This had both positive and negative effects. 
On the positive side, they provided me with detailed information. On the negative, they 
were prone to be egocentric and exaggerate. It also appeared that some were particularly 
suspicious regarding the main reasons behind this research. Thus, some were not willing 
to give specific bits of information and did not consent to being recorded. On the other 
hand, there were those who felt sympathetic to me as a student. They granted me access 
to their personal library and allowed me to make copies of documents I needed. In other 
instances, my affiliation to a United Kingdom university made certain interviewees 
more helpful than expected, because they had also studied abroad and claimed to 
understand my need for information. I observed that they were helpful, to the extent of 
providing me with contact details of more possible informants.  
 
Negotiating access to conduct research with non-governmental organizations was quite 
straightforward, as they seemed to be less suspicious and treated me more like an 
insider. My positionality with informants from the oil companies was the one I thought 
would present the greatest status imbalance, precisely because these are some of the 
highest paid employees in Nigeria. However, I soon realized that this was not the case 
because the informants were themselves at one time doctoral students. Hence, the status 
imbalance was greatly reduced and the interviews were carried out normally. This group 
were also helpful in providing me with some academic advice.  
 
During my research, I found that most of the positionality issues I experienced differed 
considerably between groups (i.e. depending on age, class and educational differences), 
a point that has been emphasized by Cormode and Hughes (1999). It is therefore 
important to develop the skills as a researcher to identify these differences and take 
proactive steps to influence the insider/outsider dichotomy.  
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I wanted to be sure that the findings of this thesis were unbiased and accurate and 
reflected the true perceptions of the informants, as well as reality. To that end, I made 
very minimal adjustments to the responses of the informants. I only made minor 
editorial corrections in order to make the ideas that they were conveying clearer. A 
number of techniques, including probing, cross-checking of responses and the use of 
triangulation, were adopted to ensure that the research findings were valid and reliable.  
 
Throughout this study I kept an open mind, which made the research an iterative 
process with the possibility of taking on board new ideas. While I generally used the 
random sampling technique, there were instances where I purposively selected 
informants, as I felt the need to ensure that the best and most appropriate informants 
were invited, especially for the focus group discussions. In conclusion, I consider my 
research findings as reasonably representative of the empirical evidence, having taken 
into due consideration all ethical implications. I have minimized the potential 
positionality bias for myself as a researcher and for my informants as the researched, 
using the appropriate techniques. This has increased both the validity and reliability of 
my research results. 
 
9.6  The NCF in Practice: Lessons Learned and a Way Forward 
 
To the best of my knowledge, the NCF presented in this study is the first example of a 
framework for analysing interactions between networks in a way that is consistent with 
interactions within networks.  
 
Because of the nature and context of the research some respondents were initially 
unwilling to speak and participate in the study. This could have made it difficult to 
understand their networks. However, by framing open ended discussions with the NCF I 
was able to penetrate the inner workings of networks with relatively simple questions 
that enabled me to get the information I wanted with relative ease, since responses were 
wide ranging and covered a number of areas relevant to the research.  
 
Testing the NCF in the demanding context of an environment in conflict has shed a 
great deal of light on the practicality of the NCF, which rightly proved its predictive 
power. Although the NCF was developed to analyse the functioning of multiple 
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networks in African societies, and for environmental management, the NCF is generic 
and could be applied anywhere one finds networks and indeed in any sector of society. 
To avoid the trap of simplistic globalized packages (Ostrom et al., 2007), and to further 
improve the NCF, the next test of the NCF should ideally be in a developed country. 
This could find that analysis of the overlaps between discourses, networks and 
institutions is even more complicated in a western situation.  
 
One of the lessons learned in testing the NCF is the recurring theme of trust in 
networks. This is because trust is generated through repetitive interactions involving 
discourses, institutions, exchange of materials etc. In my view, bringing  trust explicitly 
into the NCF could be an important way to elaborate and enhance it. Other ways to 
improve the NCF would include expanding interactions by mediation though 
intermediary organizations, which is highlighted but not yet fully developed in the NCF 
(see section 3.2.6.3). More work on the communication contents  of material resources 
and power could also improve the NCF.  
 
9.7  Limitations of this Research 
 
This study has generated important findings. Nevertheless, there are some limitations to 
it.  
 
On account of time and logistical constraints, data collection for this study was confined 
to only one of the nine states representing the Niger Delta. The replication of the study 
at different states of the Delta could enable the formation of more accurate 
generalizations associated with the findings of this study. One other limitation of this 
research relates to the number of interviews that were conducted with some groups, and 
in particular oil companies, multilateral organizations and the media. Gaining access to 
different organizations in these groups was not possible during this study. The views of 
a broad range of informants from these groups could have provided additional insights. 
For instance another limitation is the absence of religious (Christian/Muslim) network 
even though religion is important in Nigerian context. Respondents appear to have 
internalized this network as part of traditional network and did not specifically mention 
these in their responses. Hence it was not included as a distinct network on its own. The 
present study has relied largely on a qualitative methodology (though quantitative 
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methods were also used to a limited extent) and is therefore restrictive. Further rigorous 
quantitative analysis could provide a wider perspective to the present study. The paucity 
of data was another limitation of this research. For instance, in Chapter 6 I would have 
liked to present more detailed information on the benefits and costs of the ecosystem 
services. Such detailed information, however, either does not exist or access to it is 
vigorously guarded.  
 
These limitations notwithstanding, the present study advanced research in the area and 
the overall quality of data presented in this thesis has not been affected. The use of the 
method of triangulation, the combination of different sources of data, and reliance on 
secondary data from very reputable sources was very helpful in offsetting some of the 
limitations discussed above by providing complementary and supplementary 
information. Overall, all of the aforementioned parameters have contributed 
significantly in ensuring that the data in this research were valid and reliable to a high 
degree.  
 
9.8  Recommendations  
 
This section makes recommendations for making the management of the Niger Delta 
wetlands more sustainable, and for further academic research.  
 
9.8.1  Management Recommendations  
 
9.8.1.1  Recommendations to the Nigerian Government 
 
The findings of this study are consistent with earlier comments that  states in Africa do 
not fit the description of a “modern state” (Englebert, 1997). This means that any 
statement, such as the request by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Court of Justice that the Nigerian government “punish oil firms for 
pollution” (Ebiri, 2012), is fundamentally lacking in insight into the real nature of the 
Nigerian state. Consequently, the recommendations presented here to the Nigerian 
government are based on the understanding that Nigeria is not a typical modern state. 
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My first recommendation to the Nigerian government is that if it wishes to realize its 
aspirations generally it should recognize its “weakness” - and the weakness of state 
institutions at various scales in similar developing societies - and focus on 
understanding how actually things work in Nigeria, instead of assuming that it is a 
“modern state”. This will help the government look inward, instead of outward by 
spending time and resources in trying to develop and implement more formal state 
institutions, some of which are copied from developed countries in the West. If it 
follows this more realistic path, the state should be better able to foresee the interactions 
that will emerge between its institutions and the institutions of other groups (e.g. local 
communities). 
 
Regarding the difficult challenge of attaining environmentally sustainable development 
in the Niger Delta wetlands, this study has shown that this is unlikely to be achieved by 
unidirectional non-adaptive institutional outcomes alone. Given the importance and 
influence of multidirectional institutional outcomes, any approach to wetland 
management which ignores these will not succeed. The government of Nigeria should 
therefore make every effort to promote the intensification and greater 'transparency' of 
multidirectional communication between networks. The resulting enhanced learning 
process should help to reveal how to make management more environmentally 
sustainable. 
 
9.8.1.2  Recommendations to Non-Governmental and Multilateral Organizations  
 
This study has shown that unidirectional institutions are neither participatory nor 
flexible, although in principle they could be environmentally sustainable. On the other 
hand, evolved multidirectional institutions that are participatory and flexible may not be 
environmentally sustainable. It is therefore important for non-governmental 
organizations and multilateral organizations that have traditionally promoted 
participatory approaches to reconsider their various emphases on concepts such as 
“illegal logging”, which could be an evolved participatory institution. As this thesis has 
shown, environmental management in Nigeria should be based on how things actually 
work there, rather than on some idealistic representation of the design of institutions 
promoted by non-governmental and multilateral organizations. If multidirectional 
institutions are the new participatory reality, which organizations are better suited to 
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finding how to make them environmentally sustainable than non-governmental and 
multilateral organizations, which have so strongly promoted participation in the past? 
 
9.8.2  Recommendations for Future Research 
 
This study has covered a fledgling area of research which requires further theoretical 
and empirical attention. The findings of future studies will be relevant to the Niger 
Delta and to other societies too. 
 
In order to provide a broader view of institutional processes in the Niger Delta, future 
research could collect more data from a broader range of organizations, with the 
purpose of giving a more in-depth understanding of the whole process of institutional 
change. Such detailed data could take empirical verification of the Network 
Communication Framework further by presenting evidence of communication 
arrangements between more than two networks.  Since this study has focused only on 
one state in the Niger Delta, a subsequent study that analysed the applicability of the 
NCF in other states in the region would enable further generalization and comparison of 
the NCF sites. In addition, testing the applicability of the NCF in a developed society 
would greatly enhance its generalization across societies, given that governance is 
globally moving towards a complex multidirectional adaptive approach (Rhodes, 1996). 
The challenges facing the Nigerian government will therefore increasingly face the 
governments of developed countries, as well as those of many other developing 
countries.  
 
During this research several other ideas presented themselves that would be worthwhile 
to investigate more thoroughly. For example, it would be interesting to study more 
closely the importance of trust and trust-building in networks, incorporate trust in more 
detail in the Network Communication Framework, and assess the implications of this 
for the institutionalization process. The trust dimension has not yet been adequately 
theorized in contemporary research on institutions. Such a study would illustrate how 
trust can enhance multidirectional communication and how repetitive interactions and 
practices can in turn enhance trust.  
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From an environmental justice and decision-making point of view, and in line with the 
initial interest at the start of this research, more information needs to be gathered on the 
relationship between livelihoods and ecosystem services provided by the Niger Delta 
wetlands, and how these are distributed in space and time and how the distribution of 
benefits relates to actors/networks within the NCF. This will require further research to 
fully understand the flows of wetland benefits and costs through networks (both static 
and dynamic), so as to better understand interactions between networks, institutions and 
the natural resource base.  Another interesting theme for future study is to understand 
how ecosystem services are affected by various institutional settings (Gómez-
Baggethun and Kelemens, 2008). This relates to the idea by Janssen et al. (2007), who 
distinguished two main types of challenges when ecosystems adapt to institutional 
changes: slow, persistent change, that usually leads to a relatively smooth adaptive 
process; and top-down interventions that do not recognize the original adaptive 
mechanisms inherent in local systems.  
 
This research has gained many insights from the three schools of new institutionalism. 
Yet  while the processes identified in these perspectives may combine to influence 
institutional change in reality, the three "new institutionalisms" remain distant from 
each other theoretically. A new model that synthesizes the three approaches could 
greatly help to explain reality.  Although Hall and Taylor (1996) do not see this as 
“immediately practicable or even necessarily desirable” (Hall and Taylor 1996), I believe 
the field of institutional research has more to gain from forays into such arenas than it 
will lose. 
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APPENDIXES 
  
Appendix 4.1. The Major Oil Companies Operating In the Niger Delta. 
Company Name 
Entry 
Year 
Average 
Production 
(Barrels Per Day 
- bpd 2010) 
% of 
production 
*Joint Venture 
Allocation (%) 
Country of 
Origin Estimated Profit Remarks 
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
Limited (SPDC) 1937 899,000 38 
NNPC (55), Shell 
(30), Elf (10 ) and 
Agip (5 ) 
Netherlands 
and United 
Kingdom 1,800,000,000 
Accounts for about 40% of Nigeria’s 
total oil production. Oil mining lease 
area of 31,000km2 which is more 
than half of the country's oil reserves 
Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (MPNU) 1955 543,000 23 
NNPC (60 ) and 
Mobil (40 )  
United States 
of America 1,087,208,009  
Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) 1961 524,000 22 
NNPC (60) and 
Chevron (40 ) 
United States 
of America 1,049,165,740 
Operates in about 8,900 sq km n the 
Niger Delta region 
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company of Nigeria 
Unlimited (TOPCON) 1961 60,000 3 
 NNPC (60), 
Texaco (20 ) and 
Chevron (20)  
United States 
of America 120,133,482  
Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited (EPNL) (now Total Nigeria 
Plc as a result of merger between Total Nigeria Plc and Elf 
Oil Nigeria Ltd) 1962 125,000 5 
NNPC (60) and Elf 
(40 ) France 250,278,087  
Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC) (Now 
Oando) 1965 150,000 6 
NNPC (60 ), Agip 
(20 ) and Phillips 
Petroleum (20 )  Italy 300,333,704  
Other Producers (Ashland (USA), Deminex (Germany), 
Pan Ocean (Switzerland), British Gas (British), Sun Oil 
(USA), Conoco (USA), BP (British), Statoil (Norway), 
Conoil (Nigeria), Dubri Oil (Nigeria) 
various 
between 
1992-
2000 35,000 1   70,077,864  
Total  2,336,000 100   4,677,196,885  
*Some joint venture includes offshore drilling but majority on dry land or in the swamps of the Niger Delta 
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Appendix 4.2. Summary of Revenue Allocation by State 1999 – 2010. 
State 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Abia 13,033,079 54,916,532 65,594,977 72,991,095 104,135,034 137,236,045 159,464,232 192,858,753 187,141,525 265,444,854 207,110,233 137,914,089 
Adamawa 14,678,002 56,020,051 62,961,687 64,409,407 91,793,392 121,926,863 143,390,527 172,860,017 178,157,117 256,328,067 185,666,795 131,587,667 
Akwa 
Ibom 18,144,272 166,178,724 163,030,921 119,056,336 261,767,829 403,036,126 548,441,436 647,994,998 737,962,134 1,466,031,709 887,538,767 697,664,499 
Anambra 14,675,211 55,561,783 64,128,871 68,133,971 94,045,752 124,238,318 145,862,004 175,321,042 179,926,007 262,680,074 190,630,207 134,829,438 
Bauchi 15,362,652 58,718,075 67,467,662 71,572,133 98,426,002 136,079,830 162,072,425 195,524,143 201,188,105 300,784,654 216,571,593 153,335,343 
Bayelsa 14,205,540 134,470,531 152,047,021 162,731,057 267,765,479 455,922,663 690,641,347 784,189,325 527,452,392 1,014,539,862 441,262,780 333,052,231 
Benue 16,629,364 63,720,366 71,378,716 75,444,833 103,959,562 133,304,601 155,520,102 187,802,316 193,584,022 278,339,352 201,653,336 142,161,502 
Borno 16,982,094 65,203,092 72,837,299 76,878,294 106,112,625 139,234,052 163,786,687 198,661,261 203,152,527 303,117,141 218,029,091 154,905,900 
Cross 
Rivers 14,219,944 54,380,720 54,785,030 67,193,887 100,688,270 136,320,544 173,349,480 212,958,709 227,190,163 351,930,427 176,489,488 124,097,288 
Delta 20,035,569 209,148,463 239,124,213 263,444,682 374,826,115 488,941,170 572,618,893 704,956,493 577,258,209 991,146,912 794,943,657 603,052,682 
Ebonyi 11,374,926 43,334,973 55,061,548 59,356,154 82,118,600 104,927,795 122,051,657 147,431,944 152,096,740 215,688,390 156,765,490 110,398,477 
Edo 14,512,268 57,908,872 63,102,621 66,888,801 97,692,775 137,202,574 165,564,631 202,525,171 188,962,335 259,073,198 221,223,924 160,153,739 
Ekiti 11,824,697 45,049,155 49,794,009 52,418,030 72,552,067 101,553,136 121,721,063 147,118,084 151,682,717 217,921,968 158,195,993 111,515,742 
Enugu 12,717,876 48,391,704 58,636,187 62,913,164 87,301,355 115,825,141 137,050,995 164,310,092 169,994,653 236,986,017 177,380,077 116,689,762 
Gombe 11,856,140 44,673,155 52,053,799 55,371,282 76,637,052 104,963,968 124,130,781 150,076,963 153,785,892 228,338,764 165,691,785 117,086,418 
Imo 14,067,435 64,541,680 74,924,760 76,330,878 112,326,509 151,568,859 177,617,157 212,427,759 217,998,453 346,772,499 226,864,293 163,304,052 
Jigawa 15,275,951 58,371,447 64,509,557 67,912,384 93,815,551 131,505,866 157,653,249 190,186,850 195,855,611 285,681,707 205,686,613 145,853,049 
Kaduna 19,751,684 73,580,024 78,653,188 82,189,192 113,420,655 152,016,745 179,400,316 215,335,215 221,288,520 326,050,760 235,690,986 166,940,656 
Kano 21,617,740 82,142,263 94,571,579 100,259,908 138,383,083 183,812,614 218,549,800 265,748,778 272,899,200 414,173,976 300,133,125 212,963,594 
Katsina 18,167,879 69,531,546 72,743,768 75,928,579 104,834,162 142,541,726 169,322,096 204,316,520 210,563,865 311,124,305 225,256,847 159,425,382 
Kebbi 13,855,223 53,001,507 60,153,742 63,526,425 87,857,813 118,423,061 140,195,370 169,024,808 174,748,510 258,486,665 186,767,291 132,153,346 
Kogi 14,086,593 53,871,909 62,950,576 66,944,988 92,484,265 120,056,212 140,705,281 170,992,350 176,105,099 256,901,977 190,869,679 132,863,460 
Kwara 13,550,922 51,802,735 55,733,579 57,770,445 79,361,374 108,236,127 128,253,241 154,293,924 158,725,725 225,869,562 162,100,454 112,404,513 
Lagos 29,519,773 99,741,287 115,795,842 119,261,484 171,395,635 226,265,769 267,473,173 331,531,953 369,965,831 541,666,234 469,556,110 323,510,038 
Nassarawa 11,890,062 45,339,621 51,135,719 53,945,804 74,588,417 101,672,077 120,670,931 145,374,630 151,246,554 221,661,314 159,057,037 112,641,321 
Niger 16,564,194 63,612,934 68,450,490 71,561,383 98,802,999 135,438,899 161,083,425 194,336,153 199,851,298 287,246,889 214,228,338 151,856,228 
Ogun 15,583,344 58,577,282 62,727,950 65,582,852 90,345,129 118,505,465 139,804,181 167,188,315 172,888,822 253,904,498 184,068,200 130,088,379 
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Appendix 4.2 (cont …..) 
Ondo 14,655,302 86,866,346 99,481,635 80,679,962 124,085,289 166,638,978 224,916,284 315,383,863 332,928,562 549,485,487 316,780,912 234,676,772 
Osun 14,083,525 53,657,349 57,526,579 60,203,798 83,218,843 112,145,076 132,917,087 160,009,189 165,640,710 230,999,707 175,142,363 115,200,351 
Oyo 17,745,973 66,846,758 73,900,700 78,175,009 107,275,336 141,810,054 167,105,116 200,232,706 207,258,222 304,977,542 221,843,594 156,488,260 
Plateau 13,858,945 52,495,094 59,331,291 62,612,453 86,417,887 118,213,650 140,768,748 170,655,948 175,179,317 241,421,631 183,086,234 129,457,308 
Rivers 19,900,455 152,867,099 173,645,711 218,649,062 318,378,925 454,630,579 815,738,245 1,028,259,577 1,086,583,814 2,225,490,531 862,057,176 396,897,698 
Sokoto 14,466,908 55,352,091 61,119,366 64,342,199 88,751,134 124,408,154 149,167,106 179,289,772 185,731,231 269,854,476 194,711,002 136,965,546 
Taraba 13,713,272 52,732,934 58,431,293 61,497,890 84,910,918 115,640,742 137,395,503 165,854,363 171,525,072 251,114,322 180,529,741 128,008,624 
Yobe 13,270,008 50,907,661 60,749,575 64,815,496 89,460,553 114,620,140 133,484,079 160,944,590 167,683,841 250,406,160 179,664,635 127,426,601 
Zamfara 12,909,054 49,226,002 57,712,633 61,516,869 85,050,049 117,191,957 139,556,599 168,065,284 173,448,760 253,721,550 182,696,386 129,363,240 
Total 558,785,877 2,552,741,765 2,856,254,094 2,992,510,186 4,344,986,434 5,996,055,573 7,627,443,248 9,254,041,863 9,217,651,555 14,955,363,183 9,655,944,232 6,726,933,194 
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Appendix 4.3. A Highlight of Major Conflict and Incidences in the Niger Delta. 
Location and 
association involved State Year Incident Nature of violence 
All Delta (Ijaw, Urhobo 
and Itsekiri youths) 
All 
delta 1886 
Youth revolt against the British stop of middlemen in the 
trans-Atlantic trade Riot 
Isaac Adaka Boro 
All 
delta 1966 
Also called the 12 day revolution. Led by Issac Boro, who 
declared a Niger Delta Republic Secessionist   
Umuechem in Rivers 
state Rivers  1990 Peaceful youth protest against Shell 
The Community was virtually destroyed on 31 
October 1990; 80 people were killed and about 
500houses were destroyed. 
Ogoni (MOSOP) Rivers 
1993 - 
1996 
Closure of oil production, Killing of four Ogoni leaders (intra 
communal) and Ogoni vs Adoni disturbance (inter communal)  Killings, arrests floggings, rapes, looting. 
Nembe Creek Bayelsa 1994 Nembe-Kalabari communal crisis over fishing rights Soldiers were sent in 
Kaima and Yenagoa Bayelsa  1998/1999 
Youth gave ultimatum to oil companies to vacate the Niger 
delta 
Killings, flogging by police and state controlled 
military. 
Odi (Odi youth) Bayelsa 1999 Killing of seven Nigerian policemen in the community Killings and destruction of properties. 
Opia and Ikenyan Delta 1999 Youth demanding money and development from Chevron 
They (Chevron) reported to military who invaded the 
community killing scores. 
Choba Rivers 1999 
To disperse protesters outside the gate of Wilbros Nigeria Ltd 
a subsidiary of an American pipeline construction company. 
Rape especially of University students in Close by 
University of P/H 
Rumuekpe Rivers 2003 
Police hired by SPDC to protect them from the community 
while fixing a broken pipe.   
Finima Bayelsa  2001 
Youth occupied Mobil Terminal demanding more benefits to 
the community Arrests 
Liama Bayelsa 2002 
Kidnap of Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
staff. Indiscriminate shooting, arrest and killing  
Kalabari/Bille Rivers 2000/2001 Inter-communal conflict over ownership of oil flow station  
Gbarantoru Bayelsa 2002 Inter-communal fight over oil wells  
Warri Delta 2003 
Inter ethnic Urhobos and Itshekiri, fight over ownership of 
wards in Warri The military did not play much active part 
Various places in rivers 
including P/H, Okrika, 
Waterfront  2003-2007 
Cult clashes which extended to clashes with military and oil 
companies  
Odioma Bayelsa  2005 
A detachment of army, navy, police to arrest some alleged 
criminals in the community 
At least 17 people were killed, including a two year 
old child. 
Ayakoromor community Delta 2010 Renewed violence by Arm of MEND after Amnesty 
Killing, military claimed to be hunting down militant 
leader(John Togo) whose men killed military men. 
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Appendix 4.4. Threats to the Niger Delta Wetlands. 
Pressure Major service at risk/Impact Source 
Aquaculture 
 
Loss of mangrove with its rich biodiversity 
and attendant impact on livelihoods 
Davies et al. (2009), Zabbey et al. 
(2010) 
Oil exploration 
and exploitation 
activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Narcotic effects and mortality of fish and 
other faunal organisms/ dynamite shooting 
causes increases in turbidity, blockage of 
filter feeding apparatuses in benthic (bottom 
dwelling) fauna, and reduction of plant 
photosynthetic activity due to reduced light 
penetration.  
 
Ekundayo and Fodeke (2000), 
Ulocha and Okeke (2004), 
Twumasi and Merem (2006),  
James et al. (2007), Uyigue and 
Agbo (2007), Obot (2007),  
Ugochukwu and Ertel (2008),  
Luiselli (2009), Phil Eze and 
Okoro (2009), Zabbey et al. 
(2010)  
Dredging 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct burial and destruction of fringing 
mangroves and associated fauna/ Changing 
topography and hydrology/ Increased 
erosion and siltation/ Excessive flooding and 
ponding of the backswamp/ Estuarine 
acidification and heavy metal pollution/ 
Succession to freshwater vegetation 
Ohimain et al. (2004), Rim-ukeh 
et al. (2007), James et al. (2007) 
 
 
 
 
Invasive Plants (Nypa 
palm) 
 
Decrease in genetic diversity through loss of 
genetically distinct populations and 
hybridization with native species 
James et al. (2007), Phil-Eze and 
Okoro (2009), Zabbey et al. 
(2010). 
 
Damming activities 
 
reduction in water flow and 
sediment  
Abam (1999); Uluocha and 
Okeke (2004) 
Human activities (such 
as deforestation  
unsustainable hunting,  
overfishing, logging) 
 
Loss of flora and fauna  
 
 
 
 
Luiselli (2003), Luiselli et al. 
(2006), Phil-Eze and Okoro 
(2009) 
 
 
Wetland reclamation 
(agricultural and 
urbanisation) 
 
Loss of flora and fauna  
 
Wolf (2000), Twumasi 
and Merem (2006), James et al. 
(2007), Phil-Eze and Okoro 
(2009) 
Climate change 
Sea level rise, flooding, loss of lives and 
properties  
Uyigue and Agbo (2007) 
 
Other industrial and 
domestic effluents 
Soil and Water pollution  
 
Ugochukwu and Ertle (2008) 
 
Indiscriminate use of 
Fertilizer 
Water pollution  
 
Obire et al. (2008) 
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Appendix 5.1. Household Questionnaire.  
 
I am a PhD student of the University of Leeds and I am conducting my research on the uses of 
wetlands and the networks and institutions governing them. Please, kindly respond to the 
following questions as best as you can. If you feel uncomfortable or do not understand any 
question, please inform me and feel free to ask questions. I assure you that all information shall 
be treated in confidence and will be used only for academic purpose. Thank you in advance for 
your time and contribution to this study. 
 
Section A: Bio-data of Respondent 
Name: _________________________ Sex:  Male [  ]  Female [ ] 
Age/ Year of Birth: __________________________________________________ 
Marital Status:  Married [    ]  Single [    ]  Divorced [    ]  Widowed [    ]  
Educational Level or years of formal education: ___________________________ 
Main Occupation: ___________________ Number in Household ____________ 
Monthly Household Income _____________Main source of Household Income ___ 
Name of Village/Community: ____________Date/ Time Begin/End: ____________ 
Questionnaire number _________________________________________________ 
 
Section B: Knowledge and Use of Wetland 
1. Are you aware of the wetland in your community? Yes [  ] No [ ] 
2. What are for you the main characteristics of a wetland? _____________________ 
3. Can you tell me all the benefits derived from this wetland? (Table 1, Column 1) 
4. Which of these do you use the wetland for? (Column 2) 
5. Rank in order of importance the services you use the wetland for (Column 3). 
Table1: Q4 to Q6 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
   
   
   
   
 
Section C: Value of Wetland (fill this section for all service you use the wetland)  
1. Activity ______________________________________________________ 
2. How long have you been using the wetland for this? ___________________ 
3. How did you gain access to use the wetland for this purpose? Inheritance/lease/others  
4. What time of the year (months) do you carry out this activity and why? ____ 
5. How many families in this community use the wetland for this purpose? ____ 
6. Which type of this service do you collect? (Table 2, Column 1) 
7. How often do you collect each of these? (Column 2) 
8. What quantity of each of these do you collect each time? (Column 3) 
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9. How much of your time does it take to collect this quantity? (Column 4) 
10. What quantity (of each type) do you use personally? (Column 5) 
11. What quantity did you give out? (Column6) 
12. What quantity did you give out in exchange? (Column 7) 
13. What quantity did you sell? (Column 8) 
14. What else do you do with this benefit? ______________________________ 
 
Table 2 – Q6 to Q13 
Column 
1 
Column 
2 
Column 
3 
Column 
4 
Column 
5 
Column 
6 
Column  
7 
Column 
8 
        
        
        
        
1. How long is it from your home to the place of collection? _______(mins/hrs) 
2. How do you transport from your home to and from the place of collection? Walk [ ] 
Public transport [ ] Cost) _________ Personal Transport [ ]Others (specify) _______ 
3. Why do you choose to use the wetland for this purpose? _________________ 
4. Is this benefit available in other places outside the wetland? Yes [  ] No [  ] 
5. If yes, where? (describe)___________________________________ 
6. Do you also use benefits from these source(s)? Yes [  ]  No [ ] 
7. If yes, how will you describe access to this? Very easy [   ] Very difficult [   ] 
8. Which of these sources do you use the most? (rank) ____________________ 
9. Do you hire external labour for this activity? Yes [  ] No [   ] 
10. If yes, how much do you pay? ____________________________________ 
11. Please, list all the tools/equipments you use in this activity (Table 3, Column 1) 
12. How do you get these? Bought, lease, borrowed etc (Column 2) 
13. How many of each do you use/have (Column 3) 
Table 3 – Q26 to Q28 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
   
   
   
   
1. Where do you sell? In this community [] Outside this community (specify) ___ 
2. To whom do you sell them? ______________________________________ 
3. Did you incur transport cost? Yes [   ]  No [  ] 
4. If yes, how much? ______________________________________________ 
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5. Do you make other product from these benefits? Yes [  ] No [  ] 
6. If yes, what other products? (Table 4, Column 1)  
Table 4 – Q34 to Q36 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
   
   
   
1. What do you use these for? (sell, personal use, gift, etc Column 2). 
2. If you sell, indicate quantity made and price (Column 3).  
3. How will you describe the recent status of this benefit in the wetlands in the past years?  
Increasing[ ], Decreasing [  ], Not changing [  ],  No Idea[ ] 
4. What are the factors responsible for these changes? ___________________ 
5. How has these changes affected your household ___________________ 
6. How have you adapted to these changes? _____________________________ 
7. What are the major factors that affect your ability to use the wetland for this activity?  
 
Section D: General 
1. From this list, please rank (1 is most important) in order of importance the factors that 
influences your action in the wetland 
Social consideration (such as ethnicity and religion)   
Profit maximisation   
Protection of cultural values of the wetland   
Risk avoidance - protection against floods, erosion etc   
Uphold of the biodiversity and living environment   
Repercusion and punishment   
 
2. From this list, rank in order of importance the activity affecting your activity the most 
Collection of materials   
Fishing   
Land reclamation   
Lumbering   
Oil pollution/exploration   
Protection of wetland areas as reserve   
Tourism   
Invasive plant  
Others (specify)   
 
3. Please, list at least 5 main people and or groups you interact with while using the wetland 
 1   
 2   
 3   
 4   
 5   
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Section E: Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept 
 
1. Willingness to Pay 
 
The Niger Delta wetlands are important ecosystem in the region. It provides diverse ecosystem 
services of importance to local residents. The wetlands are threatened by various human 
activities and if care is not taken its ability to continually supply these important ecosystem 
services will be threatened.  
 
A project is planned to improve the quality of the wetlands ecosystem so that it can continue to 
provide the services important to local residents. This project will entail you to make a financial 
contribution towards the cost of improving the wetlands.  
 
Considering all the benefits your households derive from the wetlands (the concepts of 
ecosystem services (including regulating and supporting services) should be explained), how 
much will you be willing to pay monthly towards this project? 
 
2. If not willing to contribute, please state why _____________________________ 
 
3. Willingness to Accept 
 
On the other hand during the execution of the project which will last one year, you will not be 
able to use any of the wetland ecosystem services you derive from the wetlands. However, in this 
scenario you are not expected to pay any money but the government will request the project 
managers to compensate each household for their foregoing these services. How much will you 
expect to be paid as compensation for foregoing these services? 
 
4. Why did you choose this amount?______________________________________ 
 
5. Any other comment? 
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Appendix 5.2. Questionnaire for Representatives of Various Organizations 
 
I am a PhD student of the University of Leeds and I am conducting my research on the uses of 
wetlands and the networks and institutions governing them. Please, kindly respond to the 
following questions as best as you can. If you feel uncomfortable or do not understand any 
question, please inform me and feel free to ask questions. I assure you that all information shall 
be treated in confidence and will be used only for academic purpose. Thank you in advance for 
your time and contribution to this study. 
 
Olalekan Adekola 
University of Leeds, UK 
 
Section A: Background Data 
Questionnaire No: ___________________ Audio Number ____________ 
Name (optional): ____________________ Gender: Male [ ]   Female [  ] 
Age ______________________________ Educational level___________ 
Organization _______________________ Rank/Status ______________ 
How long have you being working in this organization ___________________ 
Please, describe your (and organizations) activities relating to the Niger Delta and the wetlands?  
 
Section B: Institutions Governing Use of Wetlands 
1. Are you aware of the rules guiding how people should use the wetland? If yes, which one 
and please, describe? (fill out Table 1 below). 
 
2. What are the benefits and challenges of each of these rules and how have you and people 
you know adapted to these?  
 
3. Do you think the current rules are appropriate? If yes, explain their strengths; if no which 
aspects of it do you think should be modified? 
 
4. Have you ever been personally involved in setting rules on how people use the wetlands? If 
yes what was your role? If no are you aware of anyone who has? 
 
5. For each of the rules you mentioned please can you tell me how it works (if not already 
described in 1 above).  
 
6. What do you think of each of these rules with reasons? 
 
7. Do you or have you previously practiced any of these rules or supported it? If not why? 
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8. If you have practiced or supported it, why did you and does it enable you to meet your 
objectives? 
 
9. What factors influence your activities and action in the wetland? 
 
Table 1: Question 1 - 8 
Institution  Aware Support 
Land Use Act   
EIA Law   
Forestry laws   
Local/communal land ownership    
Communal religious institutions    
Communal method of resource extraction    
Institution of  land sale by communities   
Institution of militancy   
Varied state institution exchanges   
Memorandum of Understanding   
   
   
 
Section C: Institutional Linkages 
1. Which organizations (e.g.  donor organization; NGOs, research institutes, etc) take part in 
wetland policy formulation and implementation and what specific roles do they play? 
 
2. In what ways do you or your organization work with people from these organizations or 
relate with the organization? 
 
3. How will you describe your interaction with these organizations and how frequently do you 
meet with people from their face to face? 
 
4. What are the main contents of these interactions? Share information, capacity building etc 
 
5. Are you able to freely discuss with other groups/individuals outside formal settings? If yes, 
on which issues, and is this always helpful? if no why? 
 
6. How important is informal interaction with these organization to you (describe). 
 
7. How has previous interactions with other people/groups affected your present mode of 
interaction? 
 
8. Including people from the organizations you have already mentioned and those listed on 
Table 2, who are the people you interact with and which organization are they from. Give 
their names if you can or describe them with details of nature of interaction.  
 
9. For each identified, please indicate on a scale of 1 (weakest) to 5 (strongest) how strong 
these interactions/relationships are.  
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10. Please, for each pair of people you mentioned can you kindly indicate if you think they 
interact and how strong these interactions are? 
 
11. For each one can you describe positives and negatives of these interactions?  
 
12. Including the organizations you mentioned, do you read about them? if yes, how frequently?  
 
13. From the list of stakeholders provided in Table 1, please, on a scale of 1-5, please indicate 
how much you trust each of these actors, how much they influence you and how important 
you think they are to wetland management (1 is low, 5 is highest. If you don’t know an 
organization indicate 0).  
 
Section D. Actors Narratives 
1. How will you describe the problems facing the Niger Delta region (specifically the 
wetlands) and how do you think these challenges can be solved.  
 
2. If you are to describe the various groups in the Niger Delta as victims, villains, fixers and 
heroes how will you describe each of the organization you mentioned and why? 
 
3. What suggestion would you make for improvement in wetland policy in Nigeria? 
 
Section E: Actors Organization  
1. Do you consider your organization to be independent with respect to planning its activities? 
Please, explain your answer. 
 
2. What is the level of resource availability (finance, manpower, etc) to carry out its activities? 
 
3. How will you describe the level of training you receive on your present job? 
 
4. Is it always possible to strictly apply rules during your operations? Yes/No. if no, explain the 
condition under strict application of rules is not possible 
 
5. What factors do you consider in taking decisions on your actions when you meet people 
engaging illegal things in the wetland? 
 
6. Any other comments   
 
 
 
301 
 
 
Table 1: Pre Identified List of Actors  
Identified Stakeholders Trust Influence Importance 
Anpez Centre for Environment and Development       
Birdlife international        
Donor Agencies (such as DFID, UNEP, World Bank)       
Ecological Fund Office       
Legislative officials       
Living Earth Nigeria Foundation       
Local communities       
Logging and Plantation Companies       
Ministry of Agriculture       
Ministry of Culture and Tourism       
Ministry of Environment       
Ministry of Justice       
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs       
Ministry of Petroleum Resources       
Ministry of Water Resources       
Niger Delta Development Commission       
Niger Delta Wetland Centre       
Nigerian Conservation Foundation       
Nigerian Conservation Foundation       
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation        
Oil Multinationals       
Pronatura Nigeria       
Ramsar Secretatriat       
Researchers       
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds       
Wetland International       
Others (Indicate below)       
 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA)       
 National Environmental Standards Regulations 
Enforcement Agency (NASREA)       
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Appendix 5.3. Guide for Focus Group Discussion. 
 
Date:  
Time:  
Venue:  
Group: 
Members: 
 
1. Welcome: Explain purpose of the discussion and expected result. Explain the rules and 
encourage openness; indicate time to be taken and that they can clarify issues and that I only 
serve as facilitator. 
 
2. General discussion about their activities in the wetland with specific emphasis on the main 
ecosystem service derived by the group (types of services, period of harvesting, challenges 
faced etc). 
 
3. What is the procedure for different categories of people to gain access to the ecosystem 
service. 
 
4. Describe labor and input requirement, price and durability as well as price of produce.  
 
5. Why do you engage in this activity?   
 
6. Knowledge of and experiences with various rules and institutions (detailed description 
needed) governing activity in the wetland. 
 
7. Intra group interaction i.e. relationship among members and sources of knowledge and 
practices. 
 
8. Categorisation of groups as victims, villains and fixers of the wetland and why? 
 
9. General discussion 
 
10. Thank them and tell them of final presentation and possibility they could still be met for 
further information. 
 
11. Refreshments! With further discussions to clarify any grey areas one on one. 
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Appendix 6.1. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents and their Households. 
Particulars  Percentage N = 283 Average 
Settlement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amassoma 18.4 
  
Angiama 7.4 
Apoi 1.8 
Kaima 8.1 
Odi 11.3 
Ogbia 6.4 
Ogbolomabiri 2.8 
Okpuama 11.0 
Onyioma 2.1 
Oporoma 14.1 
Yenagoa 11.0 
Zarama 5.7 
Gender 
 
Male 70.5 
  Female 29.5 
Marital Status 
 
 
Married 63.9 
  
Single 23.0 
Divorced 3.3 
Widowed 9.8 
Age Group 
 
 
 
<30 2.0 
50.4 
 
 
 
30-39 8.2 
40-49 46.9 
50-59 19.4 
60-69 20.4 
>70 3.1 
Education 
 
 
None 31.1 
  
Primary 14.4 
Secondary 46.7 
Post Secondary/Degree 5.6 
Post Graduate 2.2 
Household Size 
 
 
1-2 6.0 
6.23 
 
 
3-4 12.7 
5-6 40.3 
7-8 29.3 
>8 11.7 
Household Income (Naira) 
 
 
< 20000 60.1 
21653 
 
 
20000-39999 22.3 
40000-59999 8.5 
60000-79999 3.9 
>80000 1.4 
No response 3.9 
Occupation 
 
 
 
Business/Trader/Self employed 5.7 
  
Civil servant 15.5 
Company worker 6.7 
Farmer 28.0 
Fisherman 8.0 
Unemployed 33.6 
Pension 2.5 
Main Uses (Ecosystem services) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provisioning Services    
Crop production 85.5 
 
Fishing 88.7 
Hunting 57.2 
Logging 9.2 
Material collection 100.0 
Cultural Services   
Spiritual and religious 25.8 
 
Recreation (swimming) 31.4 
Regulating Services (mainly flood and erosion 
control, water purification and waste treatment 
and climate regulation) 14.5 
 
Supporting services  (mainly nutrient cycling, 
primary production and transportation) 6.0 
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Appendix 6.2 Monetary Value of Material Collection in the Niger Delta Wetlands. 
 
Common 
name Local name 
Botanical 
name 
No of 
participating 
household 
(PPH) 
1Yield/PP
H 
Total 
Yield Self-used Sold Others Price 
Gross financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash Income 
(CI) Uses/Remarks 
S
p
ic
es
, 
 
African 
nutmeg 
Igina, 
Okogolo or 
pepper fruit 
Monodora 
myristica 62 3.80 236 33.56 65.09 1.35 
           
1,500  
                 
353,400  
                 
230,028  
it is used as a popular spice in cuisine, the seeds 
are dried and sold whole or ground. The leaves 
and barks are also used for medicinal purposes 
 Angei  54 2.50 135 24.15 72.04 3.82 
           
2,500  
                 
337,500  
                 
243,123   
 Arigogo  72 2.20 158 19.05 76.26 4.70 
           
3,000  
                 
475,200  
                 
362,370   
Aridan plant Opakipaki 
tetrapleutra 
tetraptera 13 0.89 12 3.65 95.99 0.35 
               
200  
                      
2,314  
                      
2,221  
is used as a spice, a medicine and as a dietary 
supplement rich in vitamins. Widely used in 
African traditional medicine for the management 
and/or control of an array of human ailments, 
including schistosomiasis, asthma, epilepsy, 
hypertension and so on 
 Aziza Piper quineense 101 3.20 323 49.06 42.90 8.04 
           
3,000  
                 
969,600  
                 
415,961   
W
il
d
 f
o
o
d
 c
ro
p
s,
 n
u
ts
 a
n
d
 f
ru
it
s 
 
Alligator 
pepper 
(Grain of 
paradise) Sani 
Aframomum 
melegueta 54 2.80 151 37.55 54.05 8.41 
           
3,500  
                 
529,200  
                 
286,010   
Bush Mango Ogbono 
Irvingia 
gabonensis 179 3.91 700 9.10 90.90 0.00 
         
10,000  
              
7,004,990  
              
6,367,536  
The kernel from the tree is eaten as soup. The 
bark of the tree is used for chewing stick and 
also an important timber, but seldom cut down 
because of its importance as a source of food.  
Oil palm  Lou/Banga Elaeis guinensis  141 9.40 1325 15.00 45.00 40.00 
           
5,000  
              
6,627,000  
              
2,982,150  
This is an important source of kernel oil and 
palm (red oil) that have immense culinary and 
industrial uses. The stem, the fond, the mesocarp 
fiber and the kernel have various traditional and 
domestic uses 
Rafia palm  Koro or Bou 
Raphia 
hookeri: Family
, Palmaceae or 
Palmae 101 11.90 1202 0.00 100.00 0.00 
           
4,250  
              
5,108,075  
              
5,108,075  
It is an important source of traditional gin 
(Ogogoro) drank locally and used for traditional 
rittuals. It is also used for art and craft purposes 
in making brooms, baskets, hats, mats, roofing 
Bush beans 
Ukwachi, 
Oyun 
Phaseolus 
vulgaris 56 4.50 252 64.07 23.46 12.47 
           
3,000  
                 
756,000  
                 
177,329   
Bitter Kola Ikan/Akan Garcinia kola 66 4.80 317 6.33 89.33 4.35 
           
5,000  
              
1,584,000  
              
1,414,914   
Fruit nuts 
(several) 
Bread nut, 
Iginiyea, 
Karafeye  185 27.60 5106 83.33 6.24 10.44 
           
3,500  
           
17,871,000  
              
1,114,328   
Kolanut Dabio Cola spp 82 3.30 271 13.36 84.08 2.56 
           
5,000  
              
1,353,000  
              
1,137,620  
Kolanut is eaten and also has social and 
religious values as an item of    hospitality 
and communing with    deities respectively 
and are also important material in 
masticatory and in winery and 
pharmaceutical industries 
Oil bean Ugbaka or  
Pentaclethera 
macroloba 41 11.67 478 26.32 70.46 3.21 
           
2,500  
              
1,196,151  
                 
842,819  
The fruits are used for food and medicinal 
purpose 
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Common 
name Local name 
Botanical 
name 
No of 
participating 
household 
(PPH) 
1Yield/PP
H 
Total 
Yield Self-used Sold Others Price 
Gross financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash Income 
(CI) Uses/Remarks 
In
se
ct
s,
 G
as
tr
o
p
o
d
s,
 B
iv
al
v
es
 a
n
d
 o
th
er
 a
q
u
at
ic
 
Snail Osi 
Archachatina 
marginata 189 29.05 5491 16.20 81.50 2.30 
           
3,500  
           
19,217,898  
           
15,662,587  
This is a Gastropod, the meat is eaten 
while the shell is used for ritual purpose or 
for reinforcement of concerns in place of 
gravels.  
Butterfly 
caterpillars Abalabala 
Mainly 
Bunaea 
alcinoe 57 5.94 339 8.33 90.42 1.25 
           
3,500  
              
1,185,888  
              
1,072,275  
Insect Aesthetic values and food for man 
and feed for animals, Pollination  
Mushroom (edible) 
agraricus 
spp, 
mushroom 
amanita 99 2.15 213 90.90 8.24 0.86 
           
5,000  
              
1,062,765  
                    
87,523  
edible ones are eaten while poisonous ones 
are used for medicinal purposes  
commonly Clam, 
mussels, water 
snails, oyster 
Okp
oku 
/Ogb
ou Bivalves 137 12.25 1678 51.65 47.38 0.97 
           
5,000  
              
8,391,695  
              
3,975,941  
Muluscs eaten and the shell used as 
reinforcements in concrete in place of 
gravels.  
Crabs Otor 
Cardisoma 
armatum 78 12.29 959 25.00 66.70 8.30 
           
5,000  
              
4,794,343  
              
3,197,827   
Crayfish, Prawns 
and Shrimps 
Aza
mu, 
Opur
u or 
Otut
u Crusteceans 183 25.10 4593 12.36 84.39 3.26 
           
7,500  
           
34,445,383  
           
29,067,005  
All lobsters are generally regarded as 
crayfish in the Delta.  
Palm beetle 
Oko
ko 
Orycytes 
monocerus 86 3.11 267 33.33 61.35 5.33 
           
5,000  
              
1,335,236  
                 
819,150  
Insect Pretentious and food supplements 
for human and livestock feed, support 
biodegradation and pollination 
Palm weavel  
Dou
n 
Rhyncophoru
s pheengis 107 4.17 446 57.10 41.94 0.96 
           
7,500  
              
3,345,321  
              
1,403,148  
Is an insect delicious protenious and fatty 
food supplement for human. This is a very 
popular snack among the Ijaws that is fast 
gaining national acceptability. 
Periwinkle 
Isanb
i 
Tympanotonu
s fuscatus 
var radula (a 
brackish 
water habitat) 
and 
Pachymelania 
aurita (Fresh 
water) 119 2.38 283 27.33 70.65 2.03 
           
5,000  
              
1,417,332  
              
1,001,331  
Sources  of   animal  protein, the shells are 
also used in concrete reinforcements  
W
o
o
d
, 
ar
t 
an
d
 c
ra
ft
 
Indian Bamboo 
Abad
iipiri 
Oxytenanther
a albyssinica 88 26.80 2358 21.03 78.97 0.00 
           
5,000  
           
11,791,251  
              
9,311,008   
Firewood and 
other wood 
materials Fene  148 28.88 4275 35.33 61.42 3.26 
               
250  
              
1,068,657  
                 
656,348  
Okulu is made from some wood collected 
from the wetland and used in fishing  
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Common name 
Local 
name 
Botanical 
name 
No of 
participating 
household 
(PPH) 
1Yield/PP
H 
Total 
Yield Self-used Sold Others Price 
Gross financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash Income 
(CI) Uses/Remarks 
Cane rope for art 
and craft collected 
from raffia etc 
Apie 
/Kan
a  53 2.37 125 20.38 11.26 68.37 
           
3,000  
                 
376,035  
                    
42,337   
Chewing stick 
Duo
n  76 29.03 2207 2.94 95.70 1.36 
               
500  
              
1,103,298  
              
1,055,878   
M
at
er
ia
l 
ex
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 Sand mining  
You
n-sai  23 978.35 22502 0.00 100.00 0.00 
           
2,000  
           
45,004,125  
           
45,004,125   
Native chalk Tori Kaolin 48 1.23 59 1.03 97.10 1.87 
           
5,000  
                 
295,440  
                 
286,879  
Used for medicinal and traditional (used 
during festivals and rituals) purposes It 
helps with indigestion, dydpepsia and 
heart burn 
O
th
er
s 
Palm wine tapping Koro rafia raffia 29 11.56 335 14.33 84.44 1.24 
           
5,000  
              
1,676,573  
              
1,415,672   
Honey 
Aka
ma Apis mellifera 49 1.52 74 6.33 92.36 1.32 
           
5,000  
                 
371,216  
                 
342,842  
source of energy and sweatness and used 
for medicinal purposes Honey as food and 
medicinal uses e.g to heal burns, 
Pollination and defoliation 
Native Gin 
Ogo
goro  12 1.23 15 2.37 96.35 1.29 
           
2,500  
                    
36,960  
                    
35,611   
Total (N) 
         
181,086,845  
         
135,121,970   
Total ($) 1,207,246  
                 
900,813   
Average per participation household ($) 
                      
4,266  
                      
3,183   
Net financial value ($) 
              
1,051,101    
Average ne financial value per participation household ($) 
                      
3,714    
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Appendix 6.3. Medicinal Plants and Materials Derived From the Niger Delta Wetlands.  
Common Name Local Name Botanical Name Ailment used for 
Bitter Leaf Orugbo Vernonia Spp to treat malaria 
Bush Mango Ogbono Tree  Morning sickness treatment 
Bush Marigold  Aspilla Africanna wild margold , grass for blood clothing 
Cocoa Palm O Du  for abortion 
Kernel Oil E Ve On Dei  To heal convulsion in children 
Mango Bark   For treating malaria 
Native Gin O Goo Goo Ru  to treat burns 
Paw Paw Leaf/Unripe 
Pawpaw Ondu Carica Papaya For Typhoid  
Plantain Root / Bark Abaghan  For treating broken bones (orthopaedic application) 
Pumpkin Leaf O Gu Leaf  for low blood pressure 
Pumpkin Leaves O Gu Leaf Teltera Occidentalis 
Very rich in mineral nutrients also used as vegetable and blood 
supplement 
Scent Leaf 
Fro Ca Na/ 
Kanranforo Amadalyner Sp For headache 
 To Bo Da Tu O  stop bleeding during pregnancy 
 In Dem O  Used during pregnancy 
 Ken Buo Tia  For male fertility  
 E Yon Kor E  To heal wound 
 Beri Soun Le  To heal convulsion in children 
 A Bo E  As analthestic for pain relief 
 Sis Se Re Se  To heal injuries 
 Be Re Ba Bo  Treat burn apply to surface 
 A Ba La La  To treat ear ache 
 To Bo Da Tu O  so woman will not lose baby 
 Be La Me Me  to abort babies safely 
 Yon Ko Ra  Treat injury 
 O Bu Do  to treat diabetics 
 Da Sin Sin  to trat if you pass too much urine 
 O Bu Le Me Me  For pregnant women 
 Pow O Bre Ma  To treat injury 
 Ko Bo Tor O  stop bleeding during pregnancy 
 Beri Soun Le  for abortion and to remove placenta 
 A Ba La La  for pregnancy to save a pregnancy 
 A Bul Le Me La  same as above 
 A Ga Ga Tree  to increase man’s libido 
 Tim Pa Lay  to heal fracture 
 Bu Lo Bo  for chest and back pain 
 A Ma Se De Re  for optometric application and as analgesic 
 E Fen De Re   to treat malaria and ringworm 
 En Ge  to treat joint pain  
 Elephant Grass   to remove object from eye 
 
Native Chalk And 
Aligator Pepper  Used alongside many remedies 
 
 
308 
 
 
Appendix 6.4. Monetary Value of Fishing in the Niger Delta Wetlands. 
Common 
name Local name Botanical name 
No of 
participating 
household 
(PPH) 
1Yield/P
PH 
Total 
Yield 
Self-
used Sold Others Price 
Gross 
financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash 
Income (CI) Uses/Remarks 
African 
arowana 
Akeo or 
ogolokolo Heterotis niloticus 44 16.2 713 23.5 74.5 2.1 
         
10,000  
              
7,126,158  
              
5,307,845  
Eaten by many people, young ones are used for 
aquarium. It is popular fish in aquaculture in the delta. 
The fish is common when flood reside in the late flood 
season. 
African 
Knife Fish Ipelepele Xenomystus nigri 18 4.2 76 17.4 78.4 4.2 
           
1,500  
                 
114,206  
                    
89,526  
This fish common in local fish ponds is becoming rare. 
It is widely eaten by many people.  
African 
River Pike Usawu 
Hepsetus odoe 
Hydrosy 14 10.5 146 43.6 55.8 0.5 
           
2,000  
                 
292,619  
                 
163,388  
Used for human consumption by few because of its 
many tiny bones. It is also used to control the population 
of Tilapia in artificial ponds and control/wipe out 
leeches in water bodies.  
Blood Fish Okuwun 
Phractolaemus 
ansorgei 39 20.2 787 9.1 77.3 13.6 
           
2,000  
              
1,574,653  
              
1,216,892  
Eaten by few people, still relatively abundant in the 
area.  
Bonga fish  Fieru 
Ethmalosa 
fimbriata 29 4.6 133 17.9 76.8 5.3 
           
3,000  
                 
398,444  
                 
305,879  
Widely eaten by many as source of animal protein. It is 
mostly processed dry before sale. Abundant in coastal 
wetlands  
Butterfly 
fish or 
freshwater 
flying fish Idoumakoti Pantodon buchoizi 4 1.8 7 23.5 24.5 52.1 
               
800  
                      
5,653  
                      
1,383  
Eaten by few, but mainly used for aesthetic purposes in 
aquarium and as fish bait by fishermen.  
Catfish 
(various 
types) 
Opowei, Torio, 
Oloma, Obu, 
Oboro, Burian 
(Golden catfish), 
Ongolo (Silver 
catfish), Otoin 
Siluriformes or 
Arius species, 
clarias 
heterobrancus, 
Clarias Geritinus, 
Clarias 
anguillaris, 
Bagrus spp 205 22.9 4700 4.1 95.3 0.7 
           
9,500  
           
44,648,840  
           
42,530,252  
Eaten by many people and widely farmed in aquaculture 
farms. 
Croacker  
estuarine 
sciaenidae 11 4.8 52 18.9 76.3 4.9 
         
10,000  
                 
522,708  
                 
398,684  Widely eaten, but declining  
Drum fish Obubu 
Aplodinotus 
grunniens 14 0.8 12 2.3 65.4 32.3 
               
500  
                      
5,836  
                      
3,816  
Eaten by few, mostly used for aesthetic purposes and as 
fish bait. It is becoming rare 
Electric fish Oma 
Malapterurus 
electricus 100 14.9 1494 24.4 10.3 65.4 
           
2,000  
              
2,987,069  
                 
306,473  
Used for human consumption and for aesthetic purposes 
in aquarium.  
Freshwater 
herrings Shoun 
Sierrathrissa 
leonensis  23 4.6 106 34.8 57.7 7.5 
           
7,000  
                 
742,710  
                 
428,815  Widely eaten by many and used in aquarium.  
Grass eater Eweri 
Family 
distichodontidae 
(mailnly  
distichodus 
brevipinnis) 13 2.6 34 11.0 88.0 1.0 
         
13,000  
                 
439,491  
                 
386,693  
Eaten by many however, has tiny bones which 
discourage some.  
Leaf fish 
Epepe or 
Belegbolupe 
Polycentropsis 
abbreviate 17 6.3 108 42.9 56.0 1.1 
               
700  
                    
75,470  
                    
42,278  
Used as food as well as aesthetic purposes in aquarium 
and as fish baits.  
Lung fish Ebiesieni 
Protopterius 
annectens 94 20.0 1877 18.3 68.0 13.7 
           
3,000  
              
5,631,659  
              
3,830,936  Used as food. 
Moon fish Afou or Apepe 
Family 
Cithranidae (such 
as Citharinus 
citharus) 17 9.1 154 34.6 62.6 2.8 
           
3,000  
                 
462,289  
                 
289,356  This common lake fish is widely eaten by many. 
Mud fish  Olomo  
Clarias 
anguillaris 158 18.5 2922 20.5 59.6 19.9 
         
10,000  
           
29,215,489  
           
17,425,579  
Eaten by many people and widely farmed in aquaculture 
farms. 
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Appendix 6.4 (cont ….) 
Common 
name Local name Botanical name 
No of 
participating 
household 
(PPH) 
1Yield/P
PH 
Total 
Yield 
Self-
used Sold Others Price 
Gross 
financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash 
Income (CI) Uses/Remarks 
Niger perch 
or Nile 
perch fish Kina or Gogoba Lates niloticus 10 13.6 136 29.8 65.8 4.4 
         
12,500  
              
1,698,743  
              
1,117,024  Widely eaten by many 
Reed fish Ogbaru 
Polyterus 
ansorgei, E. 
calabaricus  14 6.3 88 13.5 85.1 1.4 
           
4,500  
                 
395,549  
                 
336,672  
Widely eaten as food and used for aesthetic purposes in 
aquarium 
Silverside 
Aza or Ewere or 
Ekolokolo or 
Iliye 
Arnoldichthys 
spilopetrus or 
brytinus spp 10 6.8 68 62.2 36.9 0.9 
           
2,000  
                 
135,899  
                    
50,206  Eaten for food. 
Snake Head  Iyoruo 
Parachanna obscu
ra 98 32.8 3216 10.4 89.4 0.3 
           
4,500  
           
14,470,496  
           
12,929,389  
Widely eaten by many. Also effective has 
environmental (bio) cleaning effect. 
Threadfin  Apuru 
family 
polynemidae 14 4.2 59 29.2 69.3 1.6 
         
10,000  
                 
588,162  
                 
407,352  Widely eaten as food.  
Tilapia Itabala 
Family Cichlidae 
(such as 
Sarotherodon 
galilaeus) 143 56.4 8065 8.6 83.9 7.5 
           
4,500  
           
36,292,282  
           
30,438,337  
Widely eaten by many people and also popular fish in 
aquaculture. 
Trunk fish 
Ugbala or Aba 
or Izimu 
(Elephant trunk 
fish) 
Order 
mormyriformes 
(especially 
Hyperoplsus bebe 
occidentallis), 
Gymnarchus 
niloticus 37 8.0 294 17.5 76.2 6.3 
           
4,500  
              
1,324,543  
              
1,009,224  Widely eaten as food.  
Unknown 
Hekpu, Igbiri, 
Ebedebe, 
Ahumo, Agiti  132 10.1 1335 24.6 73.3 2.1 
           
5,000  
              
6,673,206  
              
4,890,792  
These are the many fishes local names given but could 
not be identified.  
Total (N) 
         
155,822,175  
         
123,906,790   
Total ($) 
              
1,038,815 
                 
826,045   
Average per participation household ($) 
                      
4,139  
                      
3,291   
Net financial value ($) 854,509   
Average ne financial value per participation household ($) 3,404   
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Appendix 6.5. Monetary Value of Cropping in the Niger Delta Wetlands. 
 
Common 
name Local name Botanical name 
No of 
participating 
household 
(PPH) 
1Yield/
PPH 
Total 
Yield 
Self-
used Sold 
Added 
value 
Other
s Price 
Gross 
financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash 
Income 
(CI) 
Yield/ha 
(ton/ha) Uses 
African 
pear Ube Dacryodes edulis 32 16.2 
               
519  15.2 83.5 0.0 1.2 
         
2,000  
              
1,037,791  
                     
866,867      
Alligator 
pepper or 
Grain of 
paradise Sani 
Aframomum 
melegueta 19 2.0 
                 
39  2.6 96.3 0.0 1.1 
         
3,500  
                 
135,306  
                     
130,300  2.7 
Used as spice for cooking, medicinal 
purpose to cure common cough and in 
ritual observance. Also an important 
component in making traditional "bullet 
proof".  
Avocado 
pear Osonson Persea gratissima 13 43.7 
               
568  7.3 90.3 0.0 2.4 
         
2,500  
              
1,420,180  
                  
1,282,423  51.3 
Commonly eaten with bread as substitute 
for margarine. 
Banana  Pina Abana Musa paradisaca 132 36.7 
           
4,844  17.6 80.9 0.0 1.5 
         
3,000  
           
14,532,707  
               
11,756,960  34.2   
Bitter kola Ekann Garcinia kola 47 9.3 
               
438  1.5 97.5 0.0 1.1 
         
5,000  
              
2,191,489  
                  
2,135,606    
Eaten widely for different purposes 
including medicinal as it has spiritual 
healing factors attached to it. 
Cassava 
Inbikaka or 
Ebiaburu Manihot esculenta 217 72.8 
         
15,805  15.3 19.4 60.2 5.2 
         
1,000  
           
15,804,661  
                  
3,062,153  22.3 
Eaten as food and used for many other 
product such as garri, fufu, akpain, 
tapioka, chips, starch. Also used for 
animal feed.  
Cocoa   Theobroma cacao 11 2.8 
                 
30  10.3 89.7 0.0 0.0 
         
1,000  
                    
30,274  
                        
27,168  0.4   
Coconut  Okokodia Cocos nucifera 70 7.2 
               
506  23.6 68.1   8.3 
         
1,500  
                 
759,717  
                     
517,298  2.8 
The leaves are used for craft purpose i.e. 
for making brooms. Also grow wild. 
Cocoyam Amacy/Odu 
Colocasia esculenta 
or xanthosoma 
sagittifolium 191 35.1 
           
6,709  36.8 41.9 0.0 21.3 
            
800  
              
5,367,024  
                  
2,250,930  17.6   
Cucumber   Cucumis sativus 84 14.2 
           
1,196  8.5 87.7   3.8 
         
1,350  
              
1,614,325  
                  
1,415,091  33.0   
Kolanut 
(White and 
Red) Dabio Cola spp 91 6.2 
               
567  4.1 93.8   2.1 
         
5,000  
              
2,836,738  
                  
2,661,845    
Eaten and used for medicinal purpose in 
cure of chest pain and as a stimulant 
Fluted 
pumpkin 
fruit Ogwu 
Telfairia 
occidentalis 101 222.1 
           
2,235  10.4 80.6 0.0 9.0 
            
500  
              
1,117,292  
                     
900,872  7.9 It is an important soup vegetable. 
Garden 
egg Osonson Solanum melongena 67 12.2 
               
820  25.5 54.5   20.0 
         
1,350  
              
1,106,624  
                     
603,464  9.9 
Is the seasonal fruit and for its lovers 
having steamed yam and stew made with 
garden egg is a delight. 
Ginger   Zingiber officinale 25 4.2 
               
106  19.7 79.2   1.0 
         
2,000  
                 
211,550  
                     
167,620      
Groundnut Apapa Arachis hypogaea 128 17.3 
           
2,218  24.1 68.0   7.9 
         
1,500  
              
3,326,316  
                  
2,260,541  2.9   
Guava   Psidium guajava 58 11.2 
               
652  22.0 76.9   1.1 
         
1,750  
              
1,140,310  
                     
876,839      
Leafy 
Vegetable 
(Ugwu, 
bitter leaf 
() etc) Ugwu  
Various such as 
Vernonia 
amygdalina 140 314.7 
           
2,052  53.3 45.6   1.1 
         
2,000  
              
4,104,462  
                  
1,872,382      
Maize Agbodo Zea mays 103 28.8 
           
2,963  37.7 45.3   17.0 
         
1,750  
              
5,184,817  
                  
2,348,325  2.7   
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Appendix 6.5 (cont …) 
 
Common 
name Local name Botanical name 
No of 
participating 
household 
(PPH) 
1Yield/
PPH 
Total 
Yield 
Self-
used Sold 
Added 
value 
Other
s Price 
Gross 
financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash 
Income 
(CI) 
Yield/ha 
(ton/ha) Uses 
Mango Ogbein  Mangifera indica 64 14.3 
               
917  28.4 65.3   6.3 
            
875  
                 
802,228  
                     
524,031      
Mellon Egusi   65 32.5 
           
2,110  27.4 69.3   3.4 
         
1,750  
              
3,691,884  
                  
2,557,158  3.8 
The Mellon seeds are used as a soup 
(Egusi) 
Oil palm  Lou Elaeis guineensis 76 350.4 
           
3,831  2.4 65.1 31.1 1.3 
         
5,000  
           
19,156,734  
               
12,469,582    
The palm is a source of vegetable oil, 
the fibres and hard shells of the fruits are 
used as fuel for cooking and heating, and 
the fronds for making brooms and 
baskets and other art and craft materials. 
The tree is also tapped for wine. It also 
grows wild and commonly used for local 
gin. 
Okro/Okra Okiapu 
Abelmoschus 
esculentus 97 7.3 
               
704  22.3 58.2   19.5 
         
2,000  
              
1,407,428  
                     
819,665  16.7   
Onions Ayuo/Yabas Allium cepa 41 7.2 
               
297  20.0 79.0   1.0 
         
2,000  
                 
593,803  
                     
468,982      
Orange 
Ogo/Alaland
a Citrus sinensis 86 23.6 
           
2,029  74.3 21.8   3.9 
         
1,000  
              
2,028,521  
                     
443,184      
Pawpaw Oduon Carica papaya 55 27.2 
           
1,498  6.0 85.4   8.7 
         
2,250  
              
3,370,382  
                  
2,877,890      
Pepper Igina/Egara Piperaceae 107 4.9 
               
519  24.9 55.8   19.3 
         
2,750  
              
1,428,325  
                     
797,005  2.6   
Pineapple   Ananas comosus 59 23.2 
           
1,372  13.4 82.2   4.4 
         
2,750  
              
3,771,642  
                  
3,100,058  19.5   
Plantain Abanghan Musa paradisiaca 164 443.7 
           
7,165  38.0 41.4   20.6 
            
800  
              
5,731,794  
                  
2,371,816  25.4   
Raffia 
palm 
(value of 
native gin 
and 
material 
collection) Koro/Bou 
Raphia 
hookeri: Family, 
Palmaceae or 
Palmae 77 323.3 
           
1,791  2.3 43.7 50.7 3.3 
         
4,250  
              
7,610,063  
                  
3,323,682    Commonly a source of local wine 
Rice 
Atangbalang
a Oryza sativa 84 310.2 
               
858  35.2 62.9   1.8 
         
5,500  
              
4,719,233  
                  
2,970,555  2.7   
Rubber 
(seed)   Hevea brasiliensis 24 9.5 
               
229  1.1 95.1 1.5 2.4 
         
3,750  
                 
859,311  
                     
816,835      
Rubber 
(Latex)     12 5179.4 
           
2,153    100.0     
            
400  
                 
861,288  
                     
861,288      
Sugar cane Okpu Saccharum 178 616.2 
           
2,889  12.9 81.4   5.7 
         
4,500  
           
13,001,391  
               
10,587,033  36.2 
Juice is consumed and is an important 
material for sugar industry 
Sweet 
potatoes 
Kpukpunduk
u Ipomoea batatas 121 27.2 
           
3,293  51.6 36.9   11.5 
         
1,500  
              
4,939,443  
                  
1,824,908  6.7   
Tomatoes   
Solanum 
lycopersicum 75 3.5 
               
259  41.5 53.3   5.1 
         
2,500  
                 
648,152  
                     
345,761      
Water yam Bini Buru Dioscorea alata  117 36.4 
           
4,255  50.4 47.0   2.6 
         
3,250  
           
13,827,943  
                  
6,493,150  17.9   
Yam   Buru Dioscorea rotundata 161 62.5 
         
10,055  53.8 20.0   26.2 
         
4,250  
           
42,732,875  
                  
8,533,755  16.6   
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Appendix 6.5 (cont …) 
 
Common 
name Local name Botanical name 
No of 
participating 
household 
(PPH) 
1Yield/
PPH 
Total 
Yield 
Self-
used Sold 
Added 
value 
Other
s Price 
Gross 
financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash 
Income 
(CI) 
Yield/ha 
(ton/ha) Uses 
  Angei   17 5.2 
                 
89  12.9 78.1   9.1 
         
2,250  
                 
199,462  
                     
155,747    
Used as spice and also for some 
medicinal purpose such as sour throat 
  Arigogo   32 3.2 
               
103  8.2 89.9   1.8 
         
3,000  
                 
308,598  
                     
277,545    
Used as spice and also for some 
medicinal purpose such as sour throat 
  Aziza Piper  quineense 21 3.7 
                 
77  13.1 83.9   2.9 
         
3,000  
                 
230,254  
                     
193,293    
Used as spice and also for some 
medicinal purpose such as sour throat 
Total (N) 
 
     
193,842,338  
 
  
97,949,605 
   
Total ($) 
 
              
1,292,282  
 
                     
652,997 
     
Average per participation household ($) 
 
5,340 
 
2,698 
   
Net financial value ($)  1,167,714       
Average ne financial value per participation household ($)  4,825       
 
1 All yields are in baskets excepts stated otherwise 
2 Pieces  
3 Bags 
4 Bunches 
5 Litres 
6 Canoe loads 
313 
 
 
Appendix 6.6. Monetary Value of Hunting in the Niger Delta Wetlands. 
Common name Local name Botanical name 
No of 
participating 
household (PPH) 
1Yield/P
PH 
Total 
Yield 
Self-
used Sold Others Price 
Gross 
financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash 
Income (CI) Uses/Remarks 
Antelope Otubara 
Sitatunga 
trapelaphus spekii 26 1.3 32.7 24.3 58.2 17.5 
         
15,000  
               
490,803  
             
285,651  
A source of meat, the skin serves as hides for making 
local drums.  
Bear / 
moongoose not 
wild duck Oporu  7 3.0 21.2 27.5 72.5 0.0 
           
5,000  
               
105,754  
               
76,706  
These are destructive especially to farm crops. 
Farmers do hunt them by setting traps on their 
farmlands 
Bush Baby Okini 
Otelemur 
spp/Loris spp 10 32.1 321.3 30.0 63.2 6.8 
               
350  
               
112,439  
               
71,070   
Bush pig/wild 
pig Ombe 
Potamochoerus 
porcus 28 1.3 37.1 31.1 56.4 12.5 
         
14,000  
               
519,557  
             
293,152   
Crab eating 
fox/Bush dog Bou-obiri Cerdocyon thous 4 1.7 7.0 36.3 48.5 15.2 
           
7,000  
                 
48,883  
               
23,711   
Crocodile Segi/igiere 
Crocodylus 
niloticus 2 1.0 2.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
         
10,000  
                 
20,000  
               
20,000  
Crocodiles are not normally used for meat in most 
communities in Bayelsa state. They are regarded as 
sacred animals. There is cultural repercussion on 
those who eat or kill crocodiles.  
Duicker Bure 
cephalophus 
silvicultor 17 1.8 30.0 14.0 83.0 3.0 
           
5,000  
               
149,879  
             
124,414  
This animal is now very rare in the wetland. Its 
natural habitat is in the low forest plains.  
Dwarf crocodile 
Aligator or 
Sobiri 
osteolaemus 
tetraspis 28 25.2 706.0 5.7 92.8 1.5 
           
3,500  
           
2,471,114  
         
2,292,647  Used as meat 
Eegret Ingolo, Boye Casmeridius alba 4 12.3 49.0 67.4 32.6 0.0 
               
200  
                    
9,807  
                 
3,202  
It is a bird. This is common and widely eaten as meat 
in the coastal wetland communities. In some other 
communities it is an abomination for the blood to 
touch the soil. 
Grass cutter Ibuobuo 
Thryonomys 
swinderians 39 58.4 2276.3 27.3 65.4 7.3 
           
2,500  
           
5,690,634  
         
3,724,326  
These are roddents just like rats, they are also pests on 
farmlands, hence farmers mostly use trap to hunt 
them. There is a thriving established market and even 
demand cannot be sustained by wild catch alone 
hence some have resorted to domestication as a 
substitute source.  
Hare Nwan 
Beira antelope 
Dorcatragus 
megalotis 12 3.3 39.0 40.0 34.2 25.9 
           
5,500  
               
214,771  
               
73,388  
Consumed as meat and the skin is used as hides in 
making local drums and the horn for local trumpet. 
Hyenna  Hyaena hyaena 8 1.4 10.9 8.1 87.1 4.8 
           
8,000  
                 
87,411  
               
76,123  
This may not be hyena, some others called same 
game tiger while a local researcher advised it is 
leopard 
Leopard Ololor Panthera pardus 2 1.0 2.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
         
25,000  
                 
50,000  
               
50,000   
Malantee emien 
Trichecus 
manatus 1 1.0 1.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
         
40,000  
                 
40,000  
               
40,000  This animal is very rare 
Mangrove 
snakes or Cobra Olipi 
boiga 
dandrophilla 14 5.4 76.0 80.7 16.8 2.5 
           
1,300  
                 
98,746  
               
16,550  feed on birds 
Monitor lizard 
or Iguana Abedi Varanus niloticus 32 2.8 90.7 39.3 53.0 7.7 
           
5,000  
               
453,385  
             
240,294  
Eaten as meat and also with traditional value 
especially to pregnant women.  
Monkey (Black 
monkey, 
common 
monkey, bush 
baby) 
Akan, 
Chemeobogo
u, Tomi, 
Kuni, 
Opowo, 
Sokosiko, 
Akeke 
Obugo Cereopithecus sp 20 4.9 98.7 23.0 64.1 12.9 
           
4,500  
               
444,209  
             
284,714   
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Appendix 6.6 (cont …) 
Common name Local name Botanical name 
No of 
participating 
household (PPH) 
1Yield/P
PH 
Total 
Yield 
Self-
used Sold Others Price 
Gross 
financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash 
Income (CI) Uses/Remarks 
Otter civet Kiewe cynogale bennetti 12 1.4 17.1 27.6 69.2 3.2 
           
3,500  
                 
59,879  
               
41,421  The numbers are declining  
Pocupine  Igiri Thecurus sp 16 7.0 112.0 27.8 67.9 4.4 
           
2,500  
               
280,000  
             
190,019   
Pythons or Boas 
Abua or 
Odomo Morelia argus 8 3.3 26.1 9.3 87.5 3.3 
           
1,500  
                 
39,185  
               
34,270  These are not eaten in some communities  
Squirel 
Ogboru or 
Ugbe or 
kakarugboru Xerus erythropus 12 25.7 307.9 28.1 66.7 5.2 
           
1,000  
               
307,857  
             
205,238  Availability is widely declining 
Tortoise 
biekiruwei / 
Ikagi  24 24.0 576.0 29.9 68.3 1.7 
           
1,300  
               
748,800  
             
511,734  
It is different from turtle in that it is on land while 
turtle is water based. It is becoming very rare.  
Turtle 
Biniwei or 
Ikagi  16 31.0 496.0 42.0 56.5 1.5 
           
1,650  
               
818,400  
             
462,031   
Total (N) 
         
13,261,514  
         
9,140,660   
Total ($) 
                 
88,410  
               
60,938   
Average per participation household ($) 
                       
546 
                     
376  
Net financial value ($) 
                 
76,552    
Average ne financial value per participation household ($) 
                       
473    
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Appendix 6.7. Monetary Value of Logging in ihe Niger Delta Wetlands. 
Common 
name Local name Botanical name 
No of 
participating 
household (PPH) 
1Yield/P
PH 
Total 
Yield 
Self-
used Sold Others Price 
Gross financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash 
Income (CI) Uses/Remarks 
Abura Baya Mitragyna ciliata 4 3.6 14.5 16.67 83.33 0 
         
50,000  
               
725,670  
               
604,701  
Mostly used for canoe carving, and making other stuff like 
drums. Canoes and drums are so important in the cultural 
life of the delta.  
Africa 
Mahoganny 
or Lagos 
mahogany   Khaya ivorensis 11 8.9 97.7 11 83.33 5.67 
         
38,000  
           
3,710,790  
           
3,092,201  
Woods are used for building for boat, the bark are used for 
chewing stick, and local medicines,  
African 
oilbean   
Pentachletra 
macrophylla 2 1.7 3.4 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
                 
85,714  
                 
85,714  
Common uses include food, salt substitute, edible oil, seed 
craft, dye, fencing and palings, charcoal, carving bowls, 
medicine (convulsion, itching, lactogenicity, wound, 
diarrhoea, seed wood and ornamental 
African 
Wallnut  apopo, sida 
Lovoa 
trichilioides or 
Coula edulis 1 1.0 1.0 0 100 0 
         
85,000  
                 
85,000  
                 
85,000  
The seeds are also collected as food and the bark is used 
locally to produce rinses or enemas for loin pains or 
kidney problems. It is generally becoming rare according 
to FGD. Extensively used for furniture and cabinetmaking.  
Astronia Kigbo   2 1.5 3.1 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
                 
77,136  
                 
77,136    
Azobe   Lophira procera 3 3.0 9.0 0 100 0 
         
35,000  
               
315,000  
               
315,000    
Bau Bau   Anthcocleista sp. 2 2.0 4.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
100,000  
               
100,000    
Bilinga Opepe 
Nauclea 
diderrichii 2 2.0 4.0 0 100 0 
         
45,000  
               
180,000  
               
180,000    
Black Afara Owei-abo 
Terminalia 
ivorensis 3 3.0 9.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
225,000  
               
225,000    
Cyba Isisaghe   3 3.0 9.0 0 100 0 
         
24,000  
               
216,000  
               
216,000    
India 
Mahoganny   
Swietenia 
mahagoni 3 3.0 9.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
225,000  
               
225,000  It is not much it is scarce in the Niger delta 
Iroko   
Chlorophora 
excelsa and Chlor
ophora regia 7 4.4 30.7 0 100 0 
         
52,000  
           
1,596,922  
           
1,596,922  
Used for ship and boat building, interior and exterior 
joinery.  
Iron wood   Newbouldia laevis 3 3.0 9.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
225,000  
               
225,000    
Jute plant   
Corchorus 
olitorius and 
Corchorus 
capsularis 1 1.5 1.5 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
                 
37,500  
                 
37,500    
Mangrove 
pulp Angala-tin   3 3.5 10.5 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
262,500  
               
262,500  for making paper 
Mangrove 
tree   Rhizophora sp 3 5.0 15.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
375,000  
               
375,000  
Source of tannin used commercially in the manufacture of 
leather, inks dyes, potash for fetrlizer industry, edible 
native salt and tannic acid  
Masonia   Masonia altisonia 2 2.0 4.0 0 100 0 
         
90,000  
               
360,000  
               
360,000    
Neem   
Azadirachta 
indica 2 2.0 4.1 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
101,481  
               
101,481  The leaves and bark are also used for medicinal purposes 
Ogbono tree  Ogboin-tin 
Irvingia 
gabonensis 1 1.0 1.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
                 
25,000  
                 
25,000  
It is seldom cut for timber because of its rich economic 
value. The seed is food and now also have medicinal value 
used for chewing stick, for building house and also as fish 
hook handle- stick  
316 
 
 
Appendix 6.7 (cont …) 
Common 
name Local name Botanical name 
No of 
participating 
household (PPH) 
1Yield/P
PH 
Total 
Yield 
Self-
used Sold Others Price 
Gross financial 
value (GFV) 
Cash 
Income (CI) Uses/Remarks 
Ogea or 
Oziya   Daniellia ogea 2 2.0 4.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
100,000  
               
100,000    
Okpolota     4 4.0 16.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
400,000  
               
400,000    
Opoto   Ficus capensis 1 2.0 2.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
                 
50,000  
                 
50,000  
used to treat various types of ailments and diseases such as 
convulsion, stomach ache, respiratory disorders and 
threatened abortion 
Ozouga Atala 
Sacoglottis 
gabonensis 2 2.0 4.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
100,000  
               
100,000    
Puka   Meryta sinclairii 1 1.0 1.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
                 
25,000  
                 
25,000    
Red iron 
wood   
Reynosia 
septentrionalis 2 2.0 4.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
100,000  
               
100,000  used in making ropes and bags 
Red 
mangrove   
Rhizophora 
mangle 2 2.5 5.0 0 100 0 
         
25,000  
               
125,000  
               
125,000    
Silk Cotton 
tree   Bombax 7 5.5 38.3 0 100 0 
         
30,000  
           
1,150,440  
           
1,150,440    
Spruce   Picea 1 2.0 2.0 0 100 0 
         
40,000  
                 
80,000  
                 
80,000  for the manufacture of paper and paperboards 
Teak   Tectona grandis 3 2.0 6.1 0 100 0 
         
60,000  
               
364,457  
               
364,457    
White Afara Ere-abo 
Terminalia 
superba 10 4.2 42.2 8.335 91.665   
         
60,000  
           
2,529,647  
           
2,318,801  
Also use logged woods for carvings some of which are 
images of spirits 
Unknown   
include Monodora 
myristica (african 
nutmeg tree) 14 19.5 272.6 0 100 0 
         
35,300  
           
9,623,062  
           
9,623,062    
 Total (N) 
         
23,576,321  
         
22,625,917    
 Total ($)  
               
157,175  
               
150,839   
 Average per participation household ($)  
                    
6,045  
                    
5,802    
 Net financial value ($)  
               
106,961      
 Average ne financial value per participation household ($)  
                    
4,114     
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Appendix 6.8. WTA and WTA Bids. 
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Appendix 7.1. Narratives of Actors. 
Actors 
Government 
narrative 
Local 
narrative 
Corporate 
narrative 
Non-
Governmental 
narrative 
Multilateral 
Organization 
narrative 
Academic 
narrative 
Media 
narrative Total 
ACA1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 4 
ACA2 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 4 
ACA3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
BUS1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
BUS2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 4 
BUS6 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
BUS7 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
BUS8 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
GOV1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 
GOV3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
GOV4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
GOV5 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
GOV6 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 
GOV7 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
GOV8 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
GOV9 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
GOV10 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
GOV11 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 
GOV2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
GOV23 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 
GOV24 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 
GOV25 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
GOV26 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
LOC1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
LOC2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
LOC3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
LOC4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
LOC5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
LOC6 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
LOC7 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
LOC9 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
LOC10 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
LOC11 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
LOC12 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
MED1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
MUL1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 
NGO1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 4 
NGO2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
NGO3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
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Appendix 7.1 (cont …) 
Actors 
Government 
narrative 
Local 
narrative 
Corporate 
narrative 
Non-
Governmental 
narrative 
Multilateral 
Organization 
narrative 
Academic 
narrative 
Media 
narrative Total 
NGO4 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
NGO5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
NGO6 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
Total  23 25 18 24 25 15 6  
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Appendix 7.2. Ego Network of GOV 8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
